Invasive fungal infections among organ transplant recipients: results of the Transplant-Associated Infection Surveillance Network (TRANSNET)

BACKGROUND

Invasive fungal infections (IFIs) are a major cause of morbidity and mortality among organ transplant recipients. Multicenter prospective surveillance data to determine disease burden and secular trends are lacking.

METHODS

The Transplant-Associated Infection Surveillance Network (TRANSNET) is a consortium of 23 US transplant centers, including 15 that contributed to the organ transplant recipient dataset. We prospectively identified IFIs among organ transplant recipients from March, 2001 through March, 2006 at these sites. To explore trends, we calculated the 12-month cumulative incidence among 9 sequential cohorts.

RESULTS

During the surveillance period, 1208 IFIs were identified among 1063 organ transplant recipients. The most common IFIs were invasive candidiasis (53%), invasive aspergillosis (19%), cryptococcosis (8%), non-Aspergillus molds (8%), endemic fungi (5%), and zygomycosis (2%). Median time to onset of candidiasis, aspergillosis, and cryptococcosis was 103, 184, and 575 days, respectively. Among a cohort of 16,808 patients who underwent transplantation between March 2001 and September 2005 and were followed through March 2006, a total of 729 IFIs were reported among 633 persons. One-year cumulative incidences of the first IFI were 11.6%, 8.6%, 4.7%, 4.0%, 3.4%, and 1.3% for small bowel, lung, liver, heart, pancreas, and kidney transplant recipients, respectively. One-year incidence was highest for invasive candidiasis (1.95%) and aspergillosis (0.65%). Trend analysis showed a slight increase in cumulative incidence from 2002 to 2005.

CONCLUSIONS

We detected a slight increase in IFIs during the surveillance period. These data provide important insights into the timing and incidence of IFIs among organ transplant recipients, which can help to focus effective prevention and treatment strategies.

Prospective surveillance for invasive fungal infections in hematopoietic stem cell transplant recipients, 2001-2006: overview of the Transplant-Associated Infection Surveillance Network (TRANSNET) Database

BACKGROUND

The incidence and epidemiology of invasive fungal infections (IFIs), a leading cause of death among hematopoeitic stem cell transplant (HSCT) recipients, are derived mainly from single-institution retrospective studies.

METHODS

The Transplant Associated Infections Surveillance Network, a network of 23 US transplant centers, prospectively enrolled HSCT recipients with proven and probable IFIs occurring between March 2001 and March 2006. We collected denominator data on all HSCTs preformed at each site and clinical, diagnostic, and outcome information for each IFI case. To estimate trends in IFI, we calculated the 12-month cumulative incidence among 9 sequential subcohorts.

RESULTS

We identified 983 IFIs among 875 HSCT recipients. The median age of the patients was 49 years; 60% were male. Invasive aspergillosis (43%), invasive candidiasis (28%), and zygomycosis (8%) were the most common IFIs. Fifty-nine percent and 61% of IFIs were recognized within 60 days of neutropenia and graft-versus-host disease, respectively. Median onset of candidiasis and aspergillosis after HSCT was 61 days and 99 days, respectively. Within a cohort of 16,200 HSCT recipients who received their first transplants between March 2001 and September 2005 and were followed up through March 2006, we identified 718 IFIs in 639 persons. Twelve-month cumulative incidences, based on the first IFI, were 7.7 cases per 100 transplants for matched unrelated allogeneic, 8.1 cases per 100 transplants for mismatched-related allogeneic, 5.8 cases per 100 transplants for matched-related allogeneic, and 1.2 cases per 100 transplants for autologous HSCT.

CONCLUSIONS

In this national prospective surveillance study of IFIs in HSCT recipients, the cumulative incidence was highest for aspergillosis, followed by candidiasis. Understanding the epidemiologic trends and burden of IFIs may lead to improved management strategies and study design.

Botulinum toxin as a biological weapon: medical and public health management

OBJECTIVE

The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if botulinum toxin is used as a biological weapon against a civilian population.

PARTICIPANTS

The working group included 23 representatives from academic, government, and private institutions with expertise in public health, emergency management, and clinical medicine.

EVIDENCE

The primary authors (S.S.A. and R.S.) searched OLDMEDLINE and MEDLINE (1960-March 1999) and their professional collections for literature concerning use of botulinum toxin as a bioweapon. The literature was reviewed, and opinions were sought from the working group and other experts on diagnosis and management of botulism. Additional MEDLINE searches were conducted through April 2000 during the review and revisions of the consensus statement.

CONSENSUS PROCESS

The first draft of the working group's consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. The working group convened to review the first draft in May 1999. Working group members reviewed subsequent drafts and suggested additional revisions. The final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained in the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members.

CONCLUSIONS

An aerosolized or foodborne botulinum toxin weapon would cause acute symmetric, descending flaccid paralysis with prominent bulbar palsies such as diplopia, dysarthria, dysphonia, and dysphagia that would typically present 12 to 72 hours after exposure. Effective response to a deliberate release of botulinum toxin will depend on timely clinical diagnosis, case reporting, and epidemiological investigation. Persons potentially exposed to botulinum toxin should be closely observed, and those with signs of botulism require prompt treatment with antitoxin and supportive care that may include assisted ventilation for weeks or months. Treatment with antitoxin should not be delayed for microbiological testing.

Tularemia as a biological weapon: medical and public health management

OBJECTIVE

The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if tularemia is used as a biological weapon against a civilian population.

PARTICIPANTS

The working group included 25 representatives from academic medical centers, civilian and military governmental agencies, and other public health and emergency management institutions and agencies.

EVIDENCE

MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to October 2000, using the Medical Subject Headings Francisella tularensis, Pasteurella tularensis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, bioterrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of these references led to identification of relevant materials published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other references and sources.

CONSENSUS PROCESS

Three formal drafts of the statement that synthesized information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process were reviewed by members of the working group. Consensus was achieved on the final draft.

CONCLUSIONS

A weapon using airborne tularemia would likely result 3 to 5 days later in an outbreak of acute, undifferentiated febrile illness with incipient pneumonia, pleuritis, and hilar lymphadenopathy. Specific epidemiological, clinical, and microbiological findings should lead to early suspicion of intentional tularemia in an alert health system; laboratory confirmation of agent could be delayed. Without treatment, the clinical course could progress to respiratory failure, shock, and death. Prompt treatment with streptomycin, gentamicin, doxycycline, or ciprofloxacin is recommended. Prophylactic use of doxycycline or ciprofloxacin may be useful in the early postexposure period.

Hospital outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus

BACKGROUND

In September 2012, the World Health Organization reported the first cases of pneumonia caused by the novel Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). We describe a cluster of health care-acquired MERS-CoV infections.

METHODS

Medical records were reviewed for clinical and demographic information and determination of potential contacts and exposures. Case patients and contacts were interviewed. The incubation period and serial interval (the time between the successive onset of symptoms in a chain of transmission) were estimated. Viral RNA was sequenced.

RESULTS

Between April 1 and May 23, 2013, a total of 23 cases of MERS-CoV infection were reported in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. Symptoms included fever in 20 patients (87%), cough in 20 (87%), shortness of breath in 11 (48%), and gastrointestinal symptoms in 8 (35%); 20 patients (87%) presented with abnormal chest radiographs. As of June 12, a total of 15 patients (65%) had died, 6 (26%) had recovered, and 2 (9%) remained hospitalized. The median incubation period was 5.2 days (95% confidence interval [CI], 1.9 to 14.7), and the serial interval was 7.6 days (95% CI, 2.5 to 23.1). A total of 21 of the 23 cases were acquired by person-to-person transmission in hemodialysis units, intensive care units, or in-patient units in three different health care facilities. Sequencing data from four isolates revealed a single monophyletic clade. Among 217 household contacts and more than 200 health care worker contacts whom we identified, MERS-CoV infection developed in 5 family members (3 with laboratory-confirmed cases) and in 2 health care workers (both with laboratory-confirmed cases).

CONCLUSIONS

Person-to-person transmission of MERS-CoV can occur in health care settings and may be associated with considerable morbidity. Surveillance and infection-control measures are critical to a global public health response.

Acinetobacter baumannii: epidemiology, antimicrobial resistance, and treatment options

Multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii is recognized to be among the most difficult antimicrobial-resistant gram-negative bacilli to control and treat. Increasing antimicrobial resistance among Acinetobacter isolates has been documented, although definitions of multidrug resistance vary in the literature. A. baumannii survives for prolonged periods under a wide range of environmental conditions. The organism causes outbreaks of infection and health care-associated infections, including bacteremia, pneumonia, meningitis, urinary tract infection, and wound infection. Antimicrobial resistance greatly limits the therapeutic options for patients who are infected with this organism, especially if isolates are resistant to the carbapenem class of antimicrobial agents. Because therapeutic options are limited for multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter infection, the development or discovery of new therapies, well-controlled clinical trials of existing antimicrobial regimens and combinations, and greater emphasis on the prevention of health care-associated transmission of multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter infection are essential.

Anthrax as a biological weapon, 2002: updated recommendations for management

OBJECTIVE

To review and update consensus-based recommendations for medical and public health professionals following a Bacillus anthracis attack against a civilian population.

PARTICIPANTS

The working group included 23 experts from academic medical centers, research organizations, and governmental, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies.

EVIDENCE

MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to January 2002, using the Medical Subject Headings anthrax, Bacillus anthracis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Reference review identified work published before 1966. Participants identified unpublished sources.

CONSENSUS PROCESS

The first draft synthesized the gathered information. Written comments were incorporated into subsequent drafts. The final statement incorporated all relevant evidence from the search along with consensus recommendations.

CONCLUSIONS

Specific recommendations include diagnosis of anthrax infection, indications for vaccination, therapy, postexposure prophylaxis, decontamination of the environment, and suggested research. This revised consensus statement presents new information based on the analysis of the anthrax attacks of 2001, including developments in the investigation of the anthrax attacks of 2001; important symptoms, signs, and laboratory studies; new diagnostic clues that may help future recognition of this disease; current anthrax vaccine information; updated antibiotic therapeutic considerations; and judgments about environmental surveillance and decontamination.

Plague as a biological weapon: medical and public health management. Working Group on Civilian Biodefense

OBJECTIVE

The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of plague as a biological weapon against a civilian population.

PARTICIPANTS

The working group included 25 representatives from major academic medical centers and research, government, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies.

EVIDENCE

MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to June 1998 for the Medical Subject Headings plague, Yersinia pestis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of the bibliographies of the references identified by this search led to subsequent identification of relevant references published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other unpublished references and sources. Additional MEDLINE searches were conducted through January 2000.

CONSENSUS PROCESS

The first draft of the consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. The working group was convened to review drafts of the document in October 1998 and May 1999. The final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained by the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members.

CONCLUSIONS

An aerosolized plague weapon could cause fever, cough, chest pain, and hemoptysis with signs consistent with severe pneumonia 1 to 6 days after exposure. Rapid evolution of disease would occur in the 2 to 4 days after symptom onset and would lead to septic shock with high mortality without early treatment. Early treatment and prophylaxis with streptomycin or gentamicin or the tetracycline or fluoroquinolone classes of antimicrobials would be advised.

Eliminating catheter-related bloodstream infections in the intensive care unit

OBJECTIVE

To determine whether a multifaceted systems intervention would eliminate catheter-related bloodstream infections (CR-BSIs).

DESIGN

Prospective cohort study in a surgical intensive care unit (ICU) with a concurrent control ICU.

SETTING

The Johns Hopkins Hospital.

PATIENTS

All patients with a central venous catheter in the ICU.

INTERVENTION

To eliminate CR-BSIs, a quality improvement team implemented five interventions: educating the staff; creating a catheter insertion cart; asking providers daily whether catheters could be removed; implementing a checklist to ensure adherence to evidence-based guidelines for preventing CR-BSIs; and empowering nurses to stop the catheter insertion procedure if a violation of the guidelines was observed.

MEASUREMENT

The primary outcome variable was the rate of CR-BSIs per 1,000 catheter days from January 1, 1998, through December 31, 2002. Secondary outcome variables included adherence to evidence-based infection control guidelines during catheter insertion.

MAIN RESULTS

Before the intervention, we found that physicians followed infection control guidelines during 62% of the procedures. During the intervention time period, the CR-BSI rate in the study ICU decreased from 11.3/1,000 catheter days in the first quarter of 1998 to 0/1,000 catheter days in the fourth quarter of 2002. The CR-BSI rate in the control ICU was 5.7/1,000 catheter days in the first quarter of 1998 and 1.6/1,000 catheter days in the fourth quarter of 2002 (p = .56). We estimate that these interventions may have prevented 43 CR-BSIs, eight deaths, and 1,945,922 dollars in additional costs per year in the study ICU.

CONCLUSIONS

Multifaceted interventions that helped to ensure adherence with evidence-based infection control guidelines nearly eliminated CR-BSIs in our surgical ICU.

Incubation periods of acute respiratory viral infections: a systematic review

Knowledge of the incubation period is essential in the investigation and control of infectious disease, but statements of incubation period are often poorly referenced, inconsistent, or based on limited data. In a systematic review of the literature on nine respiratory viral infections of public-health importance, we identified 436 articles with statements of incubation period and 38 with data for pooled analysis. We fitted a log-normal distribution to pooled data and found the median incubation period to be 5·6 days (95% CI 4·8–6·3) for adenovirus, 3·2 days (95% CI 2·8–3·7) for human coronavirus, 4·0 days (95% CI 3·6–4·4) for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus, 1·4 days (95% CI 1·3–1·5) for influenza A, 0·6 days (95% CI 0·5–0·6) for influenza B, 12·5 days (95% CI 11·8–13·3) for measles, 2·6 days (95% CI 2·1–3·1) for parainfluenza, 4·4 days (95% CI 3·9–4·9) for respiratory syncytial virus, and 1·9 days (95% CI 1·4–2·4) for rhinovirus. When using the incubation period, it is important to consider its full distribution: the right tail for quarantine policy, the central regions for likely times and sources of infection, and the full distribution for models used in pandemic planning. Our estimates combine published data to give the detail necessary for these and other applications.

Intranasal mupirocin to prevent postoperative Staphylococcus aureus infections

BACKGROUND

Patients with nasal carriage of Staphylococcus aureus have an increased risk of surgical-site infections caused by that organism. Treatment with mupirocin ointment can reduce the rate of nasal carriage and may prevent postoperative S. aureus infections.

METHODS

We conducted a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial to determine whether intranasal treatment with mupirocin reduces the rate of S. aureus infections at surgical sites and prevents other nosocomial infections.

RESULTS

Of 4030 enrolled patients who underwent general, gynecologic, neurologic, or cardiothoracic surgery, 3864 were included in the intention-to-treat analysis. Overall, 2.3 percent of mupirocin recipients and 2.4 percent of placebo recipients had S. aureus infections at surgical sites. Of the 891 patients (23.1 percent of the 3864 who completed the study) who had S. aureus in their anterior nares, 444 received mupirocin and 447 received placebo. Among the patients with nasal carriage of S. aureus, 4.0 percent of those who received mupirocin had nosocomial S. aureus infections, as compared with 7.7 percent of those who received placebo (odds ratio for infection, 0.49; 95 percent confidence interval, 0.25 to 0.92; P=0.02).

CONCLUSIONS

Prophylactic intranasal application of mupirocin did not significantly reduce the rate of S. aureus surgical-site infections overall, but it did significantly decrease the rate of all nosocomial S. aureus infections among the patients who were S. aureus carriers.

Smallpox as a biological weapon: medical and public health management. Working Group on Civilian Biodefense

OBJECTIVE

To develop consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of smallpox as a biological weapon against a civilian population.

PARTICIPANTS

The working group included 21 representatives from staff of major medical centers and research, government, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies. Evidence The first author (D.A.H.) conducted a literature search in conjunction with the preparation of another publication on smallpox as well as this article. The literature identified was reviewed and opinions were sought from experts in the diagnosis and management of smallpox, including members of the working group.

CONSENSUS PROCESS

The first draft of the consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the evidence-gathering process. Members of the working group provided formal written comments that were incorporated into the second draft of the statement. The working group reviewed the second draft on October 30, 1998. No significant disagreements existed and comments were incorporated into a third draft. The fourth and final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained by the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members.

CONCLUSIONS

Specific recommendations are made regarding smallpox vaccination, therapy, postexposure isolation and infection control, hospital epidemiology and infection control, home care, decontamination of the environment, and additional research needs. In the event of an actual release of smallpox and subsequent epidemic, early detection, isolation of infected individuals, surveillance of contacts, and a focused selective vaccination program will be the essential items of an effective control program.

Severe Community-Onset Pneumonia in Healthy Adults Caused by Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Carrying the Panton-Valentine Leukocidin Genes

BACKGROUND

Recent worldwide reports of community-onset skin abscesses, outbreaks of furunculosis, and severe pneumonia associated with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) carrying Panton-Valentine leukocidin (PVL) genes and the staphylococcal cassette chromosome mec (SCCmec) type IV indicate that MRSA infections are evolving into a community-related problem. The majority of cases reported to date involve skin and soft-tissue infections, with severe pneumonia representing a relatively rare phenomenon. During a 2-month period in the winter of 2003-2004, four healthy adults presented to 1 of 2 Baltimore hospitals with severe necrotizing MRSA pneumonia in the absence of typical risk factors for MRSA infection.

METHODS

Patients' MRSA isolates were characterized by strain typing with use of pulsed-field gel electrophoresis and SCCmec typing with use of a multiplex polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assay and detection of PVL genes by PCR.

RESULTS

All 4 patients' MRSA isolates carried the PVL genes and the SCCmec type IV element and belonged to the USA300 pulsed-field type. These 3 findings are among the typical characteristics of community-onset MRSA strains. In addition, 2 of our patients had concomitant influenza A diagnosed, which likely contributed to the severity of their presentation.

CONCLUSIONS

To our knowledge, these patients represent the first reported North American adults with severe community-onset MRSA pneumonia caused by strains carrying the PVL genes.

Anthrax as a biological weapon: medical and public health management. Working Group on Civilian Biodefense

OBJECTIVE

To develop consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of anthrax as a biological weapon against a civilian population.

PARTICIPANTS

The working group included 21 representatives from staff of major academic medical centers and research, government, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies.

EVIDENCE

MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to April 1998, using the Medical Subject Headings anthrax, Bacillus anthracis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of references identified by this search led to identification of relevant references published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other unpublished references and sources.

CONSENSUS PROCESS

The first draft of the consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. Members of the working group provided formal written comments which were incorporated into the second draft of the statement. The working group reviewed the second draft on June 12, 1998. No significant disagreements existed and comments were incorporated into a third draft. The fourth and final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained by the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members.

CONCLUSIONS

Specific consensus recommendations are made regarding the diagnosis of anthrax, indications for vaccination, therapy for those exposed, postexposure prophylaxis, decontamination of the environment, and additional research needs.

Effect of daily chlorhexidine bathing on hospital-acquired infection

BACKGROUND

Results of previous single-center, observational studies suggest that daily bathing of patients with chlorhexidine may prevent hospital-acquired bloodstream infections and the acquisition of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs).

METHODS

We conducted a multicenter, cluster-randomized, nonblinded crossover trial to evaluate the effect of daily bathing with chlorhexidine-impregnated washcloths on the acquisition of MDROs and the incidence of hospital-acquired bloodstream infections. Nine intensive care and bone marrow transplantation units in six hospitals were randomly assigned to bathe patients either with no-rinse 2% chlorhexidine-impregnated washcloths or with nonantimicrobial washcloths for a 6-month period, exchanged for the alternate product during the subsequent 6 months. The incidence rates of acquisition of MDROs and the rates of hospital-acquired bloodstream infections were compared between the two periods by means of Poisson regression analysis.

RESULTS

A total of 7727 patients were enrolled during the study. The overall rate of MDRO acquisition was 5.10 cases per 1000 patient-days with chlorhexidine bathing versus 6.60 cases per 1000 patient-days with nonantimicrobial washcloths (P=0.03), the equivalent of a 23% lower rate with chlorhexidine bathing. The overall rate of hospital-acquired bloodstream infections was 4.78 cases per 1000 patient-days with chlorhexidine bathing versus 6.60 cases per 1000 patient-days with nonantimicrobial washcloths (P=0.007), a 28% lower rate with chlorhexidine-impregnated washcloths. No serious skin reactions were noted during either study period.

CONCLUSIONS

Daily bathing with chlorhexidine-impregnated washcloths significantly reduced the risks of acquisition of MDROs and development of hospital-acquired bloodstream infections. (Funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Sage Products; ClinicalTrials.gov number, NCT00502476.).

Hemorrhagic fever viruses as biological weapons: medical and public health management

OBJECTIVE

To develop consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if hemorrhagic fever viruses (HFVs) are used as biological weapons against a civilian population.

PARTICIPANTS

The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense included 26 representatives from academic medical centers, public health, military services, governmental agencies, and other emergency management institutions.

EVIDENCE

MEDLINE was searched from January 1966 to January 2002. Retrieved references, relevant material published prior to 1966, and additional sources identified by participants were reviewed.

CONSENSUS PROCESS

Three formal drafts of the statement that synthesized information obtained in the evidence-gathering process were reviewed by the working group. Each draft incorporated comments and judgments of the members. All members approved the final draft.

CONCLUSIONS

Weapons disseminating a number of HFVs could cause an outbreak of an undifferentiated febrile illness 2 to 21 days later, associated with clinical manifestations that could include rash, hemorrhagic diathesis, and shock. The mode of transmission and clinical course would vary depending on the specific pathogen. Diagnosis may be delayed given clinicians' unfamiliarity with these diseases, heterogeneous clinical presentation within an infected cohort, and lack of widely available diagnostic tests. Initiation of ribavirin therapy in the early phases of illness may be useful in treatment of some of these viruses, although extensive experience is lacking. There are no licensed vaccines to treat the diseases caused by HFVs.

An outbreak of toxic encephalopathy caused by eating mussels contaminated with domoic acid

In Canada in late 1987 there was an outbreak of an acute illness characterized by gastrointestinal symptoms and unusual neurologic abnormalities among persons who had eaten cultivated mussels. Health departments in Canada solicited reports of this newly recognized illness. A case was defined as the occurrence of gastrointestinal symptoms within 24 hours or of neurologic symptoms within 48 hours of the ingestion of mussels. From the more than 250 reports received, 107 patients met the case definition. The most common symptoms were vomiting (in 76 percent of the patients), abdominal cramps (50 percent), diarrhea (42 percent), headache, often described as incapacitating (43 percent), and loss of short-term memory (25 percent). Nineteen patients were hospitalized, of whom 12 required intensive care because of seizures, coma, profuse respiratory secretions, or unstable blood pressure. Male sex and increasing age were associated independently with the risks of hospitalization and memory loss. Three patients died. Mussels associated with this illness were traced to cultivation beds in three river estuaries on the eastern coast of Prince Edward Island. Domoic acid, which can act as an excitatory neurotransmitter, was identified in mussels left uneaten by the patients and in mussels sampled from these estuaries. The source of the domoic acid appears to have been a form of marine vegetation, Nitzschia pungens, also identified in these waters in late 1987. The contaminated mussels from Prince Edward Island were removed from the market, and no new cases have occurred since December 1987. We conclude that the cause of this outbreak of a novel and severe intoxication was the ingestion of mussels contaminated by domoic acid, a potent excitatory neurotransmitter.

Hospital epidemiology and infection control in acute-care settings

Health care-associated infections (HAIs) have become more common as medical care has grown more complex and patients have become more complicated. HAIs are associated with significant morbidity, mortality, and cost. Growing rates of HAIs alongside evidence suggesting that active surveillance and infection control practices can prevent HAIs led to the development of hospital epidemiology and infection control programs. The role for infection control programs has grown and continues to grow as rates of antimicrobial resistance rise and HAIs lead to increasing risks to patients and expanding health care costs. In this review, we summarize the history of the development of hospital epidemiology and infection control, common HAIs and the pathogens causing them, and the structure and role of a hospital epidemiology and infection control program.

N95 Respirators vs Medical Masks for Preventing Influenza Among Health Care Personnel: A Randomized Clinical Trial

Importance

Clinical studies have been inconclusive about the effectiveness of N95 respirators and medical masks in preventing health care personnel (HCP) from acquiring workplace viral respiratory infections.

Objective

To compare the effect of N95 respirators vs medical masks for prevention of influenza and other viral respiratory infections among HCP.

Design, Setting, and Participants

A cluster randomized pragmatic effectiveness study conducted at 137 outpatient study sites at 7 US medical centers between September 2011 and May 2015, with final follow-up in June 2016. Each year for 4 years, during the 12-week period of peak viral respiratory illness, pairs of outpatient sites (clusters) within each center were matched and randomly assigned to the N95 respirator or medical mask groups.

Interventions

Overall, 1993 participants in 189 clusters were randomly assigned to wear N95 respirators (2512 HCP-seasons of observation) and 2058 in 191 clusters were randomly assigned to wear medical masks (2668 HCP-seasons) when near patients with respiratory illness.

Main Outcomes and Measures

The primary outcome was the incidence of laboratory-confirmed influenza. Secondary outcomes included incidence of acute respiratory illness, laboratory-detected respiratory infections, laboratory-confirmed respiratory illness, and influenzalike illness. Adherence to interventions was assessed.

Results

Among 2862 randomized participants (mean [SD] age, 43 [11.5] years; 2369 [82.8%]) women), 2371 completed the study and accounted for 5180 HCP-seasons. There were 207 laboratory-confirmed influenza infection events (8.2% of HCP-seasons) in the N95 respirator group and 193 (7.2% of HCP-seasons) in the medical mask group (difference, 1.0%, [95% CI, -0.5% to 2.5%]; P = .18) (adjusted odds ratio [OR], 1.18 [95% CI, 0.95-1.45]). There were 1556 acute respiratory illness events in the respirator group vs 1711 in the mask group (difference, -21.9 per 1000 HCP-seasons [95% CI, -48.2 to 4.4]; P = .10); 679 laboratory-detected respiratory infections in the respirator group vs 745 in the mask group (difference, -8.9 per 1000 HCP-seasons, [95% CI, -33.3 to 15.4]; P = .47); 371 laboratory-confirmed respiratory illness events in the respirator group vs 417 in the mask group (difference, -8.6 per 1000 HCP-seasons [95% CI, -28.2 to 10.9]; P = .39); and 128 influenzalike illness events in the respirator group vs 166 in the mask group (difference, -11.3 per 1000 HCP-seasons [95% CI, -23.8 to 1.3]; P = .08). In the respirator group, 89.4% of participants reported "always" or "sometimes" wearing their assigned devices vs 90.2% in the mask group.

Conclusions and Relevance

Among outpatient health care personnel, N95 respirators vs medical masks as worn by participants in this trial resulted in no significant difference in the incidence of laboratory-confirmed influenza.

Trial Registration

ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT01249625.

Multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter infection mortality rate and length of hospitalization

Acinetobacter infections have increased and gained attention because of the organism’s prolonged environmental survival and propensity to develop antimicrobial drug resistance. The effect of multidrug-resistant (MDR) Acinetobacter infection on clinical outcomes has not been reported. A retrospective, matched cohort investigation was performed at 2 Baltimore hospitals to examine outcomes of patients with MDR Acinetobacter infection compared with patients with susceptible Acinetobacter infections and patients without Acinetobacter infections. Multivariable analysis controlling for severity of illness and underlying disease identified an independent association between patients with MDR Acinetobacter infection (n = 96) and increased hospital and intensive care unit length of stay compared with 91 patients with susceptible Acinetobacter infection (odds ratio [OR] 2.5, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.2–5.2 and OR 2.1, 95% CI 1.0–4.3] respectively) and 89 uninfected patients (OR 2.5, 95% CI 1.2–5.4 and OR 4.2, 95% CI 1.5–11.6] respectively). Increased hospitalization associated with MDR Acinetobacter infection emphasizes the need for infection control strategies to prevent cross-transmission in healthcare settings.

Strategies to prevent central line-associated bloodstream infections in acute care hospitals

Previously published guidelines are available that provide comprehensive recommendations for detecting and preventing healthcare-associated infections. The intent of this document is to highlight practical recommendations in a concise format designed to assist acute care hospitals in implementing and prioritizing their central line–associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI) prevention efforts. Refer to the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America/Infectious Diseases Society of America “Compendium of Strategies to Prevent Healthcare-Associated Infections” Executive Summary and Introduction and accompanying editorial for additional discussion.

1. Patients at risk for CLABSIs in acute care facilities

a. Intensive care unit (ICU) population: The risk of CLABSI in ICU patients is high. Reasons for this include the frequent insertion of multiple catheters, the use of specific types of catheters that are almost exclusively inserted in ICU patients and associated with substantial risk (eg, arterial catheters), and the fact that catheters are frequently placed in emergency circumstances, repeatedly accessed each day, and often needed for extended periods.

b. Non-ICU population: Although the primary focus of attention over the past 2 decades has been the ICU setting, recent data suggest that the greatest numbers of patients with central lines are in hospital units outside the ICU, where there is a substantial risk of CLABSI.

2. Outcomes associated with hospital-acquired CLABSI

a. Increased length of hospital stay

b. Increased cost; the non-inflation-adjusted attributable cost of CLABSIs has been found to vary from $3,700 to $29,000 per episode

Strategies to prevent surgical site infections in acute care hospitals

Previously published guidelines are available that provide comprehensive recommendations for detecting and preventing healthcare-associated infections. The intent of this document is to highlight practical recommendations in a concise format designed to assist acute care hospitals to implement and prioritize their surgical site infection (SSI) prevention efforts. Refer to the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America/Infectious Diseases Society of America “Compendium of Strategies to Prevent Healthcare-Associated Infections” Executive Summary and Introduction and accompanying editorial for additional discussion.

1. Burden of SSIs as complications in acute care facilities.

a. SSIs occur in 2%-5% of patients undergoing inpatient surgery in the United States.

b. Approximately 500,000 SSIs occur each year.

2. Outcomes associated with SSI

a. Each SSI is associated with approximately 7-10 additional postoperative hospital days.

b. Patients with an SSI have a 2-11 times higher risk of death, compared with operative patients without an SSI.

i. Seventy-seven percent of deaths among patients with SSI are direcdy attributable to SSI.

c. Attributable costs of SSI vary, depending on the type of operative procedure and the type of infecting pathogen; published estimates range from $3,000 to $29,000.

i. SSIs are believed to account for up to $10 billion annually in healthcare expenditures.

1. Definitions

a. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance System and the National Healthcare Safety Network definitions for SSI are widely used.

b. SSIs are classified as follows (Figure):

i. Superficial incisional (involving only skin or subcutaneous tissue of the incision)

ii. Deep incisional (involving fascia and/or muscular layers)

iii. Organ/space

Epidemiological and microbiological characterization of infections caused by Staphylococcus aureus with reduced susceptibility to vancomycin, United States, 1997-2001

Infections caused by Staphylococcus aureus with reduced vancomycin susceptibility (SA-RVS; minimum inhibitory concentration [MIC], >or=4 microg/mL), including vancomycin-intermediate S. aureus (VISA; MIC, 8 microg/mL), are a new clinical and public health dilemma. Prospective surveillance and a nested case-control study of patients in the United States infected with SA-RVS was conduced from March 1999 through December 2000. Control patients were persons infected with oxacillin-resistant S. aureus (MIC of vancomycin, <or=2 microg/mL). Among 19 case patients, 4 infections were due to VISA and 15 were due to non-VISA SA-RVS. Case patients with and those without VISA infection had similar clinical presentations and outcomes; the overall attributable mortality rate was 63%. Isolates recovered from case patients had heterogeneous pulsed-field gel electrophoresis banding patterns, regardless of the MIC of vancomycin. Neither dialysis nor chronic renal failure were predictive of case status compared with control status. Independent risk factors for being a case patient included antecedent vancomycin use and prior oxacillin-resistant S. aureus infection 2 or 3 months before the current infection.