Value Activation and Processing of Persuasive Messages

Basing attitudes on one’s core values has long been thought to result in strong, consequential attitudes. Recent research suggests a less direct route for values to influence attitude strength—by influencing the extent to which people process attitude-relevant information. That research induced research participants to explicitly consider important or unimportant values in relation to the persuasive message. In contrast, the current research examined whether mere activation of important values before encountering a persuasive message could enhance message processing. Normatively important or unimportant values were subtly activated by simply presenting values (Experiment 1) including the values in a previous “unrelated” study (Experiment 2) or rating the importance of values in a questionnaire prior to the persuasive message. Experiment 3 suggested that important values are not equivalent to any other important constructs. Activation of important values increased information processing but activation of equally important alternative attitudes did not.

Source Expertise and Persuasion

Compared to nonexperts, expert sources have been considered to elicit more processing of persuasive messages because of expectations that the information is likely to be valid or accurate. However, depending on the position of an advocacy, source expertise could activate other motives that may produce a very different relation from that found in past research. When messages are counterattitudinal (disagreeable), experts should motivate greater processing than nonexpert sources because of expectations that they will likely provide robust opposition to one’s existing views. In contrast, when advocacies are proattitudinal (agreeable), nonexpert rather than expert sources should elicit more scrutiny because of perceptions that they will likely provide inadequate support to recipients’ current views. Two studies offer evidence consistent with these predictions. Manipulations of source expertise created different expectations regarding the strength of opposition or support, and these perceptions accounted for effects of source expertise on the amount of message scrutiny.

Seeking Confirmation in Times of Doubt

Strong attitudes exert greater influence on social perceptions, judgments, and behaviors. Some research indicates that strong attitudes are associated with exposure to attitude-confirming information. However, we believe that uncertain attitudes might produce strong selective exposure to attitude-consistent information, especially when available information is unfamiliar. In three experiments, participants reported attitude favorability, reported attitude confidence (Study 1A and 2) or completed a doubt-priming manipulation (Study 1B), and selected information supporting or opposing an issue. When chosen information was relatively unfamiliar (in all three studies), uncertainty led to more attitude-consistent exposure than certainty did. However, when chosen information was more familiar (in Study 2), the pattern of effects was significantly reversed: Certainty led to more attitude-consistent exposure than did uncertainty. This finding suggests that under certain conditions, uncertainty can motivate people to seek attitude-confirming information, thereby creating a motivational basis for weak attitudes to have strong influences on information seeking.

Discovering That the Shoe Fits

Stereotypes can influence social perceptions in many ways. The current research examined a previously unexplored possibility—that activation of a stereotype can validate thoughts about other people when the thoughts are stereotype consistent (i.e., that stereotype activation can increase people's confidence in their previous stereotype-consistent thoughts). Given previous results for other forms of metacognition, this thought validation from stereotype activation should be most likely when people have the cognitive capacity to carefully process individuating information. In two experiments, participants were given information about a target person and then a description designed to activate a stereotype. When processing capacity was high, confidence in thoughts was greater when the initial information produced thoughts consistent, rather than inconsistent, with the stereotype that was later activated, and higher confidence in thoughts was associated with stronger perception-consistent recommendations related to the target. When processing capacity was low, an activated stereotype served its familiar heuristic role in judgment, and thought confidence played no role in judgment-related recommendations.

Attitudinal ambivalence and message-based persuasion: motivated processing of proattitudinal information and avoidance of counterattitudinal information

Attitudinal ambivalence has been found to increase processing of attitude-relevant information. In this research, the authors suggest that ambivalence can also create the opposite effect: avoidance of thinking about persuasive messages. If processing is intended to reduce experienced ambivalence, then ambivalent people should increase processing of information perceived as proattitudinal (agreeable) and able to decrease ambivalence. However, ambivalence should also lead people to avoid processing of counterattitudinal (disagreeable) information that threatens to increase ambivalence. Three studies provide evidence consistent with this proposal. When participants were relatively ambivalent, they processed messages to a greater extent when the messages were proattitudinal rather than counterattitudinal. However, when participants were relatively unambivalent, they processed messages more when the messages were counterattitudinal rather than proattitudinal. In addition, ambivalent participants perceived proattitudinal messages as more likely than counterattitudinal messages to reduce ambivalence, and these perceptions accounted for message position effects on amount of processing.

Opening the mind to close it: considering a message in light of important values increases message processing and later resistance to change

Past research showed that considering a persuasive message in light of important rather than unimportant values creates attitudes that resist later attack. The traditional explanation is that the attitudes come to express the value or that a cognitive link between the value and attitude enhances resistance. However, the current research showed that another explanation is plausible. Similar to other sources of involvement, considering important rather than unimportant values increases processing of the message considered in light of those values. This occurs when the values are identified as normatively high or low in importance and when the perceived importance differs across participants for the same values. The increase in processing creates resistance to later attacks, and unlike past research, individual-level measures of initial amount of processing mediate value importance effects on later resistance to change. Important values motivate processing because they increase personal involvement with the issue, rather than creating attitudes that represent or express core values.

Not all stereotyping is created equal: Differential consequences of thoughtful versus nonthoughtful stereotyping

Much research emphasizes heuristic use of stereotypes, though stereotypes have long been considered as capable of influencing more thoughtful processing of social information. Direct comparisons between thoughtful and non-thoughtful stereotyping are lacking in the literature. Recent research in attitude change emphasizes the different consequences of judgments arising from relatively thoughtful versus non-thoughtful processes. Therefore, increased thought could not only fail to decrease stereotyping but might also create stereotypic perceptions that are more likely to have lasting impact. The current studies demonstrate thoughtful and non-thoughtful stereotyping within the same setting. More thoughtful stereotyping is more resistant to future attempts at change and to warnings of possible bias. Implications are discussed for the typical research questions asked after observing stereotypic judgements.

Discrete emotions and persuasion: the role of emotion-induced expectancies

The authors argue that specific emotions can alter the persuasive impact of messages as a function of the emotional framing of persuasive appeals. Because specific emotions inflate expectancies for events possessing matching emotional overtones (D. DeSteno, R. E. Petty, D. T. Wegener, & D. D. Rucker, 2000), the authors predicted that attempts at persuasion would be more successful when messages were framed with emotional overtones matching the emotional state of the receiver and that these changes would be mediated by emotion-induced biases involving expectancies attached to arguments contained in the messages. Two studies manipulating discrete negative emotional states and message frames (i.e., sadness and anger) confirmed these predictions. The functioning of this emotion-matching bias in parallel with emotion-induced processing differences and the limitations of a valence-based approach to the study of attitude change are also considered.

Beyond valence in the perception of likelihood: the role of emotion specificity

Positive and negative moods have been shown to increase likelihood estimates of future events matching these states in valence (e.g., E. J. Johnson & A. Tversky, 1983). In the present article, 4 studies provide evidence that this congruency bias (a) is not limited to valence but functions in an emotion-specific manner, (b) derives from the informational value of emotions, and (c) is not the inevitable outcome of likelihood assessment under heightened emotion. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrates that sadness and anger, 2 distinct, negative emotions, differentially bias likelihood estimates of sad and angering events. Studies 2 and 3 replicate this finding in addition to supporting an emotion-as-information (cf. N. Schwarz & G. L. Clore, 1983), as opposed to a memory-based, mediating process for the bias. Finally, Study 4 shows that when the source of the emotion is salient, a reversal of the bias can occur given greater cognitive effort aimed at accuracy.

Beyond valence in the perception of likelihood: the role of emotion specificity

Positive and negative moods have been shown to increase likelihood estimates of future events matching these states in valence (e.g., E. J. Johnson & A. Tversky, 1983). In the present article, 4 studies provide evidence that this congruency bias (a) is not limited to valence but functions in an emotion-specific manner, (b) derives from the informational value of emotions, and (c) is not the inevitable outcome of likelihood assessment under heightened emotion. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrates that sadness and anger, 2 distinct, negative emotions, differentially bias likelihood estimates of sad and angering events. Studies 2 and 3 replicate this finding in addition to supporting an emotion-as-information (cf. N. Schwarz & G. L. Clore, 1983), as opposed to a memory-based, mediating process for the bias. Finally, Study 4 shows that when the source of the emotion is salient, a reversal of the bias can occur given greater cognitive effort aimed at accuracy.

Attitudes and attitude change

We review empirical and conceptual developments over the past four years (1992-1995) on attitudes and persuasion. A voluminous amount of material was produced concerning attitude structure, attitude change, and the consequences of holding attitudes. In the structure area, particular attention is paid to work on attitude accessibility, ambivalence, and the affective versus cognitive bases of attitudes. In persuasion, our review examines research that has focused on high effort cognitive processes (central route), low effort processes (peripheral route), and the multiple roles by which variables can have an impact on attitudes. Special emphasis is given to work on cognitive dissonance and other biases in message processing, and on the multiple processes by which mood influences evaluations. Work on the consequences of attitudes focuses on the impact of attitudes on behavior and social judgments.

Positive mood can increase or decrease message scrutiny: the hedonic contingency view of mood and message processing

Currently dominant explanations of mood effects on persuasive message processing (i.e., cognitive capacity and feelings as information) predict that happy moods lead to less message scrutiny than neutral or sad moods. The hedonic contingency view (D. T. Wegener & R. E. Petty, 1994) predicts that happy moods can sometimes be associated with greater message processing activity because people in a happy mood are more attentive than neutral or sad people to the hedonic consequences of their actions. Consistent with this view, Experiment 1 finds that a happy mood can lead to greater message scrutiny than a neutral mood when the message is not mood threatening. Experiment 2 finds that a happy mood leads to greater message scrutiny than a sad mood when an uplifting message is encountered, but to less message scrutiny when a depressing message is encountered.