Agency, embodiment and enactment in psychosomatic theory and practice

In this paper, we examine some of the conceptual, pragmatic and moral dilemmas intrinsic to psychosomatic explanation in medicine, psychiatry and psychology. Psychosomatic explanation invokes a social grey zone in which ambiguities and conflicts about agency, causality and moral responsibility abound. This conflict reflects the deep-seated dualism in Western ontology and concepts of personhood that plays out in psychosomatic research, theory and practice. Illnesses that are seen as psychologically mediated tend also to be viewed as less real or legitimate. New forms of this dualism are evident in philosophical attacks on Engel's biopsychosocial approach, which was a mainstay of earlier psychosomatic theory, and in the recent Research Domain Criteria research programme of the US National institute of Mental Health which opts for exclusively biological modes of explanation of illness. We use the example of resignation syndrome among refugee children in Sweden to show how efforts to account for such medically unexplained symptoms raise problems of the ascription of agency. We argue for an integrative multilevel approach that builds on recent work in embodied and enactive cognitive science. On this view, agency can have many fine gradations that emerge through looping effects that link neurophenomenology, narrative practices and cultural affordances in particular social contexts. This multilevel ecosocial view points the way towards a renewed biopsychosocial approach in training and clinical practice that can advance person-centred medicine and psychiatry.

Pink and blue: the role of gender in psychiatric diagnosis

Why are the diagnostic criteria of some psychiatric disorders standardised by gender while others are not? Why standardise symptom questionnaires by gender but not other personal characteristics such as ethnicity, socioeconomic class or sexual orientation? And how might our changing attitudes towards gender, born from scientific research and changing societal narratives, alter our opinion of these questions? This paper approaches these dilemmas by assessing the concept of diagnosis in psychiatry itself, before analysing two common approaches to the study of psychiatric diagnosis; the naturalist and constructivist views. The paper assesses the relative merits and significance of each, before turning its attention to the nature of gender and its relevance to psychiatry. The paper introduces a framework to approach gender-based diagnostic bias and concludes by drawing a distinction between qualitative and quantitative standardisation, arguing that gender standardisation of psychiatric diagnoses is ethically justified in the former but not the latter.

Dualism and its place in a philosophical structure for psychiatry

It is often claimed in parts of the psychiatric literature that neuroscientific research into the biological basis of mental disorder undermines dualism in the philosophy of mind. This paper shows that such a claim does not apply to all forms of dualism. Focusing on Kenneth Kendler's discussion of the mind-body problem in biological psychiatry, I argue that such criticism of dualism often conflates the psychological and phenomenal concepts of the mental. Moreover, it fails to acknowledge that there are different varieties of dualism, and so overlooks the important metaphysical insights of contemporary dualist philosophers. I argue that while the neuroscientific research underpinning biological psychiatry challenges the traditional dualism of René Descartes, it does not pose any problem for the more modern dualism of David Chalmers. It is possible to take seriously the scientific claims of biological psychiatry while holding that this latter form of dualism is true. This has implications for the positioning of the mind-body problem in psychiatry. While the "easy" problem of explaining psychological processes is relevant to the aims of biological psychiatry, psychiatrists need not worry about the "hard" problem of consciousness.

Do Community Treatment Orders in Psychiatry Stand Up to Principalism: Considerations Reflected through the Prism of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

Compulsory psychiatric treatment is the norm in many Western countries, despite the increasingly individualistic and autonomous approach to medical interventions. Community Treatment Orders (CTOs) are the singular best example of this, requiring community patients to accept a variety of interventions, both pharmacological and social, despite their explicit wish not to do so. The epidemiological, medical/treatment and legal intricacies of CTOs have been examined in detail, however the ethical considerations are less commonly considered. Principlism, the normative ethical code based on the principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, underpins modern medical ethics. Conflict exists between patient centred commentary that reflects individual autonomy in decision making and the need for supported decision making, as described in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the increasing use of such coercive measures, which undermines this principle. What appears to have been lost is the analysis of whether CTOs, or any coercive measure in psychiatric practice measures up against these ethical principles. We consider whether CTOs, as an exemplar of coercive psychiatric practice, measures up against the tenets of principalism in the modern context in order to further this debate.

Contributory injustice in psychiatry

I explain the notion of contributory injustice, a kind of epistemic injustice, and argue that it occurs within psychiatric services, affecting (at least) those who hear voices. I argue that individual effort on the part of clinicians to avoid perpetrating this injustice is an insufficient response to the problem; mitigating the injustice will require open and meaningful dialogue between clinicians and service user organisations, as well as individuals. I suggest that clinicians must become familiar with and take seriously concepts and frameworks for understanding mental distress developed in service user communities, such as Hearing Voices Network, and by individual service users. This is especially necessary when these concepts and frameworks explicitly conflict with medical or technical understandings of users' experiences. I defend this proposal against three objections.

Alternatives to War Within Medicine: From Conscientious Objection to Nonviolent Conflict About Contested Medical Practices

When we figure medical practice as warfare, an individual clinician may be either a dutiful combatant or a conscientious objector. The rhetorical structure of this choice means that clinicians may exercise their consciences by loyally joining or disloyally exiting the medical ranks' battle against disease. But there are alternatives to loyalty and exit, and within psychiatry, these alternatives have transformed clinical services. In the 1970s, gay activists successfully resisted the American Psychiatric Association's characterization of homosexuality as a mental illness. In the 1940s, Mennonite nonresisters created the Mennonite mental health movement as a noncoercive alternative to standard psychiatric care. These gay activists and Mennonite volunteers opened communal alternatives to violence. When clinicians pursue nonviolent conflict about contested medical practices, they practice with the integrity that develops out of engaging in moral dialogue. Medicine becomes something more than a war in which individuals serve or to which they object: instead, it becomes a prudential set of practices that advance through principled disagreements and that expand the imagination of clinicians as they respond to the vulnerability of the people they meet as patients.

Self-admission in psychiatry: The ethics

Self-admission to inpatient treatment is a novel approach that aims to increase agency and autonomy for patients with severe psychiatric illness and a history of high utilization of inpatient care. By focusing on brief, preventive hospital admissions in times of increased risk of relapse, self-admission seeks to reduce the need for prolonged episodes of inpatient treatment. Participants are generally satisfied with the model, which is not surprising given that self-admission programs allocate a scarce resource-hospital beds-to a select group. However, the patients targeted by these programs are not necessarily those in most need of hospital admission, which may compromise the commonly accepted 'principle of need' in allocation of public healthcare resources. In light of the current lack of consistent evidence of the usefulness and cost-effectiveness of the model, several aspects need to be further studied in order to guide any large-scale implementation of self-admission in psychiatry.

Psychopathy Treatment and the Stigma of Yesterday's Research

The psychiatric diagnosis of psychopathic personality-or psychopathy-signifies a patient stereotype with a callous lack of empathy and strong antisocial tendencies. Throughout the research record and psychiatric practices, diagnosed psychopaths have been predominantly seen as immune to psychiatric intervention and treatment, making the diagnosis a potentially strong discriminator for treatment amenability. In this contribution, the evidence in support of this proposition is critically analyzed. It is demonstrated that the untreatability perspective rests largely on erroneous, unscientific conclusions. Instead, recent research suggests that practitioners should be more optimistic about the possibility of treating and rehabilitating diagnosed psychopaths. In light of this finding, concrete ethical challenges in the forensic practice surrounding the psychopathy diagnosis are discussed, adding to a growing body of research that expresses skepticism about the forensic utility of the diagnosis.

Leadership Analysis and Political Psychology in the 21st Century

The election of President Trump has led to interest in his mental health and has resulted in heightened scrutiny regarding the American Psychiatric Association's Goldwater Rule, with its prohibition on opining psychiatrically on the mental health of public figures whom one has not examined in person. This article highlights the historic, methodological, forensic, and ethics challenges regarding psychiatric approaches to leadership analysis, and how these can offer policy makers options regarding national security decision-making.

[How human rights can guide german psychiatry]

The concerns and recommendations of the UN "Final Remarks" on the first German State Report are substantiated by up-to-date health reporting data. Their "recommendations" are substantiated by evidence-based care models and supplemented by additional content from the Special Rapporteur's report of 2017 as visions for German psychiatric care, thus demonstrating the path of psychiatry determined by respect for human rights and social inclusion. The avoidance of coercion through traumainformed treatment and the development of complex outpatient treatment structures through the models of open dialogue and the recovery approach are seen as the focus of a paradigm shift. The awareness that in today's psychiatry, especially through deficient structures, human rights violations are committed that could be avoided, should contribute to the determination for the necessary changes.

Should DBS for Psychiatric Disorders be Considered a Form of Psychosurgery? Ethical and Legal Considerations

Deep brain stimulation (DBS), a surgical procedure involving the implantation of electrodes in the brain, has rekindled the medical community's interest in psychosurgery. Whereas many researchers argue DBS is substantially different from psychosurgery, we argue psychiatric DBS-though a much more precise and refined treatment than its predecessors-is nevertheless a form of psychosurgery, which raises both old and new ethical and legal concerns that have not been given proper attention. Learning from the ethical and regulatory failures of older forms of psychosurgery can help shed light on how to address the regulatory gaps that exist currently in DBS research. To show why it is important to address the current regulatory gaps within psychiatric DBS, we draw on the motivations underlying the regulation of earlier forms of psychosurgery in the US. We begin by providing a brief history of psychosurgery and electrical brain stimulation in the US. Against this backdrop, we introduce psychiatric DBS, exploring current research and ongoing clinical trials. We then draw out the ethical and regulatory similarities between earlier forms of psychosurgery and psychiatric DBS. As we will show, the factors that motivated strict regulation of earlier psychosurgical procedures mirror concerns with psychiatric DBS today. We offer three recommendations for psychiatric DBS regulation, which echo earlier motivations for regulating psychosurgery, along with new considerations that reflect the novel technologies used in DBS.

Film Psychotherapy in the 21st Century

Psychotherapy is commonly depicted in films. Films, then, help to inform the public about the nature of psychotherapy and psychotherapists. Although much has been written about the portrayal of psychotherapy in films, there has been little empirical investigation of films from the 21st century. The current study provides a systematic investigation of the portrayal of therapists and therapy in films released between 2000 and 2013. Trained volunteers coded films with characters identified as psychotherapists. Data are presented for ratings on 22 films in which therapist characters appeared on screen for at least 15 minutes. Therapists were predominantly Caucasian, male, and between ages 40 and 60 years. Their most common characteristics were generally positive-intelligent, caring, knowledgeable, and compassionate. More than half were portrayed as unethical, and more than one-third as manipulative. Therapists were also commonly shown as touching clients in some way, disclosing client information without permission, and becoming involved in social relationships with clients. In addition, it was often unclear whether clients benefitted from their engagement in therapy. The observed portrayals raise serious concerns about their potential impact on viewers. Viewers may be discouraged from seeking help and may have increased vulnerability to exploitation because of a lack of understanding of what is appropriate and inappropriate therapist behavior.

[A relational ethical model for the assessment of decision-making competence in psychiatry]

Nowadays, partly due to legislation, decision-making competence is playing an ever-increasing role in psychiatry. So far, however, there are no clear criteria for evaluating the actual competence of the procedure.<br/> AIM: To develop a relational ethical model, including criteria and methodology, which can be used to assess and enhance decision-making competence mainly from a relational and ethical perspective.<br/> METHOD: Combination of a review of the literature and ethical reflection. First of all, a limited study was made of the literature relating to the concept of and criteria for decision-making competence. On the basis of the literature and relational ethical reflection, ten criteria were developed for decision-making competence and a method was devised for assessing the procedure.<br/> RESULTS: The criteria that have to be satisfied can be summarised as follows: the persons involved must understand the information, and must be able to apply it to their own situation. They must be able to gain insight into their own situation and be able to weigh up the available options, and be able to estimate consequences for themselves, as well as for others. They must be able to motivate choices in a sensible and comprehensible manner without being subject to coercive influences coming from internal and external sources. Participants' choices should be motivated on the basis of their own personal values. The decision-making competence is assessed and enhanced by giving a score to the individual criteria and by making an overall evaluation. This is achieved by a dialogue including all the persons involved: the care seeker (as far as possible), close relatives and the care-providers.<br/> CONCLUSION: The persons involved can attain greater objectivity by exchanging views orally on the ten proposed criteria for decision-making competence.

Clinical judgment, moral anxiety, and the limits of psychiatry

It is common for clinicians working in psychiatry and related clinical disciplines to be called on to make diagnostic clinical judgments concerning moral anxiety, which is a kind of anxiety that is closely bound up with decisions individuals face as moral agents. To make such a judgment, it is necessary to make a moral judgment. Although it has been common to acknowledge that there are ways in which moral and clinical judgment interact, this type of interaction has remained unacknowledged. This raises questions as to the nature and limits of psychiatry-particularly concerning the extent to which psychiatric discourse ought to incorporate moral discourse, and the role of the clinician as an expert in identifying problematic anxiety.

The Patient-Psychiatrist Relationship on the Axis of the Other and the Same

The patient-psychiatrist relationship is a cornerstone of psychiatric professionalism and ethics. We discuss this topic along the axis of the Other and the Same, concepts defined by continental philosophy. The self of Anglo-American philosophy is typically described in individualistic terms. Individualism, autonomy and ideal self are valorized within the current model of care. These characteristics belong to the Lacanian Imaginary Order, which is the core of narcissism. Patients may yearn for another model of interaction. For Levinas, ethics should not involve a search for perfectionism and accomplishment but responsibility toward others. Ethics is, according to him, rooted in the calling into question of one's Sameness by the other's Otherness. The question of hospitality and of the welcoming of Otherness is central to his thought. Derrida further asks whether hospitality is not an interruption of the self. Hospitality may thus become a fundamental way of re-thinking clinical practices. A relationship to the Other as an-other is characterized as of Euclidian-type, establishing borders between the self and the Other, whereas a relationship to the Other as same is characterized as of fractal-type, emphasizing similarities between self and other as same and obliterating boundaries. Winnicott's object-relating versus use of object and Buber's I-you and I-it relations are also examined along the axis of Sameness and Otherness. Since psychiatric clinical practice requires to our view adequate and adaptive to and fro movements along this axis, the two forms of relating to the Other are discussed both theoretically and through a clinical case presentation.

Global mental health, autonomy and medical paternalism: reconstructing the 'French ethical tradition' in psychiatry

In the last few decades, the definition of deontological ethics, a well-identified ethical territory in psychiatry, has been the object of increasing concerns. This has been the case in France, where claims of a specific ethical tradition in psychiatry have accompanied the institutionalization of psychiatric ethics and the perceived globalization of an Anglo-American model of mental health care. This study traces the history of the 'French ethical tradition in psychiatry' and its relationship with establishing institutional spaces for ethical decision-making. The 'ethical tradition' thus conceived proves to be functional in terms of preserving the threatened identity of French psychiatry. Nevertheless, this movement also pinpoints impasses that transcend the French context and may provide valuable resources for ethical reflections on mental health on a global scale.

A Study of the Discussions on Psychiatry of Korea in the 1960s and 1970s* - From Mental Hygiene to Modern Psychiatry

This study is to review the emergence of new psychiatrists, scientific rationalization, and popular internalization to reorganize the formation process of modern psychological medicine system. Unlike eugenic psychiatry from the Japanese Colonial Era, the social conditions and contexts forming autonomous system of psychiatry of Korea in the 1960s and 1970s have been concentrated. The discussion approach has been tried to secure two perspectives-treatment and criticism-at the same time and to expand the time and scope of study through the extensive texts such as newspapers, magazines, books, advertisements, and others in the 1960s and 1970s. Through formation of subject, rationalization, and popularization, this study has surveyed the characteristics of psychiatry in the 1960s and 1970s to accentuate complicated conditions and kinetic steps to systemize psychiatry as scientific field to promote treatment of patients by deviating from mental hygiene approaching national mental health from cleanliness and removal. The characteristics are summarized as follows. First, as the ethical models of good doctors, medical paternalistic doctors, and non-authoritarian symmetric doctors have been proposed as good psychiatrists by new medical specialists with experience of globality, a new subject emerges. However, there has been illegalization process of unlicensed medical practitioner excluded by the regulatory authority called "clearness." Second, the rationalization of psychiatry has been accelerated through the dispute of enactment of Mental Hygiene Law, segmentalization of concept of mental illness, and scientific characteristics. Especially, the disputes over enactment of Mental Hygiene Law focused on criminalization of mental patients brought a result to regulate the patients as the target of humanistic treatment and potential criminals at the same time. Third, popularization of psychiatry has embraced invisible mental illness into popular daily life through visual measure called medicine advertisement, and through the discussion about social neurosis, a new paradigm for diagnosis of Korean society has been proposed. Moreover, by focusing on autobiographical works with voices of patients, this article reveals a new doctor-patient relationship.

Reflections on the Goldwater Rule

The APA's Goldwater Rule, precluding psychiatrists from rendering opinions to the media about public figures whom they have not examined, has often engendered controversy. Here, I consider the justifications for the rule, how well they stand up to criticism, and the extent, if any, to which modifications might be called for. Although embarrassment to the profession is often cited as the basis for the Rule, it reflects more substantive concerns, including the risk of harm to living persons and discouraging persons in need of treatment from seeking psychiatric attention. The most potent criticisms of the Rule are that it discourages public education about mental illness and its effects and precludes legitimate scholarly endeavors by psychiatrists studying foreign leaders, historical figures, and others. However, there are many ways of providing education about mental illness without violating the Rule, and read properly, it should not prevent legitimate historical investigation, though some clarification of the Rule on this point might be helpful. Even psychiatrists who seek to aid policymakers in dealing with international or domestic threats should not find that the Rule interferes with their efforts. On balance, the Goldwater Rule continues to be an important underpinning of ethical behavior by psychiatrists.

A Resident Perspective on the Goldwater Rule

Section 7.3 of the Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry, more commonly known as the Goldwater rule, admonishes psychiatrists to avoid offering professional opinions about public figures in the absence of an in-person evaluation. To our knowledge, no peer-reviewed articles have been published considering resident perspectives on the Goldwater rule. Furthermore, we have found little published guidance that deals specifically with teaching the Goldwater rule in a general residency curriculum. We propose that residency programs should incorporate a brief (one hour) but thoughtful discussion of the Goldwater rule into their general curriculum. We recommend that such a didactic hour should introduce arguments for and against the rule in its present form. Covered topics could include whether there should be exceptions to the rule, whether the rule is defensible on ethical grounds, and what contexts exist in which psychiatric opinions can be rendered without personal examination. We hope to make the case that a more nuanced exploration of the Goldwater rule could help open a door to discussions that would foster the growth of a mature professional identity.