Diversity of aphantasia revealed by multiple assessments of visual imagery, multisensory imagery, and cognitive style

Aphantasia-a condition wherein individuals have a reduced or absent construction of voluntary visual imagery-is diagnosed using either the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) or self-identification. However, a significant discrepancy exists between the proportions of aphantasia in the populations assessed using these two criteria. It is unclear why the reported proportions differ excessively and what percentage of people cannot form visual imagery. We investigated the replicability of the proportion of people with aphantasia using both criteria in the same population of participants. Therefore, we explored the potential causes of the discrepancy and characteristics of putative aphantasia in terms of multisensory imagery, cognitive style, and face recognition ability. First, we conducted an online sampling study (Study 1: N = 2,871) using the VVIQ, self-identification of a reduction in visual imagery, Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery (QMI), and Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ). We found that 3.7 and 12.1% fulfilled the VVIQ and self-identification criteria, respectively, roughly replicating the proportions reported in previous studies. The self-identification criterion-but not the VVIQ criterion-contains items related to face recognition; hence, we suspected that face recognition ability was factor contributing to this discrepancy and conducted another online sampling study (Study 2: N = 774). We found a significant correlation between VVIQ and face recognition ability in the control group with self-identification, but not in the group defined by low VVIQ (VVIQ ≤32). As the participants in the control group with self-identification tended to exhibit moderately high VVIQ scores but low face recognition ability, we reason that the discrepancy can be partially explained by the contamination of individual differences in face recognition ability. Additional analyses of Study 1 revealed that the aphantasia group included participants who lacked all types of sensory imagery or only visual imagery in multisensory imagery and exhibited a non-specific cognitive style. This study indicates that the VVIQ alone may be insufficient to diagnose individuals who report an inability to form visual imagery. Furthermore, we highlight the importance of multiple assessments-along with the VVIQ-to better understand the diversity of imagery in aphantasia.

The Phenomenology of Offline Perception: Multisensory Profiles of Voluntary Mental Imagery and Dream Imagery

Both voluntary mental imagery and dream imagery involve multisensory representations without externally present stimuli that can be categorized as offline perceptions. Due to common mechanisms, correlations between multisensory dream imagery profiles and multisensory voluntary mental imagery profiles were hypothesized. In a sample of 226 participants, correlations within the respective state of consciousness were significantly bigger than across, favouring two distinct networks. However, the association between the vividness of voluntary mental imagery and vividness of dream imagery was moderated by the frequency of dream recall and lucid dreaming, suggesting that both networks become increasingly similar when higher metacognition is involved. Additionally, the vividness of emotional and visual imagery was significantly higher for dream imagery than for voluntary mental imagery, reflecting the immersive nature of dreams and the continuity of visual dominance while being awake and asleep. In contrast, the vividness of auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile imagery was higher for voluntary mental imagery, probably due to higher cognitive control while being awake. Most results were replicated four weeks later, weakening the notion of state influences. Overall, our results indicate similarities between dream imagery and voluntary mental imagery that justify a common classification as offline perception, but also highlight important differences.