[Quality and saving: do they run together?]

In the healthcare debate, it is often stated that better quality leads to savings. Quality systems lead to additional costs for setting up, running and external evaluations. In addition, suppression of implicit rationing leads to additional costs. On the other hand, they lead to savings by procedures simplification, improvement of patients' health state and quicker integration of new collaborators. It is then logical to imagine that financial incentives could improve quality. First evidences of pay for performances initiatives show a positive impact but also some limitations. Quality and savings are linked together and require all our attention.

Cost to primary care practices of responding to payer requests for quality and performance data

PURPOSE

We wanted to determine how much it costs primary care practices to participate in programs that require them to gather and report data on care quality indicators.

METHODS

Using mixed quantitative-qualitative methods, we gathered data from 8 practices in North Carolina that were selected purposively to be diverse by size, ownership, type, location, and medical records. Formal practice visits occurred between January 2008 and May 2008. Four quality-reporting programs were studied: Medicare's Physician Quality Reporting Initiative (PQRI), Community Care of North Carolina (CCNC), Bridges to Excellence (BTE), and Improving Performance in Practice (IPIP). We estimated direct costs to the practice and on-site costs to the quality organization for implementation and maintenance phases of program participation.

RESULTS

Major expenses included personnel time for planning, training, registry maintenance, visit coding, data gathering and entry, and modification of electronic systems. Costs per full-time equivalent clinician ranged from less than $1,000 to $11,100 during program implementation phases and ranged from less than $100 to $4,300 annually during maintenance phases. Main sources of variation included program characteristics, amount of on-site assistance provided, experience and expertise of practice personnel, and the extent of data system problems encountered.

CONCLUSIONS

The costs of a quality-reporting program vary greatly by program and are important to anticipate and understand when undertaking quality improvement work. Incentives that would likely improve practice participation include financial payment, quality improvement skills training, and technical assistance with electronic system troubleshooting.

The influence of economic incentives and regulatory factors on the adoption of treatment technologies: a case study of technologies used to treat heart attacks

The Technological Change in Health Care Research Network collected unique patient-level data on three procedures for treatment of heart attack patients (catheterization, coronary artery bypass grafts and percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty) for 17 countries over a 15-year period to examine the impact of economic and institutional factors on technology adoption. Specific institutional factors are shown to be important to the uptake of these technologies. Health-care systems characterized as public contract systems and reimbursement systems have higher adoption rates than public-integrated health-care systems. Central control of funding of investments is negatively associated with adoption rates and the impact is of the same magnitude as the overall health-care system classification. GDP per capita also has a strong role in initial adoption. The impact of income and institutional characteristics on the utilization rates of the three procedures diminishes over time.

The value of value-based purchasing

In the first four years of the Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID) project operated by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Improvement (CMS) and Premier, Inc., HQID hospitals improved their composite quality scores by 17.2 percent across five clinical areas. If every hospital were able to replicate this level of performance, an estimated $4.5 billion and 70,000 lives would be saved each year, according to CMS and Premier.

Effects of pay for performance on the quality of primary care in England

BACKGROUND

A pay-for-performance scheme based on meeting targets for the quality of clinical care was introduced to family practice in England in 2004.

METHODS

We conducted an interrupted time-series analysis of the quality of care in 42 representative family practices, with data collected at two time points before implementation of the scheme (1998 and 2003) and at two time points after implementation (2005 and 2007). At each time point, data on the care of patients with asthma, diabetes, or coronary heart disease were extracted from medical records; data on patients' perceptions of access to care, continuity of care, and interpersonal aspects of care were collected from questionnaires. The analysis included aspects of care that were and those that were not associated with incentives.

RESULTS

Between 2003 and 2005, the rate of improvement in the quality of care increased for asthma and diabetes (P<0.001) but not for heart disease. By 2007, the rate of improvement had slowed for all three conditions (P<0.001), and the quality of those aspects of care that were not associated with an incentive had declined for patients with asthma or heart disease. As compared with the period before the pay-for-performance scheme was introduced, the improvement rate after 2005 was unchanged for asthma or diabetes and was reduced for heart disease (P=0.02). No significant changes were seen in patients' reports on access to care or on interpersonal aspects of care. The level of the continuity of care, which had been constant, showed a reduction immediately after the introduction of the pay-for-performance scheme (P<0.001) and then continued at that reduced level.

CONCLUSIONS

Against a background of increases in the quality of care before the pay-for-performance scheme was introduced, the scheme accelerated improvements in quality for two of three chronic conditions in the short term. However, once targets were reached, the improvement in the quality of care for patients with these conditions slowed, and the quality of care declined for two conditions that had not been linked to incentives. Continuity of care was reduced after the introduction of the scheme.

The Australian Childhood Immunisation Register-A model for universal immunisation registers?

The Australian Childhood Immunisation Register (ACIR) was established in 1996 as an opt-out register built on the platform of Medicare, the universal national health insurance scheme. Introduction of financial incentives for providers and parents, linked to the ACIR, followed from 1998. Over the subsequent decade, national levels for receipt of all vaccines by 12, 24 and 72 months of age have risen to 91%, 93%, and 88%, respectively. Conscientious objection to immunisation can be registered, with retention of eligibility for incentives. The ACIR has been important in implementation of a range of measures to improve childhood immunisation coverage in Australia. Linkage of a universal childhood immunisation register to national health insurance schemes has potential applicability in a variety of settings internationally.

The UK Quality and Outcomes Framework pay-for-performance scheme and spirometry: rewarding quality or just quantity? A cross-sectional study in Rotherham, UK

BACKGROUND

Accurate spirometry is important in the management of COPD. The UK Quality and Outcomes Framework pay-for-performance scheme for general practitioners includes spirometry related indicators within its COPD domain. It is not known whether high achievement against QOF spirometry indicators is associated with spirometry to BTS standards.

METHODS

Data were obtained from the records of 3,217 patients randomly sampled from 5,649 patients with COPD in 38 general practices in Rotherham, UK. Severity of airflow obstruction was categorised by FEV1 (% predicted) according to NICE guidelines. This was compared with clinician recorded COPD severity. The proportion of patients whose spirometry met BTS standards was calculated in each practice using a random sub-sample of 761 patients. The Spearman rank correlation between practice level QOF spirometry achievement and performance against BTS spirometry standards was calculated.

RESULTS

Spirometry as assessed by clinical records was to BTS standards in 31% of cases (range at practice level 0% to 74%). The categorisation of airflow obstruction according to the most recent spirometry results did not agree well with the clinical categorisation of COPD recorded in the notes (Cohen's kappa = 0.34, 0.30 - 0.38). 12% of patients on COPD registers had FEV1 (% predicted) results recorded that did not support the diagnosis of COPD. There was no association between quality, as measured by adherence to BTS spirometry standards, and either QOF COPD9 achievement (Spearman's rho = -0.11), or QOF COPD10 achievement (rho = 0.01).

CONCLUSION

The UK Quality and Outcomes Framework currently assesses the quantity, but not the quality of spirometry.