Theory of mind in older adults: the nature of the decline

Successful social interaction depends (among others) on one's ability to understand other people's emotional states (known as "affective-Theory-of-Mind"; aToM). A decline in this ability could be associated with changes in awareness with age. Awareness can be estimated by comparing one's subjective and objective abilities. Here we explored the sequence of changes in aToM with age, with reference to objective and subjective capacities. One hundred and eight participants were divided into three age groups: young (18-39), adults (60-69), and elders' group (70-86). Objective aToM performance was assessed using the Frith-Happé animation task (including meaningful and meaningless interactions). The subjective performance was evaluated by a Short Subjective ToM Questionnaire (sToM10). The results in the animation task showed reduction in the ability to correctly categorize meaningless interaction among the adult participants (compared to young) and a further decrease in the ability to correctly categorize meaningful interactions among the elderly participants (compared to young participants). Subjective aToM results revealed that while older participants reported a reduction in general ability to infer feelings in others, they could not report a decrease in their ability to recognize specific feelings. Our results may indicate a unique characteristic of aToM decline, which may start in adults (60-69; only reflected when the social demands are high) and further aggravates as people grow older (70th and above). In addition, results of the self-report questionnaire may indicate that while the elders are fully aware of their general decline in aToM ability, awareness of their capability to identify specific emotions is impaired.

Neural correlates of affective theory of mind in medication-free nonsuicidal self-injury: An fMRI study

Emerging evidence indicates that emotion processing deficits are associated with nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI). However, limited attention has been paid to the socio-affective functions of NSSI. In this study, we aimed to investigate the affective theory of mind (ToM) in medication-free individuals engaging in NSSI at both behavioral and neural levels. Twenty-eight individuals (mean age = 22.96 years) who engaged in NSSI and 38 age-, sex-, and IQ-matched controls (mean age = 22.79 years) underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while performing the "Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test" (RMET). All participants also completed the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS), Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20), and Beck Scale for Suicide Ideation (BSI). Although we did not find significant group differences in the RMET performance, the NSSI group, relative to the controls, exhibited significantly greater left medial superior frontal lobe activation and decreased right angular gyrus activation than did the control group. Reduced right angular gyrus activity was related to higher DERS and TAS scores across all participants. Our findings provide new evidence for aberrant neural processing of affective ToM in self-injurers. Future studies in developing intervention protocols for NSSI should focus on the multifaceted phases of socio-affective processing.

What Do We Know about Theory of Mind Impairment in Parkinson's Disease?

Theory of mind (ToM) is a social cognitive skill that involves the ability to attribute mental states to self and others (what they think (cognitive ToM) and feel (affective ToM)). We aim to provide an overview of previous knowledge of ToM in Parkinson's disease (PD). In the last few years more attention has been paid to the study of this construct as a non-motor manifestation of PD. In advanced stages, both components of ToM (cognitive and affective) are commonly impaired, although in early PD results remain controversial. Executive dysfunction correlates with ToM deficits and other cognitive domains such as language and visuospatial function have also been related to ToM. Recent studies have demonstrated that PD patients with mild cognitive impairment show ToM deficits more frequently in comparison with cognitively normal PD patients. In addition to the heterogeneity of ToM tests administered in different studies, depression and dopaminergic medication may also be acting as confounding factors, but there are still insufficient data to support this. Neuroimaging studies conducted to understand the underlying networks of cognitive and affective ToM deficits in PD are lacking. The study of ToM deficit in PD continues to be important, as this may worsen quality of life and favor social stigma. Future studies should be considered, including assessment of the patients' cognitive state, associated mood disorders, and the role of dopaminergic deficit.

The human mirror neuron system-A common neural basis for social cognition?

According to the theory of embodied simulation, mirror neurons (MN) in our brain's motor system are the neuronal basis of all social-cognitive processes. The assumption of such a mirroring process in humans could be supported by results showing that within one person the same region is involved in different social cognition tasks. We conducted an fMRI-study with 75 healthy participants who completed three tasks: imitation, empathy, and theory of mind. We analyzed the data using group conjunction analyses and individual shared voxel counts. Across tasks, across and within participants, we find common activation in inferior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal cortex, fusiform gyrus, posterior superior temporal sulcus, and amygdala. Our results provide evidence for a shared neural basis for different social-cognitive processes, indicating that interpersonal understanding might occur by embodied simulation.

First-order Affective Theory of Mind in Persons with Alzheimer's Disease and in Healthy Older Adults

"Theory of Mind" (ToM) is the capacity to deduce other persons' cognitive and emotional states. Studies investigating affective ToM in healthy older adults and in persons with Alzheimer's disease have reported contradictory results, although evidence indicates that advanced age (Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone, & Phillips, 2008) and Alzheimer's disease (Elferink, van Tilborg, & Kessels, 2015) do not affect the ability to identify or infer different emotions to the same extent. To evaluate affective ToM abilities in these populations, we asked 63 individuals (17 with Alzheimer's disease) to infer the emotional states of characters presented without facial details in emotional situations. We observed similar results in healthy younger and older adults, but poorer performance in persons with Alzheimer's disease for disgust, sadness, and surprise, but not for anger, fear, and joy. Results suggest that persons with Alzheimer's disease have difficulties in inferring several emotional states from contextual information without facial cues.