Clarifying the role of theory of mind areas during visual perspective taking: Issues of spontaneity and domain-specificity

Submentalizing or mentalizing in a Level 1 perspective-taking task: A cloak and goggles test

It has been proposed that humans possess an automatic system to represent mental states (‘implicit mentalizing’). The existence of an implicit mentalizing system has generated considerable debate however, centered on the ability of various experimental paradigms to demonstrate unambiguously such mentalizing. Evidence for implicit mentalizing has previously been provided by the ‘dot perspective task,’ where participants are slower to verify the number of dots they can see when an avatar can see a different number of dots. However, recent evidence challenged a mentalizing interpretation of this effect by showing it was unaltered when the avatar was replaced with an inanimate arrow stimulus. Here we present an extension of the dot perspective task using an invisibility cloaking device to render the dots invisible on certain trials. This paradigm is capable of providing unambiguous evidence of automatic mentalizing, but no such evidence was found. Two further well-powered experiments used opaque and transparent goggles to manipulate visibility but found no evidence of automatic mentalizing, nor of individual differences in empathy or perspective-taking predicting performance, contradicting previous studies using the same design. The results cast doubt on the existence of an implicit mentalizing system, suggesting that previous effects were due to domain-general processes.

The ability to represent in one’s own mind what other people see, think, or believe is important for social interactions and relationships. There is wide agreement that this ‘mentalizing’ ability depends on a late developing, slow and effortful system, but much debate on whether humans also possess a fast and automatic mentalizing system. The present studies tested whether participants automatically represented what an onscreen human avatar could see. Objects’ visibility was manipulated by using either a set of telescopes or goggles. One of each set allowed objects to be seen, and the other did not. Participant response times were predicted to be faster when what they saw corresponded to what the avatar saw, and slower when there was a difference. However, this did not occur, providing no evidence for an automatic mentalizing system, suggesting rather that representing others’ mental states is effortful not automatic.

When Far Becomes Near

On many occasions, people spontaneously or deliberately take the perspective of a person facing them rather than their own perspective. How is this done? Using a spatial perspective task in which participants were asked to identify objects at specific locations, we found that self-perspective judgments were faster for objects presented to the right, rather than the left, and for objects presented closer to the participants’ own bodies. Strikingly, taking the opposing perspective of another person led to a reversal (i.e., remapping) of these effects, with reference to the other person’s position (Experiment 1). A remapping of spatial relations was also observed when an empty chair replaced the other person (Experiment 2), but not when access to the other viewpoint was blocked (Experiment 3). Thus, when the spatial scene allows a physically feasible but opposing point of view, people respond as if their own bodies were in that place. Imagination can thus overcome perception.

Brain stimulation reveals crucial role of overcoming self-centeredness in self-control

Neurobiological models of self-control predominantly focus on the role of prefrontal brain mechanisms involved in emotion regulation and impulse control. We provide evidence for an entirely different neural mechanism that promotes self-control by overcoming bias for the present self, a mechanism previously thought to be mainly important for interpersonal decision-making. In two separate studies, we show that disruptive transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the temporo-parietal junction-a brain region involved in overcoming one's self-centered perspective-increases the discounting of delayed and prosocial rewards. This effect of TMS on temporal and social discounting is accompanied by deficits in perspective-taking and does not reflect altered spatial reorienting and number recognition. Our findings substantiate a fundamental commonality between the domains of self-control and social decision-making and highlight a novel aspect of the neurocognitive processes involved in self-control.

Observed bodies generate object-based spatial codes

Contemporary studies of spatial and social cognition frequently use human figures as stimuli. The interpretation of such studies may be complicated by spatial compatibility effects that emerge when researchers employ spatial responses, and participants spontaneously code spatial relationships about an observed body. Yet, the nature of these spatial codes - whether they are location- or object-based, and coded from the perspective of the observer or the figure - has not been determined. Here, we investigated this issue by exploring spatial compatibility effects arising for objects held by a visually presented whole-bodied schematic human figure. In three experiments, participants responded to the colour of the object held in the figure's left or right hand, using left or right key presses. Left-right compatibility effects were found relative to the participant's egocentric perspective, rather than the figure's. These effects occurred even when the figure was rotated by 90° to the left or to the right, and the coloured objects were aligned with the participant's midline. These findings are consistent with spontaneous spatial coding from the participant's perspective and relative to the normal upright orientation of the body. This evidence for object-based spatial coding implies that the domain general cognitive mechanisms that result in spatial compatibility effects may contribute to certain spatial perspective-taking and social cognition phenomena.

Eye tracking reveals the cost of switching between self and other perspectives in a visual perspective-taking task

Previous studies have shown that while people can rapidly and accurately compute their own and other people's visual perspectives, they experience difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective when the two perspectives differ. We used the "avatar" perspective-taking task to examine the mechanisms that underlie these egocentric (i.e., interference from their own perspective) and altercentric (i.e., interference from the other person's perspective) tendencies. Participants were eye-tracked as they verified the number of discs in a visual scene according to either their own or an on-screen avatar's perspective. Crucially in some trials the two perspectives were inconsistent (i.e., each saw a different number of discs), while in others they were consistent. To examine the effect of perspective switching, performance was compared for trials that were preceded with the same versus a different perspective cue. We found that altercentric interference can be reduced or eliminated when participants stick with their own perspective across consecutive trials. Our eye-tracking analyses revealed distinct fixation patterns for self and other perspective taking, suggesting that consistency effects in this paradigm are driven by implicit mentalizing of what others can see, and not automatic directional cues from the avatar.

Do humans spontaneously take the perspective of others?

A growing number of authors have argued that humans automatically compute the visual perspective of other individuals. Evidence for this has come from the dot perspective task in which observers are faster to judge the number of dots in a display when a human avatar has the same perspective as the observer compared to when their perspectives are different. The present experiment examined the 'spontaneous perspective taking' claim using a variant of the dot perspective paradigm in which we manipulated what the avatar could see via physical barriers that either allowed the targets to be seen by the avatar or occluded this view. We found a robust 'perspective taking' effect despite the avatar being unable to see the same stimuli as the participant. These findings do not support the notion that humans spontaneously take the perspective of others.

From gaze cueing to perspective taking: Revisiting the claim that we automatically compute where or what other people are looking at

Two paradigms have shown that people automatically compute what or where another person is looking at. In the visual perspective-taking paradigm, participants judge how many objects they see; whereas, in the gaze cueing paradigm, participants identify a target. Unlike in the former task, in the latter task, the influence of what or where the other person is looking at is only observed when the other person is presented alone before the task-relevant objects. We show that this discrepancy across the two paradigms is not due to differences in visual settings (Experiment 1) or available time to extract the directional information (Experiment 2), but that it is caused by how attention is deployed in response to task instructions (Experiment 3). Thus, the mere presence of another person in the field of view is not sufficient to compute where/what that person is looking at, which qualifies the claimed automaticity of such computations.

An evaluation of neurocognitive models of theory of mind

We review nine current neurocognitive theories of how theory of mind (ToM) is implemented in the brain and evaluate them based on the results from a recent meta-analysis by Schurz et al. (2014), where we identified six types of tasks that are the most frequently used in imaging research on ToM. From theories about cognitive processes being associated with certain brain areas, we deduce predictions about which areas should be engaged by the different types of ToM tasks. We then compare these predictions with the observed activations in the meta-analysis, and identify a number of unexplained findings in current theories. These can be used to revise and improve future neurocognitive accounts of ToM.

Changing perspective: The role of vestibular signals

Social interactions depend on mechanisms such as the ability to take another person's viewpoint, i.e. visuo-spatial perspective taking. However, little is known about the sensorimotor mechanisms underpinning perspective taking. Because vestibular signals play roles in mental rotation and spatial cognition tasks and because damage to the vestibular cortex can disturb egocentric perspective, vestibular signals stand as important candidates for the sensorimotor foundations of perspective taking. Yet, no study merged natural full-body vestibular stimulations and explicit visuo-spatial perspective taking tasks in virtual environments. In Experiment 1, we combined natural vestibular stimulation on a rotatory chair with virtual reality to test how vestibular signals are processed to simulate the viewpoint of a distant avatar. While they were rotated, participants tossed a ball to a virtual character from the viewpoint of a distant avatar. Our results showed that vestibular signals influence perspective taking in a direction-specific way: participants were faster when their physical body rotated in the same direction as the mental rotation needed to take the avatar's viewpoint. In Experiment 2, participants realized 3D object mental rotations, which did not involve perspective taking, during the same whole-body vestibular stimulation. Our results demonstrated that vestibular stimulation did not affect 3D object mental rotations. Altogether, these data indicate that vestibular signals have a direction-specific influence on visuo-spatial perspective taking (self-centered mental imagery), but not a general effect on mental imagery. Findings from this study suggest that vestibular signals contribute to one of the most crucial mechanisms of social cognition: understanding others' actions.