Establishment of a Poliovirus Containment Program and Containment Certification Process for Poliovirus-Essential Facilities, United States 2017-2022

Upon declaration of poliovirus (PV) type 2 eradication in 2015, the World Health Organization (WHO) published PV containment requirements in the Global Action Plan III (GAPIII) for mitigating the risk of a facility-associated release post eradication. In 2018, the 71st World Health Assembly resolution urged member states retaining PV to appoint a National Authority for Containment (NAC), reduce the number of PV facilities, and submit applications for containment certification. The United States (US) NAC was established in 2018 for containment oversight, and two paths to WHO GAPIII containment certification were developed. Facilities retaining PV were identified through national poliovirus containment surveys. The US NAC conducted 27 site visits at 18 facilities (20 laboratories: A/BSL-2 (65%), A/BSL-3 (20%), and storage-only (15%)) to verify the implementation of US NAC's preliminary containment measures. The NAC identified areas for improvement in seven categories: primary containment, decontamination, hand hygiene, security, emergency response, training, and immunization practices. Sixteen facility applications were endorsed to pursue poliovirus-essential facility (PEF) certification, whereas four facilities opted to withdraw during the containment certification process. The US made noteworthy progress in PV containment to enhance biosafety and biosecurity practices at US PV facilities to safeguard the polio eradication effort.

The risk of unintentional propagation of poliovirus can be minimized by using human cell lines lacking the functional CD155 gene

After eradication and containment of wild poliovirus (PV) and cessation of oral polio vaccinations, it is critical to minimize the risk of reintroducing PV into PV-free communities via facilities that handle the virus. The potential risk of unintentional PV propagation through unidentified contaminated materials is a serious issue. This study reports the generation of HeLa and RD-A cells deficient in functional CD155 gene (∆PVR cells); these cells are not susceptible to PV but remain susceptible to other picornaviruses. These ∆PVR cells will minimize the risk of unintentional transmission of PV and support performing the experiments more safely.

Response to a wild poliovirus type 2 (WPV2)-shedding event following accidental exposure to WPV2, the Netherlands, April 2017

On 3 April 2017, a wild poliovirus type 2 (WPV2) spill occurred in a Dutch vaccine manufacturing plant. Two fully vaccinated operators with risk of exposure were advised on stringent personal hygiene and were monitored for virus shedding. Poliovirus (WPV2-MEF1) was detected in the stool of one, 4 days after exposure, later also in sewage samples. The operator was isolated at home and followed up until shedding stopped 29 days after exposure. No further transmission was detected.

Scientific consultation on the safety and containment of new poliovirus strains for vaccine production, clinical/regulatory testing and research. Report of a meeting held at NIBSC, Potters Bar, Hertfordshire, UK, 6/7th July 2016

When poliomyelitis is totally eradicated from the natural world containment will be vital to prevent its re-emergence. The matter has become pressing as type 2 component of oral polio vaccine was completely withdrawn by May 2016 as wild ty[e 2 was declared eradicated. Work on polioviruses must be contained in accordance with GAPIII (the third version of the Global Action Plan of WHO). Some activities will be essential for years after eradication. Vaccine production and control, surveillance and supportive applied and academic research must all continue. Most laboratories do not currently comply with GAPIII and could not do so in the short term without disruption of essential activities including vaccine supply. The development and use of safer strains is raised in GAPIII and the meeting considered the strains available and the uses to which they could be put to facilitate compliance with the aims of GAPIII.