Functional neuroimaging of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty

The contribution of fronto-parietal regions to sentence comprehension: insights from the Moses illusion

To interpret a sentence, the reader must not only process the linguistic input, but many times has also to draw inferences about what is implicitly stated. In some cases, the generation and integration of inferred information may lead to semantic illusions. In these sentences, subjects fail to detect errors such as in "It was two animals of each kind that Moses took on the ark" despite knowing that the correct answer is Noah, not Moses. The relative inability to notice these errors raises questions about how people establish and integrate inferences and which conditions improve error detection. To unravel the neural processes underlying inference and error detection in language comprehension, we carried out an fMRI study in which participants read sentences containing true or false statements. The false statements either took the form of more obvious (i.e., clearly false) or subtle (i.e., semantic illusions) inconsistent relations. Participants had to decide if each statement was true or false. Processing semantic illusions relative to true and clearly false sentences significantly engaged the right inferior parietal lobule, suggesting higher demands in establishing coherence. Successful versus unsuccessful error detection revealed a network of regions, including right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal, insula/putamen and anterior cingulate cortex. Such activation was significantly correlated with overall response accuracy to the illusions. These results suggest that to detect the semantic conflict, people must inhibit the tendency to draw pragmatic inferences. These findings demonstrate that fronto-parietal areas are involved in inference and inhibition processes necessary for establishing semantic coherence.

State of belief, subjective certainty and bliss as a product of cortical dysfunction

INTRODUCTION

Ecstatic seizures are focal epileptic seizures which are fascinating from a phenotypical point of view as they include intense positive affect, feelings of heightened self-awareness and enhanced well-being. They have been previously suggested to arise in the anterior insular cortex, although strong arguments are still lacking.

METHODS

We describe the cases of two new patients with ecstatic seizures. Their evaluation included a careful history, encouraging the patient to provide significant details about their ictal symptoms in order to better understand the origin of the sense of bliss and support the hypothesis of an insular involvement according to the current stage of knowledge. Ictal electroencephalographic and blood flow studies complemented these data in one patient.

RESULTS

The comprehensive description of the ictal ecstatic symptoms by the two patients has brought out an unfamiliar sense of absence of doubt which was at the basis of a feeling of meaningfulness and certainty. The ictal single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) showed an increased blood flow maximal at the junction of the right dorsal mid-insula and the central operculum.

CONCLUSIONS

The unveiling of an ictal sense of certainty during ecstatic seizures might imply, in the light of current knowledge, a defect in the system processing prediction errors within the framework of generalized predictive coding mechanisms of the brain. Accumulative evidence has recently highlighted a crucial role of the anterior insular cortex in this system, particularly in the detection of mismatch/conflict between prediction state and outcome. Abnormal activity related to epileptic seizure in a structure prevents its normal activity: in the anterior insula, it could prevent the detection of prediction errors, and thereby prevent the feeling of ambiguity (and the associated negative emotional component), leading to a blissful state which could be close to the deeper states of meditation.

The riddle of anosognosia: does unawareness of hemiplegia involve a failure to update beliefs?

Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) is defined as a lack of awareness for motor incapacity after a brain lesion. The causes of AHP still remain poorly understood. Many associations and dissociations with other deficits have been highlighted but no specific cognitive or neurological impairment has been identified as a unique causative factor. We hypothesized that a failure to update beliefs about current state might be a crucial component of AHP. Here, we report results from a new test that are compatible with this view. We examined anosognosic and nosognosic brain-damaged patients, as well as healthy controls, on a task where they had to guess a target word based on successive clues, with increasing informative content. After each clue, participants had to propose a word solution and rated their confidence. Compared to other participants, anosognosic patients were abnormally overconfident in their responses, even when information from the clues was insufficient. Furthermore, when presented with new clues incongruent with their previous response, they often stuck to their former "false" beliefs instead of modifying them. This impairment was unrelated to global deficits in reasoning or memory, and all patients eventually identified the correct solution of riddles after the last, fully informative, clue. These results suggest that a deficit in the generation and adjustment of beliefs may be a key factor contributing to the occurrence and persistence of anosognosia, when associated with concomitant losses in motor, proprioceptive, and/or attentional functions. Patients may remain unaware of their deficit partly because they cannot "update" their beliefs about current state.

Belief in life-after-death, beliefs about the world, and psychiatric symptoms

Data from the 2010 Baylor Religion Survey were analyzed by structural equation modeling (SEM) to test five hypotheses: (1) that religious commitment is positively related to belief in life-after-death; that belief in life-after-death is (2) positively related to belief in an equitable world, and (3) negatively related to belief in a cynical world; (4) that belief in a cynical world has a pernicious association with psychiatric symptoms; and (5) that belief in an equitable world has a salubrious association with psychiatric symptoms. As hypothesized, religious commitment was positively related to belief in life-after-death (β = .74). In turn, belief in life-after-death was negatively associated with belief in a cynical world (β = -.16) and positively associated with belief in an equitable world (β = .36), as hypothesized. SEM further confirmed that belief in a cynical world had a significant pernicious association with all five classes of psychiatric symptoms (β's = .11 to .30). Belief in an equitable world had a weaker and less consistent salubrious association with psychiatric symptoms. The results are discussed in the context of ETAS theory.

Neuropsychological correlates of insight in obsessive-compulsive disorder

OBJECTIVE

There are limited data on neuropsychological correlates of poor insight in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). We hypothesize that poor insight may be associated with greater impairment in tasks of conflict resolution/response inhibition and possibly impairment in a task of verbal learning and memory.

METHOD

Insight and neuropsychological functions were assessed in 150 subjects with DSM-IV OCD. The neuropsychological data of 177 healthy control subjects were used for comparison.

RESULTS

Insight score correlated significantly with the Stroop Interference Test for conflict resolution/response inhibition (P = 0.002), and showed trends for significance with the Controlled Oral Word Association (COWA) average for verbal fluency (P = 0.021) and delayed recall on the Auditory Verbal Learning Test (AVLT) for verbal memory (P = 0.015). On regression analysis, the AVLT delayed recall, the COWA average, the Matrix score, the Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale total score, and current antipsychotic use emerged as significant predictors of poorer insight.

CONCLUSION

Poor insight is associated with greater impairments in conflict resolution/response inhibition, verbal memory, and fluency. Individuals with poorer insight may have difficulty in appropriately processing conflicting information, updating their memory with corrective information, and then accessing this corrective information to modify their irrational beliefs.

Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, and the human prefrontal cortex

OBJECTIVE

The psychological processes of doubting and skepticism have recently become topics of neuroscientific investigation. In this context, we developed the False Tagging Theory, a neurobiological model of the belief and doubt process, which proposes that the prefrontal cortex is critical for normative doubt regarding properly comprehended cognitive representations. Here, we put our theory to an empirical test, hypothesizing that patients with prefrontal cortex damage would have a doubt deficit that would manifest as higher authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism.

METHOD

Ten patients with bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), 10 patients with damage to areas outside the vmPFC, and 16 medical comparison patients, who experienced life-threatening (but non-neurological) medical events, completed a series of scales measuring authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, and specific religious beliefs.

RESULTS

vmPFC patients reported significantly higher authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism than the other groups. The degrees of authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism in the vmPFC group were significantly higher than normative values, as well; by contrast, the comparison groups did not differ from normative values. Moreover, vmPFC patients reported increased specific religious beliefs after brain injury.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings support the False Tagging Theory and suggest that the vmPFC is critical for psychological doubt and resistance to authoritarian persuasion.

Ascribing beliefs to ingroup and outgroup political candidates: neural correlates of perspective-taking, issue importance and days until the election

We used the five weeks leading up to the 2008 presidential election as a backdrop to examine the ways that the brain processes attitudes and beliefs under different circumstances. We examined individual differences in personal issue importance and trait perspective-taking, as well as the temporal context in which attitude representation took place (i.e. number of days until the election). Finally, we examined the extent to which similar or dissimilar processes were recruited when considering the attitudes of political ingroup and outgroup candidates. Brain regions involved in social cognition and theory of mind, and to a lesser extent the limbic system, were modulated by these factors. Higher issue importance led to greater recruitment of neural regions involved in social cognition, across target perspectives. Higher trait perspective-taking was also associated with greater recruitment of several regions involved in social cognition, but differed depending on target perspective; greater activity was observed in prefrontal regions associated with social cognition when considering the perspective of one's own candidate compared with the opponent, and this effect was amplified closer to the election. Taken together, these results highlight ways in which ability and motivational relevance modulate socio-affective processing of the attitudes of others.

Neural basis of moral verdict and moral deliberation

How people judge something to be morally right or wrong is a fundamental question of both the sciences and the humanities. Here we aim to identify the neural processes that underlie the specific conclusion that something is morally wrong. To do this, we introduce a novel distinction between "moral deliberation," or the weighing of moral considerations, and the formation of a "moral verdict," or the commitment to one moral conclusion. We predict and identify hemodynamic activity in the bilateral anterior insula and basal ganglia that correlates with committing to the moral verdict "this is morally wrong" as opposed to "this is morally not-wrong," a finding that is consistent with research from economic decision-making. Using comparisons of deliberation-locked vs. verdict-locked analyses, we also demonstrate that hemodynamic activity in high-level cortical regions previously implicated in morality--including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and temporoparietal junction--correlates primarily with moral deliberation as opposed to moral verdicts. These findings provide new insights into what types of processes comprise the enterprise of moral judgment, and in doing so point to a framework for resolving why some clinical patients, including psychopaths, may have intact moral judgment but impaired moral behavior.

Disgusting bodies, disgusting religion: the biology of Tantra

Hard-core Tantric practice is disgusting, a point several scholars make. Scholarly interpretations of Tantric disgustingness, however, tend to follow the lead of Mary Douglas in suggesting that what disgusts is ultimately a reflection of social–historical concerns with borders and boundaries. Such interpretations fail to take seriously the Tantric consumption of feces, menstrual blood, urine, semen, and phlegm. Likewise, they fail to take seriously the particular sexual act involved, that is, intercourse with a menstruating, riding-astride, out-of-caste, mother-substitute. Consulting contemporary disgust research, I suggest that hard-core Tantra is literally disgusting because it is literally maladaptive. Disgust was naturally selected to deter the ingestion of bio-toxic pathogens as well as the practice of suboptimal sexual intercourse. Disgust maintains the species' viability. Tantra confounds disgust and thus disgusts. Tantra engages antibiological behaviors in its characteristically religious war against the body. As a disgusting religion, Tantra may be a perfected religion.

Performance comparison of machine learning algorithms and number of independent components used in fMRI decoding of belief vs. disbelief

Machine learning (ML) has become a popular tool for mining functional neuroimaging data, and there are now hopes of performing such analyses efficiently in real-time. Towards this goal, we compared accuracy of six different ML algorithms applied to neuroimaging data of persons engaged in a bivariate task, asserting their belief or disbelief of a variety of propositional statements. We performed unsupervised dimension reduction and automated feature extraction using independent component (IC) analysis and extracted IC time courses. Optimization of classification hyperparameters across each classifier occurred prior to assessment. Maximum accuracy was achieved at 92% for Random Forest, followed by 91% for AdaBoost, 89% for Naïve Bayes, 87% for a J48 decision tree, 86% for K*, and 84% for support vector machine. For real-time decoding applications, finding a parsimonious subset of diagnostic ICs might be useful. We used a forward search technique to sequentially add ranked ICs to the feature subspace. For the current data set, we determined that approximately six ICs represented a meaningful basis set for classification. We then projected these six IC spatial maps forward onto a later scanning session within subject. We then applied the optimized ML algorithms to these new data instances, and found that classification accuracy results were reproducible. Additionally, we compared our classification method to our previously published general linear model results on this same data set. The highest ranked IC spatial maps show similarity to brain regions associated with contrasts for belief > disbelief, and disbelief < belief.

Wo die Liebe wohnt

Zusammenfassung. Trotz der großen Popularität der bildgebenden Verfahren in den Neurowissenschaften stellen sich einige kritische Fragen, welche die Logik und die Methodologie der Hirnforschung betreffen. Darüber hinaus gibt es Zweifel am Erkenntnisgewinn, den die Psychologie aus der lokationsorientierten Hirnforschung ziehen kann und es entsteht die Gefahr, dass zentrale Fragestellungen der Psychologie der hirnanatomischen Perspektive untergeordnet werden.

Religion, evolution, and mental health: attachment theory and ETAS theory

This article reviews the historical origins of Attachment Theory and Evolutionary Threat Assessment Systems Theory (ETAS Theory), their evolutionary basis and their application in research on religion and mental health. Attachment Theory has been most commonly applied to religion and mental health in research on God as an attachment figure, which has shown that secure attachment to God is positively associated with psychological well-being. Its broader application to religion and mental health is comprehensively discussed by Kirkpatrick (2005). ETAS Theory explains why certain religious beliefs--including beliefs about God and life-after-death--should have an adverse association, an advantageous association, or no association at all with mental health. Moreover, it makes specific predictions to this effect, which have been confirmed, in part. The authors advocate the application of ETAS Theory in research on religion and mental health because it explains how religious and other beliefs related to the dangerousness of the world can directly affect psychiatric symptoms through their affects on specific brain structures.

Beliefs about God, psychiatric symptoms, and evolutionary psychiatry

The present study analyzed the association between specific beliefs about God and psychiatric symptoms among a representative sample of 1,306 U.S. adults. Three pairs of beliefs about God served as the independent variables: Close and Loving, Approving and Forgiving, and Creating and Judging. The dependent variables were measures of General Anxiety, Depression, Obsessive-Compulsion, Paranoid Ideation, Social Anxiety, and Somatization. As hypothesized, the strength of participants' belief in a Close and Loving God had a significant salutary association with overall psychiatric symptomology, and the strength of this association was significantly stronger than that of the other beliefs, which had little association with the psychiatric symptomology. The authors discuss the findings in the context of evolutionary psychiatry, and the relevance of Evolutionary Threat Assessment Systems Theory in research on religious beliefs.

Interoception in anxiety and depression

We review the literature on interoception as it relates to depression and anxiety, with a focus on belief, and alliesthesia. The connection between increased but noisy afferent interoceptive input, self-referential and belief-based states, and top-down modulation of poorly predictive signals is integrated into a neuroanatomical and processing model for depression and anxiety. The advantage of this conceptualization is the ability to specifically examine the interface between basic interoception, self-referential belief-based states, and enhanced top-down modulation to attenuate poor predictability. We conclude that depression and anxiety are not simply interoceptive disorders but are altered interoceptive states as a consequence of noisily amplified self-referential interoceptive predictive belief states.

The neural correlates of religious and nonreligious belief

Background

While religious faith remains one of the most significant features of human life, little is known about its relationship to ordinary belief at the level of the brain. Nor is it known whether religious believers and nonbelievers differ in how they evaluate statements of fact. Our lab previously has used functional neuroimaging to study belief as a general mode of cognition [1], and others have looked specifically at religious belief [2]. However, no research has compared these two states of mind directly.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure signal changes in the brains of thirty subjects—fifteen committed Christians and fifteen nonbelievers—as they evaluated the truth and falsity of religious and nonreligious propositions. For both groups, and in both categories of stimuli, belief (judgments of “true” vs judgments of “false”) was associated with greater signal in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area important for self-representation [3], [4], [5], [6], emotional associations [7], reward [8], [9], [10], and goal-driven behavior [11]. This region showed greater signal whether subjects believed statements about God, the Virgin Birth, etc. or statements about ordinary facts. A comparison of both stimulus categories suggests that religious thinking is more associated with brain regions that govern emotion, self-representation, and cognitive conflict, while thinking about ordinary facts is more reliant upon memory retrieval networks.

Conclusions/Significance

While religious and nonreligious thinking differentially engage broad regions of the frontal, parietal, and medial temporal lobes, the difference between belief and disbelief appears to be content-independent. Our study compares religious thinking with ordinary cognition and, as such, constitutes a step toward developing a neuropsychology of religion. However, these findings may also further our understanding of how the brain accepts statements of all kinds to be valid descriptions of the world.

Peduncular hallucinosis: a polysomnographic and spect study of a patient and efficacy of serotonergic therapy

Peduncular hallucinosis (PH) consists of formed and coloured visual images, which the patient knows are unreal; it is often associated with lesions of the pons, midbrain and diencephalon. A 72-year-old man had noted the sudden onset of visual hallucinations one year before, specifying the time and body position in a 4-week, 24-h diary. Thereafter, he underwent video-polysomnography (VPSG), brain magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), angiography (MRA), proton spectroscopy ((1)H MRS), and single photon emission tomography (SPECT). Patient's diaries and VPSG showed a strong clustering of hallucinatory experiences during the evening/night time while lying in supine position, similar to hypnagogic hallucination and sleep paralysis in supine position. Repeated episodes of REM sleep behaviour disorder (RBD) occurred during the night. MRI and MRA showed an elongated and dilated left internal carotid artery displacing the left subthalamus upwards, and (1)H MRS relatively decreased N-acetyl-aspartate in the left subthalamus. Brain SPECT during PH revealed hypoperfusion in the right temporal region and hyperperfusion in the left occipital and right opercular regions (the latter possibly related to the patient's awareness of unreality). PH resolved with serotonergic (citalopram) therapy.

Value judgments and self-control of action: the role of the medial frontal cortex

Humans generate actions in relation to perceived events in the environment. Events are valuated in terms of subjective (personal) relevance or meaning, i.e. "what does this mean to me?". Similarly, making sense or gaining meaning from sensations (i.e., "perception") from one's own body and of mental images, such as memories or intentions, involves valuation from a subjective perspective. Here, we review recent findings in neurophysiology and neuroimaging suggesting that the medial frontal cortex comprises cortical relay nodes that afford the attribution of self-relevant, immediate and intuitive (implicit) meaning. In addition, we describe recent data that suggest that the medial frontal cortex participates also in the explicit appraisal of certain stimuli, namely, emotional face expressions, occurring as early as 150 ms following the stimulus. We propose that the medial frontal cortex subserves egocentric "value" judgments (both implicit and explicit), which are critical for self-control of action.

Imaging the impossible: an fMRI study of impossible causal relationships in magic tricks

Understanding causal relationships and violations of those relationships is fundamental to learning about the world around us. Over time some of these relationships become so firmly established that they form part of an implicit belief system about what is possible and impossible in the world. Previous studies investigating the neural correlates of violations of learned relationships have focused on relationships that were task-specific and probabilistic. In contrast, the present study uses magic-trick perception as a means of investigating violations of relationships that are long-established, deterministic, and that form part of the aforementioned belief system. Compared to situations in which expected causal relationships are observed, magic trick perception recruited dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brain regions associated with the detection of conflict and the implementation of cognitive control. These activations were greater in the left hemisphere, supporting a role for this hemisphere in the interpretation of complex events. DLPFC is more greatly activated by magic tricks than by surprising events, but not more greatly activated by surprising than non surprising events, suggesting that this region plays a special role in causality processing. The results suggest a role for cognitive control regions in the left hemisphere in a neurobiology of disbelief.

Neural differences in the processing of true and false sentences: insights into the nature of 'truth' in language comprehension

The inquiry on the nature of truth in language comprehension has a long history of opposite perspectives. These perspectives either consider that there are qualitative differences in the processing of true and false statements, or that these processes are fundamentally the same and only differ in quantitative terms. The present study evaluated the processing nature of true and false statements in terms of patterns of brain activity using event-related functional-Magnetic-Resonance-Imaging (fMRI). We show that when true and false concept-feature statements are controlled for relation strength/ambiguity, their processing is associated to qualitatively different processes. Verifying true statements activates the left inferior parietal cortex and the caudate nucleus, a neural correlate compatible with an extended search and matching process for particular stored information. In contrast, verifying false statements activates the fronto-polar cortex and is compatible with a reasoning process of finding and evaluating a contradiction between the sentence information and stored knowledge.