Deception, intention and clinical practice

Regarding the appropriateness of deception in clinical practice, two (apparently conflicting) claims are often emphasised. First, that 'clinicians should not deceive their patients.' Second, that deception is sometimes 'in a patient's best interest.' Recently, Hardman has worked towards resolving this conflict by exploring ways in which deceptive and non-deceptive practices extend beyond consideration of patients' beliefs. In short, some practices only seem deceptive because of the (common) assumption that non-deceptive care is solely aimed at fostering true beliefs. Non-deceptive care, however, relates to patients' non-doxastic attitudes in important ways as well. As such, Hardman suggests that by focusing on belief alone, we sometimes misidentify non-deceptive care as 'deceptive'. Further, once we consider patients' beliefs and non-doxastic attitudes, identifying cases of deception becomes more difficult than it may seem. In this essay, I argue that Hardman's reasoning contains at least three serious flaws. First, his account of deception is underdeveloped, as it does not state whether deception must be intentional. The problem is that if intention is not required, absurd results follow. Alternatively, if intention is required, then identifying cases of deception will be much easier (in principle) than Hardman suggests. Second, Hardman mischaracterises the 'inverse' of deceptive care. Doing so leads to the mistaken conclusion that common conceptions of non-deceptive care are unjustifiably narrow. Third, Hardman fails to adequately separate questions about deception from questions about normativity. By addressing these issues, however, we can preserve some of Hardman's most important insights, although in a much simpler, more principled way.

Patient autonomy in an East-Asian cultural milieu: a critique of the individualism-collectivism model

The practice of medicine-and especially the patient-doctor relationship-has seen exceptional shifts in ethical standards of care over the past few years, which by and large originate in occidental countries and are then extrapolated worldwide. However, this phenomenon is blind to the fact that an ethical practice of medicine remains hugely dependent on prevailing cultural and societal expectations of the community in which it serves. One model aiming to conceptualise the dichotomous efforts for global standardisation of medical care against differing sociocultural expectations is the individualism-collectivism model, with the 'West' being seen as individualistic and the 'East' being seen as collectivistic. This has been used by many academics to explain differences in approach towards ethical practice on key concepts such as informed consent and patient autonomy. However, I argue that this characterisation is incomplete and lacks nuance into the complexities surrounding cross-cultural ethics in practice, and I propose an alternative model based on the ethics of clinical care in Hong Kong, China. Core ethical principles need not be culture-bound-indeed, their very existence mandates for them to be universal and non-derogable-but instead cultural alignment occurs in the particular implementation of these principles, insofar as they respect the general spirit of contemporary ethical standards.

Attitudes of Physicians in Jordan Towards Non-Disclosure of Health Information

Objectives

This report aims to investigate the attitudes of physicians in Jordan towards non-disclosure of health information among physicians, with a focus on those who are 'always truthful' and those who are not.

Methods

The report is based on the second subset of data from a cross-sectional study-conducted between January and August 2016-of the truth disclosure practices among and attitudes of physicians in Jordan. The sample consisted of 240 physicians selected from four major hospitals by stratified random sampling and invited to complete a self-administered questionnaire regarding truth disclosure attitudes. The attitudes of physicians who were 'always truthful' were compared with those who were not.

Results

A total of 164 physicians (response rate: 68%) completed the questionnaire. Of these, 17 (10%) were 'always truthful', while the remaining 144 (90%) were not. Physicians who were 'always truthful' were more likely to indicate that non-disclosure is 'unethical' (77% versus 39%; P = 0.009). Moreover, physicians who were 'always truthful' were more likely to disagree that non-disclosure is beneficial for the physical and psychological health of patients (82% versus 55%; P = 0.03). Most of the surveyed physicians agreed that all patients have the right to know their diagnosis, most patients prefer to know their diagnosis and the introduction of legislation to enforce disclosure would positively affect medical practice in Jordan.

Conclusion

The differential attitudes of physicians who were 'always truthful' and those who were 'not always truthful' suggests a rationale behind independent non-disclosure; namely, that non-disclosure is ethically justifiable and beneficial for the physical and psychological health of patients.

[Announcement of a serious illness to a child]

Announcement of a serious illness to a child. Critically ill children should be directly informed about their illness, in a way that is appropriate to their age, family context and alliance with themselves and their parents. The process of the announcement of the diagnosis does not correspond to an isolated moment but must be conceived in successive stages, respecting a different rhythm of progression in the child and in each of his parents, even if sometimes the clinical circumstances require the initiation of treatment fairly quickly. The synthetic principle of informing "without violence or betrayal" guides the conditions for the announcement of the diagnosis of pediatric serious illness, both to parents and to the sick child.

Aid-in-dying laws and the physician's duty to inform

On 19 July 2016, three medical organisations filed a federal lawsuit against representatives from several Vermont agencies over the Patient Choice and Control at End of Life Act. The law is similar to aid-in-dying (AID) laws in four other US states, but the lawsuit hinges on a distinctive aspect of Vermont's law pertaining to patients' rights to information. The lawsuit raises questions about whether, and under what circumstances, there is an ethical obligation to inform terminally ill patients about AID as an end-of-life option. Much of the literature on clinical communication about AID addresses how physicians should respond to patient requests for assisted dying, but neglects the question of how physicians should approach patients who may not know enough about AID to request it. In this article, I examine the possibility of an affirmative duty to inform terminally ill patients about AID in light of ethical concerns about professional responsibilities to patients and the maintenance of the patient-provider relationship. I suggest that we should not take for granted that communication about AID ought to be patient-initiated, and that there may be circumstances in which physicians have good reasons to introduce the topic themselves. By identifying ethical considerations that ought to inform such discussions, I aim to set an agenda for future bioethical research that adopts a broader perspective on clinical communication about AID.

An Overview of Teaching Communication of Bad News in Medical School: Should a Lecture be Adequate to Address the Topic?

INTRODUCTION

Delivering bad news is very common in medical daily practice. Several studies have shown a lack of effective communication skills amongst medical students, particularly concerning how to deliver bad news. The SPIKES protocol allows communicating bad news in a 6-step method. The aim of this study is to investigate the perspective of students related to this subject.

MATERIAL AND METHODS

A 45 minute lecture "Breaking Bad News" was given to 160 students in the fifth and sixth years of the Medicine course, using the SPIKES' protocol training. After the lecture, an online survey was given to all students, and a cross-sectional and descriptive analysis of data extracted from survey was undertaken.

RESULTS

Fifty-four students (21% of overall) answered the online survey. Eighty three percent said that theme should have an important role in their further daily medical practice, and most of students rated the physicians' role as challenging. Sixty percent of students expressed that communicating bad news was an integral part of the medical course curriculum. Regarding the SPIKES´ protocol, 48% felt that the first step would be the easiest to put in practice, and 40% felt that the fifth step related to "Emotions" would be the most difficult.

DISCUSSION

In general, the students would like to gain competencies in breaking bad news using a practical approach Conclusions: Students highly valued theoretical and practical approaches in teaching of communication of bad news. Therefore, we encourage a combination approach in pre-graduate medical education.

Parsing placebo treatments: a response to Barnhill and Miller

Anne Barnhill and Franklin Miller dispute my claim that the prescriptions of placebo treatments to patients are not typically deceptive, and do not typically violate the patients' informed consent. However, Barnhill and Miller seriously mischaracterise my position in two ways, as well as failing to show that the procedure I discuss requires a physician to act wrongfully in deceiving her patient. Accordingly, I find their argument unpersuasive.

Medical maternalism: beyond paternalism and antipaternalism

This paper argues that the concept of paternalism is currently overextended to include a variety of actions that, while resembling paternalistic actions, are importantly different. I use the example of Japanese physicians' non-disclosures of cancer diagnoses directly to patients, arguing that the concept of maternalism better captures these actions. To act paternalistically is to substitute one's own judgement for that of another person and decide in place of that person for his/her best interest. By contrast, to act maternalistically is to decide for another person based on a reasonable understanding of that person's own preferences. The concept of maternalism allows for a more thorough assessment of the moral justification of these types of actions. I conclude that it is possible, at least in principle, to justify Japanese physicians' non-disclosures, and that this justification must be based on an understanding of these actions as maternalistic.

Placebo treatments, informed consent and 'the grip of a false picture'

It is widely supposed that the prescription of placebo treatments to patients for therapeutic purposes is ethically problematic on the grounds that the patient cannot give informed consent to the treatment, and is therefore deceived by the physician. This claim, I argue, rests on two confusions: one concerning the meaning of 'informed consent' and its relation to the information available to the patient, and another concerning the relation of body and mind. Taken together, these errors lead naturally to the conclusion that the prescription of placebos to unwitting patients is unethical. Once they are dispelled, I argue, we can see that providing 'full' information against a background of metaphysical confusion may make a patient less informed and that the 'therapeutic' goal of relieving the patient of such confusions is properly the duty of the philosopher rather than the physician. Therapeutic placebos therefore do not violate the patient's informed consent or the ethical duties of the doctor.

Understanding, interests and informed consent: a reply to Sreenivasan

It is widely agreed that the view of informed consent found in the regulations and guidelines struggles to keep pace with the ever-advancing enterprise of human subjects research. Over the last 10 years, there have been serious attempts to rethink informed consent so that it conforms to our considered judgments about cases where we are confident valid consent has been given. These arguments are influenced by an argument from Gopal Sreenivasan, which apparently shows that a potential participant's consent to research participation can be perfectly valid even if she fails to understand the risk-benefit profile of the study. I argue that Sreenivasan's argument fails. The set of clinical trials that is supposed to be ethical in the face of this kind of ignorance is empty. However, I argue that his argument is nonetheless instructive in allowing us to identify three important but neglected areas for future conceptual research on informed consent. I close by arguing that research on these identified questions promises to yield a defensible view of consent, lessen the burden of ambiguity on researchers attempting to obtain consent to research participation, and facilitate socially valuable research.

Care ethics for guiding the process of multiple sclerosis diagnosis

Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a chronic neurological disorder for which there is no definitive diagnostic test. Uncertainty characterises most of its features with diagnosis reached through a process of elimination. Coping with uncertainty has been recognised as a significant problem for MS patients. Discussions in the literature concerning the ethics of MS diagnosis have focused on an ethics of duty emphasising the rules for disclosure and healthcare professionals' obligations to provide information to patients. This narrow construal of the ethics at stake with MS diagnosis may be driven by a common misperception that diagnosis is an event, or series of events, rather than a process. Scant attention has been given to the dynamic, situated relational space between patient and physician as they journey potentially together (or apart) through the process of diagnosis. The healthcare provider cannot properly judge 'the how, what and when' of MS disclosure merely by applying rules pertaining to general professional duties to tell the truth and patients' rights to know their medical status. Proper disclosure and effective communication require the practice of flexible, caring responsibility and sustained, ongoing attention to the particular relational needs of 'this' patient in her own situational context. Accordingly, this article argues that care ethics is especially useful (but not without certain limitations) for attending to a broader swath of responsibilities (different from minimal duties) and affective components implicated in meeting patients' overall needs for care as the patient and physician cope with uncertainty through the process of establishing an MS diagnosis.

Giving bad news: a qualitative research exploration

BACKGROUND

The manner in which healthcare professionals deliver bad news affects the way it is received, interpreted, understood, and dealt with. Despite the fact that clinicians are responsible for breaking bad news, it has been shown that they lack skills necessary to perform this task.

OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this study was to explore Iranian mothers' experiences to receive bad news about their children cancer and to summarize suggestions for improving delivering bad news by healthcare providers.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

A qualitative approach using content analysis was adopted. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 14 mothers from two pediatric hospitals in Iran.

RESULTS

Five major categories emerged from the data analysis, including dumping information, shock and upset, emotional work, burden of delivering bad news to the family members, and a room for multidisciplinary approach.

CONCLUSIONS

Effective communication of healthcare team with mothers is required during breaking bad news. Using multidisciplinary approaches to prevent harmful reactions and providing appropriate support are recommended.

Discovering misattributed paternity in genetic counselling: different ethical perspectives in two countries

Misattributed paternity or 'false' paternity is when a man is wrongly thought, by himself and possibly by others, to be the biological father of a child. Nowadays, because of the progression of genetics and genomics the possibility of finding misattributed paternity during familial genetic testing has increased. In contrast to other medical information, which pertains primarily to individuals, information obtained by genetic testing and/or pedigree analysis necessarily has implications for other biologically related members in the family. Disclosing or not a misattributed paternity has a number of different biological and social consequences for the people involved. Such an issue presents important ethical and deontological challenges. The debate centres on whether or not to inform the family and, particularly, whom in the family, about the possibility that misattributed paternity might be discovered incidentally, and whether or not it is the duty of the healthcare professional (HCP) to disclose the results and to whom. In this paper, we consider the different perspectives and reported problems, and analyse their cultural, ethical and legal dimensions. We compare the position of HCPs from an Italian and British point of view, particularly their role in genetic counselling. We discuss whether the Oviedo Convention of the Council of Europe (1997) can be seen as a basis for enriching the debate.

Disclosure of Cancer Information in Iran: a Perspective of Patients, Family Members, and Health Professionals

BACKGROUND

In the last decades cancer has become one of the important causes of death in Iran .This study examined perspective of a group of Iranian health professionals, patients and patients' family members regarding their view on disclosure of cancer information at a university hospital in Tehran, Iran.

METHODS

The method of study was qualitative semi-structured focused group content analysis. Two group leaders (psychologist and psychiatrist) run the focus groups. Oncologists, nurses, patients and family members participated in separate focus groups. Five group sessions were held to sum up the participants views in four major topics related to disclosure of cancer information to patients and families.

RESULTS

Most of physicians and nurses believed that disclosure of cancer diagnosis is a mistake. Family members think that it should be delivered gradually during stages of therapy based on patient's psychological state, but most of the patients consider truth telling as a patient right. All physicians, most of nurses and all the patients see the physician as a person responsible to break the diagnostic disclosure. All patients wanted the physicians to take the total control of decision-making process for their treatment.

CONCLUSION

Iranian physicians and nurses hesitate to disclose cancer diagnosis compared to patients, who want to know the truth. Patients, nurses and physicians consider the physician to be the person responsible for delivering the information of cancer diagnosis .Development and implementation of a protocol based on Iranian culture is a necessity.