On the Disposition to Think Analytically: Four Distinct Intuitive-Analytic Thinking Styles

Many measures have been developed to index intuitive versus analytic thinking. Yet it remains an open question whether people primarily vary along a single dimension or if there are genuinely different types of thinking styles. We distinguish between four distinct types of thinking styles: Actively Open-minded Thinking, Close-Minded Thinking, Preference for Intuitive Thinking, and Preference for Effortful Thinking. We discovered strong predictive validity across several outcome measures (e.g., epistemically suspect beliefs, bullshit receptivity, empathy, moral judgments), with some subscales having stronger predictive validity for some outcomes but not others. Furthermore, Actively Open-minded Thinking, in particular, strongly outperformed the Cognitive Reflection Test in predicting misperceptions about COVID-19 and the ability to discern between vaccination-related true and false news. Our results indicate that people do, in fact, differ along multiple dimensions of intuitive-analytic thinking styles and that these dimensions have consequences for understanding a wide range of beliefs and behaviors.

Mindfulness-based stress reduction is linked with an improved Cognitive Reflection Test score

Initially, dual-process theories suggested that the existence of two different cognitive systems explained why many participants do not find the correct answer in many reasoning tasks. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is one such task. It contains three questions with incorrect answers (typically associated with intuition and thus system 1 which processes information automatically) and correct answers (typically associated with deliberate thinking and thus system 2 which involves the conscious processing of information). More recent theories suggest system 1 is responsible for both incorrect and correct responses, with system 2 being used to resolve the conflict between these different intuitions. Since mindfulness training improves self-regulation and cognitive flexibility, we believe it could improve CRT scores by reducing the relative weight of initial intuitions by strengthening alternative intuitions, thus increasing the probability of triggering deliberate reasoning. To test this hypothesis, we recruited 36 participants, all registered in the same Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) training. Of those 36 participants, 18 answered the CRT before the training and 18 answered it after 8 weeks of training. Results show that participants who followed MBSR training had better CRT scores than those without training. This is coherent with our hypothesis that mindfulness training could reduce the relative weight of initial intuitions and facilitate deliberate thinking.

Intuitive thinking impedes cooperation by decreasing cooperative expectations for pro-self but not for pro-social individuals

This study conducted two experiments to explore the effects of intuitive thinking and social value orientation (SVO) on cooperative behavior and assess the mediating effect of cooperative expectations. It manipulated intuitive thinking by increasing the participants' need for cognitive closure, classified SVO using the triple-dominance measure, measured cooperative behavior using the prisoner's dilemma game, and considered cooperative expectations based on participants' assessments of the cooperativeness of their counterparts. Both experiments showed that intuitive thinking increased and decreased the cooperation of pro-social and pro-self individuals, respectively. In pro-self individuals, cooperative expectations mediated the effect of intuitive thinking on cooperation.

Corrigendum: Thinking Preferences and Conspiracy Belief: Intuitive Thinking and the Jumping to Conclusions-Bias as a Basis for the Belief in Conspiracy Theories

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fpsyt.2020.568942.].

Bias in Medicine: Lessons Learned and Mitigation Strategies

Cognitive bias consists of systematic errors in thinking due to human processing limitations or inappropriate mental models. Cognitive bias occurs when intuitive thinking is used to reach conclusions about information rather than analytic (mindful) thinking. Scientific progress is delayed when bias influences the dissemination of new scientific knowledge, as it has with the role of human leucocyte antigen antibodies and antibody-mediated rejection in cardiac transplantation. Mitigating strategies can be successful but involve concerted action by investigators, peer reviewers, and editors to consider how we think as well as what we think.

Thinking Preferences and Conspiracy Belief: Intuitive Thinking and the Jumping to Conclusions-Bias as a Basis for the Belief in Conspiracy Theories

BACKGROUND

The belief in conspiracy theories and paranoid ideation are often treated as almost synonymous. However, there is to date no research concerning shared underlying cognitive underpinnings of belief in conspiracy theories and paranoid ideation. One potential underlying factor could be the well-known jumping to conclusion (JTC) bias, the tendency of persons with delusions to perform hasty decisions that are sometimes based on little evidence. Furthermore, a preference for a more intuitive general thinking style, as opposed to an analytical thinking style, could be an additional underlying cognitive factor of both conspiracy theories and paranoia. Thus, the aim of the present study is to investigate in a large sample of non-clinical individuals whether the JTC-bias is more pronounced in individuals who display a stronger belief in conspiracy theories and whether both are related to a more intuitive thinking preference.

METHODS

We assessed the data of 519 non-clinical individuals regarding their respective approval of 20 specific conspiracy theories in an online study. Further, we assessed the JTC-bias by using a computerized variant of the beads task (fish task). Thinking preferences were measured with the Rational-Experiential Interview.

RESULTS

Subjects who displayed the JTC-bias presented a more pronounced belief in conspiracy theories. In addition, gathering little information in the fish task before performing a decision (less draws to decision) was related to a stronger endorsement of conspiracy theories and a more intuitive thinking style (and a less analytic thinking style). Finally, a preference for intuitive thinking predicted a stronger belief in conspiracy theories in a multiple regression analysis.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results demonstrate the implication of a preference for an intuitive thinking style accompanied by a propensity to faster decision-making (JTC-bias) as possible cognitive underpinnings of beliefs in conspiracy theories. Furthermore, our study is the first to confirm the notion of the JTC-bias as a reflection of the use of an intuitive thinking style.

Irrational Beliefs

Irrational beliefs are often used as an umbrella term that comprises a variety of psychological constructs: from specific cognitive biases to a wider class of epistemologically suspect beliefs (superstitions, paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs, conspiracy theories etc.) or cognitive styles (analytical versus intuitive thinking), but also unsubstantiated self-related beliefs. This collection of papers illustrates this diversity well. Apart from the descriptive portion of the data, which has merit on its own, the authors provide important methodological innovations in the way these beliefs are measured, but also look deeper in their functionality and consequences.

Implementation of a Clinical Reasoning Course in the Internal Medicine trimester of the final year of undergraduate medical training and its effect on students' case presentation and differential diagnostic skills

Background: Clinical reasoning, comprising the processes of clinical thinking, which form the basis of medical decisions, constitutes a central competence in the clinical routine on which diagnostic and therapeutic steps are based. In medical curricula in Germany, clinical reasoning is currently taught explicitly only to a small extend. Therefore, the aim of this project was to develop and implement a clinical reasoning course in the final year of undergraduate medical training. Project description: A clinical reasoning course with six learning units and 18 learning objectives was developed, which was taught by two to four instructors on the basis of 32 paper cases from the clinical practice of the instructors. In the years 2011 to 2013, the course of eight weeks with two hours per week was taught seven times. Before the first and after the last seminar, the participating students filled out a self-assessment questionnaire with a 6-point Likert scale regarding eight different clinical reasoning skills. At the same times, they received a patient case with the assignment to prepare a case presentation and differential diagnoses. Results: From 128 participating students altogether, 42 complete data sets were available. After the course, participants assessed themselves significantly better than before the course in all eight clinical reasoning skills, for example in "Summarizing and presentation of a paper case" or in the "Skill to enumerate differential diagnoses" (p<0.05). The greatest increase occurred in the skill to recognize typical cognitive errors in medicine and to identify risk situations for their occurrence (pre: 2.98±0.92 and retro-pre: 2.64±1.01, respectively, versus post: 4.38±0.88). Based on the ratio of number of words used per keywords used the problem presentation of the paper case was significantly more focused after the course (p=0.011). A significant increase in the number of gathered differential diagnoses was not detected after the course. Conclusion: The newly developed and established Clinical Reasoning Course leads to a gain in the desired skills from the students' self-assessment perspective and to a more structured case presentation. To establish better options to exercise clinical reasoning, a longitudinal implementation in the medical curriculum seems to be desirable. Faculty training would be useful to implement the concept as standardized as possible.