Should continuous deep sedation until death be legally regulated in Switzerland? An exploratory study with palliative care physicians

Background

In Switzerland, continuous deep sedation until death (CDSUD) is not legally regulated and the current clinical practice guidelines on palliative sedation from 2005 do not refer to it. In contrast, in France, a neighbouring country, CDSUD is regulated by a specific law and professional guidelines. International studies show that in culturally polymorphic countries, there are variations in the end-of-life practices between linguistic regions and that a linguistic region shares many cultural characteristics with the neighbouring country.

Objectives

This study aimed to explore the attitudes of palliative care physicians from the French-speaking part of Switzerland on the question of whether CDSUD should be legally regulated in the country, and to identify their arguments. Our study also aimed to assess whether a hypothetical Swiss law on CDSUD should be similar to the current legal regulation of this practice in France.

Design

We conducted a multicentre exploratory qualitative study based on face-to-face interviews with palliative care physicians in the French-speaking part of Switzerland.

Methods

We analysed the interview transcripts using thematic analysis, combining deductive and inductive coding.

Results

Most of the participants were opposed to having specific legal regulation of CDSUD in Switzerland. Their arguments were diverse: some focused on medical and epistemological aspects of CDSUD, whereas others emphasized the legal inconvenience of having such regulation. None had the opinion that, if CDSUD were legally regulated in Switzerland, the regulation should be similar to that in France.

Conclusion

This study allows to better understand why palliative care physicians in French-speaking Switzerland may be reluctant to have legal regulation of CDSUD. Further studies covering the whole country would be needed to gain a more complete picture of Swiss palliative care physicians on this question.

'How is it possible that at times we can be physicians and at times assistants in suicide?' Attitudes and experiences of palliative care physicians in respect of the current legal situation of suicide assistance in Switzerland

INTRODUCTION

Switzerland lacks specific legal regulation of assistance in suicide. The practice has, however, developed since the 1980s as a consequence of a gap in the Swiss Criminal Code and is performed by private right-to-die organisations. Traditionally, assistance in suicide is considered contrary to the philosophy of palliative care. Nonetheless, Swiss palliative care physicians regularly receive patient requests for suicide assistance. Their attitudes towards the legal regulations of this practice and their experience in this context remain unclear.

OBJECTIVES

Our study aimed to explore and describe the attitudes and experiences of Swiss palliative care physicians concerning the legal situation of suicide assistance.

METHODS

In 2019, we performed an exploratory interview study with 12 Swiss palliative care physicians on palliative sedation as an alternative to assisted suicide. In this paper, we present the results that emerged from a thematic subanalysis of the data.

RESULTS

Participants stated that assistance in suicide and palliative care are based on opposing philosophies, but they admitted a shift in paradigm over the last years in the sense that one practice does not necessarily exclude the other. They reported various roles in suicide assistance and considered that the current activities of Swiss right-to-die organisations were problematic and needed to be regulated by law.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

These results could enrich national and international reflection on suicide assistance in the context of palliative care by reducing confusion between the two practices and strengthening the confidence of patients and their relatives.

Minding Rights: Mapping Ethical and Legal Foundations of 'Neurorights'

The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty - often framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.

Towards a Governance Framework for Brain Data

The increasing availability of brain data within and outside the biomedical field, combined with the application of artificial intelligence (AI) to brain data analysis, poses a challenge for ethics and governance. We identify distinctive ethical implications of brain data acquisition and processing, and outline a multi-level governance framework. This framework is aimed at maximizing the benefits of facilitated brain data collection and further processing for science and medicine whilst minimizing risks and preventing harmful use. The framework consists of four primary areas of regulatory intervention: binding regulation, ethics and soft law, responsible innovation, and human rights.

Geneva Statement on Heritable Human Genome Editing: The Need for Course Correction

As public interest advocates, policy experts, bioethicists, and scientists, we call for a course correction in public discussions about heritable human genome editing. Clarifying misrepresentations, centering societal consequences and concerns, and fostering public empowerment will support robust, global public engagement and meaningful deliberation about altering the genes of future generations.

La dignidad humana como principio biojurídico y como estándar moral de la relación médico-paciente

El artículo destaca la importancia de distinguir entre dos roles diversos que la noción de dignidad humana juega en bioética: uno, como principio de orden jurídico-político, y otro, como estándar moral del trato debido al paciente. Cuando la dignidad es entendida en el primer sentido, nos encontramos con un concepto muy general, que cumple un rol fundacional y de orientación de las normas relacionadas con las prácticas biomédicas. En cambio, cuando es utilizada en el segundo sentido, intenta captar la exigencia moral de tratar siempre al paciente como “persona”, es decir, con el mayor cuidado y respeto. Para clarificar el significado de la dignidad como principio, se apela a la distinción entre principios y normas elaborada en el campo de la filosofía jurídica. La dignidad como estándar moral de la relación médico-paciente se ilustra en base a una serie de estudios empíricos.

Towards new human rights in the age of neuroscience and neurotechnology

Rapid advancements in human neuroscience and neurotechnology open unprecedented possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from the human brain. Such applications raise important challenges to human rights principles that need to be addressed to prevent unintended consequences. This paper assesses the implications of emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of the human rights framework and suggests that existing human rights may not be sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. After analysing the relationship between neuroscience and human rights, we identify four new rights that may become of great relevance in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological continuity.

Integrating Advance Research Directives into the European Legal Framework

The possibility of using advance directives to prospectively consent to research participation in the event of dementia remains largely unexplored in Europe. Moreover, the legal status of advance directives for research is unclear in the European regulations governing biomedical research. The article explores the place that advance research directives have in the current European legal framework, and considers the possibility of integrating them more explicitly into the existing regulations. Special focus is placed on issues regarding informed consent, the role of proxies, and the level of acceptable risks and burdens.

Protecting prisoners' autonomy with advance directives: ethical dilemmas and policy issues

Over the last decade, several European countries and the Council of Europe itself have strongly supported the use of advance directives as a means of protecting patients' autonomy, and adopted specific norms to regulate this matter. However, it remains unclear under which conditions those regulations should apply to people who are placed in correctional settings. The issue is becoming more significant due to the increasing numbers of inmates of old age or at risk of suffering from mental disorders, all of whom might benefit from using advance directives. At the same time, the closed nature of prisons and the disparate power relationships that characterise them mean that great caution must be exercised to prevent care being withdrawn or withheld from inmates who actually want to receive it. This paper explores the issue of prisoners' advance directives in the European context, starting with the position enshrined in international and European law that prisoners retain all their human rights, except the right to liberty, and are therefore entitled to self-determination regarding health care decisions.

The dual role of human dignity in bioethics

This paper argues that some of the misunderstandings surrounding the meaning and function of the concept of human dignity in bioethics arise from a lack of distinction between two different roles that this notion plays: one as an overarching policy principle, and the other as a moral standard of patient care. While the former is a very general concept which fulfils a foundational and a guiding role of the normative framework governing biomedical issues, the latter reflects a much more concrete and context-specific understanding of the patient as a "person". The importance of dignity as a policy principle will be described by appealing to the distinction between principles and rules as developed by some legal philosophers. The value of dignity as a standard of patient care will be illustrated with the help of concrete examples and by drawing on the taxonomies of dignity proposed by Jonathan Mann and other scholars. The overall scope of the article is to highlight this double and complementary role of human dignity in bioethics.

[Human dignity, human rights and bioethics: what is the connection?]

Human rights are closely related to the notion of human dignity, to such a point that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to promote them without appealing, at least implicitly, to the idea that each individual has intrinsic worth simply by virtue of being human. This relationship between dignity and rights is even stronger in the field of bioethics, which deals directly with some of the most basic human rights, such as the rights to life and to physical integrity. It is therefore not by chance that the international norms relating to bioethics give a central role to the concept of human dignity. However, one should not expect from dignity more than it can offer; dignity is a "principle", not a "rule"; it embodies a fundamental value, but it alone does not determine the content of a particular decision.

Advance health care directives: towards a coordinated European policy?

The aim of this paper is to compare the different existing approaches to advance health care directives within the European context, and to explore the possibility of reaching a deeper consensus among countries on this subject. To this end, it first discusses the shortcomings of Article 9 of the Council of Europe's Biomedicine Convention. Second, it offers a comparative analysis of the legal status of advance directives in a number of European countries. Finally, it presents the conclusions of an international interdisciplinary workshop focused on this topic that was held in Zurich in June 2008.

Human dignity and human rights as a common ground for a global bioethics

The principle of respect for human dignity plays a crucial role in the emerging global norms relating to bioethics, in particular in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. This instrument, which is a legal, not merely an ethical document, can be regarded as an extension of international human rights law into the field of biomedicine. Although the Declaration does not explicitly define human dignity, it would be a mistake to see the emphasis put on this notion as a mere rhetorical strategy. Rather, the appeal to dignity reflects a real concern about the need to promote respect both for the intrinsic worth of human beings and for the integrity of the human species. But dignity alone cannot solve most of the dilemmas posed by biomedical practice. This is why international biolaw combines, on the one hand, the appeal to human dignity as an overarching principle with, on the other hand, the recourse to human rights, which provide an effective and practical way forward for dealing with bioethical issues at a global level.

Global bioethics and human rights

The globalization of biomedical related issues has created the urgent need for coordinated intergovernmental action in order to promote respect for human dignity and human rights in this field, as it is clear that individual countries alone cannot satisfactorily address the new and complex challenges. This situation has been perceived by some intergovernmental organizations, which have made significant efforts over the last decade to establish common standards relating to biomedicine. This article aims, first, to provide an overview of the human rights instruments dealing with bioethical issues adopted by UNESCO and the Council of Europe; second, to explain the reasons for the use of a human rights framework in this area; and third, to respond to the objections that have been raised against this strategy.

Global bioethics at UNESCO: in defence of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights

The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) on 19 October 2005 is an important step in the search for global minimum standards in biomedical research and clinical practice. As a member of UNESCO International Bioethics Committee, I participated in the drafting of this document. Drawing on this experience, the principal features of the Declaration are outlined, before responding to two general charges that have been levelled at UNESCO's bioethical activities and at this particular document, are outlined. One criticism is to the effect that UNESCO is exceeding its mandate by drafting such bioethical instruments--in particular, the charge is that it is trespassing on a topic that lies in the responsibility of the World Health Organization. The second criticism is that UNESCO's reliance on international human rights norms is inappropriate.

[Population bio-banks: a juridical analysis based on Icelandic and Estonian experience]

Large-scale collections of human biological samples and associated data are becoming increasingly common as a means of identifying, in a particular population, genetic predispositions to complex diseases that result from an interaction of environmental, lifestyle and genetic factors. This paper compares the recent experiences of Iceland and Estonia in the establishment of population biobanks as well as the specific law passed by both countries to deal with this matter. In the light of this comparative analysis, this paper summarizes the main ethical and policy dilemmas posed by large-scale biobanks and suggests some possible solutions to these new challenges.

The Oviedo Convention: A European Legal Framework at the Intersection of Human Rights and Health Law

Introduction

The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of 1997 (“Oviedo Convention“) is the best current example of how to promote the protection of human rights in the biomedical field at a transnational level. The importance of this instrument lies in the fact that it is the first comprehensive multilateral treaty addressing biomedical human rights issues. Certainly, some of the principles it contains were already included in more general terms in previous international human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 and the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 (e.g. the rights to life, to physical integrity and to privacy, the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment and of any form of discrimination). However, this is the first time that these rights have been developed and assembled in one single multilateral binding instrument entirely devoted to biomedical issues.

The purpose of this paper is, first, to give an overview of the history of the Convention; second, to present its general characteristics; and finally to summarize its key provisions.

The right not to know: an autonomy based approach

The emerging international biomedical law tends to recognise the right not to know one's genetic status. However, the basis and conditions for the exercise of this right remain unclear in domestic laws. In addition to this, such a right has been criticised at the theoretical level as being in contradiction with patient's autonomy, with doctors' duty to inform patients, and with solidarity with family members. This happens especially when non-disclosure poses a risk of serious harm to the patient's relatives who, without that vital information, could be deprived of preventive or therapeutic measures. This paper argues, firstly, that individuals may have a legitimate interest in not knowing their genetic make up to avoid serious psychological consequences; secondly, that this interest, far from being contrary to autonomy, may constitute an enhancement of autonomy; thirdly, that the right not to know cannot be presumed, but must be "activated" by the individual's explicit choice, and fourthly, that this is not an absolute right, in the sense that it may be restricted when disclosure to the patient is necessary in order to avoid a risk of serious harm to third persons.

Biomedicine and international human rights law: in search of a global consensus

Global challenges raised by biomedical advances require global responses. Some international organizations have made significant efforts over the last few years to establish common standards that can be regarded as the beginning of an international biomedical law. One of the main features of this new legal discipline is the integration of its principles into a human rights framework. This strategy seems the most appropriate, given the role of "universal ethics" that human rights play in our world of philosophical pluralism. In addition to the general standards that are gradually being established, a widespread consensus exists on the urgency of preventing two specific procedures: human germ-line interventions and human reproductive cloning.

[Human dignity as a key notion in the UNESCO declaration on the human genome]

The notion of human dignity plays an increasing role in the bioethical discussion. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights is the best example of this phenomenon. This instrument is the first important step to establish international standards with regard to the ethical and legal problems raised by genetic advances. Nevertheless, the major work is still pending. First, because the concept of dignity requires a better characterization with reference to the new bioethical dilemmas. Second, because the principles enunciated at the international level should be concretized locally through well-crafted national law.