Unintentional perspective-taking calculates whether something is seen, but not how it is seen

A long established distinction exists in developmental psychology between young children's ability to judge whether objects are seen by another, known as "level-1" perspective-taking, and judging how the other sees those objects, known as "level-2" perspective-taking (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981a; Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Wilcox, 1981b). Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Bodley Scott (2010) provided evidence that there are two routes available to adults for level-1 perspective-taking: one which is triggered relatively automatically and the other requiring cognitive control. We tested whether both these routes were available for adults' level-2 perspective-taking. Explicit judgements of both level-1 and level-2 perspectives were subject to egocentric interference, suggesting a need for cognitive control. Evidence of unintentional perspective-taking was limited to level-1 judgements.

Executive function underlies both perspective selection and calculation in Level-1 visual perspective taking

Previous research has suggested that the calculation of another’s perspective is cognitively efficient, whereas perspective selection (selection of a particular perspective, self or other) is associated with executive function, particularly inhibitory control. However, research has not previously tested how perspective calculation and selection may be associated with another key executive function, working memory. In the present study (N = 54 adult participants), we administered a Level-1 visual perspective task in a dual-task paradigm in which the secondary task required working memory. The results suggest that executive function is associated with both perspective calculation and perspective selection, contrary to previous evidence from similar dual-task studies that had used inhibitory control and attention-based secondary tasks. This contrast may suggest that working memory capacity facilitates perspective-taking. Furthermore, it may follow that the notion of simple perspective-taking is distinct from more the complex and cognitively demanding “theory of mind.” Research of this nature warrants further investigation.

Age of avatar modulates the altercentric bias in a visual perspective-taking task: ERP and behavioral evidence

Despite being able to rapidly and accurately infer their own and other peoples’ visual perspectives, healthy adults experience difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective when the two perspectives are in conflict; they experience egocentric and altercentric interference. We examine for the first time how the age of an observed person (adult vs. child avatar) influences adults’ visual perspective-taking, particularly the degree to which they experience interference from their own or the other person’s perspective. Participants completed the avatar visual perspective-taking task, in which they verified the number of discs in a visual scene according to either their own or an on-screen avatar’s perspective (Experiments 1 and 2) or only from their own perspective (Experiment 3), where the two perspectives could be consistent or in conflict. Age of avatar was manipulated between (Experiment 1) or within (Experiments 2 and 3) participants, and interference was assessed using behavioral (Experiments 1–3) and ERP (Experiment 1) measures. Results revealed that altercentric interference is reduced or eliminated when a child avatar was present, suggesting that adults do not automatically compute a child avatar’s perspective. We attribute this pattern to either enhanced visual processing for own-age others or an inference on reduced mental awareness in younger children. The findings argue against a purely attentional basis for the altercentric effect, and instead support an account where both mentalising and directional processes modulate automatic visual perspective-taking, and perspective-taking effects are strongly influenced by experimental context.

Stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impacts conflict resolution in Level-1 visual perspective taking

Theory of mind is the ability to understand others' beliefs, mental states, and knowledge. Perspective-taking is a key part of this capacity, and while previous research has suggested that calculating another's perspective is relatively straightforward, executive function is required to resolve the conflict between the self and that other perspective. Previous studies have shown that theory of mind is selectively impaired by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). However, it has been hitherto unclear as to which specific aspect of perspective-taking is impacted. The current study administered rTMS (N = 31 adult participants) to the DLPFC (active condition) and vertex (control condition) in a within-subjects design. Participants completed a L1 VPT task after each stimulation session, and focus (relative performance on self-perspective trials compared with other perspective trials) and conflict indices (relative ability to resolve competing self/other perspectives) were calculated. Results showed that stimulation of the DLPFC selectively impaired the conflict index, suggesting that the DLPFC may be causally related with the resolution of conflict between self and other perspectives, and that self-other interference may rely on domain-general processes.

Adopting the visual perspective of a group member is influenced by implicit group averaging

As social entities, individuals' perception and behaviors are susceptible to the influence of their social groups. Previous research has consistently shown that the group context in which individuals are situated significantly influences their perceptual processing. We aim to investigate whether the group context in which another individual is situated alters our understanding of their visual perception, which holds profound implications for interpersonal interactions. To address this inquiry, we conducted three experiments. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a visual scene depicting multiple avatars seated around a table, all facing an arrow positioned at the center of the table. They were instructed to adopt the visual perspective of a specific avatar within the group to perceive the arrow's orientation, and then reproduce its orientation from their own perspectives. We found that participants exhibited a bias towards the group's average perspective when reproducing the arrow's orientation. Experiment 2 further demonstrated that reinforced group processing could elicit an earlier appearance of this bias. In Experiment 3, we investigated an alternative explanation positing that the aforementioned bias originated from visual ensemble perception rather than group influence by instructing participants to reproduce the target avatar's position relative to the arrow's orientation. If the bias indeed originated from ensemble perception, it should also manifest in this task. However, the absence of any reproduction bias refuted this possibility. Through these experiments, we demonstrate that our understanding of an individual's perceptual experiences is influenced by the social context in which they are situated, which manifests as a convergence phenomenon.

Humans take the visuospatial perspective of robots and objects that imply social presence

Visual perspective-taking (VPT) plays a crucial role in social interactions. Although the mechanisms behind VPT have been thoroughly studied in human-human interactions, there are only a few studies examining whether humans can also adopt the visuospatial perspective of machines such as robots or objects that have an implied social presence. Thus far, earlier work suggested that a human-like appearance is a major factor determining VPT. In the present study, we isolate the social presence aspect that is inherent to a human-like appearance to specifically assess whether the social presence on its own is sufficient to trigger VPT. In particular, we test whether participants can adopt the visuospatial perspective of an object that implies a social presence (i.e., a camera) and compare findings to an earlier study, in which we tested whether participants adopt the visuospatial perspective of a robot. We find that participants adopt the visuospatial perspective of a camera and that the magnitude of these effects do not differ from VPT effects for robots. These results expand on previous findings on this topic by showing that an object, which is associated with an implied social presence can already trigger VPT effects. Moreover, these findings are informative for the design of cost-effective social robots as camera-like features can already effectively trigger VPT mechanisms, which are highly relevant for smooth social interactions, and thus more costly human-like features are not necessarily required.

I prefer what you can see: The role of visual perspective-taking on the gaze-liking effect

Individuals' gaze on an object usually leads others to prefer that object, which is called the gaze-liking effect. However, it is still unclear whether this effect is driven by social factors (i.e., visual perspective-taking) or the domain-general processing (i.e., attention cueing). This research explored the mechanism of the gaze-liking effect by manipulating the objects' visibility to an avatar in six online one-shot experiments. The results showed that participants' affective evaluation for the object was modulated by the avatar's visual perspective. Specifically, the visible object to the avatar received a higher rating of liking degree. However, when the avatar was replaced with a non-social stimulus, the experimental effect was absent. Furthermore, the gaze-liking effect was robust while controlling for confounding factors such as the distance between the object and the avatar or type of stimuli. These findings provided convincing evidence that the gaze-liking effect involves a process of the other's visual experience and is not merely a by-product of the gaze-cueing effect.