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The place of Free Will: the freedom of the prisoner. Neurol Sci 2024; 45:861-871. [PMID: 37870645 DOI: 10.1007/s10072-023-07138-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/17/2023] [Accepted: 10/13/2023] [Indexed: 10/24/2023]
Abstract
Debates about the concept of Free Will date back to ancient times. About 40 years ago, Benjamin Libet designed an experiment showing that the conscious intention to move is preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation. His finding suggested that unconscious processes determine our decisions. Libet-style experiments have continued to dominate the debate about Free Will, pushing some authors to argue that the existence of Free Will is a mere illusion. We believe that this dispute is because we often measure Free Will using arbitrary human decisions rather than deliberate actions. After reviewing the definition of Free Will and the related literature, we conclude that the scientific evidence does not disprove the existence of Free Will. However, our will encounters several constraints and limitations that should be considered when evaluating our deeds' personal responsibility.
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What we know when we act. PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 2023; 180:2665-2683. [PMID: 37662849 PMCID: PMC10471674 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-023-01997-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 05/21/2023] [Indexed: 09/05/2023]
Abstract
Two traditions in action theory offer different accounts of what distinguishes intentional action from mere behavior. According to the causalist tradition, intentional action has certain distinguished causal antecedents, and according to the Anscombian tradition, intentional action has certain distinguished epistemological features. I offer a way to reconcile these ostensibly conflicting accounts of intentional action by way of appealing to "ability-constituting knowledge". After explaining what such knowledge is, and in particular its relationship to inadvertent virtue and knowledge-how, I suggest that, among other things, appealing to ability-constituting knowledge can help us flesh out what it is for an agent's reasons to non-deviantly cause and sustain her purposive behavior.
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3
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The effect of context and reason on the neural correlates of intentions. Heliyon 2023; 9:e17231. [PMID: 37383217 PMCID: PMC10293734 DOI: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e17231] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/03/2022] [Revised: 05/31/2023] [Accepted: 06/12/2023] [Indexed: 06/30/2023] Open
Abstract
Many studies have identified networks in parietal and prefrontal cortex that are involved in intentional action. Yet, our understanding of the way these networks are involved in intentions is still very limited. In this study, we investigate two characteristics of these processes: context- and reason-dependence of the neural states associated with intentions. We ask whether these states depend on the context a person is in and the reasons they have for choosing an action. We used a combination of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and multivariate decoding to directly assess the context- and reason-dependency of the neural states underlying intentions. We show that action intentions can be decoded from fMRI data based on a classifier trained in the same context and with the same reason, in line with previous decoding studies. Furthermore, we found that intentions can be decoded across different reasons for choosing an action. However, decoding across different contexts was not successful. We found anecdotal to moderate evidence against context-invariant information in all regions of interest and for all conditions but one. These results suggest that the neural states associated with intentions are modulated by the context of the action.
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Machine Ethics: Do Androids Dream of Being Good People? SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS 2023; 29:10. [PMID: 36952064 PMCID: PMC10036453 DOI: 10.1007/s11948-023-00433-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/29/2021] [Accepted: 02/10/2023] [Indexed: 06/18/2023]
Abstract
Is ethics a computable function? Can machines learn ethics like humans do? If teaching consists in no more than programming, training, indoctrinating… and if ethics is merely following a code of conduct, then yes, we can teach ethics to algorithmic machines. But if ethics is not merely about following a code of conduct or about imitating the behavior of others, then an approach based on computing outcomes, and on the reduction of ethics to the compilation and application of a set of rules, either a priori or learned, misses the point. Our intention is not to solve the technical problem of machine ethics, but to learn something about human ethics, and its rationality, by reflecting on the ethics that can and should be implemented in machines. Any machine ethics implementation will have to face a number of fundamental or conceptual problems, which in the end refer to philosophical questions, such as: what is a human being (or more generally, what is a worthy being); what is human intentional acting; and how are intentional actions and their consequences morally evaluated. We are convinced that a proper understanding of ethical issues in AI can teach us something valuable about ourselves, and what it means to lead a free and responsible ethical life, that is, being good people beyond merely "following a moral code". In the end we believe that rationality must be seen to involve more than just computing, and that value rationality is beyond numbers. Such an understanding is a required step to recovering a renewed rationality of ethics, one that is urgently needed in our highly technified society.
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Probability and intentional action. Cogn Psychol 2023; 141:101551. [PMID: 36764242 DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101551] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/29/2022] [Revised: 01/30/2023] [Accepted: 01/30/2023] [Indexed: 02/11/2023]
Abstract
How does probability affect attributions of intentionality? In five experiments (total N = 1410), we provide evidence for a probability raising account holding that people are more likely to see the outcome of an agent's action as intentional if the agent does something to increase the odds of that outcome. Experiment 1 found that high probability without probability raising does not suffice for strong attributions of intentionality. Participants were more likely to conclude a girl intentionally obtained a desired gumball from a single gumball machine when it offered favorable odds for getting that kind of gumball compared with when it offered poor odds, but their attributions of intentionality were lukewarm. Experiments 2 and 3 then found stronger attributions of intentionality when the girl raised her probability of success by choosing to use machines offering favorable odds over machines offering poor odds. Finally, Experiments 4 and 5 examined whether these effects of probability raising might reduce to consideration of agents' beliefs and expectations. We found that although these mental states do matter, probability raising matters too-people attribute intentional actions to agents who increase their odds of success, rather than to agents who merely become convinced that success is likely. We discuss the implications of these findings for claims that control and skill contribute to attributions of intentional action.
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Task-based functional connectivity identifies two segregated networks underlying intentional action. Neuroimage 2023; 268:119866. [PMID: 36610680 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2023.119866] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/15/2022] [Revised: 12/26/2022] [Accepted: 01/04/2023] [Indexed: 01/06/2023] Open
Abstract
While much of motor behavior is automatic, intentional action is necessary for the selection and initiation of controlled motor acts and is thus an essential part of goal-directed behavior. Neuroimaging studies have shown that self-generated action implicates several dorsal and ventral frontoparietal areas. However, knowledge of the functional coupling between these brain regions during intentional action remains limited. We here studied brain activations and functional connectivity (FC) of thirty right-handed healthy participants performing a finger pressing task instructed to use a specific finger (externally-triggered action) or to select one of four fingers randomly (internally-generated action). Participants performed the task in alternating order either with their dominant right hand or the left hand. Consistent with previous studies, we observed stronger involvement of posterior parietal cortex and premotor regions when contrasting internally-generated with externally-triggered action. Interestingly, this contrast also revealed significant engagement of medial occipitotemporal regions including the left lingual and right fusiform gyrus. Task-based FC analysis identified increased functional coupling among frontoparietal regions as well as increased and decreased coupling between occipitotemporal regions, thus differentiating between two segregated networks. When comparing results of the dominant and nondominant hand we found less activation, but stronger connectivity for the former, suggesting increased neural efficiency when participants use their dominant hand. Taken together, our results reveal that two segregated networks that encompass the frontoparietal and occipitotemporal cortex contribute independently to intentional action.
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The auditory brain in action: Intention determines predictive processing in the auditory system-A review of current paradigms and findings. Psychon Bull Rev 2021; 29:321-342. [PMID: 34505988 PMCID: PMC9038838 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-021-01992-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 07/29/2021] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
According to the ideomotor theory, action may serve to produce desired sensory outcomes. Perception has been widely described in terms of sensory predictions arising due to top-down input from higher order cortical areas. Here, we demonstrate that the action intention results in reliable top-down predictions that modulate the auditory brain responses. We bring together several lines of research, including sensory attenuation, active oddball, and action-related omission studies: Together, the results suggest that the intention-based predictions modulate several steps in the sound processing hierarchy, from preattentive to evaluation-related processes, also when controlling for additional prediction sources (i.e., sound regularity). We propose an integrative theoretical framework—the extended auditory event representation system (AERS), a model compatible with the ideomotor theory, theory of event coding, and predictive coding. Initially introduced to describe regularity-based auditory predictions, we argue that the extended AERS explains the effects of action intention on auditory processing while additionally allowing studying the differences and commonalities between intention- and regularity-based predictions—we thus believe that this framework could guide future research on action and perception.
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A simple definition of 'intentionally'. Cognition 2021; 214:104806. [PMID: 34146998 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104806] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/08/2020] [Revised: 06/04/2021] [Accepted: 06/05/2021] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Cognitive scientists have been debating how the folk concept of intentional action works. We suggest a simple account: people consider that an agent did X intentionally to the extent that X was causally dependent on how much the agent wanted X to happen (or not to happen). Combined with recent models of human causal cognition, this definition provides a good account of the way people use the concept of intentional action, and offers natural explanations for puzzling phenomena such as the side-effect effect. We provide empirical support for our theory, in studies where we show that people's causation and intentionality judgments track each other closely, in everyday situations as well as in scenarios with unusual causal structures. Study 5 additionally shows that the effect of norm violations on intentionality judgments depends on the causal structure of the situation, in a way uniquely predicted by our theory. Taken together, these results suggest that the folk concept of intentional action has been difficult to define because it is made of cognitive building blocks, such as our intuitive concept of causation, whose logic cognitive scientists are just starting to understand.
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A meta-analysis of Libet-style experiments. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2021; 128:182-198. [PMID: 34119525 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.06.018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/23/2021] [Revised: 06/07/2021] [Accepted: 06/07/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
In the seminal Libet experiment (Libet et al., 1983), unconscious brain activity preceded the self-reported, conscious intention to move. This was repeatedly interpreted as challenging the view that (conscious) mental states cause behavior and, prominently, as challenging the existence of free will. Extensive discussions in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and jurisprudence followed, but further empirical findings were heterogeneous. However, a quantitative review of the literature summarizing the evidence of Libet-style experiments is lacking. The present meta-analysis fills this gap. The results revealed a temporal pattern that is largely consistent with the one found by Libet and colleagues. Remarkably, there were only k = 6 studies for the time difference between unconscious brain activity and the conscious intention to move - the most crucial time difference regarding implications about conscious causation and free will. Additionally, there was a high degree of uncertainty associated with this meta-analytic effect. We conclude that some of Libet et al.'s findings appear more fragile than anticipated in light of the substantial scientific work that built on them.
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Inferior parietal lobule involved in representation of "what" in a delayed-action Libet task. Conscious Cogn 2021; 93:103149. [PMID: 34098153 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103149] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/12/2020] [Revised: 03/22/2021] [Accepted: 05/05/2021] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Intentional motor action is typically characterized by the decision about the timing, and the selection of the action variant, known as the "what" component. We compared free action selection with instructed action, where the movement type was externally cued, in order to investigate the action selection and action representation in a Libet's task. Temporal and spatial locus of these processes was examined using the combination of high-density electroencephalography, topographic analysis of variance, and source reconstruction. Instructed action, engaging representation of the response movement, was associated with distinct negativity at the parietal and centro-parietal channels starting around 750 ms before the movement, which has a source particularly in the bilateral inferior parietal lobule. This suggests that in delayed-action tasks, the process of action representation in the inferior parietal lobule may play an important part in the larger parieto-frontal activity responsible for movement selection.
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Studying the sense of agency in the absence of motor movement: an investigation into temporal binding of tactile sensations and auditory effects. Exp Brain Res 2021; 239:1795-1806. [PMID: 33829297 PMCID: PMC8277642 DOI: 10.1007/s00221-021-06087-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/21/2020] [Accepted: 03/11/2021] [Indexed: 01/09/2023]
Abstract
People form coherent representations of goal-directed actions. Such agency experiences of intentional action are reflected by a shift in temporal perception: self-generated motor movements and subsequent sensory effects are perceived to occur closer together in time—a phenomenon termed intentional binding. Building on recent research suggesting that temporal binding occurs without intentionally performing actions, we further examined whether such perceptual compression occurs when motor action is fully absent. In three experiments, we used a novel sensory-based adaptation of the Libet clock paradigm to assess how a brief tactile sensation on the index finger and a resulting auditory stimulus perceptually bind together in time. Findings revealed robust temporal repulsion (instead of binding) between tactile sensation and auditory effect. Temporal repulsion was attenuated when participants could anticipate the identity and temporal onset (two crucial components of intentional action) of the tactile sensation. These findings are briefly discussed in the context of differences between intentional movement and anticipated bodily sensations in shaping action coherence and agentic experiences.
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Intentionality and temporal binding: Do causality beliefs increase the perceived temporal attraction between events? Conscious Cogn 2019; 77:102835. [PMID: 31704296 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2019.102835] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/08/2019] [Revised: 09/05/2019] [Accepted: 10/05/2019] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
Intentional motor actions and their effects are bound together in temporal perception, resulting in the so-called intentional binding effect. In the current study, we address an alternative explanatory mechanism for the emergence of temporal binding by excluding the role of motor action. Employing a sensory-based Libet clock paradigm, we examined temporal perception of two different auditory stimuli, and tested the influence of beliefs about the causal relationship between the two auditory stimuli, thus simulating a crucial feature of intentional action. In two experiments, we found a robust temporal repulsion effect, indicating that instead of being attracted to each other, the auditory stimuli were shifted away from each other in temporal perception. Interestingly, repulsion was attenuated by causal beliefs, but this effect was fragile. Furthermore, temporal repulsion was unaffected by the intensity of prior learning. Findings are discussed in the context of intentional action awareness research and multisensory integration.
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Negative and positive volitional responses induced by stimulating the superior frontal gyrus: A case study. Brain Stimul 2019; 12:1614-1616. [PMID: 31474544 DOI: 10.1016/j.brs.2019.08.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/13/2019] [Revised: 08/03/2019] [Accepted: 08/17/2019] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
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Why neuroscience does not disprove free will. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2019; 102:251-263. [PMID: 31059730 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.04.024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/24/2019] [Revised: 04/30/2019] [Accepted: 04/30/2019] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Abstract
While the question whether free will exists or not has concerned philosophers for centuries, empirical research on this question is relatively young. About 35 years ago Benjamin Libet designed an experiment that challenged the common intuition of free will, namely that conscious intentions are causally efficacious. Libet demonstrated that conscious intentions are preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation, suggesting that unconscious processes determine our decisions and we are only retrospectively informed about these decisions. Libet-style experiments have ever since dominated the discourse about the existence of free will and have found their way into the public media. Here we review the most important challenges to the common interpretation of Libet-style tasks and argue that the common interpretation is questionable. Brain activity preceding conscious decisions reflects the decision process rather than its outcome. Furthermore, the decision process is configured by conditional intentions that participants form at the beginning of the experiment. We conclude that Libet-style tasks do not provide a serious challenge to our intuition of free will.
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Variations in judgments of intentional action and moral evaluation across eight cultures. Cognition 2017; 164:22-30. [PMID: 28364713 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.02.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/06/2016] [Revised: 02/18/2017] [Accepted: 02/25/2017] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Individuals tend to judge bad side effects as more intentional than good side effects (the Knobe or side-effect effect). Here, we assessed how widespread these findings are by testing eleven adult cohorts of eight highly contrasted cultures on their attributions of intentional action as well as ratings of blame and praise. We found limited generalizability of the original side-effect effect, and even a reversal of the effect in two rural, traditional cultures (Samoa and Vanuatu) where participants were more likely to judge the good side effect as intentional. Three follow-up experiments indicate that this reversal of the side-effect effect is not due to semantics and may be linked to the perception of the status of the protagonist. These results highlight the importance of factoring cultural context in our understanding of moral cognition.
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Intentional action processing results from automatic bottom-up attention: An EEG-investigation into the Social Relevance Hypothesis using hypnosis. Conscious Cogn 2016; 42:101-112. [PMID: 26998562 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2016.03.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/27/2015] [Revised: 01/10/2016] [Accepted: 03/02/2016] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
Social stimuli grab our attention. However, it has rarely been investigated how variations in attention affect the processing of social stimuli, although the answer could help us uncover details of social cognition processes such as action understanding. In the present study, we examined how changes to bottom-up attention affects neural EEG-responses associated with intentional action processing. We induced an increase in bottom-up attention by using hypnosis. We recorded the electroencephalographic μ-wave suppression of hypnotized participants when presented with intentional actions in first and third person perspective in a video-clip paradigm. Previous studies have shown that the μ-rhythm is selectively suppressed both when executing and observing goal-directed motor actions; hence it can be used as a neural signal for intentional action processing. Our results show that neutral hypnotic trance increases μ-suppression in highly suggestible participants when they observe intentional actions. This suggests that social action processing is enhanced when bottom-up attentional processes are predominant. Our findings support the Social Relevance Hypothesis, according to which social action processing is a bottom-up driven attentional process, and can thus be altered as a function of bottom-up processing devoted to a social stimulus.
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Pro-social cognition: helping, practical reasons, and 'theory of mind'. PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES 2015; 14:755-767. [PMID: 26941589 PMCID: PMC4772120 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-015-9438-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/05/2023]
Abstract
There is converging evidence that over the course of the second year children become good at various fairly sophisticated forms of pro-social activities, such as helping, informing and comforting. Not only are toddlers able to do these things, they appear to do them routinely and almost reliably. A striking feature of these interventions, emphasized in the recent literature, is that they show precocious abilities in two different domains: they reflect complex 'theory of mind' abilities as well as 'altruistic motivation'. Our aim in this paper is to present a theoretical hypothesis that bears on both kinds of developments. The suggestion is that children's 'instrumental helping' reflects their budding understanding of practical reasons (in the standard sense of 'considerations that count in favour of' someone's acting in a certain way). We can put the basic idea in the familiar terminology of common coding: toddlers conceive of the goals of others' actions in the same format as the goals of their own actions: in terms of features of their situation that provide us with reasons to act.
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