Increased interference from conflicting perspectives and gender differences: A longitudinal study during adolescence

Adolescents need to develop adequate perspective-taking skills to successfully navigate their increasingly complex social environments. This study investigated adolescents' development of the cognitive processes of egocentric and altercentric interference that influence perspective-taking abilities. Using the Dot Perspective Task, participants' (N = 803; 50.9% female) egocentric and altercentric interference was measured during 3 consecutive years from 12 to 14 years of age. Linear mixed model analyses showed that whereas overall task performance improved over time, egocentric and altercentric interference increased over time. These results suggest that perspective taking develops at slower rates when there are conflicting perspectives than in situations with no conflict. Moreover, we found that girls showed less egocentric interference than boys. This result provides task-based evidence that supports previous findings of higher self-reported perspective taking in adolescent girls than in adolescent boys.

Shared social groups or shared experiences? The effect of shared knowledge on children's perspective-taking

Although the ability to consider others' visual perspectives to interpret ambiguous communication emerges during childhood, people sometimes fail to attend to their partner's perspective. Two studies investigated whether 4- to 6-year-olds show a "closeness-communication bias" in their consideration of a partner's perspective in a communication task. Participants played a game that required them to take their partner's visual perspective in order to interpret an ambiguous instruction. If children, like adults, perform worse when they overestimate the extent to which their perspective is aligned with that of a partner, then they should make more perspective-taking errors when interacting with a socially close partner compared with a more socially distant partner. In Study 1, social closeness was based on belonging to the same social group. In Study 2, social closeness was based on caregiving, a long-standing social relationship with a close kinship bond. Although social group membership did not affect children's consideration of their partner's perspective, children did make more perspective-taking errors when interacting with a close caregiver compared with a novel experimenter. These findings suggest that close personal relationships may be more likely to lead children to overestimate perspective alignment and hinder children's perspective-taking than shared social group membership, and they highlight important questions about the mechanisms underlying the effects of partner characteristics in perspective-taking tasks.

Development of beliefs about censorship

Across four studies (total N = 431), we examined 5- to 10-year-old children's choices to censor depictions of harm. In all studies, children learned about (fictional) movies that depicted harmful behaviors and decided whether specific audiences should be allowed to watch those movies. In Study 1, children often censored depictions of harms and did so similarly when considering both themselves and another hypothetical child as the viewer. At the same time, children did not censor indiscriminately: Children censored depictions of intentional harms more than accidental harms and, in Study 2, children (and adults; N = 101) censored harms (especially intentional ones) more from younger versus older audiences. In Studies 3 and 4, we more directly tested children's motivations for censoring harms, examining dual potential motivations of 1) preventing viewers from feeling sad; and 2) preventing viewers from being inspired to engage in harmful behaviors. We found that children who were motivated to avoid inspiring harmful behaviors were especially likely to censor depictions of harmful intentions. Together, our results indicate that children make sophisticated decisions regarding censorship and underscore an early emerging motivation to disrupt cascades of harmful behavior. These findings hold implications for children's thinking about the psychological and behavioral consequences of harm and for children's thinking about the potential effects of media on themselves and others.

Children's memory for gender-neutral pronouns

Are there disparities in children's memory for gender-neutral pronouns compared with gendered pronouns? We explored this question in two preregistered studies with 4- to 10-year-old children (N = 168; 79 boys, 89 girls, 0 gender-diverse). Participants were presented with a memory task. An experimenter read an illustrated story about a target character. Participants were asked to verbally repeat the story to measure spontaneous pronoun use and then to explicitly recall the characters' pronouns. In Study 1 the story characters had typically feminine or typically masculine appearances (determined by independent raters), whereas in Study 2 the characters had gender-neutral appearances. In both studies, targets were referred to with gendered or gender-neutral pronouns. In both studies, children more accurately recalled gendered pronouns than gender-neutral pronouns. However, on most tasks, children only used "they" if a character had gender-neutral pronouns, and almost never used "they" if a character had gendered pronouns. We also found some evidence suggesting that older children more accurately recall gender-neutral pronouns compared with younger children.

How cues to social categorization impact children's inferences about social categories

Social categorization involves two crucial processes: First, children seek properties on which they can categorize individuals, i.e., they learn to form social categories; then children make inferences based on social category membership and might develop affective responses toward social categories. Over the last decade, a growing number of research in developmental psychology started to use novel social categories to investigate how children learn and reason about social categories. To date, three types of cues have been put forward as means to form social categories, namely linguistic, visual, and behavioral cues. Based on social category membership, children draw inferences about the shared properties of social category members and about how social category members ought to behave and interact with each other. With additional input, children might apply essentialist beliefs to social categories and develop affective responses toward social categories. This article aims to provide key insights on the development of stereotypes and intergroup biases by reviewing recent works that investigated how children learn to form novel social categories and the kind of inferences they make about these novel social categories.

Blurred boundaries between us and them: Do young children affiliate with outgroup members with shared preferences?

Children tend to assume that their ingroup members are more likely to share their preferences than outgroup members, but group membership and shared preferences need not be congruent in reality. The current study investigated 76 3- to 6-year-old children's baseline intergroup attitudes in a minimal group context and their subsequent attitudes after being informed that either (a) their ingroup, but not their outgroup, shared their preferences or (b) their outgroup, but not their ingroup, shared their preferences. Cues about shared preferences affected children's intergroup biases to some extent, such that children tended to like their outgroup more and to allocate resources fairly among their ingroup and outgroup when they learned that their outgroup shared their preferences. However, intergroup biases were robust in some measures, such that children reported high ingroup liking and demonstrated ingroup favoritism in behavioral attribution regardless of whether they learned that their ingroup or outgroup shared their preferences. Children were also administered measures tapping into cognitive flexibility, but there was no coherent evidence that children's cognitive flexibility was related to their initial intergroup attitudes or their subsequent intergroup attitudes after learning that their ingroup or outgroup shared their preferences. The current study demonstrates a nuanced picture of intergroup biases, such that these biases might not be entirely entrenched but can nonetheless be robust in the face of conflicting cues about group membership and shared preferences. Furthermore, the importance of investigating intergroup biases at the individual level, rather than only at the group level, is discussed.

The power of allies: Infants' expectations of social obligations during intergroup conflict

Many species of animals form social allegiances to enhance survival. Across disciplines, researchers have suggested that allegiances form to facilitate within group cooperation and defend each other against rival groups. Here, we explore humans' reasoning about social allegiances and obligations beginning in infancy, long before they have experience with intergroup conflict. In Experiments 1 and 2, we demonstrate that infants (17-19 months, and 9-13 months, respectively) expect a social ally to intervene and provide aid during an episode of intergroup conflict. Experiment 3 conceptually replicated the results of Experiments 1 and 2. Together, this set of experiments reveals that humans' understanding of social obligation and loyalty may be innate, and supported by infants' naïve sociology.

Susceptibility to prosocial and antisocial influence in adolescence

Introduction

Adolescents are particularly susceptible to social influence and previous studies have shown that this susceptibility decreases with age. The current study used a cross-sectional experimental paradigm to investigate the effect of age and puberty on susceptibility to both prosocial and antisocial influence.

Methods

Participants (N = 520) aged 11–18 from London and Cambridge (United Kingdom) rated how likely they would be to engage in a prosocial (e.g. “help a classmate with their work”) or antisocial (e.g. “make fun of a classmate”) act. They were then shown the average rating (in fact fictitious) that other adolescents had given to the same question, and were then asked to rate the same behaviour again.

Results

Both prosocial and antisocial influence decreased linearly with age, with younger adolescents being more socially influenced when other adolescents’ ratings were more prosocial and less antisocial than their own initial rating. Both antisocial and prosocial influence significantly decreased across puberty for boys but not girls (independent of age).

Conclusions

These findings suggest that social influence declines with increasing maturity across adolescence. However, the exact relationship between social influence and maturity is dependent on the nature of the social influence and gender. Understanding when adolescents are most susceptible to different types of social influence, and how this might influence their social behaviour, has important implications for understanding adolescent social development.

Young children and adults associate social power with indifference to others' needs

In hierarchical societies, what do we expect from people at the top? Early in life, children use horizontal relationships (e.g., affiliation) to predict selectivity in others' prosocial behavior. But it is unknown whether children also view asymmetries in prosocial behavior as characteristic of vertical relationships (e.g., differences in social power). In two experiments, we investigated 4- to 7-year-old children's and adults' (N = 192) intuitions about links among relative authority status, helpful action, and unhelpful inaction. In Experiment 1, participants at all ages viewed a character who chose not to help another person as holding a position of authority over them; participants also viewed this unhelpful character as being less nice than the person in need. However, no age group made consistent inferences about the relative authority of a helper and a helpee. In Experiment 2, children had mixed intuitions when separately predicting whether high- and low-authority characters would be helpful in the future. However, older children and adults consistently indicated that a subordinate would be more likely than an authority to help a third party. These findings establish that children's social theories include expectations for links between power and prosociality by at least the preschool years. Whereas some judgments in this domain are stable from 4 years of age onward, others emerge gradually. Whether consistent responses occurred early or only later in development, however, all measures converged on a single intuition: People more easily associate authority with indifference to others' needs.

The development and consequences of moral essentialism

Children report that many natural kinds, social groups, and psychological characteristics arise from an innate, internal "essence" that is rooted in biology and remains stable over time. These perceptions persist into adulthood, albeit often in weakened form. This chapter argues that in addition to the domains previously examined in the essentialism literature, children-and to some extent adults-also view moral characteristics in essentialist terms. This form of essentialism has important social consequences, including in the area of prosocial behavior and in the legal domain. The body of evidence reviewed here suggests that children's and adults' moral judgments depend not just on what people do but also on perceptions of who those people are, i.e., whether they are people of good or bad moral character.

Groups as moral boundaries: A developmental perspective

In this chapter we present the perspective that social groups serve as moral boundaries. Social groups establish the bounds within which people hold moral obligations toward one another. The belief that people are morally obligated toward fellow social group members, but not toward members of other groups, is an early-emerging feature of human cognition, arising out of domain-general processes in conceptual development. We review evidence that supports this account from the adult and child moral cognition literature, and we describe the developmental processes by which people come to view social groups as shaping moral obligation. We conclude with suggestions about how this account can inform the study of social cognitive development more broadly, as well as how it can be used to promote positive moral socialization.

Group presence, category labels, and generic statements influence children to treat descriptive group regularities as prescriptive

Children use descriptive regularities of social groups (what is) to generate prescriptive judgments (what should be). We examined whether this tendency held when the regularities were introduced through group presence, category labels, or generic statements. Children (ages 4-9years, N=203) were randomly assigned to one of four conditions that manipulated how descriptive group regularities were presented: group presence (e.g., "These ones [a group of three individuals] eat this kind of berry"), category labels (e.g., "This [individual] Hibble eats this kind of berry"), generic statements (e.g., [showing an individual] "Hibbles eat this kind of berry"), or control (e.g., "This one [individual] eats this kind of berry"). Then, children saw conforming and non-conforming individuals and were asked to evaluate their behavior. As predicted, children evaluated non-conformity negatively in all conditions except the control condition. Together, these results suggest that minimal perceptual and linguistic cues provoke children to treat social groups as having normative force.

In the name of God: How children and adults judge agents who act for religious versus secular reasons

Many people are guided by religious beliefs, but judgments of religiously and secularly motivated individuals remain unclear. We investigated reasoning about religiously versus secularly motivated characters among 5- to 10-year-olds and adults. In Study 1, theist and non-theist children reported similar attitudes toward theists; however, large differences emerged between theist and non-theist adults. Study 2 obtained similar results using a continuous, rather than forced choice, measure of preference. Additionally, Studies 2-3 tested two explanations for the stronger influence of religious background on adults' versus children's responses. Study 2 did not find strong evidence for the theistic majority account, which posits that the greater perceived prevalence of theists as compared with non-theists influenced children's responses more than adults' responses. The results of Study 3 were consistent with the intuition account, which argues that non-theist adults had effortfully overridden the teleological intuitions that may have influenced children's responses in Studies 1-2 and potentially led children to prefer characters whose beliefs were in line with children's own intuitions. The degree to which teleological intuitions persisted implicitly among adults predicted those adults' pro-theist preferences. These findings offer connections between religious judgments and other areas of social cognition, such as social preferences and teleology.

Goal attributions and instrumental helping at 14 and 24 months of age

Infants reason about goals and helping as early as 3 months of age, but toddlers fail to help others appropriately until well into the second year. Five experiments explored the reasons for this discrepancy. First, we verified that 14-month-old toddlers encode the goal of an actor's reaching action, in a situation in which a social agent selectively reaches for one of two objects. Then, four further experiments presented toddlers with a social agent who manifested her goal in this manner when the two objects were accessible, and then requested help in obtaining her goal object when the two objects were out of reach. In all the experiments, toddlers responded to the actor's request for help by handing her an out-of-reach object, showing that they understood that a prosocial action was called for and were motivated to perform it. When the two objects had moved out of the social agent's sight so that she could not indicate the goal object directly, 24-month-old children used her prior goal-directed action to select the appropriate goal object, but 14-month-old toddlers did not. The 14-month-olds toddlers helped appropriately only when no attribution of enduring goals was necessary, because the social agent could see the out-of-reach object and both looked at and reached toward it while making her request. These findings suggest striking limits to 14-month-old toddlers' understanding of helping.

How Children and Adults Represent God's Mind

For centuries, humans have contemplated the minds of gods. Research on religious cognition is spread across sub-disciplines, making it difficult to gain a complete understanding of how people reason about gods' minds. We integrate approaches from cognitive, developmental, and social psychology and neuroscience to illuminate the origins of religious cognition. First, we show that although adults explicitly discriminate supernatural minds from human minds, their implicit responses reveal far less discrimination. Next, we demonstrate that children's religious cognition often matches adults' implicit responses, revealing anthropomorphic notions of God's mind. Together, data from children and adults suggest the intuitive nature of perceiving God's mind as human-like. We then propose three complementary explanations for why anthropomorphism persists in adulthood, suggesting that anthropomorphism may be (a) an instance of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic; (b) a reflection of early testimony; and/or (c) an evolutionary byproduct.

Verbal framing of statistical evidence drives children's preference inferences

Although research has shown that statistical information can support children's inferences about specific psychological causes of others' behavior, previous work leaves open the question of how children interpret statistical information in more ambiguous situations. The current studies investigated the effect of specific verbal framing information on children's ability to infer mental states from statistical regularities in behavior. We found that preschool children inferred others' preferences from their statistically non-random choices only when they were provided with verbal information placing the person's behavior in a specifically preference-related context, not when the behavior was presented in a non-mentalistic action context or an intentional choice context. Furthermore, verbal framing information showed some evidence of supporting children's mental state inferences even from more ambiguous statistical data. These results highlight the role that specific, relevant framing information can play in supporting children's ability to derive novel insights from statistical information.

Shared function knowledge: infants' attention to function information in communicative contexts

Humans are specifically adapted to knowledge acquisition and transfer by social communication. According to natural pedagogy theory, infants are highly sensitive to signals that indicate a teacher's communicative intention and are biased to interpret communicative contexts as conveying relevant and generalizable knowledge that is also shared by other conspecifics. We investigated whether infants as young as 12 months interpret ostensively communicated object-directed emotion expressions as generalizable and shareable with others. Given that young infants pay particular attention to information about objects' functions, we were interested in whether the shareability assumption also holds for emotional attitudes toward functional features of unfamiliar objects. The results suggest that 12-month-olds (N=80) flexibly interpret another person's emotion displays toward unfamiliar artifacts either as object-centered and generalizable attitudes or as person-centered subjective attitudes, depending on the communicative characteristics of the learning context. Furthermore, the transfer of ostensively communicated information about the artifacts depended on their functional usability, which is consistent with infants' early sensitivity to function information in various areas of cognitive development.