Towards a computational(ist) neurobiology of language: Correlational, integrated, and explanatory neurolinguistics

We outline what an integrated approach to language research that connects experimental, theoretical, and neurobiological domains of inquiry would look like, and ask to what extent unification is possible across domains. At the center of the program is the idea that computational/representational (CR) theories of language must be used to investigate its neurobiological (NB) foundations. We consider different ways in which CR and NB might be connected. These are (1) A Correlational way, in which NB computation is correlated with the CR theory; (2) An Integrated way, in which NB data provide crucial evidence for choosing among CR theories; and (3) an Explanatory way, in which properties of NB explain why a CR theory is the way it is. We examine various questions concerning the prospects for Explanatory connections in particular, including to what extent it makes sense to say that NB could be specialized for particular computations.

Emergence in cognitive science

The study of human intelligence was once dominated by symbolic approaches, but over the last 30 years an alternative approach has arisen. Symbols and processes that operate on them are often seen today as approximate characterizations of the emergent consequences of sub- or nonsymbolic processes, and a wide range of constructs in cognitive science can be understood as emergents. These include representational constructs (units, structures, rules), architectural constructs (central executive, declarative memory), and developmental processes and outcomes (stages, sensitive periods, neurocognitive modules, developmental disorders). The greatest achievements of human cognition may be largely emergent phenomena. It remains a challenge for the future to learn more about how these greatest achievements arise and to emulate them in artificial systems.

Why some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty

Early theories of surprise, including Darwin's, argued that it was predominantly a basic emotion. Recently, theories have taken a more cognitive view of surprise, casting it as a process of "making sense of surprising events". The current paper advances the view that the essence of this sense-making process is explanation; specifically, that people's perception of surprise is a metacognitive estimate of the cognitive work involved in explaining an abnormal event. So, some surprises are more surprising because they are harder to explain. This proposal is tested in eight experiments that explore how (i) the contents of memory can influence surprise, (ii) different classes of scenarios can retrieve more/less relevant knowledge from memory to explain surprising outcomes, (iii) how partial explanations constrain the explanation process, reducing surprise, and (iv) how, overall, any factor that acts to increase the cognitive work in explaining a surprising event, results in higher levels of surprise (e.g., task demands to find three rather than one explanations). Across the present studies, using different materials, paradigms and measures, it is consistently and repeatedly found that the difficulty of explaining a surprising outcome is the best predictor for people's perceptions of the surprisingness of events. Alternative accounts of these results are considered, as are future directions for this research.

Does the Body Survive Death? Cultural Variation in Beliefs About Life Everlasting

Mounting evidence suggests that endorsement of psychological continuity and the afterlife increases with age. This developmental change raises questions about the cognitive biases, social representations, and cultural input that may support afterlife beliefs. To what extent is there similarity versus diversity across cultures in how people reason about what happens after death? The objective of this study was to compare beliefs about the continuation of biological and psychological functions after death in Tanna, Vanuatu (a Melanesian archipelago), and the United States (Austin, Texas). Children, adolescents, and adults were primed with a story that contained either natural (non-theistic) or supernatural (theistic) cues. Participants were then asked whether or not different biological and psychological processes continue to function after death. We predicted that across cultures individuals would be more likely to endorse the continuation of psychological processes over biological processes (dualism) and that a theistic prime would increase continuation responses regarding both types of process. Results largely supported predictions; U.S. participants provided more continuation responses for psychological than biological processes following both the theistic and non-theistic primes. Participants in Vanuatu, however, provided more continuation responses for biological than psychological processes following the theistic prime. The data provide evidence for both cultural similarity and variability in afterlife beliefs and demonstrate that individuals use both natural and supernatural explanations to interpret the same events.

Dynamical models: an alternative or complement to mechanistic explanations?

While agreeing that dynamical models play a major role in cognitive science, we reject Stepp, Chemero, and Turvey's contention that they constitute an alternative to mechanistic explanations. We review several problems dynamical models face as putative explanations when they are not grounded in mechanisms. Further, we argue that the opposition of dynamical models and mechanisms is a false one and that those dynamical models that characterize the operations of mechanisms overcome these problems. By briefly considering examples involving the generation of action potentials and circadian rhythms, we show how decomposing a mechanism and modeling its dynamics are complementary endeavors.

Philosophy for the rest of cognitive science

Cognitive science has always included multiple methodologies and theoretical commitments. The philosophy of cognitive science should embrace, or at least acknowledge, this diversity. Bechtel's (2009a) proposed philosophy of cognitive science, however, applies only to representationalist and mechanist cognitive science, ignoring the substantial minority of dynamically oriented cognitive scientists. As an example of nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science, we describe strong anticipation as a model for circadian systems (Stepp & Turvey, 2009). We then propose a philosophy of science appropriate to nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science.

A neurobiologist's attempt to understand persistent pain

This topical review starts with a warning that despite an impressive wealth of neuroscientific data, a reductionist approach can never fully explain persistent pain. One reason is the complexity of clinical pain (in contrast to experimentally induced pain). Another reason is that the "pain system" shows degeneracy, which means that an outcome can have several causes. Problems also arise from lack of conceptual clarity regarding words like nociceptors, pain, and perception. It is, for example, argued that "homeoceptor" would be a more meaningful term than nociceptor. Pain experience most likely depends on synchronized, oscillatory activity in a distributed neural network regardless of whether the pain is caused by tissue injury, deafferentation, or hypnosis. In experimental pain, the insula, the second somatosensory area, and the anterior cingulate gyrus are consistently activated. These regions are not pain-specific, however, and are now regarded by most authors as parts of the so-called salience network, which detects all kinds of salient events (pain being highly salient). The networks related to persistent pain seem to differ from the those identified experimentally, and show a more individually varied pattern of activations. One crucial difference seems to be activation of regions implicated in emotional and body-information processing in persistent pain. Basic properties of the "pain system" may help to explain why it so often goes awry, leading to persistent pain. Thus, the system must be highly sensitive not to miss important homeostatic threats, it cannot be very specific, and it must be highly plastic to quickly learn important associations. Indeed, learning and memory processes play an important role in persistent pain. Thus, behaviour with the goal of avoiding pain provocation is quickly learned and may persist despite healing of the original insult. Experimental and clinical evidence suggest that the hippocampal formation and neurogenesis (formation of new neurons) in the dentate gyrus are involved in the development and maintenance of persistent pain. There is evidence that persistent pain in many instances may be understood as the result of an interpretation of the organism's state of health. Any abnormal pattern of sensory information as well as lack of expected correspondence between motor commands and sensory feedback may be interpreted as bodily threats and evoke pain. This may, for example, be an important mechanism in many cases of neuropathic pain. Accordingly, many patients with persistent pain show evidence of a distorted body image. Another approach to understanding why the "pain system" so often goes awry comes from knowledge of the dynamic and nonlinear behaviour of neuronal networks. In real life the emergence of persistent pain probably depends on the simultaneous occurrence of numerous challenges, and just one extra (however small) might put the network into a an inflexible state with heightened sensitivity to normally innocuous inputs. Finally, the importance of seeking the meaning the patient attributes to his/her pain is emphasized. Only then can we understand why a particular person suffers so much more than another with very similar pathology, and subsequently be able to help the person to alter the meaning of the situation.

Constructing a philosophy of science of cognitive science

Philosophy of science is positioned to make distinctive contributions to cognitive science by providing perspective on its conceptual foundations and by advancing normative recommendations. The philosophy of science I embrace is naturalistic in that it is grounded in the study of actual science. Focusing on explanation, I describe the recent development of a mechanistic philosophy of science from which I draw three normative consequences for cognitive science. First, insofar as cognitive mechanisms are information-processing mechanisms, cognitive science needs an account of how the representations invoked in cognitive mechanisms carry information about contents, and I suggest that control theory offers the needed perspective on the relation of representations to contents. Second, I argue that cognitive science requires, but is still in search of, a catalog of cognitive operations that researchers can draw upon in explaining cognitive mechanisms. Last, I provide a new perspective on the relation of cognitive science to brain sciences, one which embraces both reductive research on neural components that figure in cognitive mechanisms and a concern with recomposing higher-level mechanisms from their components and situating them in their environments.

Children's explanations as a window into their intuitive theories of the social world

Social categorization is an early emerging and robust component of social cognition, yet the role that social categories play in children's understanding of the social world has remained unclear. The present studies examined children's (N = 52 four- and five-year olds) explanations of social behavior to provide a window into their intuitive theories of how social categories constrain human action. Children systematically referenced category memberships and social relationships as causal-explanatory factors for specific types of social interactions: harm among members of different categories more than harm among members of the same category. In contrast, they systematically referred to agents' mental states to explain the reverse patterns of behaviors: harm among members of the same category more than harm among members of different categories. These data suggest that children view social category memberships as playing a causal-explanatory role in constraining social interactions.

Awe as a Scientific Emotion

Awe has traditionally been considered a religious or spiritual emotion, yet scientists often report that awe motivates them to answer questions about the natural world, and to do so in naturalistic terms. Indeed, awe may be closely related to scientific discovery and theoretical advance. Awe is typically triggered by something vast (either literally or metaphorically) and initiates processes of accommodation, in which existing mental schemas are revised to make sense of the awe-inspiring stimuli. This process of accommodation is essential for the kind of belief revision that characterizes scientific reasoning and theory change. Across six studies, we find that the tendency to experience awe is positively associated with scientific thinking, and that this association is not shared by other positive emotions. Specifically, we show that the disposition to experience awe predicts a more accurate understanding of how science works, rejection of creationism, and rejection of unwarranted teleological explanations more broadly.

Unification by Fiat: Arrested Development of Predictive Processing

Predictive processing (PP) has been repeatedly presented as a unificatory account of perception, action, and cognition. In this paper, we argue that this is premature: As a unifying theory, PP fails to deliver general, simple, homogeneous, and systematic explanations. By examining its current trajectory of development, we conclude that PP remains only loosely connected both to its computational framework and to its hypothetical biological underpinnings, which makes its fundamentals unclear. Instead of offering explanations that refer to the same set of principles, we observe systematic equivocations in PP‐based models, or outright contradictions with its avowed principles. To make matters worse, PP‐based models are seldom empirically validated, and they are frequently offered as mere just‐so stories. The large number of PP‐based models is thus not evidence of theoretical progress in unifying perception, action, and cognition. On the contrary, we maintain that the gap between theory and its biological and computational bases contributes to the arrested development of PP as a unificatory theory. Thus, we urge the defenders of PP to focus on its critical problems instead of offering mere re‐descriptions of known phenomena, and to validate their models against possible alternative explanations that stem from different theoretical assumptions. Otherwise, PP will ultimately fail as a unified theory of cognition.

Three legs of the missing heritability problem

The so-called 'missing heritability problem' is often characterized by behavior geneticists as a numerical discrepancy between alternative kinds of heritability. For example, while 'traditional heritability' derived from twin and family studies indicates that approximately ∼50% of variation in intelligence is attributable to genetics, 'SNP heritability' derived from genome-wide association studies indicates that only ∼10% of variation in intelligence is attributable to genetics. This 40% gap in variance accounted for by alternative kinds of heritability is frequently referred to as what's "missing." Philosophers have picked up on this reading, suggesting that "dissolving" the missing heritability problem is merely a matter of closing the numerical gap between traditional and molecular kinds of heritability. We argue that this framing of the problem undervalues the severity of the many challenges to scientific understanding of the "heritability" of human behavior. On our view, resolving the numerical discrepancies between alternative kinds of heritability will do little to advance scientific explanation and understanding of behavior genetics. Thus, we propose a new conceptual framework of the missing heritability problem that comprises three independent methodological and explanatory challenges: the numerical gap, the prediction gap, and the mechanism gap.

The early emergence and puzzling decline of relational reasoning: Effects of knowledge and search on inferring abstract concepts

We explore the developmental trajectory and underlying mechanisms of abstract relational reasoning. We describe a surprising developmental pattern: Younger learners are better than older ones at inferring abstract causal relations. Walker and Gopnik (2014) demonstrated that toddlers are able to infer that an effect was caused by a relation between two objects (whether they are the same or different), rather than by individual kinds of objects. While these findings are consistent with evidence that infants recognize same-different relations, they contrast with a large literature suggesting that older children tend to have difficulty inferring these relations. Why might this be? In Experiment 1a, we demonstrate that while younger children (18-30-month-olds) have no difficulty learning these relational concepts, older children (36-48-month-olds) fail to draw this abstract inference. Experiment 1b replicates the finding with 18-30-month-olds using a more demanding intervention task. Experiment 2 tests whether this difference in performance might be because older children have developed the general hypothesis that individual kinds of objects are causal - the high initial probability of this alternative hypothesis might override the data that favors the relational hypothesis. Providing additional information falsifying the alternative hypothesis improves older children's performance. Finally, Experiment 3 demonstrates that prompting for explanations during learning also improves performance, even without any additional information. These findings are discussed in light of recent computational and algorithmic theories of learning.

Children's success at detecting circular explanations and their interest in future learning

These studies explore elementary-school-aged children's ability to evaluate circular explanations and whether they respond to receiving weak explanations by expressing interest in additional learning. In the first study, 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds (n = 53) heard why questions about unfamiliar animals. For each question, they rated the quality of single explanations and later selected the best explanation between pairs of circular and noncircular explanations. When judging single explanations, 8- and 10-year-olds, and to some extent 6-year-olds, provided higher ratings for noncircular explanations compared to circular ones. When selecting between pairs of explanations, all age groups preferred noncircular explanations to circular ones, but older children did so more consistently than 6-year-olds. Children who recognized the weakness of the single circular explanations were more interested in receiving additional information about the question topics. In Study 2, all three age groups (n = 87) provided higher ratings for noncircular explanations compared to circular ones when listening to responses to how questions, but older children showed a greater distinction in their ratings than 6-year-olds. Moreover, the link between recognizing circular explanations as weak and interest in future learning could not be accounted for solely by individual differences in verbal intelligence. These findings illustrate the developmental trajectory of explanation evaluation and support that recognition of weak explanations is linked to interest in future learning across the elementary years. Implications for education are discussed.

Explaining the moral of the story

Although storybooks are often used as pedagogical tools for conveying moral lessons to children, the ability to spontaneously extract "the moral" of a story develops relatively late. Instead, children tend to represent stories at a concrete level - one that highlights surface features and understates more abstract themes. Here we examine the role of explanation in 5- and 6-year-old children's developing ability to learn the moral of a story. Two experiments demonstrate that, relative to a control condition, prompts to explain aspects of a story facilitate children's ability to override salient surface features, abstract the underlying moral, and generalize that moral to novel contexts. In some cases, generating an explanation is more effective than being explicitly told the moral of the story, as in a more traditional pedagogical exchange. These findings have implications for moral comprehension, the role of explanation in learning, and the development of abstract reasoning in early childhood.

Explanation in personality psychology: "Verbal magic" and the five-factor model

Scientific psychology involves both identifying and classifying phenomena of interest (description) and revealing the causes and mechanisms that contribute towards these phenomena arising (explanation). Within personality psychology, some propose that aspects of behavior and cognition can be explained with reference to personality traits. However, certain conceptual and logical issues cast doubt upon the adequacy of traits as coherent explanatory constructs. This paper discusses “explanation” in psychology and the problems of circularity and reification. An analysis of relations and intrinsic properties is then developed to address the logical requirements necessary for circumventing these problems. An examination of McCrae and Costa's defense of traits as explanatory constructs, in terms of “tendencies” and “dispositions” highlights logical issues that prevent traits, so defined, from explaining trait-like behaviors and cognitions. The logical requirements for a coherent trait-explanatory account are outlined and possible explanatory directions in trait-approaches are discussed. The ongoing tendency towards fallacious reasoning in psychology and suggestions for preventing this are further examined.

Explanatory pluralism: An unrewarding prediction error for free energy theorists

Courtesy of its free energy formulation, the hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain (PTB) is often claimed to be a grand unifying theory. To test this claim, we examine a central case: activity of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic (DA) systems. After reviewing the three most prominent hypotheses of DA activity-the anhedonia, incentive salience, and reward prediction error hypotheses-we conclude that the evidence currently vindicates explanatory pluralism. This vindication implies that the grand unifying claims of advocates of PTB are unwarranted. More generally, we suggest that the form of scientific progress in the cognitive sciences is unlikely to be a single overarching grand unifying theory.

Violations of expectation trigger infants to search for explanations

Infants look longer and explore more following violations-of-expectation, but the reasons for these surprise-induced behaviors are unclear. One possibility is that expectancy violations heighten arousal generally, thereby increasing infants' post-surprise activity. Another possibility is that infants' exploration reflects the search for an explanation for the surprising event. We tested these alternatives in three experiments. First in Experiment 1 we confirmed that seeing an object violate expectations (by passing through a solid wall) increased infants' exploration of the surprising object, relative to when no expectancy violation was seen. Then in Experiment 2 we measured infants' exploration after they had seen the same violation event, but then an explanation for the event was provided (the wall was revealed to have a large hole in it). We found that providing this explanation abolished infants' surprise-induced exploration. In Experiment 3 we replicated this effect. Furthermore, we found that the longer infants looked at the explanation, the greater their reversal in exploratory preference (i.e., the more they ignored the surprising object). These findings demonstrate that preverbal infants both seek and recognize explanations for surprising events.

A taxonomy of explanations in a general practitioner clinic for patients with persistent "medically unexplained" physical symptoms

OBJECTIVE

To develop a taxonomy of explanations for patients with persistent physical symptoms.

METHODS

We analysed doctors' explanations from two studies of a moderately-intensive consultation intervention for patients with multiple, often "medically-unexplained," physical symptoms. We used a constant comparative method to develop a taxonomy which was then applied to all verbatim explanations.

RESULTS

We analysed 138 explanations provided by five general practitioners to 38 patients. The taxonomy comprised explanation types and explanation components. Three explanation types described the overall structure of the explanations: Rational Adaptive, Automatic Adaptive, and Complex. These differed in terms of who or what was given agency within the explanation. Three explanation components described the content of the explanation: Facts - generic statements about normal or dysfunctional processes; Causes - person-specific statements about proximal or distal causes for symptoms; Mechanisms - processes by which symptoms arise or persist in the individual. Most explanations conformed to one type and contained several components.

CONCLUSIONS

This novel taxonomy for classifying clinical explanations permits detailed classification of explanation types and content. Explanation types appear to carry different implications of agency.

PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS

The taxonomy is suitable for examining explanations and developing prototype explanatory scripts in both training and research settings.

How to Explain Behavior?

Unlike behaviorism, cognitive psychology relies on mental concepts to explain behavior. Yet mental processes are not directly observable and multiple explanations are possible, which poses a challenge for finding a useful framework. In this article, I distinguish three new frameworks for explanations that emerged after the cognitive revolution. The first is called tools-to-theories: Psychologists' new tools for data analysis, such as computers and statistics, are turned into theories of mind. The second proposes as-if theories: Expected utility theory and Bayesian statistics are turned into theories of mind, describing an optimal solution of a problem but not its psychological process. The third studies the adaptive toolbox (formal models of heuristics) that describes mental processes in situations of uncertainty where an optimal solution is unknown. Depending on which framework researchers choose, they will model behavior in either situations of risk or of uncertainty, and construct models of cognitive processes or not. The frameworks also determine what questions are asked and what kind of data are generated. What all three frameworks have in common, however, is a clear preference for formal models rather than explanations by general dichotomies or mere verbal concepts. The frameworks have considerable potential to inform each other and to generate points of integration.

On the Nature of Explanations Offered by Network Science: A Perspective From and for Practicing Neuroscientists

Network neuroscience represents the brain as a collection of regions and inter-regional connections. Given its ability to formalize systems-level models, network neuroscience has generated unique explanations of neural function and behavior. The mechanistic status of these explanations and how they can contribute to and fit within the field of neuroscience as a whole has received careful treatment from philosophers. However, these philosophical contributions have not yet reached many neuroscientists. Here we complement formal philosophical efforts by providing an applied perspective from and for neuroscientists. We discuss the mechanistic status of the explanations offered by network neuroscience and how they contribute to, enhance, and interdigitate with other types of explanations in neuroscience. In doing so, we rely on philosophical work concerning the role of causality, scale, and mechanisms in scientific explanations. In particular, we make the distinction between an explanation and the evidence supporting that explanation, and we argue for a scale-free nature of mechanistic explanations. In the course of these discussions, we hope to provide a useful applied framework in which network neuroscience explanations can be exercised across scales and combined with other fields of neuroscience to gain deeper insights into the brain and behavior.

Against all odds? Understanding the emergence of accreditation of the Danish hospitals

Despite intense critique from various parts of the medical professions, Danish hospitals have been subjected to a mandatory accreditation system known as the Danish Quality Model (Den Danske Kvalitetsmodel, DDKM) since 2009. The notion of government assemblage is employed to understand how and why, in the face of these obstacles, DDKM was ultimately implemented. It is argued that DDKM is the result of the emergence of hospital quality management assemblage in 1980s and 1990s made up by new methods of categorizing disease treatments, computerization of such treatments, concerns over cost-effectiveness, complaint registration, the availability of international hospital quality assessment systems, the mobilization of organized medical interest groups, and a tradition of consultative policymaking procedures. This assemblage was crucial for identifying quality as a problem in need of administrative intervention and for shaping the political struggle over how best to assure the quality of hospital services.

Generating explanations via analogical comparison

Generating explanations can be highly effective in promoting learning in both adults and children. Our interest is in the mechanisms that underlie this effect and in whether and how they operate in early learning. In adult reasoning, explanation may call on many subprocesses-including comparison, counterfactual reasoning, and reasoning by exclusion; but it is unlikely that all these processes are available to young children. We propose that one process that may serve both children and adults is comparison. In this study, we asked whether children would use the results of a comparison experience when asked to explain why a model skyscraper was stable. We focused on a challenging principle-that diagonal cross-bracing lends stability to physical structures (Gentner et al., Cognitive Science, 40, 224-240, 2016). Six-year-olds either received no training or interacted with model skyscrapers in one of three different conditions, designed to vary in their potential to invite and support comparison. In the Single Model condition, children interacted with a single braced model. In the comparison conditions (Low Alignability and High Alignability), children compared braced and unbraced models. Following experience with the models, children were asked to explain why the braced model was stable. They then received two transfer tasks. We found that children who received highly alignable pairs were most likely to (a) produce brace-based explanations and (b) transfer the brace principle to a dissimilar context. This provides evidence that children can benefit from analogical comparison in generating explanations and also suggests limitations on this ability.

The challenges of choosing and explaining a phenomenon in epidemiological research on the "Hispanic Paradox"

According to public health data, the US Hispanic population is far healthier than would be expected for a population with low socioeconomic status. Ever since Kyriakos Markides and Jeannine Coreil highlighted this in a seminal 1986 article, public health researchers have sought to explain the so-called "Hispanic paradox." Several candidate explanations have been offered over the years, but the debate goes on. This article offers a philosophical analysis that clarifies how two sets of obstacles make it particularly difficult to explain the Hispanic paradox. First, different research projects define the Hispanic paradox phenomenon in substantially different ways. Moreover, using Bas van Fraassen's pragmatic theory of explanation and Sean Valles's extension of it with the concept of "phenomenon choice," it also becomes clear that there are also multiple ways of explaining each individual definition of the phenomenon. A second set of philosophical and methodological challenges arises during any attempt to study "Hispanic" phenomena, with one key challenge being that the "Hispanic" panethnic concept was intentionally made vague as it was developed and popularized during the 1960s-1970s. After comparing this case with similar cases in the philosophical literature, the article concludes with observations on what makes this problem unique, particularly its ethical features.

Is the bias for function-based explanations culturally universal? Children from China endorse teleological explanations of natural phenomena

Young children in Western cultures tend to endorse teleological (function-based) explanations broadly across many domains, even when scientifically unwarranted. For instance, in contrast to Western adults, they explicitly endorse the idea that mountains were created for climbing, just like hats were created for warmth. Is this bias a product of culture or a product of universal aspects of human cognition? In two studies, we explored whether adults and children in Mainland China, a highly secular, non-Western culture, show a bias for teleological explanations. When explaining both object properties (Experiment 1) and origins (Experiment 2), we found evidence that they do. Whereas Chinese adults restricted teleological explanations to scientifically warranted cases, Chinese children endorsed them more broadly, extending them across different kinds of natural phenomena. This bias decreased with rising grade level across first, second, and fourth grades. Overall, these data provide evidence that children's bias for teleological explanations is not solely a product of Western Abrahamic cultures. Instead, it extends to other cultures, including the East Asian secular culture of modern-day China. This suggests that the bias for function-based explanations may be driven by universal aspects of human cognition.