Teleological reasoning bias is predicted by pupil dynamics: Evidence for the extensive integration account of bias in reasoning

Teleological reasoning is the tendency for humans to see purpose and intentionality in natural phenomena when there is none. In this study, we assess three competing theories on how bias in reasoning arises by examining performance on a teleological reasoning task while measuring pupil size and response times. We replicate that humans (N = 45) are prone to accept false teleological explanations. Further, we show that errors on the teleological reasoning task are associated with slower response times, smaller baseline pupil size, and larger pupil dilations. The results are in line with the single-process extensive integration account and directly oppose predictions from dual-processing accounts. Lastly, by modeling responses with a drift-diffusion model, we find that larger baseline pupil size is associated with lower decision threshold and higher drift rate, whereas larger pupil dilations are associated with higher decision threshold and lower drift rate. The results highlight the role of neural gain and the Locus Coeruleus-Norepinephrine system in modulating evidence integration and bias in reasoning. Thus, teleological reasoning and susceptibility to bias likely arise due to extensive processing rather than through fast and effortless processing.

Expectations of efficient actions bias social perception: a pre-registered online replication

Humans take a teleological stance when observing others' actions, interpreting them as intentional and goal directed. In predictive processing accounts of social perception, this teleological stance would be mediated by a perceptual prediction of an ideal energy-efficient reference trajectory with which a rational actor would achieve their goals within the current environmental constraints. Hudson and colleagues (2018 Proc. R. Soc. B 285, 20180638. (doi:10.1098/rspb.2018.0638)) tested this hypothesis in a series of experiments in which participants reported the perceived disappearance points of hands reaching for objects. They found that these judgements were biased towards the expected efficient reference trajectories. Observed straight reaches were reported higher when an obstacle needed to be overcome than if the path was clear. By contrast, unnecessarily high reaches over empty space were perceptually flattened. Moreover, these perceptual biases increased the more the environmental constraints and expected action trajectories were explicitly processed. These findings provide an important advance to our understanding of the mechanisms underlying social perception. The current replication tests the robustness of these findings and whether they uphold in an online setting.

The teleological stance: Past, present, and future

We review the support for, and criticisms of, the teleological stance theory, often described as a foundation for goal-directed action understanding early in life. A major point of contention in the literature has been how teleological processes and assumptions of rationality are represented and understood in infancy, and this debate has been largely centered on three paradigms. Visual habituation studies assess infant's abilities to retrospectively assess teleological processes; the presence of such processes is supported by the literature. Rational imitation is a phenomenon that has been questioned both theoretically and empirically, and there is currently little support for this concept in the literature. The involvement of teleological processes in action prediction is unclear. To date, the ontology of teleological processes remains unspecified. To remedy this, we present a new action-based theory of teleological processes (here referred to as the embodied account of teleological processes), based on the development of goal-directed reaching with its origin during the fetal period and continuous development over the first few months of life.

Perceptual teleology: expectations of action efficiency bias social perception

Primates interpret conspecific behaviour as goal-directed and expect others to achieve goals by the most efficient means possible. While this teleological stance is prominent in evolutionary and developmental theories of social cognition, little is known about the underlying mechanisms. In predictive models of social cognition, a perceptual prediction of an ideal efficient trajectory would be generated from prior knowledge against which the observed action is evaluated, distorting the perception of unexpected inefficient actions. To test this, participants observed an actor reach for an object with a straight or arched trajectory on a touch screen. The actions were made efficient or inefficient by adding or removing an obstructing object. The action disappeared mid-trajectory and participants touched the last seen screen position of the hand. Judgements of inefficient actions were biased towards the efficient prediction (straight trajectories upward to avoid the obstruction, arched trajectories downward towards the target). These corrections increased when the obstruction's presence/absence was explicitly acknowledged, and when the efficient trajectory was explicitly predicted. Additional supplementary experiments demonstrated that these biases occur during ongoing visual perception and/or immediately after motion offset. The teleological stance is at least partly perceptual, providing an ideal reference trajectory against which actual behaviour is evaluated.