Multiple cognitive capabilities/deficits in children with an autism spectrum disorder: “Weak” central coherence and its relationship to theory of mind and executive control

This study examined the validity of "weak" central coherence (CC) in the context of multiple cognitive capabilities/deficits in autism. Children with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and matched typically developing children were administered tasks tapping visuospatial coherence, false-belief understanding and aspects of executive control. Significant group differences were found in all three cognitive domains. Evidence of local processing on coherence tasks was widespread in the ASD group, but difficulties in attributing false beliefs and in components of executive functioning were present in fewer of the children with ASD. This cognitive profile was generally similar for younger and older children with ASD. Furthermore, weak CC was unrelated to false-belief understanding, but aspects of coherence (related to integration) were associated with aspects of executive control. Few associations were found between cognitive variables and indices of autistic symptomatology. Implications for CC theory are discussed.

Central coherence in typically developing preschoolers: does it cohere and does it relate to mindreading and executive control?

BACKGROUND

Frith and Happé (1994) describe central coherence (CC) as the normal tendency to integrate individual elements into a coherent whole, a cognitive style which varies in the general population. Individuals with autism are at the extreme (weak) end of the continuum of coherence. There has been debate over whether CC is independent from other psychological functions such as theory of mind and executive control.

METHODS

We examined the validity of the CC construct in 76 typically developing 4- and 5-year-old children using four visuospatial coherence tasks. We also investigated the extent to which individual differences in performance on CC measures were associated with individual differences on measures of mindreading and executive functioning (EF).

RESULTS

Unexpectedly, the CC variables were not highly intercorrelated and did not form a single coherence factor. Instead, the results revealed a two-factor structure, one of which corresponded to visuospatial constructional ability. Correlations between the emerging factors of coherence and mindreading ability were weak, even when developmental differences in age and verbal and nonverbal ability were taken into account. In contrast, visuospatial constructional ability was reliably related to measures of EF, whilst correlations between EF and the second CC factor were very weak.

CONCLUSIONS

CC in typically developing preschoolers is not a unitary construct. Whilst there is little relationship between CC and mindreading abilities in these young children, executive control appears to be associated with one aspect of coherence: visuospatial construction.

Cultural Difference in the Application of the Diagnosticity Principle to Schematic Faces

Abstract

Tversky's (1977) diagnosticity principle implies that categorization affects similarity, and that similarity in turn is based on context. However, Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan (2001) suggest that Chinese and Westerners differ in their sensitivity to context and categorization. Because of these differences, it is not clear whether Chinese should follow the diagnosticity principle. To explore these possibilities, we conducted a cross-cultural experiment using participants from Australia and China to repeat the experiment of Tversky (1977) using schematic faces as stimuli. Results showed that Australians, but not Chinese, made similarity judgments in a manner compatible with the diagnosticity principle. We suggest that: 1) the use of the diagnosticity principle depends upon contextual variables for Chinese people; and 2) Chinese participants judged neutral schematic faces as more positive than Western participants did.

Abnormal global processing along the dorsal visual pathway in autism: a possible mechanism for weak visuospatial coherence?

Frith and Happe (Frith, U., & Happe, F. (1994). Autism: Beyond theory of mind. Cognition, 50, 115-132) argue that individuals with autism exhibit 'weak central coherence': an inability to integrate elements of information into coherent wholes. Some authors have speculated that a high-level impairment might be present in the dorsal visual pathway in autism, and furthermore, that this might account for weak central coherence, at least at the visuospatial level. We assessed the integrity of the dorsal visual pathway in children diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and in typically developing children, using two visual tasks, one examining functioning at higher levels of the dorsal cortical stream (Global Dot Motion (GDM)), and the other assessing lower-level dorsal stream functioning (Flicker Contrast Sensitivity (FCS)). Central coherence was tested using the Children's Embedded Figures Test (CEFT). Relative to the typically developing children, the children with ASD had shorter CEFT latencies and higher GDM thresholds but equivalent FCS thresholds. Additionally, CEFT latencies were inversely related to GDM thresholds in the ASD group. These outcomes indicate that the elevated global motion thresholds in autism are the result of high-level impairments in dorsal cortical regions. Weak visuospatial coherence in autism may be in the form of abnormal cooperative mechanisms in extra-striate cortical areas, which might contribute to differential performance when processing stimuli as Gestalts, including both dynamic (i.e., global motion perception) and static (i.e., disembedding performance) stimuli.

Holistic processing of faces in preschool children and adults

Contrary to the encoding-switch hypothesis, recent research demonstrates that 6-year-olds do not rely solely on parts-based encoding to recognize upright faces. This research shows better recognition of face parts presented in the whole face than in isolation, indicating use of holistic encoding. The present study examined whether children younger than 6 years also recognize faces holistically. Four-year-olds, 5-year-olds, and adults were administered a part-whole face recognition task. Children below the age of 6 remembered parts from upright faces better when tested in the whole-face context than in isolation. This whole-face advantage did not occur when faces were inverted. Although children showed a smaller inversion decrement than adults and generally performed more poorly than adults, the different age groups showed similar patterns of performance, indicating that young preschoolers, like older children and adults, are able to recognize faces holistically.

Recognizing the un-real McCoy: priming and the modularity of face recognition

Fodor (1983) has proposed that face perception is carried out by an informationally encapsulated module, whose operation is unaffected by context or expectancies. We tested the modularity hypothesis by examining whether discriminations between normal and distorted versions of famous faces can be primed, either by the name of an associated person (semantic context) or by a valid cue as to the identity of the target face (expectancy). A preliminary experiment showed that, in the absence of priming, discriminations between normal and distorted versions of a face were unaffected by whether the target faces were familiar or not, confirming that these judgments tap perceptual, not postperceptual (semantic), coding processes. In Experiment 1, accuracy was significantly higher when target face pairs were preceded by related name primes, as compared with unrelated ones. In Experiment 2, reaction times were significantly faster for targets preceded by a valid identity cue than for targets preceded by an invalid one. Neither effect could be explained as a speed-accuracy tradeoff. These results fail to support Fodor's conjecture that face processing is encapsulated.