Managing disclosure outcomes in intelligence interviews

We introduce the disclosure-outcomes management model. The model views disclosure in intelligence interviews as a behaviour interviewees use to profitably navigate self-interest dilemmas. We theorized that interviewees compare the potential outcomes of disclosing to their self-interests. They evaluate the extent to which disclosure will facilitate or impede those self-interests: an interviewee's self-interest dilemma elicits cooperation with respect to some information but not other information. A Preliminary Study (N = 300) supported the model's predictions. We proposed a Replication Study (N = 369) to examine the model further. Participants assumed the role of an intelligence source undergoing an interview. They decided what information to disclose, contending the typical dilemma in an intelligence interview wherein disclosure could jeopardize or advance their self-interests. The results from the Preliminary and Replication studies were broadly in line with our proposition: perceived benefits positively influenced the likelihood of disclosing. However, a negative interaction between costs and benefits observed in the Preliminary Study did not replicate. That finding may be due to power constraints, not evidence against the existence of an interaction effect. Our proposal that-generally speaking-interviewees are likelier to disclose information units that seem less versus more risky requires further examination. Individual-level sensitivity to benefits, costs and their co-occurrence varied substantially in our studies. We discuss avenues for future research.

How intelligence interviewees mentally identify relevant information

This research explored how intelligence interviewees mentally identify the relevant information at their disposal. We theorized that interviewees estimate the interviewer's objectives based on how they frame any attempt to solicit information. Then interviewees organize the information they possess into item designations that pragmatically correspond to the perceived interviewer-objective. The more an interviewer specifies what they want to know, the more the interviewee will mentally designate information items corresponding with that objective. To examine the theory, we conducted two identical experiments wherein participants assumed the role of an informant with one of two dispositions. They were to be cooperative or resistant when undergoing an interview. The interviewer posed specific or ambiguous questions. In Study 1 (N = 210), interviewees identified applicable information items based on their interviewer's questions. And interviewees answered their interviewer's questions in Study 2 (N = 199). We aimed to demonstrate that question type influences mental designations and disposition affects disclosures. Disposition had a stronger influence on interviewees' disclosure than when reasoning about what the interviewer wants to know. But contrary to our expectations, mental designation preferences indicated that interviewees generally assume interviewers want to know complete details, irrespective of question specificity. We suggest avenues for future research.