An under-represented and underserved population in trials: methodological, structural, and systemic barriers to the inclusion of adults lacking capacity to consent

BACKGROUND

There is increasing international recognition that populations included in trials should adequately represent the population treated in clinical practice; however, adults who lack the capacity to provide informed consent are frequently excluded from trials. Addressing the under-representation of groups such as those with impaired capacity to consent is essential to develop effective interventions and provide these groups with the opportunity to benefit from evidence-based care. While the spotlight has been on ensuring only appropriate and justifiable exclusion criteria are used in trials, barriers to the inclusion of adults lacking capacity are multifactorial and complex, and addressing their under-representation will require more than merely widening eligibility criteria. This commentary draws on the literature exploring the inclusion of adults lacking the capacity to consent in research and a number of recent studies to describe the methodological, structural, and systemic factors that have been identified.

MAIN TEXT

A number of potentially modifiable factors contributing to the under-representation of adults lacking the capacity to consent in trials have been identified. In addition to restrictive eligibility criteria, methodological issues include developing appropriate interventions and outcome measures for populations with impaired capacity. Structurally determined factors include the resource-intensive nature of these trials, the requirement for more appropriate research infrastructure, and a lack of interventions to inform and support proxy decision-makers. Systemic factors include the complexities of the legal frameworks, the challenges of ethical review processes, and paternalistic attitudes towards protecting adults with incapacity from the perceived harms of research.

CONCLUSIONS

Measures needed to address under-representation include greater scrutiny of exclusion criteria by those reviewing study proposals, providing education and training for personnel who design, conduct, and review research, ensuring greater consistency in the reviews undertaken by research ethics committees, and extending processes for advance planning to include prospectively appointing a proxy for research and documenting preferences about research participation. Negative societal and professional attitudes towards the inclusion of adults with impaired capacity in research should also be addressed, and the development of trials that are more person-centred should be encouraged. Further work to conceptualise under-representation in trials for such populations may also be helpful.

Competing Professional Knowledge Claims About Mental Capacity in the Court of Protection

This article analyses the role of evidence in resolving Court of Protection proceedings, drawing on qualitative data obtained from observations of the Court of Protection, a review of Court of Protection case files and interviews with social workers. It is argued that there is a hierarchy of professional evidence in mental capacity law. Psychiatric evidence is at the top of this hierarchy, whereas social work evidence is viewed as a less persuasive form of knowledge about mental capacity. The article argues that this is because mental capacity law views psychiatric evidence as a form of objective and technical expertise about capacity, whereas social work evidence is viewed as a form of subjective, experiential knowledge. In challenging this hierarchy, it is instead argued that mental capacity law should place greater weight on experiential knowledge emanating from a relationship with the subject of the proceedings, rather than elevating the status of psychiatric evidence about mental capacity.

Unspoken and unthinkable: The older disabled body in judicial discourse

While much has been said about gendered bodies in legal discourse, as yet relatively little has been written about older bodies. This is surprising given the fact older people are statistically far more likely to be the subjects of certain areas of law which constrain and regulate bodily autonomy, such as mental health and capacity law. This paper uses discourse analysis to understand the way in which older disabled bodies appear in judicial discourse. It is argued that these bodies are often understood as abject, which in turn is used to legitimize certain problematic legal interventions.

Managing mental incapacity in the 20th century: A history of the Court of Protection of England & Wales

This article explores the history of the Court of Protection of England & Wales (CoP) over the twentieth century. The CoP, which is responsible for making financial and welfare decisions on behalf of those deemed incapable of doing so themselves, presently faces a rapidly growing caseload, and considerable scrutiny and critique. Such close attention to its work may be new, but many of the issues it faces have deep roots. Using practitioners' texts, judgements, and the archives of the CoP and the Lord Chancellor's Office, I review the evolution of the CoP in terms of its structure and caseload, its decisions regarding incapacity, its efforts to manage the affairs of those found incapable, and its long-term survival. This reveals the origins of many of the issues it faces today, the different anxieties and approaches that have animated its work in the past, the ways in which approaches to incapacity have changed, and the value of a historical perspective.

Changes in subjective mental and physical fatigue during netball games in elite development athletes

OBJECTIVES

To assess the magnitude of changes in, and relationships between, physical and mental fatigue pre-to-post match in elite development netballers.

DESIGN

Observational.

METHODS

Twelve female netballers (21.3±2.9 years) competing in the Australian Netball League reported perceptual measures of mental and physical fatigue pre- and post-match on 12 separate competition occasions. Minutes played, to allow for calculation of weighted changes (ratings proportional to playing time), positional groups and performance analysis variables were also assessed.

RESULTS

Post-match ratings were higher (p<0.01) than pre-match for both mental (pre: 31.02±19.28; post: 44.73±24.47) and physical fatigue (pre: 28.86±15.37; post: 47.21±24.67). The correlation coefficient between change in mental and physical fatigue (r=0.37, p<0.01) revealed a shared variance of 13.9%. Acute changes in mental fatigue were related to minutes played (r=0.32, p<0.01) as was change in physical fatigue (r=0.59, p<0.01). No differences in change in mental fatigue were found between positional groups (p=0.07) though change in physical fatigue was higher for shooters compared to defenders (p<0.05). Performance variables revealed no relationships with mental or physical fatigue, with the exception of turnover number with both post-match weighted physical (r= -0.23, p<0.01) and weighted-change in physical fatigue (r=-0.16, p<0.05).

CONCLUSIONS

Mental and physical fatigue were found to increase across netball matches in elite development athletes. Mental fatigue emerged as a largely separate construct to physical fatigue.

Clinical implications of self-neglect among patients in community settings

The consequences of self-neglect can be wide-reaching and devastating, not only for patients themselves but also for their wider community, including assisting health practitioners and social care staff. Supporting patients in the context of self-neglect requires extensive multi-agency collaboration in order to gain a full understanding and a workable management strategy for the individual. Because community nurses see patients in their own homes, they are well placed to identify and address self-neglect. This article explores the definition, signs and causes of self-neglect, with issues of particular relevance for community nursing staff. The understanding and assessment of mental capacity, which is often complex and challenging, is also discussed, as well as the involvement of the safeguarding team where necessary.

Making healthcare decisions in a person's best interests when they lack capacity: clinical guidance based on a review of evidence

OBJECTIVE

To clarify the concept of best interests, setting out how they should be ascertained and used to make healthcare decisions for patients who lack the mental capacity to make decisions.

CONTEXT

The legal framework is the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005, which applies to England and Wales.

THEORY

Unless there is a valid and applicable Advance Decision, an appointed decision-maker needs to decide for those without capacity. This may be someone appointed by the patient through a Lasting Power of Attorney, or a Deputy appointed by the court. Otherwise the decision-maker is usually the responsible clinician. Different approaches exist to surrogate decision-making cross-nationally. In England and Wales, decision-making is governed by the MCA 2005, which uses a person-centred, flexible best interests (substituted interests) approach.

OBSERVATIONS

The MCA is often not followed in healthcare settings, despite widespread mandatory training. The possible reasons include its focus on single decisions, when multiple decisions are made daily, the potential time involved and lack of clarity about who is the responsible decision-maker.

SOLUTION

One solution is to decide a strategic policy to cover more significant (usually health-related) decisions and to separate these from day-to-day relational decisions covering care and activities. Once persistent lack of capacity is confirmed, an early meeting should be arranged with family and friends, to start a process of sharing information about the patient's medical condition and their values, wishes, feelings and beliefs with a view to making timely treatment decisions in the patient's best interests.

Situating dementia in the experience of old age: Reconstructing legal response

This paper examines the intersection of dementia with the physiological processes and social contexts of old age; assesses the current legal response to problems arising through that intersection; and considers the potentially transformative effect of re-thinking legal response with those contextualised problems in mind. Two distinctive problems are identified: a heightened risk of exploitation, and an increasingly intense need for care coinciding with a decreasing ability to recognise and respond to that need. These problems require a social (rather than medical) response, of which law is an integral part. Several areas of law (including adult guardianship, legislation and common law doctrine relating to health care consent/refusal, and the body of law relating to decision-making about agreements, transactions, and bequests) provide for that response through the medico-legal construct of mental capacity. This legal idea of mental capacity has survived extensive critique, particularly in relation to interpretation and implementation of Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities. The survival of the mental capacity construct can be attributed to its usefulness as a theoretical mechanism that provides both a justification for over-ruling choice and preference (locating autonomy in the mentally capable decision) and a process for doing so (the mental capacity assessment and determination). This ambit of usefulness is particularly relevant to the problems (arising in the context of dementia in old age) identified in this paper. Both problems engage the public interest, together with the fundamental legal principle of fairness, in ways that call for legal response of some kind. Supported decision-making, as the suggested replacement for mental capacity based legal response, applies awkwardly in these contexts; as far as the individual is concerned, her decision has been made (and she does not need assistance in making one). This paper concludes that the mental capacity construct is problematic both for the reasons identified in the CRPD discourse (in which the experience of dementia in old age has been largely invisible) and because of the complicated intersections between mental capacity, dementia, and old age. The paper concludes by setting out an alternative conceptual basis and framework for legal response, including over-ruling expressed choice and preference, constructed around a principled theory of vulnerability as an alternative to and replacement for the mental capacity construct.

Age, psychiatry admission status and linear mental capacity for treatment decisions

The relationship between age and mental capacity among psychiatry inpatients is not fully understood. We aimed to assess mental capacity for treatment decisions in voluntary and involuntary psychiatry inpatients in Ireland and, in this analysis of our data-set, to elucidate the linear relationship, if any, between linear (as opposed to categorical) mental capacity and age. We used the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T) to assess mental capacity for treatment decisions in 215 psychiatry inpatients (176 voluntary and 39 involuntary) in four psychiatry admission units in Ireland. Mean age was 46.2 years and majorities were male (58.1%), never married (74.0%), unemployed (64.2%) and of Irish ethnicity (87.0%). The most common primary diagnoses were schizophrenia and related disorders (42.8%) followed by affective disorders (36.7%). On multi-variable linear regression analysis, linear mental capacity was significantly associated with voluntary admission status, being employed, having a primary diagnosis other than schizophrenia or a related disorder, and younger age. Together, these factors accounted for 44.4% of the variance in mental capacity between participants. Overall, while increased age is associated with diminished mental capacity, other factors appear more significant, including involuntary admission status which is likely an indicator of symptom severity. There is a need for further research to (a) elucidate the relationships between the significant factors identified in this study and the cognitive status of patients (which impacts on assessments of mental capacity); (b) identify and elucidate other factors of likely relevance to mental capacity (e.g. medical illness, medication use); and (c) translate these findings into targeted interventions to support decision-making in clinical practice among psychiatry inpatients, especially those with involuntary status.

Protection by exclusion? The (lack of) inclusion of adults who lack capacity to consent to research in clinical trials in the UK

BACKGROUND

Around two million adults in the UK have significantly impaired decision-making capacity. However, there are concerns that this population is under-represented in research, due in part to the challenges around obtaining consent. Under-representation of populations denies those who would have wanted to participate the opportunity to make a contribution to society, but also fails to generate results that are applicable to them. Consequently, the evidence base for their care is poorer than for other populations. We recently published in this journal an analysis of Participant Information Sheets provided to consultees and legal representatives of adults who lack capacity and noted the small number of trials designed to include adults who lack capacity. In order to understand how many adults who lack capacity to consent are actually enrolled in clinical trials, we further explored how many of the participants lacked capacity, and who acted as a consultee or legal representative on their behalf.

MAIN TEXT

The ISRCTN registry was searched for UK clinical trials in conditions commonly associated with cognitive impairment that were designed to include (or not exclude) adults who lack capacity to consent. Details about participants and capacity status were obtained from published data or directly from the trial teams. Of the 80 retrieved clinical trials that had completed in the previous 3 years, we identified 15 which included adults who lack capacity to consent. Data regarding participants' capacity status were not available for five trials. Where capacity was reported, 5-100% participants lacked capacity to consent. Trials predominantly utilised personal consultees/legal representatives; however, 39% (634/1631) of participants required a professional to act as consultee/legal representative.

CONCLUSIONS

Only a small number of trials including adults who lacked capacity were identified. The majority of participants were represented by a personal consultee/legal representative; however, between 21 and 100% of participants across five trials required the involvement of a professional, suggesting it is not uncommon. Data relating to capacity status were rarely reported, potentially masking the under-representation of adults who lack capacity. The findings may help researchers and funders target resources towards studies involving under-represented populations to increase the much-needed evidence base for their care and treatment.

Concordance of mental capacity assessments based on legal and clinical criteria: A cross-sectional study of psychiatry inpatients

This study aimed to compare assessments of mental capacity based on legal criteria with assessments based on clinical criteria among psychiatry inpatients to establish the concordance, if any, between these two approaches to assessing mental capacity. We assessed mental capacity for treatment decisions in 215 psychiatry inpatients (176 voluntary and 39 involuntary) in four psychiatry admission units in Ireland using both legal criteria (Ireland's Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015) and clinical criteria (the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment; MacCAT-T). Over one third of participants (34.9%) lacked mental capacity for treatment decisions according to the legal criteria. Mental incapacity was associated with involuntary admission status, being unemployed, a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia or a related disorder, and older age. Patients who lacked mental capacity according to the legislation scored significantly lower on all subscales of the MacCAT-T than patients who had mental capacity. We conclude that mental capacity assessments based on legal criteria correlate closely with those based on clinical criteria. These findings support current legal definitions of mental incapacity in Ireland and other jurisdictions with similar legislation (e.g. England and Wales).

Categorical mental capacity for treatment decisions among psychiatry inpatients in Ireland

This study aimed to assess mental capacity for treatment decisions among psychiatry inpatients in Ireland and explore the relationship, if any, between mental capacity and various demographics and clinical variables. We assessed mental capacity for treatment decisions in 215 psychiatry inpatients in four psychiatry admission units. Almost half of the participants were female and the most common diagnoses were schizophrenia or a related disorder and affective disorders. Overall, 1.9% of participants lacked mental capacity for treatment decisions; 50.7% had partial mental capacity; and 47.4% had full mental capacity. These proportions did not differ between female and male patients. On multi-variable regression analysis, greater mental capacity was significantly associated with, in order of strength of association, voluntary admission status, Irish ethnicity, being employed and younger age. However, while these relationships were statistically significant (i.e. were unlikely to have occurred by chance), together they accounted for just 27.6% of the variance in mental capacity between participants (i.e. they were not very strong). The relatively high rate of "partial mental capacity" identified in our work suggests that decision-making supports are likely to be of substantial importance in assisting psychiatry inpatients making decisions about treatment, especially involuntary inpatients whose mental capacity is especially likely to be impaired. Future research could usefully clarify and quantify the role of cognitive and other factors in relation to the unexplained variance (72.4%) in mental capacity identified in this study; and explore which models of supported decision-making are most likely to assist the substantial proportion (50.7%) of psychiatry inpatients who have partial mental capacity for treatment decisions, as well as the minority lacking such mental capacity (1.9%).

Advance decision-making in mental health - Suggestions for legal reform in England and Wales

This paper argues that existing English and Welsh mental health legislation (The Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA)) should be changed to make provision for advance decision-making (ADM) within statute and makes detailed recommendations as to what should constitute this statutory provision. The recommendations seek to enable a culture change in relation to written statements made with capacity such that they are developed within mental health services and involve joint working on mental health requests as well as potential refusals. In formulating our recommendations, we consider the historical background of ADM, similarities and differences between physical and mental health, a taxonomy of ADM, the evidence base for mental health ADM, the ethics of ADM, the necessity for statutory ADM and the possibility of capacity based 'fusion' law on ADM. It is argued that the introduction of mental health ADM into the MHA will provide clarity within what has become a confusing area and will enable and promote the development and realisation of ADM as a form of self-determination. The paper originated as a report commissioned by, and submitted to, the UK Government's 2018 Independent Review of the Mental Health Act 1983.

Problems of Control: Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and the Flexible Interpretation of Mental Incapacity Tests

This article investigates the ability of mental incapacity tests to account for problems of control, through a study of the approach to alcohol dependence and a comparison with the approach to anorexia nervosa, in England and Wales. The focus is on two areas of law where questions of legal and mental capacity arise for people who are alcohol dependent: decisions about treatment for alcohol dependence and diminished responsibility for a killing. The mental incapacity tests used in these legal contexts are importantly different-one involves a 'cognitive' test, while the other includes an explicit impaired-control limb-and the comparison provides insight into a longstanding debate about the virtues of one type of test over the other. It is shown that both kinds of test can take control problems into account, but also that both can be interpreted in narrow and wide ways that significantly influence the outcome of the assessment. It is therefore argued that to a large extent, it is not the kind of mental incapacity test that matters, but how the test is interpreted. It is further proposed that value judgements are playing an unrecognised and inappropriate role in shaping this interpretation. This raises concerns about the current approach to assessing the impact of alcohol dependency on the capacity to make decisions about alcohol use or treatment, as well as broader concerns about flexibility within incapacity tests.

India's Mental Healthcare Act, 2017: Content, context, controversy

India's new mental health legislation, the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, was commenced on 29 May 2018 and seeks explicitly to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. It grants a legally binding right to mental healthcare to over 1.3 billion people, one sixth of the planet's population. Key measures include (a) new definitions of 'mental illness' and 'mental health establishment'; (b) revised consideration of 'capacity' in relation to mental healthcare (c) 'advance directives' to permit persons with mental illness to direct future care; (d) 'nominated representatives', who need not be family members; (e) the right to mental healthcare and broad social rights for the mentally ill; (f) establishment of governmental authorities to oversee services; (g) Mental Health Review Boards to review admissions and other matters; (h) revised procedures for 'independent admission' (voluntary admission), 'supported admission' (admission and treatment without patient consent), and 'admission of minor'; (i) revised rules governing treatment, restraint and research; and (j) de facto decriminalization of suicide. Key challenges relate to resourcing both mental health services and the new structures proposed in the legislation, the appropriateness of apparently increasingly legalized approaches to care (especially the implications of potentially lengthy judicial proceedings), and possible paradoxical effects resulting in barriers to care (e.g. revised licensing requirements for general hospital psychiatry units). There is ongoing controversy about specific measures (e.g. the ban on electro-convulsive therapy without muscle relaxants and anaesthesia), reflecting a need for continued engagement with stakeholders including patients, families, the Indian Psychiatric Society and non-governmental organisations. Despite these challenges, the new legislation offers substantial potential benefits not only to India but, by example, to other countries that seek to align their laws with the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and improve the position of the mentally ill.

Legal capacity, mental capacity and supported decision-making: Report from a panel event

Against a backdrop of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities having been in place for over a decade, discussions about legal capacity, the relevance of mental capacity and the shift to supported decision-making, continue to develop. A panel event was held at the King's Transnational Law Summit in 2018 with the aim of understanding the contours of the dialogue around these issues. This paper presents the contributions of the panel members, a summary of the discussion that took place and a synthesis of the views expressed. It suggests that divergent conclusions in this area turn on disagreements about: the consequences of sometimes limiting legal capacity for people with mental disabilities; the emphasis placed on particular values; the basis for mental capacity assessments; and the scope for supported decision-making. It also highlights the connection between resources, recognition and freedoms for people with mental disabilities, and therefore the issues that arise when discussion in this area is limited to legal capacity in the context of decision-making.

Taking capacity seriously? Ten years of mental capacity disputes before England's Court of Protection

Most of the late 20th century wave of reforms in mental capacity or competence law were predicated upon the so-called 'functional' model of mental capacity, asking not merely whether a person had a mental disorder or disability but rather whether they were capable of making a specific decision (or decisions) at a specific point of time. This model is now under sustained challenge, most notably from the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and this challenge has focused a spotlight on the difficulty of applying the legally 'neat' concepts of the functional model of mental capacity across the full complex spectrum of human life. This paper presents a review, in two parts, of the first ten years of the Court of Protection, a specialist mental capacity court in England and Wales which applies a functional model of mental capacity. The first part outlines the history of the functional model in England and Wales, and the development of this specialist mental capacity court (Court of Protection), created by the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The second part presents an empirical and case-based study of 40 published cases of capacity disputes presented to the Court of Protection, or to the Court of Appeal on appeal from the Court of Protection, during the first ten years of its existence. The authors found that in 70% of cases the subject of proceedings (or P) had either a learning disability or dementia, and the court ruled on P's capacity for a wide range of issues, most commonly residence, care and contact. The judge considered the support principle, or whether practical steps were taken to maximise P's capacity, in 23 of 40 (57.5%) cases. The subject P was determined to have capacity in 13 cases, to lack capacity in 22 cases, and in 5 cases P was found to have and lack capacity for different issues before the court. The functional inability to use or weigh relevant information was most commonly cited by the judge, being cited in all but 2 cases in which P was determined to lack capacity and inabilities were cited. The propensity for the system to learn was shown by an increase in the proportion of cases which considered the 'causative nexus' from 2013, when a Court of Appeal case emphasised that impairment must not merely be present alongside functional inability but must be the causal basis of inability. The authors conclude that whilst the Court of Protection is still on a learning curve, its work provides a powerful illustration of what taking capacity seriously looks like, both inside and outside the courtroom. The implications for judges, lawyers and psychiatrists that can be drawn from the study are generalisable to other comparable socio-legal frameworks in which mental capacity or competence plays a role and is likely to do so for the foreseeable future.

Misevaluating the Future: Affective Disorder and Decision-Making Capacity for Treatment - A Temporal Understanding

BACKGROUND

Within psychiatric practice and policy there is considerable controversy surrounding the nature and assessment of impairments of decision-making capacity (DMC) for treatment in persons diagnosed with affective disorders. We identify the problems of "cognitive bias" and "outcome bias" in assessment of DMC for treatment in affective disorder and aim to help resolve these problems with an analysis of how time is experienced in depression and mania.

SAMPLING AND METHODS

We conducted purposeful sampling and a qualitative phenomenological analysis of interview data on patients with depression and mania, exploring temporal experience and decision-making regarding treatment.

RESULTS

In both severe depression and mania there is a distinctive experience of the future. Two consequences can follow: a loss of evaluative differentiation concerning future outcomes and, relatedly, inductive failure. This temporal inability can compromise an individual's ability to appreciate or "use or weigh" treatment information.

CONCLUSIONS

The decision-making abilities required for self-determination involve an ability to evaluate alternative future outcomes. Our results show that, within severe depression or mania, anticipation of future outcomes is inflexibly fixed at one end of the value spectrum. We therefore propose a temporal model of decision-making abilities, which could be used to improve assessment of DMC in affective disorder.

Assessment of mental capacity to consent to treatment in anorexia nervosa: A comparison of clinical judgment and MacCAT-T and consequences for clinical practice

Informed consent requires adequate mental capacity to consent to treatment. Mental capacity (MC) to consent to treatment refers to the ability to make medical decisions. MC is assessed in a general psychiatric interview, but this clinical assessment is known to overestimate mental capacity in patients and the inter rater reliability is low. The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T) has emerged as the gold standard to assess mental capacity to consent to treatment. The MacCAT-T is a semi-structured interview designed to aid clinicians in this assessment and has shown good inter rater reliability in patients with schizophrenia and other mental disorders, but has hardly been studied in patients with anorexia nervosa. Patients with anorexia nervosa (AN) regularly avoid treatment, even when severely ill and discussion includes assessing MC to consent to treatment. The aim of this study is to compare clinical judgment and the MacCAT-T in evaluating MC in patients with AN which in turn may influence use of the MacCAT-T in daily practice. In a sample of 70 consecutively referred severely ill patients with AN with a mean BMI of 15.5 kg/m² and a mean duration of illness of 8.6 years, clinical assessment of MC by experienced psychiatrists and the outcome of the MacCAT-T interview were compared. Agreement (κ-value) was calculated. Agreement between clinical assessment and outcome of the MacCAT-T was questionable (κ 0.23). Unlike in other psychiatric populations, clinicians judged a high proportion of patients with AN as having diminished MC. The MacCAT-T can be useful in assessing MC in AN when used in addition to clinical judgment to aid clinicians in complex cases. Why clinicians judge a relatively high proportion of patients with AN as having diminished MC, in contrast to lower proportions in other psychiatric disorders, is an area in need of further research.

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 best interests test as applied to the elderly - is it fit for purpose?

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 ('MCA') sets out a regime which governs the making of decisions for people who lack mental capacity. Acts must be carried out, and decisions made, for such an incapacitated person, based on what is in her best interests (section 4 MCA). In this paper, I consider the body of post-MCA case law which applies the MCA best interests test to decision-making for elderly people, in various contexts. Is the best interests test 'fit for purpose' for the vulnerable elderly? The key aims of Parliament in introducing the test seem to have been empowerment, protection and support - and alertness to undue influence - as well as a balance between the objective and subjective viewpoints. Laudable attempts have been made by some judges, applying the MCA, to pay real heed to the patient's wishes and values, and to balance physical risk with welfare and happiness. However, it is not yet clear in my view that the new regime fully achieves Parliament's aims. Indeed, these aims themselves should be expanded; the law in this area should also promote the significance and value of advanced years and should recognise Aristotle's concept of 'human flourishing' in old age. Consideration should be given to amending the MCA, adding guidance specifically for the elderly and also to introducing a Convention of Human Rights for the older person and to creating a new statutory Older Persons' Commissioner and/or a cabinet-level Minister for Ageing and Older People.

Lack of Capacity is not an 'off Switch' for Rights and Freedoms: Wye Valley Nhs Trust V Mr B (By His Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor) [2015] Ewcop 60

Wye Valley NHS Trust v Mr B [2015] EWCOP 60 illustrates the extent to which the wishes, feelings, beliefs, and values strongly expressed by a person who lacks decision-making capacity are to be considered in determining his best interests. Whilst not going as far as a supported decision-making model, as endorsed by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the case exemplifies the participative ethos of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the requirement that the person lacking capacity should participate as fully as possible in any decision affecting him.

Humility when responding to the abuse of adults with mental disabilities

Legal theorists often reduce the ethics of responding to the abuse of another person to a clash between the principles of autonomy and protection. This reduction is a problem. Responding to suspected abuse requires humility - the potential responder must be aware of and respect their own limits - but humility cannot be usefully reduced to protection and autonomy. Using examples from the Court of Protection of England and Wales, this article examines the different ways that someone responding to abuse should respect their own limits, and suggests that a failure to do so will disproportionately affect people with mental disabilities. It is therefore necessary to attend to whether the law fosters humility among those who respond to abuse, although this must be tempered by humility about legal reform itself. Finally, the article shows how attention to humility can assist the interpretation of Article 16 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and suggests that, so interpreted, the Convention may help to promote humility when responding to abuse.

Mental Capacity Assessments Among Inpatients Referred to the Consultation-Liaison Psychiatry Unit at a University Hospital in Bangkok, Thailand

Clinicians routinely assess patients' mental capacity on a daily basis, but a more thorough assessment may be needed in complex cases. We aimed to identify the characteristics of inpatients in a general hospital, who were referred to a liaison psychiatry service for mental capacity assessment, reasons for the referrals, and the factors associated with their mental capacity. A 6-year retrospective study (2008-2013) was conducted using data collected routinely (e.g., age, gender, diagnosis, Thai Mental State Examination score, reasons for the referral, and the outcome of capacity assessment) on referrals for mental capacity assessment to a Consultation-liaison Psychiatry Unit at a university hospital in Thailand. Among 6194 consecutive referrals to the liaison-psychiatry services, only 0.6 % [n = 37, mean age (SD), 59.83 (20.42)] were referred for capacity assessment, 43.24 % of which lacked mental capacity. The most common requests from referring physicians were for assessment of testamentary capacity (15 assessed, 53.33 % lacking capacity), financial management capacity (14 assessed, 50 % lacking capacity), and capacity to consent to treatment (9 assessed, 22.22 % lacking capacity). Delirium, rather than dementia or other mental disorders, was associated with mental incapacity (p < 0.001) and being more dependent during the admission (p = 0.048). There were no significant differences for mean age (p = 0.257) or Thai Mental State Examination score (p = 0.206). The main request from referring clinicians was to assess testamentary capacity. Delirium and being more dependent during the admission were associated with lack of mental capacity, whereas age and dementia were not.

Is there a broader role for independent mental capacity advocates in critical care? An exploratory study

BACKGROUND

This research explores the current and potential future role of independent mental capacity advocates (IMCAs) in critical care. The Mental Capacity Act (MCA) of 2005 introduced IMCAs as advocates for patients without anyone to represent their best interests, but research suggests that this role is not well understood or implemented. No existing research explores the role of IMCAs in critical care or their potential use when families are judged 'appropriate to act' on the patient's behalf. It is suggested that families may not be best placed to advocate for their sick family member when they themselves are in a state of shock.

AIM

To investigate existing levels of knowledge and awareness of the MCA and understanding of the role of IMCAs in critical care as a prelude to considering whether the role of IMCAs might usefully be extended. The concept of 'IMCA clinics' is introduced and explored.

DESIGN AND METHODS

A small-scale qualitative study using thematic analysis of 15 interviews across two NHS sites and a survey of IMCA services were undertaken.

RESULTS

Some knowledge of the MCA was evident across both study sites, but training on MCA remains unsatisfactory, with confusion about the role of IMCAs and when they should become involved. Overall, participants felt that the broader involvement of IMCAs on a regular basis within critical care could be useful.

CONCLUSIONS

There was evidence of good practice when instructing IMCAs, but further work needs to be conducted to ensure that critical care staff are informed about the referral process. It was clear that expanding the role of an advocate warrants further investigation.

RELEVANCE TO CLINICAL PRACTICE

Further training on the role of IMCAs within critical care is required, and good practice examples should be shared with other units to improve referral rates to the IMCA service and ensure that vulnerable patients are properly represented.

Informed consent in the context of research involving acute injuries and emergencies

Traditionally, informed consent for clinical research involves the patient reading an approved Participant Information Sheet, considering the information presented and having as much time as they need to discuss the study information with their friends and relatives, their clinical care and the research teams. This system works well in the 'planned' or 'elective' setting. But what happens if the patient requires urgent treatment for an injury or emergency? This article reviews the legal framework which governs informed consent in the emergency setting, discusses how the approach taken may vary according to the details of the emergency and the treatment required, and reports on the patients' view of providing consent following a serious injury. We then provide some practical tips for managing the process of informed consent in the context of injuries and emergencies. Cite this article: Bone Joint J 2017;99-B:147-150.