The blind mind: No sensory visual imagery in aphantasia

For most people the use of visual imagery is pervasive in daily life, but for a small group of people the experience of visual imagery is entirely unknown. Research based on subjective phenomenology indicates that otherwise healthy people can completely lack the experience of visual imagery, a condition now referred to as aphantasia. As congenital aphantasia has thus far been based on subjective reports, it remains unclear whether individuals are really unable to imagine visually, or if they have very poor metacognition - they have images in their mind, but are blind to them. Here we measured sensory imagery in subjectively self-diagnosed aphantasics, using the binocular rivalry paradigm, as well as measuring their self-rated object and spatial imagery with multiple questionnaires (VVIQ, SUIS and OSIQ). Unlike, the general population, experimentally naive aphantasics showed almost no imagery-based rivalry priming. Aphantasic participants' self-rated visual object imagery was significantly below average, however their spatial imagery scores were above average. These data suggest that aphantasia is a condition involving a lack of sensory and phenomenal imagery, and not a lack of metacognition. The possible underlying neurological cause of aphantasia is discussed as well as future research directions.

Using a motor imagery questionnaire to estimate the performance of a Brain-Computer Interface based on object oriented motor imagery

OBJECTIVES

The primary objective was to test whether motor imagery (MI) questionnaires can be used to detect BCI 'illiterate'. The second objective was to test how different MI paradigms, with and without the physical presence of the goal of an action, influence a BCI classifier.

METHODS

Kinaesthetic (KI) and visual (VI) motor imagery questionnaires were administered to 30 healthy volunteers. Their EEG was recorded during a cue-based, simple imagery (SI) and goal oriented imagery (GOI).

RESULTS

The strongest correlation (Pearson r(2)=0.53, p=1.6e-5) was found between KI and SI, followed by a moderate correlation between KI and GOI (r(2)=0.33, p=0.001) and a weak correlation between VI and SI (r(2)=0.21, p=0.022) and VI and GOI (r(2)=0.17, p=0.05). Classification accuracy was similar for SI (71.1 ± 7.8%) and GOI (70.5 ± 5.9%) though corresponding classification features differed in 70% participants. Compared to SI, GOI improved the classification accuracy in 'poor' imagers while reducing the classification accuracy in 'very good' imagers.

CONCLUSION

The KI score could potentially be a useful tool to predict the performance of a MI based BCI. The physical presence of the object of an action facilitates motor imagination in 'poor' able-bodied imagers.

SIGNIFICANCE

Although this study shows results on able-bodied people, its general conclusions should be transferable to BCI based on MI for assisted rehabilitation of the upper extremities in patients.

Association between precuneus volume and autobiographical memory impairment in posterior cortical atrophy: Beyond the visual syndrome

Posterior cortical atrophy is a neurodegenerative syndrome characterised by progressive disruption of visual and perceptual processing, associated with atrophy in the parieto-occipital cortex. Current diagnostic criteria describe relative sparing of episodic memory function, but recent findings suggest that anterograde memory is often impaired. Whether these deficits extend to remote memory has not been addressed. A large body of evidence suggests that the recollection of an autobiographical event from the remote past coincides with the successful retrieval of visual images. We hypothesised that the profound visual processing deficits in posterior cortical atrophy would result in impaired autobiographical memory retrieval. Fourteen posterior cortical atrophy patients, eighteen typical Alzheimer's disease patients and twenty-eight healthy controls completed the Autobiographical Interview. Autobiographical memory in posterior cortical atrophy was characterised by a striking loss of internal, episodic detail relative to controls and to same extent as typical Alzheimer's disease patients, in conjunction with an increase in external details tangential to the memory described. The memory narratives of posterior cortical atrophy patients showed a specific reduction in spatiotemporal and perceptual detail. Voxel-based morphometry analysis revealed atrophy of the parieto-occipital cortices in posterior cortical atrophy but relatively spared hippocampi bilaterally, compared with characteristic atrophy of the medial temporal lobes in typical Alzheimer's disease. Analysis of brain regions showing posterior cortical atrophy-specific atrophy revealed a correlation between perceptual details in autobiographical memory and grey matter density in the right precuneus. This study demonstrates remote memory impairment in posterior cortical atrophy despite relatively preserved medial temporal lobe structures. The results demonstrate, for the first time, profound autobiographical memory impairment in PCA and suggest that this is driven by the well-recognised deficits in higher-order visual processing. The findings are discussed in the context of posterior parietal contributions to imagery and memory, and the clinical implications of autobiographical memory impairment for diagnostic and management protocols in posterior cortical atrophy.

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Autobiographical memory in PCA shows a striking loss of internal, episodic detail.

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Narratives showed a specific reduction in spatiotemporal and perceptual detail.

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Loss of perceptual details correlated with grey matter density in the right precuneus.

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Impaired autobiographical memory is driven by deficient higher-order visual processing.

Visual working memory in aphantasia: Retained accuracy and capacity with a different strategy

Visual working memory paradigms involve retaining and manipulating visual information in mind over a period of seconds. Evidence suggests that visual imagery (sensory recruitment) is a strategy used by many to retain visual information during such tasks, leading some researchers to propose that visual imagery and visual working memory may be one and the same. If visual imagery is essential to visual working memory task performance there should be large ramifications for a special population of individuals who do not experience visual imagery, aphantasia. Here we assessed visual working memory task performance in this population using a number of different lab and clinical working memory tasks. We found no differences in capacity limits for visual, general number or spatial working memory for aphantasic individuals compared to controls. Further, aphantasic individuals showed no significant differences in performance on visual components of clinical working memory tests as compared to verbal components. However, there were significant differences in the reported strategies used by aphantasic individuals across all memory tasks. Additionally, aphantasic individual's visual memory accuracy did not demonstrate a significant oblique orientation effect, which is proposed to occur due to sensory recruitment, further supporting their non-visual imagery strategy reports. Taken together these data demonstrate that aphantasic individuals are not impaired on visual working memory tasks, suggesting visual imagery and working memory are not one and the same, with imagery (and sensory recruitment) being just one of the tools that can be used to solve visual working memory tasks.

Beyond visual imagery: how modality-specific is enhanced mental imagery in synesthesia?

Synesthesia based in visual modalities has been associated with reports of vivid visual imagery. We extend this finding to consider whether other forms of synesthesia are also associated with enhanced imagery, and whether this enhancement reflects the modality of synesthesia. We used self-report imagery measures across multiple sensory modalities, comparing synesthetes' responses (with a variety of forms of synesthesia) to those of non-synesthete matched controls. Synesthetes reported higher levels of visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory and tactile imagery and a greater level of imagery use. Furthermore, their reported enhanced imagery is restricted to the modalities involved in the individual's synesthesia. There was also a relationship between the number of forms of synesthesia an individual has, and the reported vividness of their imagery, highlighting the need for future research to consider the impact of multiple forms of synesthesia. We also recommend the use of behavioral measures to validate these self-report findings.

Visual imagery in autobiographical memory: The role of repeated retrieval in shifting perspective

Recent memories are generally recalled from a first-person perspective whereas older memories are often recalled from a third-person perspective. We investigated how repeated retrieval affects the availability of visual information, and whether it could explain the observed shift in perspective with time. In Experiment 1, participants performed mini-events and nominated memories of recent autobiographical events in response to cue words. Next, they described their memory for each event and rated its phenomenological characteristics. Over the following three weeks, they repeatedly retrieved half of the mini-event and cue-word memories. No instructions were given about how to retrieve the memories. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to adopt either a first- or third-person perspective during retrieval. One month later, participants retrieved all of the memories and again provided phenomenology ratings. When first-person visual details from the event were repeatedly retrieved, this information was retained better and the shift in perspective was slowed.

Blurring emotional memories using eye movements: individual differences and speed of eye movements

BACKGROUND

In eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR), patients make eye movements (EM) while recalling traumatic memories. Making EM taxes working memory (WM), which leaves less resources available for imagery of the memory. This reduces memory vividness and emotionality during future recalls. WM theory predicts that individuals with small working memory capacities (WMCs) benefit more from low levels of taxing (i.e., slow EM) whereas individuals with large WMC benefit more from high levels of taxing (i.e., fast EM).

OBJECTIVE

We experimentally examined and tested four prespecified hypotheses regarding the role of WMC and EM speed in reducing emotionality and vividness ratings: 1) EM-regardless of WMC and EM speed-are more effective compared to no dual task, 2) increasing EM speed only affects the decrease in memory ratings irrespective of WMC, 3) low-WMC individuals-compared to high-WMC individuals-benefit more from making either type of EM, 4) the EM intervention is most effective when-as predicted by WM theory-EM are adjusted to WMC.

METHOD

Undergraduates with low (n=31) or high (n=35) WMC recalled three emotional memories and rated vividness and emotionality before and after each condition (recall only, recall + slow EM, and recall + fast EM).

RESULTS

Contrary to the theory, the data do not support the hypothesis that EM speed should be adjusted to WMC (hypothesis 4). However, the data show that a dual task in general is more effective in reducing memory ratings than no dual task (hypothesis 1), and that a more cognitively demanding dual task increases the intervention's effectiveness (hypothesis 2).

CONCLUSIONS

Although adjusting EM speed to an individual's WMC seems a straightforward clinical implication, the data do not show any indication that such a titration is helpful.

Memories with a blind mind: Remembering the past and imagining the future with aphantasia

Our capacity to re-experience the past and simulate the future is thought to depend heavily on visual imagery, which allows us to construct complex sensory representations in the absence of sensory stimulation. There are large individual differences in visual imagery ability, but their impact on autobiographical memory and future prospection remains poorly understood. Research in this field assumes the normative use of visual imagery as a cognitive tool to simulate the past and future, however some individuals lack the ability to visualise altogether (a condition termed "aphantasia"). Aphantasia represents a rare and naturally occurring knock-out model for examining the role of visual imagery in episodic memory recall. Here, we assessed individuals with aphantasia on an adapted form of the Autobiographical Interview, a behavioural measure of the specificity and richness of episodic details underpinning the memory of events. Aphantasic participants generated significantly fewer episodic details than controls for both past and future events. This effect was most pronounced for novel future events, driven by selective reductions in visual detail retrieval, accompanied by comparatively reduced ratings of the phenomenological richness of simulated events, and paralleled by quantitative linguistic markers of reduced perceptual language use in aphantasic participants compared to those with visual imagery. Our findings represent the first systematic evidence (using combined objective and subjective data streams) that aphantasia is associated with a diminished ability to re-experience the past and simulate the future, indicating that visual imagery is an important cognitive tool for the dynamic retrieval and recombination of episodic details during mental simulation.

An asymmetrical relationship between verbal and visual thinking: Converging evidence from behavior and fMRI

Humans rely on at least two modes of thought: verbal (inner speech) and visual (imagery). Are these modes independent, or does engaging in one entail engaging in the other? To address this question, we performed a behavioral and an fMRI study. In the behavioral experiment, participants received a prompt and were asked to either silently generate a sentence or create a visual image in their mind. They were then asked to judge the vividness of the resulting representation, and of the potentially accompanying representation in the other format. In the fMRI experiment, participants had to recall sentences or images (that they were familiarized with prior to the scanning session) given prompts, or read sentences and view images, in the control, perceptual, condition. An asymmetry was observed between inner speech and visual imagery. In particular, inner speech was engaged to a greater extent during verbal than visual thought, but visual imagery was engaged to a similar extent during both modes of thought. Thus, it appears that people generate more robust verbal representations during deliberate inner speech compared to when their intent is to visualize. However, they generate visual images regardless of whether their intent is to visualize or to think verbally. One possible interpretation of these results is that visual thinking is somehow primary, given the relatively late emergence of verbal abilities during human development and in the evolution of our species.

Imagine, and you will find - Lack of attentional guidance through visual imagery in aphantasics

Aphantasia is the condition of reduced or absent voluntary imagery. So far, behavioural differences between aphantasics and non-aphantasics have hardly been studied as the base rate of those affected is quite low. The aim of the study was to examine if attentional guidance in aphantasics is impaired by their lack of visual imagery. In two visual search tasks, an already established one by Moriya (Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 80(5), 1127-1142, 2018) and a newly developed one, we examined whether aphantasics are primed less by their visual imagery than non-aphantasics. The sample in Study 1 consisted of 531 and the sample in Study 2 consisted of 325 age-matched pairs of aphantasics and non-aphantasics. Moriya's Task was not capable of showing the expected effect, whereas the new developed task was. These results could mainly be attributed to different task characteristics. Therefore, a lack of attentional guidance through visual imagery in aphantasics can be assumed and interpreted as new evidence in the imagery debate, showing that mental images actually influence information processing and are not merely epiphenomena of propositional processing.

Decoding stimulus identity in occipital, parietal and inferotemporal cortices during visual mental imagery

In the absence of input from the external world, humans are still able to generate vivid mental images. This cognitive process, known as visual mental imagery, involves a network of prefrontal, parietal, inferotemporal, and occipital regions. Using multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA), previous studies were able to distinguish between the different orientations of imagined gratings, but not between more complex imagined stimuli, such as common objects, in early visual cortex (V1). Here we asked whether letters, simple shapes, and objects can be decoded in early visual areas during visual mental imagery. In a delayed spatial judgment task, we asked participants to observe or imagine stimuli. To examine whether it is possible to discriminate between neural patterns during perception and visual mental imagery, we performed ROI-based and whole-brain searchlight-based MVPA. We were able to decode imagined stimuli in early visual (V1, V2), parietal (SPL, IPL, aIPS), inferotemporal (LOC) and prefrontal (PMd) areas. In a subset of these areas (i.e., V1, V2, LOC, SPL, IPL and aIPS), we also obtained significant cross-decoding across visual imagery and perception. Moreover, we observed a linear relationship between behavioral accuracy and the amplitude of the BOLD signal in parietal and inferotemporal cortices, but not in early visual cortex, in line with the view that these areas contribute to the ability to perform visual imagery. Together, our results suggest that in the absence of bottom-up visual inputs, patterns of functional activation in early visual cortex allow distinguishing between different imagined stimulus exemplars, most likely mediated by signals from parietal and inferotemporal areas.

Aphantasia: The science of visual imagery extremes

Visual imagery allows us to revisit the appearance of things in their absence and to test out virtual combinations of sensory experience. Visual imagery has been linked to many cognitive processes, such as autobiographical and visual working memory. Imagery also plays symptomatic and mechanistic roles in neurologic and mental disorders and is utilized in treatment. A large network of brain activity spanning frontal, parietal, temporal, and visual cortex is involved in generating and maintain images in mind. The ability to visualize has extreme variations, ranging from completely absent (aphantasia) to photo-like (hyperphantasia). The anatomy and functionality of visual cortex, including primary visual cortex, have been associated with individual differences in visual imagery ability, pointing to a potential correlate for both aphantasia and hyperphantasia. Preliminary evidence suggests that lifelong aphantasia is associated with prosopagnosia and reduction in autobiographical memory; hyperphantasia is associated with synesthesia. Aphantasic individuals can also be highly imaginative and are able to complete many tasks that were previously thought to rely on visual imagery, demonstrating that visualization is only one of many ways of representing things in their absence. The study of extreme imagination reminds us how easily invisible differences can escape detection.

Different representations and strategies in mental rotation

It is still debated whether holistic or piecemeal transformation is applied to carry out mental rotation (MR) as an aspect of visual imagery. It has been recently argued that various mental representations could be flexibly generated to perform MR tasks. To test the hypothesis that imagery ability and types of stimuli interact to affect the format of representation and the choice of strategy in performing MR task, participants, grouped as good or poor imagers, were assessed using four MR tasks, comprising two sets of 'Standard' cube figures and two sets of 'non-Standard' ones, designed by withdrawing cubes from the Standard ones. Both good and poor imagers performed similarly under the two Standard conditions. Under non-Standard conditions, good imagers performed much faster in non-Standard objects than Standard ones, whereas poor imagers performed much slower in non-Standard objects than Standard ones. These results suggested that (1) individuals did not differ in processing the integrated Standard object, whereas (2) in processing the non-Standard objects, various visual representations and strategies could be applied in MR by diverse individuals: Good imagers were more flexible in generating different visual representations, whereas poor imagers applied different strategies under different task demands.

Defining and 'diagnosing' aphantasia: Condition or individual difference?

Research into the newly-coined 'condition' of 'aphantasia', an individual difference involving the self-reported absence of voluntary visual imagery, has taken off in recent years, and more and more people are 'self-diagnosing' as aphantasic. Yet, there is no consensus on whether aphantasia should really be described as a 'condition', and there is no battery of psychometric instruments to detect or 'diagnose' aphantasia. Instead, researchers currently rely on the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) to 'diagnose' aphantasia. We review here fundamental and methodological problems affecting aphantasia research stemming from an inadequate focus on how we should define aphantasia, whether aphantasia is a pathological condition, and the extensive use of VVIQ as a 'diagnostic test' for aphantasia. Firstly, we draw attention to 'literature blindness' for visual imagery research from the 1960s-1990s concerning individual differences in visual imagery vividness. Secondly, despite aphantasia being defined as a 'condition' where voluntary visual imagery is absent as indicated by the lowest score on the VVIQ, aphantasia studies inconsistently employ samples comprised of a mixture of participants with no visual imagery and low visual imagery, and we argue that this hinders the uncovering of the underlying cause of aphantasia. Thirdly, the scores used to designate the boundary between aphantasia and non-aphantasia are arbitrary and differ between studies, compromising the possibility for cross-study comparison of results. Fourthly, the problems of 'diagnosing' aphantasia are not limited to the academic sphere, as one can 'self-diagnose' online, for example by using the variant-VVIQ on the Aphantasia Network website. However, the variant-VVIQ departs from the original in ways likely to impact validity and accuracy, which could lead people to falsely believe they have been 'diagnosed' with aphantasia by a scientifically-validated measure. Fifthly, we discuss the hypothesis that people who believe they have been 'diagnosed' with aphantasia might be vulnerable to health anxiety, distress, and stigma. We conclude with a discussion about some fundamental aspects of how to classify a disorder, and suggest the need for a new psychometric measure of aphantasia.

Imagined character recognition through EEG signals using deep convolutional neural network

Electroencephalography (EEG)-based brain computer interface (BCI) enables people to interact directly with computing devices through their brain signals. A BCI typically interprets EEG signals to reflect the user's intent or other mental activity. Motor imagery (MI) is a commonly used technique in BCIs where a user is asked to imagine moving certain part of the body such as a hand or a foot. By correctly interpreting the signal, one can perform a multitude of tasks such as controlling wheel chair, playing computer games, or even typing text. However, the use of motor-imagery-based BCIs outside the laboratory environment is limited due to the lack of their reliability. This work focuses on another kind of mental imagery, namely, the visual imagery (VI). VI is the manipulation of visual information that comes from memory. This work presents a deep convolutional neural network (DCNN)-based system for the recognition of visual/mental imagination of English alphabets so as to enable typing directly via brain signals. The DCNN learns to extract the spatial features hidden in the EEG signal. As opposed to many deep neural networks that use raw EEG signals for classification, this work transforms the raw signals into band powers using Morlet wavelet transformation. The proposed approach is evaluated on two publicly available benchmark MI-EEG datasets and a visual imagery dataset specifically collected for this work. The obtained results demonstrate that the proposed model performs better than the existing state-of-the-art methods for MI-EEG classification and yields an average accuracy of 99.45% on the two public MI-EEG datasets. The model also achieves an average recognition rate of 95.2% for the 26 English-language alphabets. Overall working of the proposed solution for imagined character recognition through EEG signals.

The effect of a mindfulness-based decentering strategy on chocolate craving

According to the elaborated-intrusion theory of desire, strategies that load visual working memory will reduce cravings. According to the grounded cognition theory of desire, cravings will be reduced with mindfulness-based decentering strategies that encourage individuals to see their thoughts as thoughts. However, decentering strategies also tend to load visual working memory making it difficult to test the latter prediction. This study addressed this issue by matching visualization across decentering and guided imagery tasks. Male and female participants (n = 101) underwent a chocolate craving induction before listening to a 4-min audio recording that guided them to (a) decenter from their thoughts and feelings, (b) engage in visualization, or (c) let their mind wander. Participants reported on chocolate craving before and after the craving induction and following the 4-min recording. They also provided retrospective reports of craving during the recording, reported on the extent to which they had adhered to the audio instructions and briefly indicated what they had been thinking about during the recording. Results showed a significant reduction in cravings to baseline following the recording across all three conditions (p < .001), but no significant differences between conditions or in the retrospective reports of craving. There was some evidence to suggest that participants in the mind wandering condition had been thinking about alternate goals, which may have inhibited thoughts about chocolate and been just as effective at reducing craving as the imagery and decentering strategies. Exploratory analyses showed a trend toward decentering being more effective than imagery where participants reported higher task adherence throughout the 4 min (p = .067). This raises the possibility that decentering effects may be improved with better strategy adherence, which might be achieved through practice or increased motivation.

Visual image retention does not contribute to modulation of event-related potentials by mental rotation

Rotation of a visual image in mind is associated with a slow posterior negative deflection of the event-related potential (ERP), termed rotation-related negativity (RRN). Retention of a visual image in short-term memory is also associated with a slow posterior negative ERP, termed negative slow wave (NSW). We tested whether short-term memory retention, indexed by the NSW, contributes to the RRN. ERPs were recorded in the same subjects in two tasks, a mental rotation task, eliciting the RRN, and a visual short-term memory task, eliciting the NSW. Over both right and left parietal scalp, no association was found between the NSW and the RRN amplitudes. Furthermore, adjusting for the effect of the NSW had no influence on a significant association between the RRN amplitude and response time, an index of mental rotation performance. Our data indicate that the RRN reflects manipulation of a visual image but not its retention in short-term memory.

Mental imagery of gravitational motion

There is considerable evidence that gravitational acceleration is taken into account in the interaction with falling targets through an internal model of Earth gravity. Here we asked whether this internal model is accessed also when target motion is imagined rather than real. In the main experiments, naïve participants grasped an imaginary ball, threw it against the ceiling, and caught it on rebound. In different blocks of trials, they had to imagine that the ball moved under terrestrial gravity (1g condition) or under microgravity (0g) as during a space flight. We measured the speed and timing of the throwing and catching actions, and plotted ball flight duration versus throwing speed. Best-fitting duration-speed curves estimate the laws of ball motion implicit in the participant's performance. Surprisingly, we found duration-speed curves compatible with 0g for both the imaginary 0g condition and the imaginary 1g condition, despite the familiarity with Earth gravity effects and the added realism of performing the throwing and catching actions. In a control experiment, naïve participants were asked to throw the imaginary ball vertically upwards at different heights, without hitting the ceiling, and to catch it on its way down. All participants overestimated ball flight durations relative to the durations predicted by the effects of Earth gravity. Overall, the results indicate that mental imagery of motion does not have access to the internal model of Earth gravity, but resorts to a simulation of visual motion. Because visual processing of accelerating/decelerating motion is poor, visual imagery of motion at constant speed or slowly varying speed appears to be the preferred mode to perform the tasks.

Mental rotation performance in young adults with and without developmental coordination disorder

While there have been consistent behavioural reports of atypical hand rotation task (HRT) performance in adults with developmental coordination disorder (DCD), this study aimed to clarify whether this deficit could be attributed to specific difficulties in motor imagery (MI), as opposed to broad deficits in general mental rotation. Participants were 57 young adults aged 18-30 years with (n = 22) and without DCD (n = 35). Participants were compared on the HRT, a measure of MI, and the letter number rotation task (LNRT), a common visual imagery task. Only participants whose behavioural performance on the HRT suggested use of a MI strategy were included in group comparisons. Young adults with DCD were significantly less efficient compared to controls when completing the HRT yet showed comparable performance on the LNRT relative to adults with typical motor ability. Our data are consistent with the view that atypical HRT performance in adults with DCD is likely to be attributed to specific difficulties engaging in MI, as opposed to deficits in general mental rotation. Based on the theory that MI provides insight into the integrity of internal action representations, these findings offer further support for the internal modelling deficit hypothesis of DCD.

Body image, visual working memory and visual mental imagery

Body dissatisfaction (BD) is a highly prevalent feature amongst females in society, with the majority of individuals regarding themselves to be overweight compared to their personal ideal, and very few self-describing as underweight. To date, explanations of this dramatic pattern have centred on extrinsic social and media factors, or intrinsic factors connected to individuals’ knowledge and belief structures regarding eating and body shape, with little research examining links between BD and basic cognitive mechanisms. This paper reports a correlational study in which visual and executive cognitive processes that could potentially impact on BD were assessed. Visual memory span and self-rated visual imagery were found to be predictive of BD, alongside a measure of inhibition derived from the Stroop task. In contrast, spatial memory and global precedence were not related to BD. Results are interpreted with reference to the influential multi-component model of working memory.

On the relationship between trait autobiographical episodic memory and spatial navigation

Influential research has focused on identifying the common neural and behavioural substrates underlying episodic memory (the re-experiencing of specific details from past experiences) and spatial cognition, with some theories proposing that these are supported by the same mechanisms. However, the similarities and differences between these two forms of memory in humans require further specification. We used an individual-differences approach based on self-reported survey data collected in a large online study (n = 7,487), focusing on autobiographical episodic memory and spatial navigation and their relationship to object and spatial imagery abilities. Multivariate analyses replicated prior findings that autobiographical episodic memory abilities dissociated from spatial navigational abilities. Considering imagery, episodic autobiographical memory overlapped with imagery of objects, whereas spatial navigation overlapped with a tendency to focus on spatial schematics and manipulation. These results suggest that trait episodic autobiographical memory and spatial navigation correspond to distinct mental processes.

Eye movements during visual imagery and perception show spatial correspondence but have unique temporal signatures

Eye fixation patterns during mental imagery are similar to those during perception of the same picture, suggesting that oculomotor mechanisms play a role in mental imagery (i.e., the "looking at nothing" effect). Previous research has focused on the spatial similarities of eye movements during perception and mental imagery. The primary aim of this study was to assess whether the spatial similarity translates to the temporal domain. We used recurrence quantification analysis (RQA) to assess the temporal structure of eye fixations in visual perception and mental imagery and we compared the temporal as well as the spatial characteristics in mental imagery with perception by means of Bayesian hierarchical regression models. We further investigated how person and picture-specific characteristics contribute to eye movement behavior in mental imagery. Working memory capacity and mental imagery abilities were assessed to either predict gaze dynamics in visual imagery or to moderate a possible correspondence between spatial or temporal gaze dynamics in perception and mental imagery. We were able to show the spatial similarity of fixations between visual perception and imagery and we provide first evidence for its moderation by working memory capacity. Interestingly, the temporal gaze dynamics in mental imagery were unrelated to those in perception and their variance between participants was not explained by variance in visuo-spatial working memory capacity or vividness of mental images. The semantic content of the imagined pictures was the only meaningful predictor of temporal gaze dynamics. The spatial correspondence reflects shared spatial structure of mental images and perceived pictures, while the unique temporal gaze behavior could be driven by generation, maintenance and protection processes specific to visual imagery. The unique temporal gaze dynamics offer a window to new insights into the genuine process of mental imagery independent of its similarity to perception.

Hypnotizability influences the cortical representation of visually and kinaesthetically imagined head position

The study investigates the cortical representation of the visual and kinesthetic image of a rotated position of the head in highly (highs) and low hypnotizable individuals (lows) of both gender. Participants were invited to imagine maintaining their head rotated toward one side by seeing their chin aligned with their right shoulder (V, visual imagery), and in a different condition, by feeling tension in their neck muscles (K, kinaesthetic imagery). Vividness of imagery and cognitive effort were reported after each task. Alpha and beta band absolute power was studied. Highs reported higher vividness than lows only for the kinaesthetic modality of imagery. The cortical desyncronization observed during visual and kinaesthetic imagery were different in high females (HM), low females (LF), high males (HM) and low males (LM). In fact, only HF and LM exhibited significant power changes during the kinaesthetic task, whereas visual imagery was associated with cortical desynchronization in all subgroups except HM. The study supports earlier findings of an advantage of highs in kinesthetic imagery, shows an intriguing interaction of hypnotizability and gender, and indicates topographical difference in the four subgroups of participants suggesting differences in underlying generators.

A spiking neural network model of spatial and visual mental imagery

Mental imagery has long been of interest to the cognitive and neurosciences, but how it manifests itself in the mind and brain still remains unresolved. In pursuit of this, we built a spiking neural model that can perform mental rotation and mental map scanning using strategies informed by the psychology and neuroscience literature. Results: When performing mental map scanning, reaction times (RTs) for our model closely match behavioural studies (approx. 50 ms/cm), and replicate the cognitive penetrability of the task. When performing mental rotation, our model's RTs once again closely match behavioural studies (model: 55-65°/s; studies: 60°/s), and performed the task using the same task strategy (whole unit rotation of simple and familiar objects through intermediary points). Overall, our model suggests: (1) vector-based approaches to neuro-cognitive modelling are well equipped to re-produce behavioural findings, and (2) the cognitive (in)penetrability of imagery tasks may depend on whether or not the task makes use of (non)symbolic processing.

Using eye movements to explore mental representations of space

Visual mental imagery is a cognitive experience characterised by the activation of the mental representation of an object or scene in the absence of the corresponding stimulus. According to the analogical theory, mental representations have a pictorial nature that preserves the spatial characteristics of the environment that is mentally represented. This cognitive experience shares many similarities with the experience of visual perception, including eye movements. The mental visualisation of a scene is accompanied by eye movements that reflect the spatial content of the mental image, and which can mirror the deformations of this mental image with respect to the real image, such as asymmetries or size reduction. The present article offers a concise overview of the main theories explaining the interactions between eye movements and mental representations, with some examples of the studies supporting them. It also aims to explain how ocular-tracking could be a useful tool in exploring the dynamics of spatial mental representations, especially in pathological situations where these representations can be altered, for instance in unilateral spatial neglect.