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Westerstrand S. Reconstructing AI Ethics Principles: Rawlsian Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS 2024; 30:46. [PMID: 39384600 PMCID: PMC11464555 DOI: 10.1007/s11948-024-00507-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/27/2023] [Accepted: 08/05/2024] [Indexed: 10/11/2024]
Abstract
The popularisation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies has sparked discussion about their ethical implications. This development has forced governmental organisations, NGOs, and private companies to react and draft ethics guidelines for future development of ethical AI systems. Whereas many ethics guidelines address values familiar to ethicists, they seem to lack in ethical justifications. Furthermore, most tend to neglect the impact of AI on democracy, governance, and public deliberation. Existing research suggest, however, that AI can threaten key elements of western democracies that are ethically relevant. In this paper, Rawls's theory of justice is applied to draft a set of guidelines for organisations and policy-makers to guide AI development towards a more ethical direction. The goal is to contribute to the broadening of the discussion on AI ethics by exploring the possibility of constructing AI ethics guidelines that are philosophically justified and take a broader perspective of societal justice. The paper discusses how Rawls's theory of justice as fairness and its key concepts relate to the ongoing developments in AI ethics and gives a proposition of how principles that offer a foundation for operationalising AI ethics in practice could look like if aligned with Rawls's theory of justice as fairness.
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Fleck LM. Public Reason, Bioethics, and Public Policy: A Seductive Delusion or Ambitious Aspiration? Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2024:1-15. [PMID: 38465673 DOI: 10.1017/s0963180124000124] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/12/2024]
Abstract
Can Rawlsian public reason sufficiently justify public policies that regulate or restrain controversial medical and technological interventions in bioethics (and the broader social world), such as abortion, physician aid-in-dying, CRISPER-cas9 gene editing of embryos, surrogate mothers, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis of eight-cell embryos, and so on? The first part of this essay briefly explicates the central concepts that define Rawlsian political liberalism. The latter half of this essay then demonstrates how a commitment to Rawlsian public reason can ameliorate (not completely resolve) many of the policy disagreements related to bioethically controversial medical interventions today. The goal of public reason is to reduce the size of the disagreement by eliminating features of the disagreement that violate the norms of public reason. The norms of public reason are those norms that are politically necessary to preserve the liberal, pluralistic, democratic character of this society. What remains is reasonable disagreement to be addressed through normal democratic deliberative processes. Specific issues addressed from a public reason perspective include personal responsibility for excessive health costs, the utility of a metaphysical definition of death for organ transplantation, and the moral status of excess embryos generated through IVF and/or their use in medical research.
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Holm S. Public Reason Requirements in Bioethical Discourse. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2024:1-10. [PMID: 38389493 DOI: 10.1017/s0963180124000094] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/24/2024]
Abstract
This paper analyzes the use of public reason requirements in bioethical discourse and discusses when such requirements are warranted. By a "public reason requirement," I mean a requirement that those involved in a particular discourse or debate only use reasons that can properly be described as public reasons. The first part of the paper outlines the concept of public reasons as developed by John Rawls and others and discusses some of the general criticisms of the concept and its importance. The second part then distinguishes between two types of public reason requirements in bioethics. One type is what I will call the orthodox public reason requirement since it hews closely to the original Rawlsian conception. The second is what I will call the expansive public reason requirement, which departs quite radically from the Rawlsian conception and applies the requirement not to policy discourse or policymaking, but to the actions of individuals. Both types of requirements will be analyzed, and some problems in applying public reason requirements in bioethics will be identified. It will be argued that the expansive public reason requirement is misguided. The concluding part argues that requirements of civic civility and what Rawls terms an "inclusive view" of public reason should be important in bioethical discourse.
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Moen LJ. How Do You Like Your Justice, Bent or Unbent? MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS 2023; 10:285-297. [PMID: 38014360 PMCID: PMC10568981 DOI: 10.1515/mopp-2021-0072] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/29/2023]
Abstract
Principles of justice, David Estlund argues, cannot be falsified by people's unwillingness to satisfy them. In his Utopophobia, Estlund rejects the view that justice must bend to human motivation to deliver practical implications for how institutions ought to function. In this paper, I argue that a substantive argument against such bending of justice principles must challenge the reasons for making these principles sensitive to motivational limitations. Estlund, however, provides no such challenge. His dispute with benders of justice is therefore a verbal one over the true meaning of justice, which need not worry those with the intuition that justice should perform a function that requires bending. By focusing on John Rawls's reasons for bending his justice principles, I point towards a substantive critique of bent justice.
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Hickey T. Legitimacy-not Justice -and the Case for Judicial Review. OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 2022; 42:893-917. [PMID: 36381266 PMCID: PMC9645005 DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqac009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/16/2023]
Abstract
Sceptics of judicial review-from Jeremy Waldron to those in the Judicial Power Project-have tended to attribute to their opponents an erroneous prioritisation of 'justice' over 'legitimacy'. They claim that those who make the case for judicial review do so on the grounds that 'judges know best', and that judicial review therefore helps promote the overall justness of a state's social order-rather than on the grounds that it helps enhance the overall legitimacy of a state's authority. This article interrogates that line of attack. It explores its roots in political theory, particularly the idea that those guilty of it (such as Aileen Kavanagh) follow in John Rawls's supposed prioritisation of justice over legitimacy. And it turns to republican and later-Rawlsian thinking on these two concepts to see whether it may offer a sound basis upon which the case for judicial review can be made … legitimately.
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Brun G. Re-engineering contested concepts. A reflective-equilibrium approach. SYNTHESE 2022; 200:168. [PMID: 35509852 PMCID: PMC9012703 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03556-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/25/2020] [Revised: 01/02/2022] [Accepted: 01/04/2022] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
Social scientists, political scientists and philosophers debate key concepts such as democracy, power and autonomy. Contested concepts like these pose questions: Are terms such as "democracy" hopelessly ambiguous? How can two theorists defend alternative accounts of democracy without talking past each other? How can we understand debates in which theorists disagree about what democracy is? This paper first discusses the popular strategy to answer these questions by appealing to Rawls's distinction between concepts and conceptions. According to this approach, defenders of rival conceptions of, e.g. justice can disagree without talking past each other because they share the concept of justice. It is argued that this idea is attractive but limited in application and that it fails to do justice to the dynamic and normative aspects of concept formation. Reflective equilibrium is then suggested as an alternative approach. It replaces the static contrast between a conceptual 'core' and competing conceptions by a dynamic perspective of concept formation as a partly normative undertaking: pre-theoretic language use and commitments can provide a shared starting point for developing alternative accounts which yield different concepts of, e.g. justice. This perspective provides a new understanding of how it is possible that different theorists defend rival accounts of, e.g. justice, without talking past each other.
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Garzarelli G, Keeton L, Sitoe AA. Rights redistribution and COVID-19 lockdown policy. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 2022; 54:5-36. [PMID: 35924088 PMCID: PMC8980515 DOI: 10.1007/s10657-022-09732-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 02/08/2022] [Indexed: 06/28/2023]
Abstract
What is the tenet upon which the public policy of lockdown by fiat experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic is based on? The work approaches this question about the rationale of the mandatory shelter-in-place policy as an interpersonal exchange of rights, but where the exchange occurs coercively instead of voluntarily. It compares, in positive political economy terms, the normative principles of utilitarianism and Rawlsianism, and shows that lockdown by fiat is a policy that is closer to a maximin equity criterion rather than to a utilitarian one. The work moreover shows, also with the aid of a thought experiment and with factual applications, that the fiat redistribution of rights to liberty in favor of rights to health-from those least affected to those most affected by COVID-19-is, in the main, a policy choice that is to be expected under certain constraints.
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Warner CH. Public Reason in a Pandemic: John Rawls on Truth in the Age of COVID-19. PHILOSOPHIA (RAMAT-GAN, ISRAEL) 2022; 50:1503-1513. [PMID: 35125552 PMCID: PMC8801277 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-021-00459-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/22/2021] [Revised: 10/19/2021] [Accepted: 12/18/2021] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
In "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," John Rawls suggests an approach to a public conception of justice that eschews any dependence on metaphysical conceptions of justice in favor of a political conception of justice. This means that if there is a metaphysical conception of justice that actually obtains, then Rawls' theory would not (and could not) be sensitive to it. Rawls himself admitted in Political Liberalism that "the political conception does without the truth." Similarly, in Law of Peoples, Rawls endorses a political conception of justice to govern the society of peoples that is not concerned with truth, but instead concerned with being sufficiently neutral so as to avoid conflict with any reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The odd result is that this neutrality excludes any conception of truth at all. Therefore, in times of crisis that demand incisive decision making based on scientific, economic or moral considerations, public reason will stall because it can contain no coherent conception of truth.
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Abstract
With the rise of telemedicine, wearable healthcare, and the greater leverage of 'big data' for precision medicine, various challenges present themselves to organisations, physicians, and patients. Beyond the practical, financial, and clinical considerations, we must not ignore the ethical imperative for fair and just applications to improve the field of healthcare for all. Given the increasing personalisation of medicine and the role technology will play at the interface of healthcare delivery, a thorough understanding of the challenges presented is critical for future physicians who will navigate a novel environment. This article aims to explore the ethical challenges that the adoption of digital healthcare technology presents, contextualised at multiple levels. Potential solutions are suggested to initiate a discussion about the future of medicine and digital healthcare.
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Abstract
An increasing amount of very diverse scholarship self-identifies as belonging to the field of neuroethics, illuminating a need to provide some reference points for what that field actually entails. We argue that neuroethics is a single field with distinct perspectives, roles, and subspecialties. We propose that-in addition to the three traditional perspectives delineated by Eric Racine-a fourth, socio-political perspective, must be recognized in neuroethics. The socio-political perspective in neuroethics focuses on the interplay between the behavioral as well as the brain sciences and the socio-political system; this interplay includes social regulation in addition to all other realistic elements of social and political neurodiscourses. Thus, defining what-if any-roles the socio-political perspective in neuroethics might have is a pressing issue. Doing so could provide guidance for defining the criteria for prospective ethical evaluations in neuroethics. A promising approach to doing this could be by describing the roles of neuroethics in terms of the more concrete examples of the roles of political philosophy in general, as in the tradition of John Rawls. We take klotho, the supposed "longevity protein," as a modern neuroethics case to exemplify the obstacles faced in securing neuroethics' legitimacy and how the Rawlsian framework we propose may be applied to handle cases such as this. Ultimately, the socio-political perspective in neuroethics should not be swayed by the media hype and ought to offer useful ethical guidance and articulation of genuine ethical concerns to policy makers and the public alike.
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Abstract
Both articles in the November-December 2021 issue of the Hastings Center Report reflect bioethics' growing interest in questions of justice, or more generally, questions of how collective interests constrain individual interests. Hugh Desmond argues that human enhancement should be reconsidered in light of developments in the field of human evolution. Contemporary understandings in this area lead, he argues, to a new way of thinking about the ethics of enhancement-an approach that replaces personal autonomy with group benefit as the primary criterion for deciding what enhancements are acceptable. In the second article, Johannes Kniess considers the many attempts within bioethics to draw on John Rawls's work to discuss health care access and social determinants of health, and he comes across as moderately optimistic that Rawls's theory of justice has ongoing relevance.
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Walsh A. Distributive justice, equality and the enhancement of human cognition: A commentary on fairness and 'cognitive doping'. THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DRUG POLICY 2020; 95:102874. [PMID: 32718812 DOI: 10.1016/j.drugpo.2020.102874] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/20/2020] [Revised: 06/26/2020] [Accepted: 07/20/2020] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
What implications might the use of techniques to enhance human cognition have for the kind of polities or civil societies we inhabit? What might political philosophy, if anything, have to tell us about the desirability of using drugs to increase our intellectual powers? Much of the focus in contemporary debates about human enhancement has been upon the ethical desirability of endeavouring to enhance our capacities: should we be meddling with 'human nature', as it were? Therapeutic uses of drugs are regarded as acceptable but enhancement is frowned upon in much of this literature. This rejection of enhancement is especially prevalent in the area of sport where there is a great deal of opposition to doping. Herein I take a somewhat different approach and explore enhancement as a problem in political philosophy and, more specifically, as a problem of distributive justice. Should the enhancement of human intellectual functioning be rejected on distributive grounds of equality? Alternatively, might it be plausibly be argued that distributive justice requires such enhancement? In this paper I shall outline two contemporary theories of justice-namely, the Egalitarianism and the Rawlsian Prioritarianism-and then consider what these principles might tell us about the political legitimacy (or otherwise) of 'doping for intellect'.
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Greenblum J, Kasperbauer TJ. Forget Evil: Autonomy, the Physician-Patient Relationship, and the Duty to Refer. JOURNAL OF BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 2018; 15:313-317. [PMID: 29790018 DOI: 10.1007/s11673-018-9854-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2017] [Accepted: 01/17/2018] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
Aulisio and Arora argue that the moral significance of value imposition explains the moral distinction between traditional conscientious objection and non-traditional conscientious objection. The former objects to directly performing actions, whereas the latter objects to indirectly assisting actions on the grounds that indirectly assisting makes the actor morally complicit. Examples of non-traditional conscientious objection include objections to the duty to refer. Typically, we expect physicians who object to a practice to refer, but the non-traditional conscientious objector physician refuses to refer. Aulisio and Arora argue that physicians have a duty to refer because refusing to do so violates the patient's values. While we agree with Aulisio and Arora's conclusions, we argue value imposition cannot adequately explain the moral difference between traditional conscientious objection and non-traditional conscientious objection. Treating autonomy as the freedom to live in accordance with one's values, as Aulisio and Arora do, is a departure from traditional liberal conceptions of autonomy and consequently fails to explain the moral difference between the two kinds of objection. We outline how a traditional liberal understanding of autonomy would help in this regard, and we make two additional arguments-one that maintains that non-traditional conscientious objection undermines society's autonomy, and another that maintains that it undermines the physician-patient relationship-to establish why physicians have a duty to refer.
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Samanta J, Samanta A, Madhloom O. A rights-based proposal for managing faith-based values and expectations of migrants at end-of-life illustrated by an empirical study involving South Asians in the UK. BIOETHICS 2018; 32:368-377. [PMID: 29882999 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12447] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/15/2017] [Accepted: 02/21/2018] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
International migration is an important issue for many high-income countries and is accompanied by opportunities as well as challenges. South Asians are the largest minority ethnic group in the United Kingdom, and this diaspora is reflective of the growing diversity of British society. An empirical study was performed to ascertain the faith-based values, beliefs, views and attitudes of participants in relation to their perception of issues pertaining to end-of-life care. Empirical observations from this study, as well as the extant knowledge-base from the literature, are used to support and contextualise our reflections against a socio-legal backdrop. We argue for accommodation of faith-based values of migrants at end-of-life within normative structures of receiving countries. We posit the ethically relevant principles of inclusiveness, integration and embedment, for an innovative bioethical framework as a vehicle for accommodating faith-based values and needs of migrants at end-of-life. These tenets work conjunctively, as well as individually, in respect of individual care, enabling processes and procedures, and ultimately for formulating policy and strategy.
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James Roberts A. Response: Freedom from Pain as a Rawlsian Primary Good. BIOETHICS 2016; 30:774-775. [PMID: 27518927 DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12271] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/06/2023]
Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Carl Knight and Andreas Albertsen argue that Rawlsian theories of distributive justice as applied to health and healthcare fail to accommodate both palliative care and the desirability of less painful treatments. The asserted Rawlsian focus on opportunities or capacities, as exemplified in Normal Daniels' developments of John Rawls' theory, results in a normative account of healthcare which is at best only indirectly sensitive to pain and so unable to account for the value of efforts of which the sole purpose is pain reduction. I argue that, far from undermining the Rawlsian project and its application to problems of health, what the authors' argument at most amounts to is a compelling case for the inclusion of freedom from physical pain within its index of primary goods.
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Abstract
While philosophers are often concerned with the conditions for moral knowledge or justification, in practice something arguably less demanding is just as, if not more, important - reliably making correct moral judgments. Judges and juries should hand down fair sentences, government officials should decide on just laws, members of ethics committees should make sound recommendations, and so on. We want such agents, more often than not and as often as possible, to make the right decisions. The purpose of this paper is to propose a method of enhancing the moral reliability of such agents. In particular, we advocate for a procedural approach; certain internal processes generally contribute to people's moral reliability. Building on the early work of Rawls, we identify several particular factors related to moral reasoning that are specific enough to be the target of practical intervention: logical competence, conceptual understanding, empirical competence, openness, empathy and bias. Improving on these processes can in turn make people more morally reliable in a variety of contexts and has implications for recent debates over moral enhancement.
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Borenstein J, Arkin R. Robotic Nudges: The Ethics of Engineering a More Socially Just Human Being. SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS 2016; 22:31-46. [PMID: 25736832 DOI: 10.1007/s11948-015-9636-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/27/2014] [Accepted: 02/17/2015] [Indexed: 05/21/2023]
Abstract
Robots are becoming an increasingly pervasive feature of our personal lives. As a result, there is growing importance placed on examining what constitutes appropriate behavior when they interact with human beings. In this paper, we discuss whether companion robots should be permitted to "nudge" their human users in the direction of being "more ethical". More specifically, we use Rawlsian principles of justice to illustrate how robots might nurture "socially just" tendencies in their human counterparts. Designing technological artifacts in such a way to influence human behavior is already well-established but merely because the practice is commonplace does not necessarily resolve the ethical issues associated with its implementation.
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Abstract
Palliative care serves both as an integrated part of treatment and as a last effort to care for those we cannot cure. The extent to which palliative care should be provided and our reasons for doing so have been curiously overlooked in the debate about distributive justice in health and healthcare. We argue that one prominent approach, the Rawlsian approach developed by Norman Daniels, is unable to provide such reasons and such care. This is because of a central feature in Daniels' account, namely that care should be provided to restore people's opportunities. Daniels' view is both unable to provide pain relief to those who need it as a supplement to treatment and, without justice-based reasons to provide palliative care to those whose opportunities cannot be restored. We conclude that this makes Daniels' framework much less attractive.
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Floridi L. Toleration and the Design of Norms. SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS 2015; 21:1095-1123. [PMID: 25287376 DOI: 10.1007/s11948-014-9589-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/23/2014] [Accepted: 09/05/2014] [Indexed: 06/03/2023]
Abstract
One of the pressing challenges we face today-in a post-Westphalian order (emergence of the state as the modern, political information agent) and post-Bretton Woods world (emergence of non-state multiagent systems or MASs as "hyperhistorical" players in the global economy and politics)-is how to design the right kind of MAS that can take full advantage of the socio-economic and political progress made so far, while dealing successfully with the new global challenges that are undermining the best legacy of that very progress. This is the topic of the article. In it, I argue that (i) in order to design the right kind of MAS, we need to design the right kind of norms that constitute them; (ii) in order to design the right kind of constitutive norms, we need to identify and adopt the right kind of principles of normative design; (iii) toleration is one of those principles; (iv) unfortunately, its role as a foundation for the design of norms has been undermined by the "paradox of toleration"; (v) however, the paradox can be solved; (vi) so toleration can be re-instated as the right kind of foundational principle for the design of the right kind of norms that can constitute the right kind of MAS that can operate across cultures, societies and states, to help us to tackle the new global challenges facing us.
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