Spiders at the cocktail party: an ancestral threat that surmounts inattentional blindness

How Fuzzy-Trace Theory Predicts True and False Memories for Words, Sentences, and Narratives

Fuzzy-trace theory posits independent verbatim and gist memory processes, a distinction that has implications for such applied topics as eyewitness testimony. This distinction between precise, literal verbatim memory and meaning-based, intuitive gist accounts for memory paradoxes including dissociations between true and false memory, false memories outlasting true memories, and developmental increases in false memory. We provide an overview of fuzzy-trace theory, and, using mathematical modeling, also present results demonstrating verbatim and gist memory in true and false recognition of narrative sentences and inferences. Results supported fuzzy-trace theory's dual-process view of memory: verbatim memory was relied on to reject meaning-consistent, but unpresented, sentences (via recollection rejection). However, verbatim memory was often not retrieved, and gist memory supported acceptance of these sentences (via similarity judgment and phantom recollection). Thus, mathematical models of words can be extended to explain memory for complex stimuli, such as narratives, the kind of memory interrogated in law.

Itsy bitsy spider?: Valence and self-relevance predict size estimation

The current study explored the role of valence and self-relevance in size estimation of neutral and aversive animals. In Experiment 1, participants who were highly fearful of spiders and participants with low fear of spiders rated the size and unpleasantness of spiders and other neutral animals (birds and butterflies). We found that although individuals with both high and low fear of spiders rated spiders as highly unpleasant, only the highly fearful participants rated spiders as larger than butterflies. Experiment 2 included additional pictures of wasps (not self-relevant, but unpleasant) and beetles. The results of this experiment replicated those of Experiment 1 and showed a similar bias in size estimation for beetles, but not for wasps. Mediation analysis revealed that in the high-fear group both relevance and valence influenced perceived size, whereas in the low-fear group only valence affected perceived size. These findings suggest that the effect of highly relevant stimuli on size perception is both direct and mediated by valence.

Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects

What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional “modular” understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct, top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between perception and cognition may itself be unsustainable. We argue otherwise: None of these hundreds of studies – either individually or collectively – provides compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or “cognitive penetrability.” In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls. And whereas abstract theoretical challenges have failed to resolve this debate in the past, our presentation of these pitfalls is empirically anchored: In each case, we show not only how certain studies could be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but also how several alleged top-down effects actually are explained by the pitfall (in practice). Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects. We conclude by extracting the lessons provided by these pitfalls into a checklist that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. The discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized; but without addressing these pitfalls, no such empirical report will license such exciting conclusions.

Inattentional blindness is influenced by exposure time not motion speed

Inattentional blindness is a striking phenomenon in which a salient object within the visual field goes unnoticed because it is unexpected, and attention is focused elsewhere. Several attributes of the unexpected object, such as size and animacy, have been shown to influence the probability of inattentional blindness. At present it is unclear whether or how the speed of a moving unexpected object influences inattentional blindness. We demonstrated that inattentional blindness rates are considerably lower if the unexpected object moves more slowly, suggesting that it is the mere exposure time of the object rather than a higher saliency potentially induced by higher speed that determines the likelihood of its detection. Alternative explanations could be ruled out: The effect is not based on a pop-out effect arising from different motion speeds in relation to the primary-task stimuli (Experiment 2), nor is it based on a higher saliency of slow-moving unexpected objects (Experiment 3).