The cognitive activation theory of stress

This paper presents a cognitive activation theory of stress (CATS), with a formal system of systematic definitions. The term "stress" is used for four aspects of "stress", stress stimuli, stress experience, the non-specific, general stress response, and experience of the stress response. These four meanings may be measured separately. The stress response is a general alarm in a homeostatic system, producing general and unspecific neurophysiological activation from one level of arousal to more arousal. The stress response occurs whenever there is something missing, for instance a homeostatic imbalance, or a threat to homeostasis and life of the organism. Formally, the alarm occurs when there is a discrepancy between what should be and what is-between the value a variable should have (set value (SV)), and the real value (actual value (AV)) of the same variable. The stress response, therefore, is an essential and necessary physiological response. The unpleasantness of the alarm is no health threat. However, if sustained, the response may lead to illness and disease through established pathophysiological processes ("allostatic load"). The alarm elicits specific behaviors to cope with the situation. The level of alarm depends on expectancy of the outcome of stimuli and the specific responses available for coping. Psychological defense is defined as a distortion of stimulus expectancies. Response outcome expectancies are defined as positive, negative, or none, to the available responses. This offers formal definitions of coping, hopelessness, and helplessness that are easy to operationalize in man and in animals. It is an essential element of CATS that only when coping is defined as positive outcome expectancy does the concept predict relations to health and disease.

Standardizing the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale: past, present, and future

The Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HAM-D) has become the most widely used depression severity rating scale in the world. It was originally published by Max Hamilton in 1960 to measure severity of depression in previously diagnosed depressed inpatients. Since that time, multiple versions of the scale have been created, although authors are rarely clear about which version they used. In addition, structured interview guides, self-report forms, and computerized versions have been developed in an effort to standardize administration of the scale and improve the psychometric characteristics of the individual items. The history of the development of these features is discussed, and the various versions of the scale are summarized in tables. This article is a fitting tribute to Per Bech, who has contributed so much to the assessment of depression severity.

Twenty-five years of diabetes distress research

The term 'diabetes distress' first entered the psychosocial research vernacular in 1995, and refers to 'the negative emotional or affective experience resulting from the challenge of living with the demands of diabetes'. At first the proponents of the concept were hesitant in advocating that diabetes distress was a major barrier to individuals' self-care and management of diabetes. Since then, a burgeoning body of evidence, now including several systematic reviews of intervention studies, suggests that diabetes distress, in both type 1 and type 2 diabetes, across ages and in all countries and cultures where it has been studied, is common and can be a barrier to optimal emotional well-being, self-care and management of diabetes. As a consequence, monitoring diabetes distress as part of routine clinical care is part of many national guidelines. The present narrative review summarizes this research and related literature, to postulate the aetiology of diabetes distress, and thus how it may be prevented. The current evidence base for the management of diabetes distress is summarized, and the next steps in the prevention and management of diabetes distress identified.

Radical concept nativism

Radical concept nativism is the thesis that virtually all lexical concepts are innate. Notoriously endorsed by Jerry Fodor, radical concept nativism has had few supporters. However, it has proven difficult to say exactly what's wrong with Fodor's argument. We show that previous responses are inadequate on a number of grounds. Chief among these is that they typically do not achieve sufficient distance from Fodor's dialectic, and, as a result, they do not illuminate the central question of how new primitive concepts are acquired. To achieve a fully satisfactory response to Fodor's argument, one has to juxtapose questions about conceptual content with questions about cognitive development. To this end, we formulate a general schema for thinking about how concepts are acquired and then present a detailed illustration.

Neuroscience: breaking down scientific barriers to the study of brain and mind

In this month's essay, Eric R. Kandel and Larry R. Squire chronicle how brain research has migrated from the peripheries of biology and psychology to assume a central position within those disciplines. The multidiscipline of neuroscience that emerged from this process now ranges from genes to cognition, from molecules to minds.

Schizotaxia, schizotypy, and schizophrenia: Paul E. Meehl's blueprint for the experimental psychopathology and genetics of schizophrenia

Paul E. Meehl proposed a model of the cause and pathogenesis of schizophrenia and related states in the early 1960s (Meehl, 1962), which he later revised in 1990 (Meehl, 1990). His model emphasized a genetically influenced aberration in neural transmission that could eventuate in clinical schizophrenia, nonpsychotic schizotypic states, or apparent normalcy depending on the coexistence of other factors. His model embodied the core ideas of the diathesis-stressor framework that would come to dominate experimental and developmental psychopathology for the next 40 years. The author reviews Meehl's model of schizotaxia, schizotypy, and schizophrenia and reviews and clarifies some frequent misunderstandings of the model.

The affirmation of the scientist-practitioner. A look back at Boulder

In the aftermath of World War II, several influences were paramount in forcing academic psychology to recognize, albeit reluctantly, the coming professionalization of psychology. The federal government, wishing to avoid a repeat of blunders following World War I that led to significant dissatisfaction among veterans, took proactive steps to ensure that mental health needs of the new veterans would be met. The USPHS and the VA were mandated to expand significantly the pool of mental health practitioners, a direction that led not only to the funding of the Boulder conference but also to the development of APA's accreditation program, funded practical and internship arrangements with the VA, and the USPHS grants to academic departments for clinical training. The GI Bill, amended to include payment for graduate education, created tremendous interest in graduate programs in psychology. As a result, psychology programs were inundated with funded applicants, most of whom were interested in the application of psychology to clinical and other applied fields. Graduate psychology departments were mixed in their views of this "blessing." The reality of a separate curriculum for professional training in psychology was a bitter pill for some academic psychologists to swallow. Graduate departments feared that control of their programs would be taken over by external forces and that they would lose their right to determine their own curriculum. Further, they feared the domination of clinical training within their own departments and the effects of such educational emphasis on their traditional experimental programs. The Boulder conference brought together these disparate needs and concerns, although one can argue about how well some points of view were represented with respect to others. It was a time of high anticipation and fear. The conference could easily have ended in failure, with such diverse interests being unable to reach any consensus. There are many letters in the correspondence of committee members that suggest disagreements serious enough to prevent the development of any single model of training. Instead, by most yardsticks that one could apply, the conference succeeded, perhaps beyond the dreams of many of those in attendance who were most invested in a model for professional training. In evaluating the legacy of Boulder, several points are apparent. First, the conference succeeded because 73 individuals were able to agree to some 70 resolutions in 15 days, creating the scientist-practitioner model of professional training. Such consensus was arguably a remarkable achievement. The endorsement of the model by academic units followed with little evident resistance, although it is clear that some Boulder-model programs were developed that bore little resemblance to the model's insistence on significant training in both research and practice. Second, as a response to social and political needs, the conference was clearly a success. The cooperation of the APA, the USPHS, and the VA benefited all three entities. Clinical psychology was given the financial support and backing to advance it as a profession, and the federal government was able to begin the process of securing the personnel needed to address the mental health needs of the nation. The architects of Boulder were clear that their vision of training for professional psychology should be viewed as dynamic and experimental rather than fixed and prescribed. Certainly there are several variants of professional training extant today, yet the overwhelming majority of currently accredited programs in psychology label themselves as "Boulder-model" programs or "scientist-practitioner" programs. Still, new national conferences on professional training in psychology occur with some regularity as participants seek to resolve many of the same concerns debated by those at Boulder. The grand experiment goes on.

Correlation not causation: the relationship between personality traits and political ideologies

The assumption in the personality and politics literature is that a person's personality motivates them to develop certain political attitudes later in life. This assumption is founded on the simple correlation between the two constructs and the observation that personality traits are genetically influenced and develop in infancy, whereas political preferences develop later in life. Work in psychology, behavioral genetics, and recently political science, however, has demonstrated that political preferences also develop in childhood and are equally influenced by genetic factors. These findings cast doubt on the assumed causal relationship between personality and politics. Here we test the causal relationship between personality traits and political attitudes using a direction of causation structural model on a genetically informative sample. The results suggest that personality traits do not cause people to develop political attitudes; rather, the correlation between the two is a function of an innate common underlying genetic factor.

Validating the measurement and structure of self-concept: snapshots of past, present, and future research

Although the study of self-concept has been a topic of great interest and much study in the social sciences for many decades, it is really only in the past 30 years that any fruitful expansion in knowledge of both its theoretical structure and its related measurement has been forthcoming. From three perspectives--past, present, and future--the author presents abbreviated and selected highlights of important construct validity findings related to this research and postulates possible trends and areas of self-concept research yet to be explored.

The psychopathology of affectivity: conceptual and historical aspects

The disorders of affect have not contributed much to the diagnostic definition of mental disease, and their phenomenological description has never achieved the richness of the psychopathology of perception or cognition. This paper shows how the subordinate role played by affectivity in the Western concept of man led to the early and enduring view of mental illness as an exclusive disturbance of intellect. Attempts by nineteenth-century alienists to challenge this notion were only partially successful, due to the conceptual unmanageability of most forms of affective behaviour and the terminological redundancy that this engendered. These efforts were frustrated by the rebirth of Associationism, the rise of brain localization experiments, the peripheralist definition of the emotions and, finally, by the unfolding of Darwinism. As a result, no autonomous psychopathology of affectivity was ever developed. The eventual recognition of the so-called 'primary' disorders of mood has not led, however, to a refinement in the semiology of the experiences themselves. This has been impeded by the use of descriptive behavioural surrogates or by metapsychological accounts of affect as a form of energy or as a driving force. None of these developments has contributed to the clinical description of the mood disorders.

Psychology of religion and adolescents in the United States: past to present

Many of the early founders of America were concerned with religious issues, and some of their concerns continue in contemporary science. Psychology of religion has a long history in American psychology, but one marred by neglect and misguided claims about the nature of science. Psychology of religion offers a chance for an expansion of behavioral science into realms of importance to many people. For example, both development during adolescence and the implications of gender differences may be illuminated by a consideration of the role of religion in human life. Particular topics discussed include conversion and religious mobility, religious experience, images of God, identity, and mental health and coping.

The scientific attack on Brown v. Board of Education, 1954-1964

Psychologists' work was cited in the Supreme Court case of Brown v. Board of Education (1954). One criticism of the citation was that psychology could be used to overturn the Brown decision and return the country to segregation. A historical examination of such an attempt to overturn Brown in the early 1960s on the basis of new psychological knowledge shows that psychology was not persuasive in the face of the civil rights movement. The failure of segregationists to overturn Brown with psychological experts underscores how psychology is ineluctably bound to the larger society.

IPOS Sutherland Memorial Lecture: An international perspective on the development of psychosocial oncology: overcoming cultural and attitudinal barriers to improve psychosocial care

Around the world, traditionally the diagnosis of cancer and its prognosis was withheld from patients for centuries, due to the stigma and fears attached to it. This custom of 'never telling' precluded talking with patients about their feelings and how they were coping with illness and the threat of death. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, patient's right of access to information, coupled with the diminished stigma attached to cancer, encouraged physicians into a more open dialogue. In the majority of countries today, patients learn their diagnosis and know their treatment options. This change permitted the first formal psychosocial studies of patients in the 1950s, and the beginning of research into coping and development of interventions to improve quality of life. However, a second independent stigma, also present for centuries, has persisted: the stigma associated with mental disorders (even in the context of severe physical illness). This prejudice about mental problems has been a barrier to the integration of the psychosocial domain into total cancer care; the identification of patients who are distressed; and, patient's acceptance of psychological help. Despite these barriers, psychosocial oncology has developed worldwide, with a small, but active cadre of investigators and clinicians engaging in clinical, educational and research aspects of psycho-oncology. The International Psycho-Oncology Society (IPOS), since 1984, has brought them together. The Sutherland Memorial Lecture has honored nine individuals from five countries who have made major contributions to the field: 1982, Avery Weisman; 1984, Bernard Fox; 1987, Morton Bard; 1991, Margit von Kerekjarto; 1993, Ned Cassem; 1996, Steven Greer; 1998, Hiroomi Kawano; 2000, Robert Zittoun; and 2003, Jimmie Holland. The scientific base for psychosocial oncology is now secure with a body of knowledge, textbooks and journals which have led to the development of evidence-based clinical practice guidelines for psychosocial services in several countries. A benchmark now exists against which care can be monitored and accountability established. The next 25 years will see an improvement in the psychosocial care of patients, based on research that gives a scientific basis for interventions, and a reduction in the barriers to psychosocial care in cancer.

Grief as pathology: The evolution of grief theory in psychology from Freud to the present

The emergence of grief as a topic worthy of psychological study is an early 20th century invention. Freud published his influential essay on mourning and melancholia in 1917. Since he proposed the concept of "grief work," contemporary psychologists have examined his theory empirically and have claimed that grief is a pathology that should be included within the psychological domain. How, and why, has grief theory evolved within the discipline of psychology in this way? In what ways do these changes in the understanding of grief coincide with other historical developments within the discipline? In this article, I trace the development of grief, originally conceived by Freud within a psychoanalytic and nonpathological framework, to the current conceptualization of grief within the disease model. I show how grief theory has evolved within the discipline of psychology to become (a) an object worthy of scientific study within the discipline, and subsequently, (b) a pathology to be privatized, specialized, and treated by mental health professionals.

The history of autism

Autism remains a fascinating condition, perhaps the most prolifically researched of all child psychiatric disorders. Its history yields many lessons: early accounts of possible autism are, with one exception, unclear; the greatest contributions to our understanding have come from individual clinicians and researchers; the concept and definition of the disorder have changed greatly over the years; some ideas once held with conviction, were later proved to be unfounded; and socio-political shifts as well as research findings have radically altered our understanding of the syndrome as well as the care and treatment offered to people with autism.

All that glitters: a review of psychological research on the aesthetics of the golden section

Since at least the time of the Ancient Greeks, scholars have argued about whether the golden section-a number approximately equal to 0.618-holds the key to the secret of beauty. Empirical investigations of the aesthetic properties of the golden section date back to the very origins of scientific psychology itself, the first duties being conducted by Fechner in the 1860s. In this paper historical and contemporary issues are reviewed with regard to the alleged aesthetic properties of the golden section. In the introductory section the most important mathematical occurrences of the golden section are described. As well, brief reference is made to research on natural occurrences of the golden section, and to ancient and medieval knowledge and application of the golden section, primarily in art and architecture. Two major sections then discuss and critically examine empirical studies of the putative aesthetic properties of the golden section dating from the mid-19th century up to the 1950s, and the empirical work of the last three decades, respectively. It is concluded that there seems to be, in fact, real psychological effects associated with the golden section, but that they are relatively sensitive to careless methodological practices.