The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking: New Evidence, New Challenges, New Insights

Improving workplace safety by thinking about what might have been: A first look at the role of counterfactual thinking

INTRODUCTION

Information processing theories of workplace safety suggest that cognition is an antecedent of safety behavior. However, little research has directly tested cognitive factors as predictors of workplace safety within organizational psychology and behavior research. Counterfactuals (cognitions about "what might have been") can be functional when they consist of characteristics (e.g., "upward' - focusing on better outcomes) that alter behavior in a manner consistent with those outcomes. This field study aimed to examine the influence of counterfactual thinking on safety behavior and explanatory mechanisms and boundary conditions of that relationship.

METHOD

A sample of 240 medical providers from a hospital in China responded to three surveys over a four-month time frame.

RESULTS

Results showed that upward counterfactuals were positively related to supervisor ratings of safety compliance and participation. These relationships were mediated by safety knowledge but not by safety motivation. Upward counterfactuals were more strongly related to safety behavior and knowledge than downward counterfactuals. As expected, safety locus of control strengthened the mediating effects of safety knowledge on the relationship between upward counterfactuals and safety behavior. Conclusions and Practical Applications: The findings demonstrated that counterfactual thinking is positively associated with safety behavior and knowledge, thus expanding the variables related to workplace safety and laying some initial groundwork for new safety interventions incorporating counterfactual thinking.

Temporal Junctures in the Mind

Humans can imagine what happened in the past and what will happen in the future, but also what did not happen and what might happen. We reflect on envisioned events from alternative timelines, while knowing that we only ever live on one timeline. Considering alternative timelines rests on representations of temporal junctures, or points in time at which possible versions of reality diverge. These representations become increasingly sophisticated over childhood, first enabling preparation for mutually exclusive future possibilities and later the experience of counterfactual emotions like regret. By contrast, it remains unclear whether non-human animals represent temporal junctures at all. The emergence of these representations may have been a prime mover in human evolution.

What if I had not fallen from grace? Psychological distress and the gap between factual and counterfactual subjective social status

The aim of this work was to test the hypothesis that the discrepancy between factual and counterfactual subjective social status (DCS) relates to psychological distress beyond the effect of current (i.e., factual) subjective and objective social status. Participants were 124 single mothers (Study 1) and 310 persons who have become unemployed (Study 2). In both samples, higher DCS was related to more severe symptoms of stress and depression beyond the effect of current subjective and objective social status. Upward counterfactual thinking might be an additional psychological factor in the relationship between social inequality and health in socially deprived individuals.

What Might Have Been: Near Miss Experiences and Adjustment to a Terrorist Attack

Near miss experiences—narrowly avoiding a traumatic event—are associated with distress, despite signaling good fortune. For some, near miss experiences call to mind those who, unlike oneself, were directly affected by the event, leading to “survivor guilt” or distress over one’s comparative good fortune. Survivor guilt, in turn, may function as upward counterfactual thinking about others’ negative outcomes, leading to intrusive thoughts and post-traumatic stress. We compared individuals who did or did not report a near miss with respect to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks—that is, almost being directly affected—in a national longitudinal study ( N = 1,433). Near miss experiences predicted higher levels of reexperiencing symptoms and probable post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as maintenance of reexperiencing symptoms over the next 3 years. These associations were partially accounted for by survivor guilt. Near misses may be associated with distress in part because they entail reflection on negative outcomes for others.

Happiness and counterfactual thinking at the 2016 Summer Olympic Games

The purpose of this study was to investigate potential differences in emotional expression and counterfactual thought between bronze and silver Olympic medallists. In Study 1, 468 photographs (156 gold medallists, 156 silver medallists, 156 bronze medallists) were obtained of Olympic medal winners standing on the podium at the 2016 Summer Olympic Games, and 20 students rated the level of expressed happiness in each photograph. The students were blind to the outcome of the event and an average score for each photograph was used in data analysis. Results showed that gold medallists displayed greater levels of happiness than silver medallists but that silver and bronze medallists showed little difference in their expressed happiness. In Study 2, 192 quotations from bronze and silver medallists were obtained from news outlets, and 20 students rated the expression of counterfactual thought in each quotation. Results showed that compared to bronze medallists, silver medallists had more counterfactual thoughts overall, more counterfactual thoughts about how things could have gone better, and more counterfactual thoughts about their opponents' behaviour. Overall, findings indicate that counterfactual thoughts differ between bronze and silver medallists, but that differences in expressed emotion are likely to be trivial or negligible.

Counterfactual Thinking, Causation, and Covariation in Mock Juror Assessments of Negligence: Twenty‐Five Years Later

In the past three decades, researchers have examined counterfactual thinking and causation in decision making. However, little work has applied these findings to trial settings. The present research examined two conflicting theories regarding counterfactual thinking and causation to elaborate on earlier work examining counterfactual thinking in negligence law cases. The research also expanded the earlier work by examining covariation theory, additional psychological measures, and the rank order and reaction time associated with counterfactuals. Participants read a summary of a negligence case that manipulated covariation information to suggest that the defendant or plaintiff caused an accident. Participants then completed counterfactual, preventability, or causal statements about the case before responding to legal and psychological measures. Overall, the research found support for norm theory and covariation, but mixed evidence regarding the role of counterfactual thinking and causation. Counterfactual thinking more strongly affected the duty and breach components of a negligence case, while causal thinking more strongly affected causation and legal decisions. Legal implications were discussed.

Episodic Counterfactual Thinking

Our tendency to engage in episodic counterfactual thinking—namely, imagining alternative ways in which past personal events could have occurred but did not—is ubiquitous. Although widely studied by cognitive and social psychologists, this autobiographically based variety of counterfactual thought has been connected only recently to research on the cognitive and neuroscientific basis of episodic memory and mental simulation. In the current article, we offer an empirical characterization of episodic counterfactual thinking by contrasting it with related varieties of mental simulation along three dimensions: temporal context, degree of episodic detail, and modal profile (i.e., perceived possibility or impossibility). In so doing, we offer a practical strategy to navigate the nascent literature on episodic counterfactual thinking within the context of other mental simulations, and we argue that the evidence surveyed strongly indicates that although connected along the aforementioned dimensions, episodic counterfactual thinking is a psychological process different from episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and semantic counterfactual thinking.

On the Existential Road From Regret to Heroism: Searching for Meaning in Life

We investigated whether regret predicted the motivation to act heroically. In a series of studies, we examined the relationship between regret, search for meaning in life, and heroism motivation. First, Study 1 (a and b) investigated the association between regret and search for meaning in life, considering regret as a whole, action regret, and inaction regret. As expected, regret correlated positively with search for meaning in life. In two additional studies (Study 2 and 3), we examined whether regret predicted heroism motivation and whether this effect was mediated through search for meaning in life. Study 2 confirmed this hypothesis for individual differences in regret, using a correlational design. Study 3 confirmed the hypothesis for temporary experiences of regret, using an experimental design. In addition, in Study 3 we found that heroism motivation was stronger for people with high self-enhancement needs than for those with lower self-enhancement needs. We discuss the relationship between regret and heroism in light of these results and explore their implications.

The impact of past behaviour normality on regret: replication and extension of three experiments of the exceptionality effect

Norm theory (Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological Review, 93, 136-153) described a tendency for people to associate stronger regret with a negative outcome when it is a result of an exception (abnormal behaviour) compared to when it is a result of routine (normal behaviour). In two pre-registered studies, we conducted a replication and extension of three classic experiments on past behaviour exception/routine contrasts (N = 684). We successfully replicated Kahneman and Miller's (1986) experiments with the classic hitchhiker-scenario (Part 1) and car accident-scenario (Part 2). In both cases, participants examined negative outcomes and tended to indicate a protagonist who deviated from own past behaviour as more regretful than another who followed routine. Pre-registered extensions also showed effects for ratings of social norms, negative affect, and perceived luck. We did not find support for the Miller, D. T., and McFarland, C. [(1986). Counterfactual thinking and victim compensation: A test of norm theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12, 513-519] experiment robbery scenario (Part 3) using a compensation measure, in that compensation to a victim of a robbery was not significantly different comparing exceptional and routine circumstances. However, a pre-registered extension showed that robbery under exceptional circumstances was perceived as more regretful than robbery under routine circumstances. We discuss implications for current and future research.

How thinking about what could have been affects how we feel about what was

Episodic counterfactual thoughts (CFT) and autobiographical memories (AM) involve the reactivation and recombination of episodic memory components into mental simulations. Upon reactivation, memories become labile and prone to modification. Thus, reactivating AM in the context of mentally generating CFT may provide an opportunity for editing processes to modify the content of the original memory. To examine this idea, this paper reports the results of two studies that investigated the effect of reactivating negative and positive AM in the context of either imagining a better (i.e. upward CFT) or a worse (i.e. downward CFT) alternative to an experienced event, as opposed to attentively retrieving the memory without mental modification (i.e. remembering) or no reactivation. Our results suggest that attentive remembering was the best strategy to both reduce the negative affect associated with negative AM, and to prevent the decay of positive affect associated with positive AM. In addition, reactivating positive, but not negative, AM with or without CFT modification reduces the perceived arousal of the original memory over time. Finally, reactivating negative AM in a downward CFT or an attentive remembering condition increases the perceived detail of the original memory over time.

Imagining What Could Have Happened: Types and Vividness of Counterfactual Thoughts and the Relationship With Post-traumatic Stress Reactions

A growing body of research suggests that counterfactual thinking after traumatic events is associated with post-traumatic stress reactions. In this study we explored frequency of upward and downward counterfactuals in trauma-exposed individuals, and how trauma-related counterfactuals were represented in terms of vividness. We examined the relationships between vividness and frequency of counterfactual thoughts and post-traumatic stress reactions in two groups who had experienced different types of traumatic exposure, namely survivors and bereaved from the fire on the ferry Scandinavian Star in 1990. Even after 26 years, both survivors and bereaved reported that they currently entertained thoughts about what could have happened during the fire on Scandinavian Star. Survivors reported more downward counterfactuals than the bereaved, whereas the bereaved reported more upward counterfactuals than the survivors did. Vividness of counterfactual thoughts, as well as reported frequency of upward and downward counterfactuals, were associated with post-traumatic stress reactions. Our results suggest that both upward and downward counterfactuals can be harmful, and that vivid counterfactuals about a traumatic event might play a similar role in post-traumatic stress as trauma memories. Therefore, traumatized individuals who entertain counterfactual thoughts may benefit from interventions that target these thoughts specifically.

The Effects of Counterfactual Attacks on the Morality and Leadership of Different Professionals

Abstract. Past research has offered contrasting results regarding the effects of attacks on social judgments. In three experiments, we investigated the effects of counterfactual (“If only…”) and non-counterfactual attacks on the morality versus leadership of politicians versus entrepreneurs. First, participants rated morality as the most desirable, but least typical dimension of politicians, and leadership as the most desirable and most typical dimension of entrepreneurs (Study 1). Then, counterfactual attacks led to poorer evaluation of the attacked target and better evaluation of the attacking source as compared to non-counterfactual attacks, especially when counterfactuals were focused on the most desirable dimension for the professional category of the attacked target (Study 2). Similar results emerged when the typicality of the attacked dimension was manipulated (Study 3). Discussion focuses on the higher success of attacks on desirable personality dimensions and of counterfactual attacks as compared to other attacks.

Can implicit measures detect source information in crime-related amnesia?

Participants who are asked to simulate amnesia for a mock crime have a weaker memory for this event when they have to give up their role as a feigner, than those who are not asked to feign memory loss. According to the source monitoring framework (SMF), this memory-undermining effect of simulating amnesia for a crime would be due to misattribution of the right source of information. However, we know that the content of self-generated information (e.g., feigned version of the crime) might be preserved and recognised over time as a result of elaborative cognitive processing. In the present study, we aimed to contrast these two explanations. We showed participants a mock crime video and we instructed them to either feign amnesia (simulators) or confess the mock crime (confessors). Next, a free recall memory test was administered. After one week, participants were asked to perform a personalised source monitoring task using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT). As predicted, we found that simulators were able to discriminate the content of their self-generated feigned story of the crime from the original version. Moreover, simulators were quicker than confessors at the aIAT task. Practical and theoretical implications of our results are discussed.

Why do I think and talk about it? Perceived functions and phenomenology of episodic counterfactual thinking compared with remembering and future thinking

People revisit situations from their past and imagine what could have happened had the situation played out differently. This form of hypothetical thinking is known as episodic counterfactual thinking. The reasons why people engage in episodic counterfactual thinking have not been examined in the same context with remembering the past and imagining the future. We addressed this gap, by focusing on the perceived functions and phenomenological characteristics of the most important episodic counterfactuals compared with episodic memories and future projections in younger adults. We base our analyses on four categories of functions previously identified for past events: reflective, social, generative, and ruminative. The reflective and social functions dominated across all events, with the reflective function being most pronounced for future projections, potentially suggesting a close connection between future projections and self-regulation and/or identity formation. Counter to predictions, the ruminative function was not rated higher for episodic counterfactuals than for other events; however, ratings of ruminative function showed unique correlations with the emotional intensity and involuntary remembering for episodic counterfactuals. Overall, these results suggest that episodic counterfactuals are used for self-reflection and social sharing more than they are used for rumination and generative concerns.

Neural activity associated with repetitive simulation of episodic counterfactual thoughts

When people revisit past autobiographical events they often imagine alternative ways in which such events could have occurred. Often these episodic counterfactual thoughts (eCFT) are momentary and fleeting, but sometimes they are simulated frequently and repeatedly. However, little is known about the neural differences between frequently versus infrequently repeated eCFT. The current study explores this issue. In a three-session study, participants were asked to simulate alternative ways positive, negative, and neutral autobiographical memories could have occurred. Half of these eCFT were repeatedly re-simulated while the other half were not. Immediately after, participants were asked to simulate all these eCFT again while undergoing fMRI. A partial least squares analysis on the resultant fMRI data revealed that eCFT that were not frequently repeated preferentially engaged brain regions including middle (BA 21) and superior temporal gyri (BA 38/39), middle (BA 11) and superior frontal gyri (BA 9), and hippocampus. By contrast, frequently repeated eCFT preferentially engaged regions including medial frontal gyri (BA 10), anterior cingulate cortex, insula, and inferior parietal lobule (BA 40). Direct contrasts for each type of eCFT were also conducted. The results of these analyses suggest differential contributions of regions traditionally associated with eCFT, such as BA 10, anterior cingulate cortex, and hippocampus, as a function of kind of eCFT and frequency of repetition. Consequences for future research on eCFT and rumination are considered.