Embodying an outgroup: the role of racial bias and the effect of multisensory processing in somatosensory remapping

We come to understand other people's physical and mental states by re-mapping their bodily states onto our sensorimotor system. This process, also called somatosensory resonance, is an essential ability for social cognition and is stronger when observing ingroup than outgroup members. Here we investigated, first, whether implicit racial bias constrains somatosensory resonance, and second, whether increasing the ingroup/outgroup perceived physical similarity results in an increase in the somatosensory resonance for outgroup members. We used the Visual Remapping of Touch effect as an index of individuals' ability in resonating with the others, and the Implicit Association Test to measure racial bias. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to detect near-threshold tactile stimuli delivered to their own face while viewing either an ingroup or an outgroup face receiving a similar stimulation. Our results showed that individuals' tactile accuracy when viewing an outgroup face being touched was negatively correlated to their implicit racial bias. In Experiment 2, participants received the interpersonal multisensory stimulation (IMS) while observing an outgroup member. IMS has been found to increase the perceived physical similarity between the observer's and the observed body. We tested whether such increase in ingroup/outgroup perceived physical similarity increased the remapping ability for outgroup members. We found that after sharing IMS experience with an outgroup member, tactile accuracy when viewing touch on outgroup faces increased. Interestingly, participants with stronger implicit bias against the outgroup showed larger positive change in the remapping. We conclude that shared multisensory experiences might represent one key way to improve our ability to resonate with others by overcoming the boundaries between ingroup and outgroup categories.

Enhanced interoceptive awareness during anticipation of public speaking is associated with fear of negative evaluation

Interoceptive awareness (IA)--the ability to detect internal body signals--has been linked to various aspects of emotional processing. However, it has been examined mostly as a trait variable, with few studies also investigating state dependent fluctuations in IA. Based on the known positive correlation between IA and emotional reactivity, negative affectivity, and trait anxiety, the current study examined whether IA, as indexed by heartbeat detection accuracy, would change during an anxiety-provoking situation. Participants in the experimental condition, in which they anticipated giving a speech in front of a small audience, displayed significant IA increases from baseline to anticipation. Enhancement in IA was positively correlated with fear of negative evaluation. Implications of the results are discussed in relation to the role of trait and state IA in emotional experience.

Plasticity in unimodal and multimodal brain areas reflects multisensory changes in self-face identification

Nothing provides as strong a sense of self as seeing one's face. Nevertheless, it remains unknown how the brain processes the sense of self during the multisensory experience of looking at one's face in a mirror. Synchronized visuo-tactile stimulation on one's own and another's face, an experience that is akin to looking in the mirror but seeing another's face, causes the illusory experience of ownership over the other person's face and changes in self-recognition. Here, we investigate the neural correlates of this enfacement illusion using fMRI. We examine activity in the human brain as participants experience tactile stimulation delivered to their face, while observing either temporally synchronous or asynchronous tactile stimulation delivered to another's face on either a specularly congruent or incongruent location. Activity in the multisensory right temporo-parietal junction, intraparietal sulcus, and the unimodal inferior occipital gyrus showed an interaction between the synchronicity and the congruency of the stimulation and varied with the self-reported strength of the illusory experience, which was recorded after each stimulation block. Our results highlight the important interplay between unimodal and multimodal information processing for self-face recognition, and elucidate the neurobiological basis for the plasticity required for identifying with our continuously changing visual appearance.

My face, my heart: cultural differences in integrated bodily self-awareness

Body-awareness is produced by an integration of both interoceptive and exteroceptive bodily signals. However, previous investigations into cultural differences in bodily self-awareness have only studied these two aspects in isolation. We investigated the interaction between interoceptive and exteroceptive self-processing in East Asian and Western participants. During an interoceptive awareness task, self-face observation improved performance of those with initially low awareness in the Western group, but did not benefit the East Asian participants. These results suggest that the integrated, coherent experience of the body differs between East Asian and Western cultures. For Western participants, viewing one's own face may activate a bodily self-awareness which enhances processing of other bodily information, such as interoceptive signals. Instead, for East Asian individuals, the external appearance of the self may activate higher-level, social aspects of self-identity, reflecting the importance of the sociocultural construct of "face" in East Asian cultures.

Balancing the "inner" and the "outer" self: interoceptive sensitivity modulates self-other boundaries

Distinguishing self from other is necessary for self-awareness and social interactions. This distinction is thought to depend on multisensory integration dominated by visual feedback. However, self-awareness also relies on the processing of interoceptive signals. We contrasted the exteroceptive and interoceptive models of the self to investigate the hitherto unexplored interaction between the perception of the self from the outside and from within. Multisensory stimulation between self and other was used to induce controlled changes in the representation of one's identity. Interoceptive sensitivity predicted the malleability of self-representations in response to multisensory integration across behavioral, physiological, and introspective responses, suggesting that interoception plays a key modulating role in the self-recognition system. In particular, only participants with low interoceptive sensitivity experienced changes in self-other boundaries in response to multisensory stimulation. These results support the view that interoceptive predictive coding models are used to monitor and assign the sources of sensory input either to the self or to others, as well as support the hypothesis of the insular cortex as a convergence zone in the processing and global representation of the material self given its involvement in both interoceptive feelings, multisensory integration, and self-processing.

The free-energy self: a predictive coding account of self-recognition

Recognising and representing one's self as distinct from others is a fundamental component of self-awareness. However, current theories of self-recognition are not embedded within global theories of cortical function and therefore fail to provide a compelling explanation of how the self is processed. We present a theoretical account of the neural and computational basis of self-recognition that is embedded within the free-energy account of cortical function. In this account one's body is processed in a Bayesian manner as the most likely to be "me". Such probabilistic representation arises through the integration of information from hierarchically organised unimodal systems in higher-level multimodal areas. This information takes the form of bottom-up "surprise" signals from unimodal sensory systems that are explained away by top-down processes that minimise the level of surprise across the brain. We present evidence that this theoretical perspective may account for the findings of psychological and neuroimaging investigations into self-recognition and particularly evidence that representations of the self are malleable, rather than fixed as previous accounts of self-recognition might suggest.

Body conscious? Interoceptive awareness, measured by heartbeat perception, is negatively correlated with self-objectification

BACKGROUND

'Self-objectification' is the tendency to experience one's body principally as an object, to be evaluated for its appearance rather than for its effectiveness. Within objectification theory, it has been proposed that self-objectification accounts for the poorer interoceptive awareness observed in women, as measured by heartbeat perception. Our study is, we believe, the first specifically to test this relationship.

METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Using a well-validated and reliable heartbeat perception task, we measured interoceptive awareness in women and compared this with their scores on the Self-Objectification Questionnaire, the Self-Consciousness Scale and the Body Consciousness Questionnaire. Interoceptive awareness was negatively correlated with self-objectification. Interoceptive awareness, public body consciousness and private body consciousness together explained 31% of the variance in self-objectification. However, private body consciousness was not significantly correlated with interoceptive awareness, which may explain the many nonsignificant results in self-objectification studies that have used private body consciousness as a measure of body awareness.

CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE

We propose interoceptive awareness, assessed by heartbeat perception, as a measure of body awareness in self-objectification studies. Our findings have implications for those clinical conditions, in women, which are characterised by self-objectification and low interoceptive awareness, such as eating disorders.

Mirror-touch synaesthesia changes representations of self-identity

Individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS) experience touch on their own bodies when observing another person being touched. Whilst somatosensory processing in MTS has been extensively investigated, the extent to which the remapping of observed touch on the synaesthete's body can also lead to changes in the mental representation of the self remains unknown. We adapted the experimental paradigm of the 'enfacement illusion' to quantify the changes in self-face recognition as a result of synaesthetic touch. MTS and control participants observed the face of an unfamiliar person being touched or not, without delivering touch on the participant's face. Changes in self-representation were quantified with a self-face recognition task, using 'morphed' images containing varying proportions of the participant's face and the face of the unfamiliar other. This task was administered before and after the exposure to the other face. While self-recognition performance for both groups was similar during pre-test, MTS individuals showed a significant change in self-recognition performance following the observation of touch delivered to the other face. Specifically, the images that participants had initially perceived as containing equal quantities of self and other became more likely to be recognised as the self after viewing the other being touched. These results suggest that observing touch on others not only elicits a conscious experience of touch in MTS, but also elicits a change in the mental representation of the self, blurring self-other boundaries. This is consistent with a multisensory account of the self, whereby integrated multisensory experiences maintain or update self-representations.

I feel your fear: shared touch between faces facilitates recognition of fearful facial expressions

Embodied simulation accounts of emotion recognition claim that we vicariously activate somatosensory representations to simulate, and eventually understand, how others feel. Interestingly, mirror-touch synesthetes, who experience touch when observing others being touched, show both enhanced somatosensory simulation and superior recognition of emotional facial expressions. We employed synchronous visuotactile stimulation to experimentally induce a similar experience of "mirror touch" in nonsynesthetic participants. Seeing someone else's face being touched at the same time as one's own face results in the "enfacement illusion," which has been previously shown to blur self-other boundaries. We demonstrate that the enfacement illusion also facilitates emotion recognition, and, importantly, this facilitatory effect is specific to fearful facial expressions. Shared synchronous multisensory experiences may experimentally facilitate somatosensory simulation mechanisms involved in the recognition of fearful emotional expressions.

It feels like it's me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation enhances visual remapping of touch from other to self

Understanding other people's feelings in social interactions depends on the ability to map onto our body the sensory experiences we observed on other people's bodies. It has been shown that the perception of tactile stimuli on the face is improved when concurrently viewing a face being touched. This Visual Remapping of Touch (VRT) is enhanced the more similar others are perceived to be to the self and is strongest when viewing one's face. Here, we ask whether altering self-other boundaries can in turn change the VRT effect. We used the enfacement illusion, which relies on synchronous interpersonal multisensory stimulation (IMS), to manipulate self-other boundaries. Following synchronous, but not asynchronous, IMS, the self-related enhancement of the VRT extended to the other individual. These findings suggest that shared multisensory experiences represent one key way to overcome the boundaries between self and others, as evidenced by changes in somatosensory processing of tactile stimuli on one's own face when concurrently viewing another person's face being touched.

The person in the mirror: using the enfacement illusion to investigate the experiential structure of self-identification

How do we acquire a mental representation of our own face? Recently, synchronous, but not asynchronous, interpersonal multisensory stimulation (IMS) between one's own and another person's face has been used to evoke changes in self-identification (enfacement illusion). We investigated the conscious experience of these changes with principal component analyses (PCA) that revealed that while the conscious experience during synchronous IMS focused on resemblance and similarity with the other's face, during asynchronous IMS it focused on multisensory stimulation. Analyses of the identified common factor structure revealed significant quantitative differences between synchronous and asynchronous IMS on self-identification and perceived similarity with the other's face. Experiment 2 revealed that participants with lower interoceptive sensitivity experienced stronger enfacement illusion. Overall, self-identification and body-ownership rely on similar basic mechanisms of multisensory integration, but the effects of multisensory input on their experience are qualitatively different, possibly underlying the face's unique role as a marker of selfhood.

Looking into myself: changes in interoceptive sensitivity during mirror self-observation

Interoceptive sensitivity is an essential component of recent models of "the self." Increased focus on the self (e.g., self-observation in a mirror) can enhance aspects of self-processing. We examined whether self-observation also enhances interoceptive sensitivity. Participants performed a heartbeat detection task while looking at their own face in a mirror or at a black screen. There was significant improvement in interoceptive sensitivity in the mirror condition for those participants with lower interoceptive sensitivity at baseline. This effect was independent of the order of conditions, gender, age, body mass index, habitual exercise, and changes in heart rate. Our results suggest that self-observation may represent a viable way of manipulating individuals' interoceptive sensitivity, in order to directly test causal relations between interoceptive sensitivity and exteroceptive self-processing.

The different faces of one's self: an fMRI study into the recognition of current and past self-facial appearances

Mirror self-recognition is often considered as an index of self-awareness. Neuroimaging studies have identified a neural circuit specialised for the recognition of one's own current facial appearance. However, faces change considerably over a lifespan, highlighting the necessity for representations of one's face to continually be updated. We used fMRI to investigate the different neural circuits involved in the recognition of the childhood and current, adult, faces of one's self. Participants viewed images of either their own face as it currently looks morphed with the face of a familiar other or their childhood face morphed with the childhood face of the familiar other. Activity in areas which have a generalised selectivity for faces, including the inferior occipital gyrus, the superior parietal lobule and the inferior temporal gyrus, varied with the amount of current self in an image. Activity in areas involved in memory encoding and retrieval, including the hippocampus and the posterior cingulate gyrus, and areas involved in creating a sense of body ownership, including the temporo-parietal junction and the inferior parietal lobule, varied with the amount of childhood self in an image. We suggest that the recognition of one's own past or present face is underpinned by different cognitive processes in distinct neural circuits. Current self-recognition engages areas involved in perceptual face processing, whereas childhood self-recognition recruits networks involved in body ownership and memory processing.

Beyond the colour of my skin: how skin colour affects the sense of body-ownership

Multisensory stimulation has been shown to alter the sense of body-ownership. Given that perceived similarity between one's own body and those of others is crucial for social cognition, we investigated whether multisensory stimulation can lead participants to experience ownership over a hand of different skin colour. Results from two studies using introspective, behavioural and physiological methods show that, following synchronous visuotactile (VT) stimulation, participants can experience body-ownership over hands that seem to belong to a different racial group. Interestingly, a baseline measure of implicit racial bias did not predict whether participants would experience the RHI, but the overall strength of experienced body-ownership seemed to predict the participants' post-illusion implicit racial bias with those who experienced a stronger RHI showing a lower bias. These findings suggest that multisensory experiences can override strict ingroup/outgroup distinctions based on skin colour and point to a key role for sensory processing in social cognition.

Just a heartbeat away from one's body: interoceptive sensitivity predicts malleability of body-representations

Body-awareness relies on the representation of both interoceptive and exteroceptive percepts coming from one's body. However, the exact relationship and possible interaction of interoceptive and exteroceptive systems for body-awareness remain unknown. We sought to understand for the first time, to our knowledge, the interaction between interoceptive and exteroceptive awareness of the body. First, we measured interoceptive awareness with an established heartbeat monitoring task. We, then, used a multi-sensory-induced manipulation of body-ownership (e.g. Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI)) and we quantified the extent to which participants experienced ownership over a foreign body-part using behavioural, physiological and introspective measures. The results suggest that interoceptive sensitivity predicts the malleability of body representations, that is, people with low interoceptive sensitivity experienced a stronger illusion of ownership in the RHI. Importantly, this effect was not simply owing to a poor proprioceptive representation or differences in autonomic states of one's body prior to the multi-sensory stimulation, suggesting that interoceptive awareness modulates the online integration of multi-sensory body-percepts.

Having a body versus moving your body: neural signatures of agency and body-ownership

The exact relation between the sense that one's body is one's own (body-ownership) and the sense that one controls one's own bodily actions (agency) has been the focus of much speculation, but remains unclear. On an 'additive' model, agency and body-ownership are strongly related; the ability to control actions is a powerful cue to body-ownership. This view implies a component common to the senses of body-ownership and agency, plus possible additional components unique to agency. An alternative 'independence' model holds that agency and body-ownership are qualitatively different experiences, triggered by different inputs, and recruiting distinct brain networks. We tested these two specific models by investigating the sensory and motor aspects of body-representation in the brain using fMRI. Activations in midline cortical structures were associated with a sensory-driven sense of body-ownership, and were absent in agency conditions. Activity in the pre-SMA was linked to the sense of agency, but distinct from the sense of body-ownership. No shared activations that would support the additive model were found. The results support the independence model. Body-ownership involves a psychophysiological baseline, linked to activation of the brain's default mode network. Agency is linked to premotor and parietal areas involved in generating motor intentions and subsequent action monitoring.