Does End-of-Life Planning Help Partners Become Better Surrogates?

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This study investigates the role of surrogates' involvement in their partners' end-of-life care planning, focusing on the relationship between the extent and type of end-of-life planning in which surrogates have been involved and the accuracy of their substituted judgments.

DESIGN AND METHODS

The data come from an internet survey collected by Knowledge Networks and the National Center for Family and Marriage Research. The national sample is comprised of 1,075 opposite-sex American couples aged 18-64. A series of multilevel negative binomial regression analyses were conducted.

RESULTS

Surrogates' involvement in multiple types of planning helped them to make accurate substituted judgments, whereas surrogates' involvement in informal discussions helped them to make accurate estimations primarily when they wanted limited care for themselves.

IMPLICATIONS

This study highlights the importance of engaging in both advance directives and informal discussion. The findings also suggest that surrogates who want extensive care for themselves may need extra attention when practitioners assist them in making a substituted judgment.

Prediction of life-story narrative for end-of-life surrogate's decision-making is inadequate: a Q-methodology study

Background

Substituted judgment assumes adequate knowledge of patient’s mind-set. However, surrogates’ prediction of individual healthcare decisions is often inadequate and may be based on shared background rather than patient-specific knowledge. It is not known whether surrogate’s prediction of patient’s integrative life-story narrative is better.

Methods

Respondents in 90 family pairs (30 husband-wife, 30 parent-child, 30 sibling-sibling) rank-ordered 47 end-of-life statements as life-story narrative measure (Q-sort) and completed instruments on decision-control preference and healthcare-outcomes acceptability as control measures, from respondent’s view (respondent-personal) and predicted pair’s view (respondent-surrogate). They also scored their confidence in surrogate’s decision-making (0 to 4 = maximum) and familiarity with pair’s healthcare-preferences (1 to 4 = maximum). Life-story narratives’ prediction was examined by calculating correlation of statements’ ranking scores between respondent-personal and respondent-surrogate Q-sorts (projection) and between respondent-surrogate and pair-personal Q-sorts before (simulation) and after controlling for correlation with respondent-personal scores (adjusted-simulation), and by comparing percentages of respondent-surrogate Q-sorts co-loading with pair-personal vs. respondent-personal Q-sorts. Accuracy in predicting decision-control preference and healthcare-outcomes acceptability was determined by percent concordance. Results were compared among subgroups defined by intra-pair relationship, surrogate’s decision-making confidence, and healthcare-preferences familiarity.

Results

Mean (SD) age was 35.4 (10.3) years, 69% were females, and 73 and 80% reported ≥ very good health and life-quality, respectively. Mean surrogate’s decision-making confidence score was 3.35 (0.58) and 75% were ≥ familiar with pair’s healthcare-preferences. Mean (95% confidence interval) projection, simulation, and adjusted-simulation correlations were 0.68 (0.67–0.69), 0.42 (0.40–0.44), and 0.26 (0.24–0.28), respectively. Out of 180 respondent-surrogate Q-sorts, 24, 9, and 32% co-loaded with respondent-personal, pair-personal, or both Q-sorts, respectively. Accuracy in predicting decision-control preference and healthcare-outcomes acceptability was 47 and 52%, respectively. Surrogate’s decision-making confidence score correlated with adjusted-simulation’s correlation score (rho = 0.18, p = 0.01). There were significant differences among the husband-wife, parent-child, and sibling-sibling subgroups in percentage of respondent-surrogate Q-sorts co-loading with pair-personal Q-sorts (38, 32, 55%, respectively, p = 0.03) and percent agreement on healthcare-outcomes acceptability (55, 35, and 67%, respectively, p = 0.002).

Conclusions

Despite high self-reported surrogate’s decision-making confidence and healthcare-preferences familiarity, family surrogates are variably inadequate in simulating life-story narratives. Simulation accuracy may not follow the next-of-kin concept and is 38% based on shared background.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (10.1186/s12910-019-0368-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Does difficulty functioning in the surrogate role equate to vulnerability in critical illness research? Use of path analysis to examine the relationship between difficulty providing substituted judgment and receptivity to critical illness research participation

PURPOSE

Individuals who struggle to provide substitute judgment for the critically ill often find it challenging to engage in decision making for therapeutic interventions. Although essential to the conduct of research, how these individuals respond to requests for clinical trial participation is poorly understood.

METHODS

Survey data collected to examine surrogate attitudes toward research provided the conceptual framework to explore influences on decision making. Path analysis was used to derive the final model (nonlatent, fully recursive, 1 indicator/variable).

RESULTS

Surrogates with list-wise complete records (406) were analyzed. The following variables were not retained in the final model: education, income, religiosity, decision-making experience, discussion of patient's wishes, number of individuals assisting with decision making, trust in care providers, difficulty making decisions, and responsibility for decision making. Being white and having experience making treatment decisions for the patient during the current intensive care unit encounter affected the likelihood the surrogate would permit participation in research positively (parameter estimates, 0.281 and 0.06, respectively). No variable reflecting difficulty functioning in the surrogate role was associated with permitting research participation.

CONCLUSIONS

We were unable to demonstrate a relationship between perceived difficulty in decision making in the surrogate role and receptivity to clinical trial participation.

Making Medical Decisions for Incapacitated Patients Without Proxies: Part II

In the United States, there is no consensus about who should make decisions in acute but non-emergent situations for incapacitated patients who lack surrogates. For more than a decade, our academic medical center has utilized community volunteers from the hospital ethics committee to engage in shared decision-making with the medical providers for these patients. In order to add a different point of view and minimize conflict of interest, the volunteers are non-clinicians who are not employed by the hospital. Using case examples and interviews with the community members, this paper describes how the protocol has translated into practice over the years since its inception. Members reported comfort with the role as well as satisfaction with the thoroughness of their discussions with the medical team. They acknowledged feelings of moral uncertainty, but expressed confidence in the process. Questions raised by the experience are discussed. Overall, the protocol has provided oversight, transparency, and protection from conflict of interest to the decision-making process for this vulnerable patient population.

Ethics in the Setting of Burned Patients

This article considers multiple ethical principles in the context of patients with burns. It explores the application of these principles to burn care and the impact on medical decision making, through several clinical vignettes.

Informed Consent and Decision-Making for Patients with Acquired Cognitive Impairment

Informed consent (IC) is an ethical and legal requirement grounded in the principle of autonomy. Cognitive impairment may often interfere with decision-making capacity necessitating alternative models of ethically sound deliberation. In cases where the patient lacks decision-making capacity, one must determine the appropriate decision-maker and the criteria used in making a medical decision appropriate for the patient. In this article, I critically discuss the traditional approaches of IC, advance directives, substituted judgment, and best interests. A further suggestion is that thinking about sufficient reasons for or against a course of action is a conceptual enrichment in addition to the concepts of interests and well-being. Finally, I propose another model of collective consensus-seeking decision-making.

Surrogate consent to non-beneficial research: erring on the right side when substituted judgments may be inaccurate

Part of the standard protection of decisionally incapacitated research subjects is a prohibition against enrolling them unless surrogate decision makers authorize it. A common view is that surrogates primarily ought to make their decisions based on what the decisionally incapacitated subject would have wanted regarding research participation. However, empirical studies indicate that surrogate predictions about such preferences are not very accurate. The focus of this article is the significance of surrogate accuracy in the context of research that is not expected to benefit the research subject. We identify three morally relevant asymmetries between being enrolled and not being enrolled in such non-beneficial research, and conclude that when there is a non-negligible probability that surrogates' predictions are wrong, it will generally be better to err on the side of not authorizing enrollment.

Non-Psychiatric Treatment Refusal in Patients with Depression: How Should Surrogate Decision-Makers Represent the Patient's Authentic Wishes?

Patients with mental illness, and depression in particular, present clinicians and surrogate decision-makers with complex ethical dilemmas when they refuse life-sustaining non-psychiatric treatment. When treatment rejection is at variance with the beliefs and preferences that could be expected based on their premorbid or "authentic" self, their capacity to make these decisions may be called into question. If capacity cannot be demonstrated, medical decisions fall to surrogates who are usually advised to decide based on a substituted judgment standard or, when that is not possible, best interest. We propose that in cases where the patient meets the widely accepted cognitive criteria for capacity but is making decisions that appear inauthentic, the surrogate may best uphold patient autonomy by following a "restorative representation" model. We see restorative representation as a subset of substituted judgement in which the decision-maker retains responsibility for deciding as the patient would have, but discerns the decision their "truest self" would make, rather than inferring their current wishes, which are directly influenced by illness. Here we present a case in which the patient's treatment refusal and previously undiagnosed depression led to difficulty determining the patient's authentic wishes and placed a distressing burden on the surrogate decision-maker. We use this case to examine how clinicians and ethicists might better advise surrogates who find themselves making these clinically and emotionally challenging decisions.