A new look at physicians' responses to financial incentives: Quality of care, practice characteristics, and motivations

There is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay in improving the quality of care. Using a behavioral experiment with German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explore whether variations in quality are based on the incentive scheme and the interplay with physicians' real-world profit orientation and patient-regarding motivations, we link administrative data on practice characteristics and survey data on physicians' attitudes with experimental data. We find that, under performance pay, quality increases by about 7pp compared to baseline capitation. While the effect increases with the severity of illness, the bonus level does not significantly affect the quality of care. Data linkage indicates that primary-care physicians in high-profit practices provide a lower quality of care. Physicians' other-regarding motivations and attitudes are significant drivers of high treatment quality.

Plastic Surgeons and Equity: Are Merit-Based Incentive Payment System Scores Impacted by Minority Patient Caseload?

BACKGROUND

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services introduced the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) in 2017 to extend value-based payment to outpatient physicians. The authors hypothesized that the MIPS scores for plastic surgeons are impacted by the existing measures of patient disadvantage, minority patient caseload, and dual eligibility.

METHODS

The authors conducted a retrospective cohort study of plastic surgeons participating in Medicare and MIPS using the Physician Compare national downloadable file and MIPS scores. Minority patient caseload was defined as nonwhite patient caseload. The authors evaluated the characteristics of participating plastic surgeons, their patient caseloads, and their scores.

RESULTS

Of 4539 plastic surgeons participating in Medicare, 1257 participated in MIPS in the first year of scoring. The average patient caseload is 85% white, with racial/ethnicity data available for 73% of participating surgeons. In multivariable regression, higher minority patient caseload is associated with a lower MIPS score.

CONCLUSIONS

As minority patient caseload increases, MIPS scores decrease for otherwise similar caseloads. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services must consider existing and additional measures of patient disadvantage to ensure equitable surgeon scoring.

Association Between Patient Social Risk and Physician Performance Scores in the First Year of the Merit-based Incentive Payment System

IMPORTANCE

The US Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is a major Medicare value-based payment program aimed at improving quality and reducing costs. Little is known about how physicians' performance varies by social risk of their patients.

OBJECTIVE

To determine the relationship between patient social risk and physicians' scores in the first year of MIPS.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

Cross-sectional study of physicians participating in MIPS in 2017.

EXPOSURES

Physicians in the highest quintile of proportion of dually eligible patients served; physicians in the 3 middle quintiles; and physicians in the lowest quintile.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

The primary outcome was the 2017 composite MIPS score (range, 0-100; higher scores indicate better performance). Payment rates were adjusted -4% to 4% based on scores.

RESULTS

The final sample included 284 544 physicians (76.1% men, 60.1% with ≥20 years in practice, 11.9% in rural location, 26.8% hospital-based, and 24.6% in primary care). The mean composite MIPS score was 73.3. Physicians in the highest risk quintile cared for 52.0% of dually eligible patients; those in the 3 middle risk quintiles, 21.8%; and those in the lowest risk quintile, 6.6%. After adjusting for medical complexity, the mean MIPS score for physicians in the highest risk quintile (64.7) was lower relative to scores for physicians in the middle 3 (75.4) and lowest (75.9) risk quintiles (difference for highest vs middle 3, -10.7 [95% CI, -11.0 to -10.4]; highest vs lowest, -11.2 [95% CI, -11.6 to -10.8]; P < .001). This relationship was found across specialties except psychiatry. Compared with physicians in the lowest risk quintile, physicians in the highest risk quintile were more likely to work in rural areas (12.7% vs 6.4%; difference, 6.3 percentage points [95% CI, 6.0 to 6.7]; P < .001) but less likely to care for more than 1000 Medicare beneficiaries (9.4% vs 17.8%; difference, -8.3 percentage points [95% CI, -8.7 to -8.0]; P < .001) or to have more than 20 years in practice (56.7% vs 70.6%; difference, -13.9 percentage points [95% CI, -14.4 to -13.3]; P < .001). For physicians in the highest risk quintile, several characteristics were associated with higher MIPS scores, including practicing in a larger group (mean score, 82.4 for more than 50 physicians vs 46.1 for 1-5 physicians; difference, 36.2 [95% CI, 35.3 to 37.2]; P < .001) and reporting through an alternative payment model (mean score, 79.5 for alternative payment model vs 59.9 for reporting as individual; difference, 19.7 [95% CI, 18.9 to 20.4]; P < .001).

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

In this cross-sectional analysis of physicians who participated in the first year of the Medicare MIPS program, physicians with the highest proportion of patients dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid had significantly lower MIPS scores compared with other physicians. Further research is needed to understand the reasons underlying the differences in physician MIPS scores by levels of patient social risk.

Association of Clinician Health System Affiliation With Outpatient Performance Ratings in the Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System

IMPORTANCE

Integration of physician practices into health systems composed of hospitals and multispecialty practices is increasing in the era of value-based payment. It is unknown how clinicians who affiliate with such health systems perform under the new mandatory Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) relative to their peers.

OBJECTIVE

To assess the relationship between the health system affiliations of clinicians and their performance scores and value-based reimbursement under the 2019 MIPS.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

Publicly reported data on 636 552 clinicians working at outpatient clinics across the US were used to assess the association of the affiliation status of clinicians within the 609 health systems with their 2019 final MIPS performance score and value-based reimbursement (both based on clinician performance in 2017), adjusting for clinician, patient, and practice area characteristics.

EXPOSURES

Health system affiliation vs no affiliation.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

The primary outcome was final MIPS performance score (range, 0-100; higher scores intended to represent better performance). The secondary outcome was MIPS payment adjustment, including negative (penalty) payment adjustment, positive payment adjustment, and bonus payment adjustment.

RESULTS

The final sample included 636 552 clinicians (41% female, 83% physicians, 50% in primary care, 17% in rural areas), including 48.6% who were affiliated with a health system. Compared with unaffiliated clinicians, system-affiliated clinicians were significantly more likely to be female (46% vs 37%), primary care physicians (36% vs 30%), and classified as safety net clinicians (12% vs 10%) and significantly less likely to be specialists (44% vs 55%) (P < .001 for each). The mean final MIPS performance score for system-affiliated clinicians was 79.0 vs 60.3 for unaffiliated clinicians (absolute mean difference, 18.7 [95% CI, 18.5 to 18.8]). The percentage receiving a negative (penalty) payment adjustment was 2.8% for system-affiliated clinicians vs 13.7% for unaffiliated clinicians (absolute difference, -10.9% [95% CI, -11.0% to -10.7%]), 97.1% vs 82.6%, respectively, for those receiving a positive payment adjustment (absolute difference, 14.5% [95% CI, 14.3% to 14.6%]), and 73.9% vs 55.1% for those receiving a bonus payment adjustment (absolute difference, 18.9% [95% CI, 18.6% to 19.1%]).

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

Clinician affiliation with a health system was associated with significantly better 2019 MIPS performance scores. Whether this represents differences in quality of care or other factors requires additional research.

Implementation of provider payment system reforms in the age of universal health coverage: a realist review of evidence from Asian developing countries

Objective

Launched to assist in achieving universal health coverage, provider payment reform (PPR) is one of the most important policy tools deployed to transform incentives within a health system that is plagued with allocative inefficiency and high out-of-pocket payments to one that is able to deliver basic services and be cost-efficient. However, the black box of such reform – that is, the contexts in which reform operates, the mechanisms by which it changes health systems and behaviour within health systems, and the outcome patterns that arise from – remains unexplored. This review aims to examine the implementation mechanisms underlying PPR in Asian developing countries.

Methods

A realist synthesis approach was employed to tease out the configurative elements of PPR in developing countries. A multimethod and retrospective search was conducted to locate the evidence. A programme theory and data extraction framework were developed. Data were analysed using thematic synthesis to inform an overarching realist synthesis, expressed as a set of synthesized context-mechanism-outcome configurations.

Results

This review found that the policy design of PPR, policy capacity, willingness of policy adoption at the local government level and provider autonomy are critical contextual factors that could trigger different policy mechanisms leading to either intended theoretical outcomes or perverse incentives.

Conclusions

Our findings, demonstrating the PPR implementation contexts and mechanisms that have worked in Asian countries, have implications in terms of policy learning for most developing countries that are contemplating rolling out similar reforms in the future.

Influence of financial and reputational incentives on primary care performance: a longitudinal study

BACKGROUND

The Quality and Outcomes Framework has generated reputational as well as financial rewards for general practices because the number of quality points a practice receives is publicly reported. These rewards vary across diseases and practices, and over time.

AIM

To determine the relative effects on performance of the financial and reputational rewards resulting from a pay-for-performance programme.

DESIGN AND SETTING

Observational study of the published performance on 42 indicators of 8929 practices in England between 2004 and 2013.

METHOD

The authors calculated the revenue offered (financial reward, measured in £100s) and the points offered (reputational reward) per additional patient treated for each indicator for each practice in each year. Fixed-effects multivariable regression models were used to estimate whether the percentage of eligible patients treated responded to changes in these financial and reputational rewards.

RESULTS

Both the offered financial rewards and reputational rewards had small but statistically significant associations with practice performance. The effect of the financial reward on performance decreased from 0.797 percentage points per £100 (95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.614 to 0.979) in 2004, to 0.092 (95% CI = 0.045 to 0.138) in 2013. The effect of the reputational reward increased from -0.121 percentage points per quality point (95% CI = -0.220 to -0.022) in 2004, to 0.209 (95% CI = 0.147 to 0.271) in 2013.

CONCLUSION

In the short term, general practices were more sensitive to revenue than reputational rewards. In the long term, general practices appeared to divert their focus towards the reputational reward, once benchmarks of performance became established.

Interventions to increase referral and uptake to pulmonary rehabilitation in people with COPD: a systematic review

Pulmonary rehabilitation (PR) reduces the number and duration of hospital admissions and readmissions, and improves health-related quality of life in patients with COPD. Despite clinical guideline recommendations, under-referral and limited uptake to PR contribute to poor treatment access. We reviewed published literature on the effectiveness of interventions to improve referral to and uptake of PR in patients with COPD when compared to standard care, alternative interventions, or no intervention. The review followed recognized methods. Search terms included "pulmonary rehabilitation" AND "referral" OR "uptake" applied to MEDLINE, EMBASE, CINAHL, PsycINFO, ASSIA, BNI, Web of Science, and Cochrane Library up to January 2018. Titles, abstracts, and full papers were reviewed independently and quality appraised. The protocol was registered (PROSPERO # 2016:CRD42016043762). We screened 5,328 references. Fourteen papers met the inclusion criteria. Ten assessed referral and five assessed uptake (46,146 patients, 409 clinicians, 82 hospital departments, 122 general practices). One was a systematic review which assessed uptake. Designs, interventions, and scope of studies were diverse, often part of multifaceted evidence-based management of COPD. Examples included computer-based prompts at practice nurse review, patient information, clinician education, and financial incentives. Four studies reported statistically significant improvements in referral (range 3.5%-36%). Two studies reported statistically significant increases in uptake (range 18%-21.5%). Most studies had methodological and reporting limitations. Meta-analysis was not conducted due to heterogeneity of study designs. This review demonstrates the range of approaches aimed at increasing referral and uptake to PR but identifies limited evidence of effectiveness due to the heterogeneity and limitations of study designs. Research using robust methods with clear descriptions of intervention, setting, and target population is required to optimize access to PR across a range of settings.

The impact of financial incentives to improve quality indicators in patients with diabetes in Swiss primary care: a protocol for a cluster randomised controlled trial

INTRODUCTION

There is only limited and conflicting evidence on the effectiveness of Pay-for-Performance (P4P) programmes, although they might have the potential to improve guideline adherence and quality of care. We therefore aim to test a P4P intervention in Swiss primary care practices focusing on quality indicators (QI) achievement in the treatment of patients with diabetes.

METHODS AND ANALYSIS

This is a cluster-randomised, two-armed intervention study with the primary care practice as unit of randomisation. The control group will receive bimonthly feedback reports containing last data of blood pressure and glycated haemoglobin (HbA1c) measurements. The intervention group will additionally be informed about a financial incentive for each percentage point improved in QI achievement. Primary outcomes are differences in process (measurement of HbA1c) and clinical QI (blood pressure control) between the two groups. Furthermore, we investigate the effect on non-incentivised QIs and on sustainability of the financial incentives. Swiss primary care practices participating in the FIRE (Family Medicine ICPC Research using Electronic Medical Record) research network are eligible for participation. The FIRE database consists of anonymised structured medical routine data from Swiss primary care practices. According to power calculations, 70 of the general practitioners contributing to the database will be randomised in either of the groups.

ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION

According to the Local Ethics Committee of the Canton of Zurich, the project does not fall under the scope of the law on human research and therefore no ethical consent is necessary. Results will be published in a peer-reviewed journal.

TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBER

ISRCTN13305645; Pre-results.

Measuring Provider Performance for Physicians Participating in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System

In 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services began requiring all eligible providers to participate in the Quality Payment Program or face financial reimbursement penalty. The Quality Payment Program outlines two paths for provider participation: the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Advanced Alternative Payment Models. For the first performance period beginning in January of 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimates that approximately 83 to 90 percent of eligible providers will not qualify for participation in an Advanced Alternative Payment Model and therefore must participate in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System program. The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System path replaces existing quality-reporting programs and adds several new measures to evaluate providers using four categories of data: (1) quality, (2) cost/resource use, (3) improvement activities, and (4) advancing care information. These categories will be combined to calculate a weighted composite score for each provider or provider group. Composite Merit-Based Incentive Payment System scores based on 2017 performance data will be used to adjust reimbursed payment in 2019. In this article, the authors provide relevant background for understanding value-based provider performance measurement. The authors also discuss Merit-Based Incentive Payment System reporting requirements and scoring methodology to provide plastic surgeons with the necessary information to critically evaluate their own practice capabilities in the context of current performance metrics under the Quality Payment Program.

Financial Incentives to Increase Advance Care Planning Among Medicaid Beneficiaries: Lessons Learned From Two Pragmatic Randomized Trials

CONTEXT

Medicaid populations have low rates of advance care planning (ACP). Potential policy interventions include financial incentives.

OBJECTIVE

To test the effectiveness of patient plus provider financial incentive compared with provider financial incentive alone for increasing ACP discussions among Medicaid patients.

METHODS

Between April 2014 and July 2015, we conducted two sequential assessor-blinded pragmatic randomized trials in a health plan that pays primary care providers (PCPs) $100 to discuss ACP: 1) a parallel cluster trial (provider-delivered patient incentive) and 2) an individual-level trial (mail-delivered patient incentive). Control and intervention arms included encouragement to complete ACP, instructions for using an online ACP tool, and (in the intervention arm) $50 for completing the online ACP tool and a small probability of $1000 (i.e., lottery) for discussing ACP with their PCP. The primary outcome was provider-reported ACP discussion within three months.

RESULTS

In the provider-delivered patient incentive study, 38 PCPs were randomized to the intervention (n = 18) or control (n = 20) and given 10 patient packets each to distribute. Using an intention-to-treat analysis, there were 27 of 180 ACP discussions (15%) in the intervention group and 5 of 200 (2.5%) in the control group (P = .0391). In the mail-delivered patient incentive study, there were 5 of 187 ACP discussions (2.7%) in the intervention group and 5 of 189 (2.6%) in the control group (P = .99).

CONCLUSION

ACP rates were low despite an existing provider financial incentive. Adding a provider-delivered patient financial incentive, but not a mail-delivered patient incentive, modestly increased ACP discussions. PCP encouragement combined with a patient incentive may be more powerful than either encouragement or incentive alone.

Finding a Path Through the Acronym Maze

Providers must deal with new payment models governed by multiple statutes.

Increasing Value: A Research Agenda for Addressing the Managerial and Organizational Challenges Facing Health Care Delivery in the United States

There is growing consensus that the U.S. health care system is not producing value relative to the resources invested. Unwarranted variation exists in quality and outcomes of care and underutilization of both evidence-based medicine and evidence-management practices. To address these issues, this article calls for a broad-based social science approach focused on obtaining a greater understanding of change at the individual, group, organizational, and environmental levels as they influence each other. Specific examples and questions for research are suggested with regard to the redesign of care systems, enhancing learning and transferring knowledge, and creating effective financial incentives. The specific measurement, analysis, and study design issues involved in under-taking such a research agenda are discussed.

What’s the Return? Assessing the Effect of “Pay-for-Performance” Initiatives on the Quality of Care Delivery

This article evaluates the impact of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services/Premier pay-for-performance demonstration project on performance improvement in three clinical areas in a multihospital health care system. The study compares a group of hospitals participating in this project against a control group of similar hospitals that did not participate. Although the incentives are extremely small, the findings show that participation in the pay-for-performance initiative had a significant impact on the rate and magnitude of performance improvement. The project led to marked improvement in the quality of clinical process delivery and accelerated the adoption of evidence-based practices.

Will Financial Incentives Stimulate Quality Improvement? Reactions From Frontline Physicians

Pay-for-performance is being applied at the physician level to stimulate improvements in quality of care and cost efficiency; however, little is known about how physicians will respond. We interviewed physicians exposed to a financial incentive program in California to identify possible barriers to the successful application of financial incentives by exploring physicians' opinions of and experiences with pay-for-performance programs. Reasons physicians cited for quality deficiencies included insurance coverage limitations and lack of patient compliance, time, and proper physician oversight. Physicians believe that they play a significant role and have a moderate to high degree of control over quality of care and that it is important to self-monitor. Physicians expressed the need for accurate and timely data, peer comparisons, and more patient time, staff support, and consultations with colleagues to successfully monitor and deliver quality care. Many support increased pay for delivering high-quality care but question measurement accuracy, bonus payment financing, and health plan involvement.

Hospital responses to pay-for-performance incentives

Not-for-profit hospitals are complex organizations and, therefore, may face unique challenges in responding to financial incentives for quality. In this research, we explore the types of behavioural changes made by not-for-profit Michigan hospitals in response to a pay-for-performance system for quality. We also identify factors that motivate or facilitate changes in effort. We apply a conceptual framework based on agency theory to motivate our research questions. Using data derived from structured interviews and surveys administered to 86 hospitals participating in a pay-for-performance system, we compare hospitals reporting and not reporting behavioural changes. Separate analyses are performed for hospitals reporting structure-related changes and hospitals reporting process-related changes. Our findings confirm that hospitals respond to incentive payments; however, our findings also reveal that hospital responses are not universal. Rather, involvement by boards of trustees, willingness to exert leverage with physicians, and financial and competitive motivations are all associated with hospitals' behavioural responses to incentives. Results of this research will help inform payers and hospital managers considering the use of incentives about the nature of hospitals' responses.

Variation in activity rates of consultant surgeons and the influence of reward structures in the English NHS

Objectives: To explore variation in the National Health Service (NHS) activity rates of consultant surgeons, and examine whether activity is dependent upon the type of contract held and/or bonus payments, after accounting for age and other consultant and hospital characteristics.

Methods: NHS Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) for England were used in combination with workforce data in five surgical specialties in 1998/99 and 1999/2000. Descriptive statistics were used to explore variation in activity rates. A multi-level model was used to analyse the relationship between NHS contract and bonus payments, and activity.

Results: There is considerable variation in activity rates of English NHS consultant surgeons, with and without adjustment for casemix. Interquartile variation shows that the top 25% of consultants have activity rates 60 to 85% higher than the bottom 25%. A multi-level model indicates that consultant surgeons with a 'maximum part-time' contract have significantly higher activity rates than those with a full time contract (129 more finished consultant episodes (FCEs) per year, 95% CI 97-160). Consultant surgeons who hold discretionary salary points undertake significantly more activity than those without (95 FCEs, 95% CI 62-128). Those with a distinction award (a type of bonus payment) have a tendency towards higher activity rates, but this does not reach statistical significance (48 FCEs, 95% CI -4 to 103).

Conclusions: 'Maximum part-time contract' status is associated with higher absolute activity rates among NHS surgeons. Rich data sources like HES merit careful exploration and increased use as an essential first step in measuring and managing variations in specialists' performance.

Who to pay for performance? The choice of organisational level for hospital performance incentives

Financial incentives for quality improvement in hospital care [known as pay for performance (P4P)] can be directed to either the hospital level or redistributed to the department level. Theoretically, performance payments distributed to lower organisational levels are more effective in increasing performance than payments directed to the hospital level, but the empirical evidence for this expectation is scarce. This paper compares the performance of hospital departments at hospitals that do and do not redistribute performance payments to the department level. We study a Danish P4P scheme to provide patients with case managers. Applying difference in differences analysis, we estimate a 5 percentage points higher performance at hospital departments that are subject to a direct financial incentive. Our results suggest that payers can improve the effectiveness of P4P payments by distributing payments to the department level rather than the hospital level.

Modified Stage 2 and Stage 3 Meaningful Use for Eligible Providers: Performance Metrics, Reporting Period Lengths, and Hardship Exemptions

In October 2015, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services released its final rule on the new guidelines for alterations to the long-standing EHR Incentive Program. These Modified Stage 2 and upcoming Stage 3 Meaningful Use Rules were developed in response to provider and organizational feedback during the last few years. This article provides a comprehensive overview for the new rules as they relate to Medicare and Medicaid Eligible Providers. Reporting deadlines for previous calendar year compliance and the basic criteria for automatic provider hardship exemptions to avoid reimbursement penalties also are discussed.

Using Patient-Reported Information to Improve Clinical Practice

OBJECTIVE

To assess what is known about the relationship between patient experience measures and incentives designed to improve care, and to identify how public policy and medical practices can promote patient-valued outcomes in health systems with strong financial incentives.

DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING

Existing literature (gray and peer-reviewed) on measuring patient experience and patient-reported outcomes, identified from Medline and Cochrane databases; evaluations of pay-for-performance programs in the United States, Europe, and the Commonwealth countries.

STUDY DESIGN/DATA COLLECTION

We analyzed (1) studies of pay-for-performance, to identify those including metrics for patient experience, and (2) studies of patient experience and of patient-reported outcomes to identify evidence of influence on clinical practice, whether through public reporting or private reporting to clinicians.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

First, we identify four forms of "patient-reported information" (PRI), each with distinctive roles shaping clinical practice: (1) patient-reported outcomes measuring self-assessed physical and mental well-being, (2) surveys of patient experience with clinicians and staff, (3) narrative accounts describing encounters with clinicians in patients' own words, and (4) complaints/grievances signaling patients' distress when treatment or outcomes fall short of expectations. Because these forms vary in crucial ways, each must be distinctively measured, deployed, and linked with financial incentives. Second, although the literature linking incentives to patients experience is limited, implementing pay-for-performance systems appears to threaten certain patient-valued aspects of health care. But incentives can be made compatible with the outcomes patients value if: (a) a sufficient portion of incentives is tied to patient-reported outcomes and experiences, (b) incentivized forms of PRI are complemented by other forms of patient feedback, and (c) health care organizations assist clinicians to interpret and respond to PRI. Finally, we identify roles for the public and private sectors in financing PRI and orchestrating an appropriate balance among its four forms.

CONCLUSIONS

Unless public policies are attentive to patients' perspectives, stronger financial incentives for clinicians can threaten aspects of care that patients most value. Certain policy parameters are already clear, but additional research is required to clarify how best to collect patient narratives in varied settings, how to report narratives to consumers in conjunction with quantified metrics, and how to promote a "culture of learning" at the practice level that incorporates patient feedback.

SGR Is Gone. Now What?

Physicians will have to prepare to participate in one of the new payment systems that will replace Medicare's Sustainable Growth Rate formula, which Congress eliminated in April via the Medicare and CHIP Reauthorization Act. Come 2019, physicians can participate in one of two major payment tracks: the fee-for-service Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, which boosts or docks physician pay based on their quality and cost performance; or one or more alternative payment models, such as accountable care organizations, medical homes, bundled payments, or other initiatives.

Cost-effectiveness analysis of malaria rapid diagnostic test incentive schemes for informal private healthcare providers in Myanmar

BACKGROUND

The emergence of artemisinin-resistant Plasmodium falciparum parasites in Southeast Asia threatens global malaria control efforts. One strategy to counter this problem is a subsidy of malaria rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) and artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) within the informal private sector, where the majority of malaria care in Myanmar is provided. A study in Myanmar evaluated the effectiveness of financial incentives vs information, education and counselling (IEC) in driving the proper use of subsidized malaria RDTs among informal private providers. This cost-effectiveness analysis compares intervention options.

METHODS

A decision tree was constructed in a spreadsheet to estimate the incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) among four strategies: no intervention, simple subsidy, subsidy with financial incentives, and subsidy with IEC. Model inputs included programmatic costs (in dollars), malaria epidemiology and observed study outcomes. Data sources included expenditure records, study data and scientific literature. Model outcomes included the proportion of properly and improperly treated individuals with and without P. falciparum malaria, and associated disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). Results are reported as ICERs in US dollars per DALY averted. One-way sensitivity analysis assessed how outcomes depend on uncertainty in inputs.

RESULTS

ICERs from the least to most expensive intervention are: $1,169/DALY averted for simple subsidy vs no intervention, $185/DALY averted for subsidy with financial incentives vs simple subsidy, and $200/DALY averted for a subsidy with IEC vs subsidy with financial incentives. Due to decreasing ICERs, each strategy was also compared to no intervention. The subsidy with IEC was the most favourable, costing $639/DALY averted compared with no intervention. One-way sensitivity analysis shows that ICERs are most affected by programme costs, RDT uptake, treatment-seeking behaviour, and the prevalence and virulence of non-malarial fevers. In conclusion, private provider subsidies with IEC or a combination of IEC and financial incentives may be a good investment for malaria control.

Provider perceptions of the electronic health record incentive programs: a survey of eligible professionals who have and have not attested to meaningful use

BACKGROUND

The HITECH Act of 2009 enabled the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to provide financial incentives to health care providers who demonstrate "meaningful use" (MU) of their electronic health records (EHRs). Despite stakeholder involvement in the rule-making phase, formal input about the MU program from a cross section of providers has not been reported since incentive payments began.

OBJECTIVE

To examine the perspectives and experiences of a random sample of health care professionals eligible for financial incentives (eligible professionals or EPs) for demonstrating meaningful use of their EHRs. It was hypothesized that EPs actively participating in the MU program would generally view the purported benefits of MU more positively than EPs not yet participating in the incentive program.

DESIGN

Survey data were collected by mail from a random sample of EPs in Washington State and Idaho. Two follow-up mailings were made to non-respondents.

PARTICIPANTS

The sample included EPs who had registered for incentive payments or attested to MU (MU-Active) and EPs not yet participating in the incentive program (MU-Inactive).

MAIN MEASURES

The survey assessed perceptions of general realities and influences of MU on health care; views on the influence of MU on clinics; and personal views about MU. EP opinions were assessed with close- and open-ended items.

KEY RESULTS

Close-ended responses indicated that MU-Active providers were generally more positive about the program than MU-Inactive providers. However, the majority of respondents in both groups felt that MU would not reduce care disparities or improve the accuracy of patient information. The additional workload on EPs and their staff was viewed as too great a burden on productivity relative to the level of reimbursement for achieving MU goals. The majority of open-ended responses in each group reinforced the general perception that the MU program diverted attention from treating patients by imposing greater reporting requirements.

CONCLUSIONS

Survey results indicate the need by CMS to step up engagement with EPs in future planning for the MU program, while also providing support for achieving MU standards.