Reward Counteracts Conflict Adaptation

Exploring the temporal boundary conditions of the articulatory in-out preference effect

Earlier research has documented a preference for words with consonantal articulation patterns that move from the front to the back of the mouth (e.g., MENIKA) over words with reversely wandering consonantal articulation spots (e.g., KENIMA). The present experiments explored the temporal dynamics of the reading process in this in-out preference effect. In three experiments (total N = 344), we gradually reduced the presentation durations of inward and outward wandering words from 1000 ms down to 25 ms to approximate the minimum length of visual stimulus presentation required to trigger the effect. The in-out effect was reliably observed for exposure timings down to 50 ms, but vanished for 25 ms timings, which is line with previous evidence on phonological encoding. Thus, impressively, 50 ms of word presentation is sufficient to evoke the in-out effect. These findings suggest phonological activation to be a prerequisite and thus a driving mechanism of the in-out effect.

Adaptation in conflict: are conflict-triggered control adjustments protected in the presence of motivational distractors?

Solving a conflict between two response options in an interference task has been found to increase control in a subsequent conflict situation. The present research examined whether such conflict adaptation persists in the presence of distractors that have motivational relevance and are therefore competing for attentional resources (i.e. they signal opportunities for monetary gains or losses contingent on overall task performance). In an adjusted flanker task, motivational (versus neutral versus no) distractors were presented together with the current trial while the previous trial never included any distractor. Accumulated evidence across three studies showed that motivational distractors reduced the conflict adaptation effect. This was found irrespective of the location at which the distractor occurred (Study 1), and independent of its valence (i.e. reward or loss, Study 2). Study 3 and a merged data analysis ruled out low-level alternative explanations. In line with a dual competition account (Pessoa, L. (2009). How do emotion and motivation direct executive control? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(4), 160-166. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.01.006 ), our results show that conflict adaptation is not fully protected in the presence of motivational distractors. We discuss whether this should be interpreted as a limitation, or as reflecting the flexibility of the control system in dealing with motivationally relevant information.

Modulating proactive cognitive control by reward: differential anticipatory effects of performance-contingent and non-contingent rewards

The present study investigated the influences of two different forms of reward presentation in modulating cognitive control. In three experiments, participants performed a flanker task for which one-third of trials were precued for a chance of obtaining a reward (reward trials). In Experiment 1, a reward was provided if participants made the correct response on reward trials, but a penalty was given if they made an incorrect response on these trials. The anticipation of this performance-contingent reward increased response speed and reduced the flanker effect, but had little influence on the sequential modulation of the flanker effect after incompatible trials. In Experiment 2, participants obtained a reward randomly on two-thirds of the precued reward trials and were given a penalty on the remaining one-third, regardless of their performance. The anticipation of this non-contingent reward had little influence on the overall response speed or flanker effect, but reduced the sequential modulation of the flanker effect after incompatible trials. Experiment 3 also used performance non-contingent rewards, but participants were randomly penalized more often than they were rewarded; non-contingent penalty had little influence on the sequential modulation of the flanker effect. None of the three experiments showed a reliable influence of the actual acquisition of rewards on task performance. These results indicate anticipatory effects of performance-contingent and non-contingent rewards on cognitive control with little evidence of aftereffects.

This Is How To Be a Rule Breaker

Violating rules comes with cognitive conflict for the rule-breaker. Here, we probed for means to reduce the behavioral effects of this conflict by studying the combined impact of recency and frequency of rule violations. We found that violating a rule facilitated the initiation of a subsequent rule violation, while notable costs relative to rule-based responding remained in measures of response execution. Such costs during response execution vanished, however, when frequency and recency of rule violation worked in concert. That is, it is possible to overcome the costs of rule violation when (a) having violated this particular rule frequently and (b) having violated this particular rule very recently. Moreover, we demonstrated that recent rule violations reduce the costs of cognitive conflict in an unrelated interference task (Simon task). Based on these findings, we present a revised model of the cognitive processes underlying deliberate rule violations.

Temporal dynamics of reactive cognitive control as revealed by event-related brain potentials

Reactive cognitive control refers to a complementary set of cognitive operations by which individuals monitor for and detect the presence of goal-interfering conflict (i.e., conflict monitoring/evaluation) and, subsequently, initiate attention-focusing and response selection processes to bolster goal-directed action in the face of such conflict (regulative control). The purpose of the current study was to characterize the nature of conflict adaptation in both components of this dynamic process across sequences of trials and, more broadly, across time as participants complete a cognitive control task. Fifty-two young adults completed a standard arrow flanker task while behavioral and ERP data were recorded. Multilevel modeling of sequences of compatible and incompatible trials over time showed that, whereas response time data demonstrated a typical conflict adaptation effect throughout the task, N2 and frontal slow wave (FSW) indices of conflict monitoring and regulative control, respectively, demonstrated significant conflict adaptation only during the early part of the task. Moreover, although differential change in N2 and FSW over time suggested that conflict monitoring and regulative control were dissociable, a reciprocal relation between them was maintained throughout the task and was not present in a component theoretically unrelated to conflict adaptation (visual attention-related N1). Findings are discussed in terms of compensatory processes that help to maintain goal-directed performance even as control-related neural responses become fatigued.

Contributions of expected sensory and affective action effects to action selection and performance: Evidence from forced- and free-choice tasks

Whereas ideomotor approaches to action control emphasize the importance of sensory action effects for action selection, motivational approaches emphasize the role of affective action effects. We used a game-like experimental setup to directly compare the roles of sensory and affective action effects in selecting and performing reaching actions in forced- and free-choice tasks. The two kinds of action effects did not interact. Action selection and execution in the forced-choice task were strongly impacted by the spatial compatibility between actions and the expected sensory action effects, whereas the free-choice task was hardly affected. In contrast, action execution, but not selection, in both tasks was strongly impacted by the spatial compatibility between actions and highly valued action effects. This pattern suggests that sensory and affective action effects serve different purposes: The former seem to dominate rule-based action selection, whereas the latter might serve to reduce any remaining action uncertainty.

Separating the effect of reward from corrective feedback during learning in patients with Parkinson's disease

Parkinson's disease (PD) is associated with procedural learning deficits. Nonetheless, studies have demonstrated that reward-related learning is comparable between patients with PD and controls (Bódi et al., Brain, 132(9), 2385-2395, 2009; Frank, Seeberger, & O'Reilly, Science, 306(5703), 1940-1943, 2004; Palminteri et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 106(45), 19179-19184, 2009). However, because these studies do not separate the effect of reward from the effect of practice, it is difficult to determine whether the effect of reward on learning is distinct from the effect of corrective feedback on learning. Thus, it is unknown whether these group differences in learning are due to reward processing or learning in general. Here, we compared the performance of medicated PD patients to demographically matched healthy controls (HCs) on a task where the effect of reward can be examined separately from the effect of practice. We found that patients with PD showed significantly less reward-related learning improvements compared to HCs. In addition, stronger learning of rewarded associations over unrewarded associations was significantly correlated with smaller skin-conductance responses for HCs but not PD patients. These results demonstrate that when separating the effect of reward from the effect of corrective feedback, PD patients do not benefit from reward.

Motivational Sensitivities Linked to Impulsive Motor Errors in Parkinson's Disease

OBJECTIVES

We investigated how broad motivational tendencies are related to the expression and suppression of action impulses in Parkinson's disease (PD).

METHODS

Sixty-nine participants with PD completed a Simon response conflict task and Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and Behavioral Activation System (BAS) scales based on Gray's (1987) reinforcement sensitivity theory. Analyses determined relationships between BIS, BAS, and the susceptibility to making impulsive action errors and the proficiency of inhibiting interference from action impulses.

RESULTS

BIS scores correlated positively with rates of impulsive action errors, indicating that participants endorsing low BIS tendencies were much more susceptible to acting on strong motor impulses. Analyses of subgroups with high versus low BIS scores confirmed this pattern and ruled out alternative explanations in terms of group differences in speed-accuracy tradeoffs. None of the scores on the BIS or BAS scales correlated with reactive inhibitory control.

CONCLUSIONS

PD participants who endorse diminished predilection toward monitoring and avoiding aversive experiences (low BIS) show much greater difficulty restraining fast, impulsive motor errors. Establishing relationships between motivational sensitivities and cognitive control processes may have important implications for treatment strategies and positive health outcomes in participants with PD, particularly those at risk for falling and driving difficulties related to impulsive reactions. (JINS, 2018, 24, 128-138).

Cognitive capacity limitations and Need for Cognition differentially predict reward-induced cognitive effort expenditure

While psychological, economic, and neuroscientific accounts of behavior broadly maintain that people minimize expenditure of cognitive effort, empirical work reveals how reward incentives can mobilize increased cognitive effort expenditure. Recent theories posit that the decision to expend effort is governed, in part, by a cost-benefit tradeoff whereby the potential benefits of mental effort can offset the perceived costs of effort exertion. Taking an individual differences approach, the present study examined whether one's executive function capacity, as measured by Stroop interference, predicts the extent to which reward incentives reduce switch costs in a task-switching paradigm, which indexes additional expenditure of cognitive effort. In accordance with the predictions of a cost-benefit account of effort, we found that a low executive function capacity-and, relatedly, a low intrinsic motivation to expend effort (measured by Need for Cognition)-predicted larger increase in cognitive effort expenditure in response to monetary reward incentives, while individuals with greater executive function capacity-and greater intrinsic motivation to expend effort-were less responsive to reward incentives. These findings suggest that an individual's cost-benefit tradeoff is constrained by the perceived costs of exerting cognitive effort.

The Influence of Gain and Loss on Arithmetic Performance

Gain and loss modulation of different aspects of executive functions (EF) has been studied under changing conditions. However, the nature of this effect varies in different EF tasks, as both gain and loss were found to improve performance in specific EF tasks while hindering performance in others. The current study examines the influence of gain and loss stimuli on arithmetic performance. Since arithmetic processes have been found to rely heavily on EF, the current study addresses the question of "whether" and "in what direction" those stimuli might affect arithmetic performance. In three experiments, participants preformed an arithmetic equation judgment task, while gain and loss conditions were added in each trial in the form of a line drawn face representing either monetary gain, loss, or neither. In Experiment 1, the arithmetic task included carry and non-carry equations representing different arithmetic complexity levels. In Experiment 2, two and three addend equations were used, and in Experiment 3, the proportions of correct and incorrect equations differed. Results of all experiments demonstrated faster RT in the arithmetic task after gain stimuli when compared to the loss stimuli. Our results further extend our understanding regarding the nature of the relationship between gain and loss situations and arithmetic performance and further emphasize the conditions under which arithmetic performance can be improved or hindered.

Science does not disengage

In a recent commentary, Goldsmith and Morton (in press) argue that the results of a study demonstrating smaller sequential congruency effects (SCEs) for bilinguals than for monolinguals (Grundy, Chung-Fat-Yim, Friesen, Mak, & Bialystok, 2017) is incorrect in its interpretation of SCEs. Moreover, their overall framework is that there is no evidence for any cognitive differences between monolingual and bilingual young adults. Here, we provide evidence in support of our original interpretation and challenge their basis for arguing that there are no language group differences on these cognitive measures.

More pain, more gain: Blocking the opioid system boosts adaptive cognitive control

The ability to adaptively increase cognitive control in response to cognitive challenges is crucial for goal-directed behavior. Recent findings suggest that aversive arousal triggers adaptive increases of control, but the neurochemical mechanisms underlying these effects remain unclear. Given the known contributions of the opioid system to hedonic states, we investigated whether blocking this system increases adaptive control modulations. To do so, we conducted a double-blind, placebo-controlled psychopharmacological study (n=52 females) involving a Stroop-like task. Specifically, we assessed the effect of naltrexone, an opioid blocker most selective to the mu-opioid system, on two measures of adaptive control that are thought to depend differentially on aversive arousal: post-error slowing and conflict adaptation. Consistent with our hypothesis, relative to placebo, naltrexone increased post-error slowing without influencing conflict adaptation. This finding not only supports the view that aversive arousal triggers adaptive control but also reveals a novel role for the opioid system in modulating such effects.

Distinct Motivational Effects of Contingent and Noncontingent Rewards

When rewards are available, people expend more energy, increasing their motivational vigor. In theory, incentives might drive behavior for two distinct reasons: First, they increase expected reward; second, they increase the difference in subjective value between successful and unsuccessful performance, which increases contingency—the degree to which action determines outcome. Previous studies of motivational vigor have never compared these directly. Here, we indexed motivational vigor by measuring the speed of eye movements toward a target after participants heard a cue indicating how outcomes would be determined. Eye movements were faster when the cue indicated that monetary rewards would be contingent on performance than when the cue indicated that rewards would be random. But even when the cue indicated that a reward was guaranteed regardless of speed, movement was still faster than when no reward was available. Motivation by contingent and certain rewards was uncorrelated across individuals, which suggests that there are two separable, independent components of motivation. Contingent motivation generated autonomic arousal, and unlike noncontingent motivation, was effective with penalties as well as rewards.

Contribution of fronto-striatal regions to emotional valence and repetition under cognitive conflict

Conflict processing mediated by fronto-striatal regions may be influenced by emotional properties of stimuli. This study aimed to examine the effects of emotion repetition on cognitive control in a conflict-provoking situation. Twenty-one healthy subjects were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging while performing a sequential cognitive conflict task composed of emotional stimuli. The regional effects were analyzed according to the repetition or non-repetition of cognitive congruency and emotional valence between the preceding and current trials. Post-incongruence interference in error rate and reaction time was significantly smaller than post-congruence interference, particularly under repeated positive and non-repeated positive, respectively, and post-incongruence interference, compared to post-congruence interference, increased activity in the ACC, DLPFC, and striatum. ACC and DLPFC activities were significantly correlated with error rate or reaction time in some conditions, and fronto-striatal connections were related to the conflict processing heightened by negative emotion. These findings suggest that the repetition of emotional stimuli adaptively regulates cognitive control and the fronto-striatal circuit may engage in the conflict adaptation process induced by emotion repetition. Both repetition enhancement and repetition suppression of prefrontal activity may underlie the relationship between emotion and conflict adaptation.

Conflict adaptation in positive and negative mood: Applying a success-failure manipulation

Conflict adaptation is a cognitive mechanism denoting increased cognitive control upon detection of conflict. This mechanism can be measured by the congruency sequence effect, indicating the reduction of congruency effects after incongruent trials (where response conflict occurs) relative to congruent trials (without response conflict). Several studies have reported increased conflict adaptation under negative, as compared to positive, mood. In these studies, sustained mood states were induced by film clips or music combined with imagination techniques; these kinds of mood manipulations are highly obvious, possibly distorting the actual mood states experienced by the participants. Here, we report two experiments where mood states were induced in a less obvious way, and with higher ecological validity. Participants received success or failure feedback on their performance in a bogus intelligence test, and this mood manipulation proved highly effective. We largely replicated previous findings of larger conflict adaptation under negative mood than under positive mood, both with a Flanker interference paradigm (Experiment 1) and a Stroop-like interference paradigm (Experiment 2). Results are discussed with respect to current theories on affective influences on cognitive control.

Phasic valence and arousal do not influence post-conflict adjustments in the Simon task

According to theoretical accounts of cognitive control, conflict between competing responses is monitored and triggers post conflict behavioural adjustments. Some models proposed that conflict is detected as an affective signal. While the conflict monitoring theory assumed that conflict is registered as a negative valence signal, the adaptation by binding model hypothesized that conflict provides a high arousal signal. The present research induced phasic affect in a Simon task with presentations of pleasant and unpleasant pictures that were high or low in arousal. If conflict is registered as an affective signal, the presentation of a corresponding affective signal should potentiate post conflict adjustments. Results did not support the hypothesis, and Bayesian analyses corroborated the conclusion that phasic affects do not influence post conflict behavioural adjustments in the Simon task.

The emotive nature of conflict monitoring in the medial prefrontal cortex

The detection of conflict between incompatible impulses, thoughts, and actions is a ubiquitous source of motivation across theories of goal-directed action. In this overview, we explore the hypothesis that conflict is emotive, integrating perspectives from affective science and cognitive neuroscience. Initially, we review evidence suggesting that the mental and biological processes that monitor for information processing conflict-particularly those generated by the anterior midcingulate cortex-track the affective significance of conflict and use this signal to motivate increased control. In this sense, variation in control resembles a form of affect regulation in which control implementation counteracts the aversive experience of conflict. We also highlight emerging evidence proposing that states and dispositions associated with acceptance facilitate control by tuning individuals to the emotive nature of conflict, before proposing avenues for future research, including investigating the role of affect in reinforcement learning and decision making.

The social transmission of metacontrol policies: Mechanisms underlying the interpersonal transfer of persistence and flexibility

Humans often face binary cognitive-control dilemmas, with the choice between persistence and flexibility being a crucial one. Tackling these dilemmas requires metacontrol, i.e., the control of the current cognitive-control policy. As predicted from functional, psychometric, neuroscientific, and modeling approaches, interindividual variability in metacontrol biases towards persistence or flexibility could be demonstrated in metacontrol-sensitive tasks. These biases covary systematically with genetic predispositions regarding mesofrontal and nigrostriatal dopaminergic functioning and the individualistic or collectivistic nature of the cultural background. However, there is also evidence for mood- and meditation-induced intraindividual variability (with negative mood and focused-attention meditation being associated with a bias towards persistence, and positive mood and open-monitoring meditation being associated with a bias towards flexibility), suggesting that genetic and cultural factors do not determine metacontrol settings entirely. We suggest a theoretical framework that explains how genetic predisposition and cultural learning can lead to the implementation of metacontrol defaults, which however can be shifted towards persistence or flexibility by situational factors.

Conflict and disfluency as aversive signals: context-specific processing adjustments are modulated by affective location associations

Context-specific processing adjustments are one signature feature of flexible human action control. However, up to now the precise mechanisms underlying these adjustments are not fully understood. Here it is argued that aversive signals produced by conflict- or disfluency-experience originally motivate such context-specific processing adjustments. We tested whether the efficiency of the aversive conflict signal for control adaptation depends on the affective nature of the context it is presented in. In two experiments, high vs. low proportions of aversive signals (Experiment 1: conflict trials; Experiment 2: disfluent trials) were presented either above or below the screen center. This location manipulation was motivated by existing evidence that verticality is generally associated with affective valence with up being positive and down being negative. From there it was hypothesized that the aversive signals would lose their trigger function for processing adjustments when presented at the lower (i.e., more negative) location. This should then result in a reduced context-specific proportion effect when the high proportion of aversive signals was presented at the lower location. Results fully confirmed the predictions. In both experiments, the location-specific proportion effects were only present when the high proportion of aversive signals occurred at the more positive location above but were reduced (Experiment 1) or even eliminated (Experiment 2) when the high proportion occurred at the more negative location below. This interaction of processing adjustments with affective background contexts can thus be taken as further hint for an affective origin of control adaptations.

Winning and losing: Effects on impulsive action

In the present study, we examined the effect of wins and losses on impulsive action in gambling (Experiments 1-3) and nongambling tasks (Experiments 4-5). In each experiment, subjects performed a simple task in which they had to win points. On each trial, they had to choose between a gamble and a nongamble. The gamble was always associated with a higher amount but a lower probability of winning than the nongamble. After subjects indicated their choice (i.e., gamble or not), feedback was presented. They had to press a key to start the next trial. Experiments 1-3 showed that, compared to the nongambling baseline, subjects were faster to initiate the next trial after a gambled loss, indicating that losses can induce impulsive actions. In Experiments 4 and 5, subjects alternated between the gambling task and a neutral decision-making task in which they could not win or lose points. Subjects were faster in the neutral decision-making task if they had just lost in the gambling task, suggesting that losses have a general effect on action. Our results challenge the dominant idea that humans become more cautious after suboptimal outcomes. Instead, they indicate that losses in the context of potential rewards are emotional events that increase impulsivity. (PsycINFO Database Record

HiTEC: a connectionist model of the interaction between perception and action planning

Increasing evidence suggests that perception and action planning do not represent separable stages of a unidirectional processing sequence, but rather emerging properties of highly interactive processes. To capture these characteristics of the human cognitive system, we have developed a connectionist model of the interaction between perception and action planning: HiTEC, based on the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al. in Behav Brain Sci 24:849–937, 2001). The model is characterized by representations at multiple levels and by shared representations and processes. It complements available models of stimulus–response translation by providing a rationale for (1) how situation-specific meanings of motor actions emerge, (2) how and why some aspects of stimulus–response translation occur automatically and (3) how task demands modulate sensorimotor processing. The model is demonstrated to provide a unitary account and simulation of a number of key findings with multiple experimental paradigms on the interaction between perception and action such as the Simon effect, its inversion (Hommel in Psychol Res 55:270–279, 1993), and action–effect learning.

How performance (non-)contingent reward modulates cognitive control

Reward has repeatedly been shown to influence cognitive control. More precisely, performance contingent reward is known to increase preparatory, proactive control. In comparison, performance non-contingent reward, that is, reward that is not dependent on a pre-specified performance criterion but is given unconditional for any response, even errors, is a rather understudied topic. Recently, Fröber and Dreisbach (2014) compared performance contingent and non-contingent reward in a single experiment. They found that non-contingent reward seems to modulate cognitive control in an oppositional way than contingent reward, namely by reducing proactive control. In the present paper, the authors further investigate this dissociation in two experiments with a reward manipulation that facilitated adaptations to changes in reward availability: reward - with performance contingency varying between subjects - was manipulated not trial-by-trial but in mini-blocks of 20 consecutive trials in an AX-Continuous Performance Task. Performance contingent reward significantly increased proactive control. The repeated experience of non-contingent reward even for errors did not result in increased error rates, but instead was indicative of stable compliance with task rules over time and with less reliance on proactive control.

Enhanced conflict-driven cognitive control by emotional arousal, not by valence

Emotion is widely agreed to have two dimensions, valence and arousal. Few studies have explored the effect of emotion on conflict adaptation by considering both of these, which could have dissociate influence. The present study aimed to fill the gap as to whether emotional valence and arousal would exert dissociable influence on conflict adaptation. In the experiments, we included positive, neutral, and negative conditions, with comparable arousal between positive and negative conditions. Both positive and negative conditions have higher arousal than neutral ones. In Experiment 1, by using a two-colour-word Flanker task, we found that conflict adaptation was enhanced in both positive and negative contexts compared to a neutral context. Furthermore, this effect still existed when controlling stimulus-response repetitions in Experiment 2, which used a four-colour-word Flanker task. The findings suggest emotional arousal enhances conflict adaptation, regardless of emotional valence. Thus, future studies should consider emotional arousal when studying the effect of emotion on conflict adaptation. Moreover, the unique role of the emotional context in conflict-driven cognitive control is emphasised.

Neural Dysfunction in Cognitive Control Circuits in Persons at Clinical High-Risk for Psychosis

Cognitive control, a set of functions that develop throughout adolescence, is important in the pathogenesis of psychotic disorders. Whether cognitive control has a role in conferring vulnerability for the development of psychotic illness is still unknown. The aim of this study was to investigate the neural systems supporting cognitive control in individuals deemed to be potentially prodromal for psychotic illness. We recruited 56 participants at clinical high-risk (CHR) for psychosis based on the Structured Interview for Psychosis-Risk Syndromes (SIPS) and 49 healthy controls. Twelve of the CHR participants eventually developed psychosis. We compared functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) BOLD signal during the performance of the Simon task. We tested for differences between CHR individuals and controls in conflict-related functional activity. In the CHR group when compared with controls, we detected smaller conflict-related activations in several cortical areas, including the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC). Furthermore, conflict-related activations in the DLPFC of those CHR individuals who ultimately developed psychosis (CHR converters) were smaller than in non-converters (CHR non-converters). Higher levels of conflict-related activation were associated with better social and role outcome. Risk for psychosis was associated at the neural level with reduced conflict-related brain activity. This neural phenotype appears correlated within the DLPFC with the development of psychosis and with functional outcome.

Motivation-cognition interaction: how feedback processing changes in healthy ageing and in Parkinson's disease

BACKGROUND

Several studies have investigated the interaction between motivation and cognition in both young and older adults, but with inconsistent results. A recent hypothesis suggests exploring the role of dopamine to study this interaction.

AIMS

To explore how different motivational states can modulate cognitive control, as well as investigate the hypothesis of a dopaminergic role in this phenomenon.

METHODS

27 young subjects, 15 healthy old subjects, and 15 Parkinson's disease (PD) patients took part in this study. The motivational Simon task-a new paradigm in which rewards and punishments are delivered to promote fast and accurate responses-was employed. The participants' performance was evaluated by analysing their reaction times and accuracy, while employing a diffusion model analysis.

RESULTS

The employment of positive and negative feedback significantly modulated performance in a conflict task. In both, the young and older participants, the speed-accuracy trade-off significantly changed in response to different motivational incentives (p < .005), although in opposite ways. On the contrary, PD patients showed an absence of performance modulation in response to positive and negative feedback.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In normal conditions, motivation interacts with cognitive control to modulate decisional aspects of a response in a conflict task. The elderly modulate their performance in response to positive and negative feedback differently from young adults, showing a classical positivity effect. The impairment manifested by PD patients, which is compatible with the literature about feedback processing deficits in this clinical condition, can support the hypothesis that the interaction between motivation and cognitive control is mediated by dopaminergic functionality.

No pain, no gain: the affective valence of congruency conditions changes following a successful response

The cognitive control theory of Botvinick, Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 356-366 (2007) integrates cognitive and affective control processes by emphasizing the aversive nature of cognitive conflict. Using an affective priming paradigm, we replicate earlier results showing that incongruent trials, relative to congruent trials, are indeed perceived as more aversive (Dreisbach & Fischer, Brain and Cognition, 78(2), 94-98 (2012)). Importantly, however, in two experiments we demonstrate that this effect is reversed following successful responses; correctly responding to incongruent trials engendered relatively more positive affect than correctly responding to congruent trials. The results are discussed in light of a recent computational model by Silvetti, Seurinck, and Verguts, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5:75 (2011) where it is assumed that outcome expectancies are more negative for incongruent trials than congruent trials. Consequently, the intrinsic reward (prediction error) following successful completion is larger for incongruent than congruent trials. These findings divulge a novel perspective on 'cognitive' adaptations to conflict.

Easy to learn, hard to suppress: The impact of learned stimulus-outcome associations on subsequent action control

The inhibition of impulsive response tendencies that conflict with goal-directed action is a key component of executive control. An emerging literature reveals that the proficiency of inhibitory control is modulated by expected or unexpected opportunities to earn reward or avoid punishment. However, less is known about how inhibitory control is impacted by the processing of task-irrelevant stimulus information that has been associated previously with particular outcomes (reward or punishment) or response tendencies (action or inaction). We hypothesized that stimulus features associated with particular action-valence tendencies, even though task irrelevant, would modulate inhibitory control processes. Participants first learned associations between stimulus features (color), actions, and outcomes using an action-valence learning task that orthogonalizes action (action, inaction) and valence (reward, punishment). Next, these stimulus features were embedded in a Simon task as a task-irrelevant stimulus attribute. We analyzed the effects of action-valence associations on the Simon task by means of distributional analysis to reveal the temporal dynamics. Learning patterns replicated previously reported biases; inherent, Pavlovian-like mappings (action-reward, inaction-punishment avoidance) were easier to learn than mappings conflicting with these biases (action-punishment avoidance, inaction-reward). More importantly, results from two experiments demonstrated that the easier to learn, Pavlovian-like action-valence associations interfered with the proficiency of inhibiting impulsive actions in the Simon task. Processing conflicting associations led to more proficient inhibitory control of impulsive actions, similar to Simon trials without any association. Fast impulsive errors were reduced for trials associated with punishment in comparison to reward trials or trials without any valence association. These findings provide insight into the temporal dynamics of task irrelevant information associated with action and valence modulating cognitive control. We discuss putative mechanisms that might explain these interactions.

Conflicts as Aversive Signals for Control Adaptation

The dynamic adaptation of cognitive control in the face of competition from conflicting response tendencies is one of the hallmarks of flexible human action control. Here, we suggest an alternative framework that places conflict-triggered control adaptation into the broader context of affect regulation. Specifically, we review evidence showing that (a) conflicts are inherently aversive, that (b) aversive stimuli in the absence of conflict also trigger behavioral adjustments, and, finally, that (c) conflict stimuli do trigger processes of affective counter-regulation. Together with recent findings showing that conflict-triggered control adaptation depends on the subjective experience of the conflict, we suggest that it is the subjective aversive conflict experience that originally motivates control adaptations. Such a view offers new perspectives for investigating and understanding intra- and interindividual differences in the regulation of cognitive control by differentiating between the individual sensitivity to experience and the individual ability to utilize the aversive signal.

The time course of the aversive conflict signal

The idea that conflicts are aversive signals recently has gained strong support by both physiological as well as psychological evidence. However, the time course of the aversive signal has not been subject to direct investigation. In the present study, participants had to judge the valence of neutral German words after being primed with conflict or non-conflict Stroop stimuli in three experiments with varying SOA (200 ms, 400 ms, 800 ms) and varying prime presentation time. Conflict priming effects (i.e., increased frequencies of negative judgments after conflict as compared to non-conflict primes) were found for SOAs of 200 ms and 400 ms, but absent (or even reversed) with a SOA of 800 ms. These results imply that the aversiveness of conflicts is evaluated automatically with short SOAs, but is actively counteracted with prolonged prime presentation.

Reward-prospect interacts with trial-by-trial preparation for potential distraction

When attending for impending visual stimuli, cognitive systems prepare to identify relevant information while ignoring irrelevant, potentially distracting input. Recent work (Marini et al., 2013) showed that a supramodal distracter-filtering mechanism is invoked in blocked designs involving expectation of possible distracter stimuli, although this entails a cost (distraction-filtering cost) on speeded performance when distracters are expected but not presented. Here we used an arrow-flanker task to study whether an analogous cost, potentially reflecting the recruitment of a specific distraction-filtering mechanism, occurs dynamically when potential distraction is cued trial-to-trial (cued distracter-expectation cost). In order to promote the maximal utilization of cue information by participants, in some experimental conditions the cue also signaled the possibility of earning a monetary reward for fast and accurate performance. This design also allowed us to investigate the interplay between anticipation for distracters and anticipation of reward, which is known to engender attentional preparation. Only in reward contexts did participants show a cued distracter-expectation cost, which was larger with higher reward prospect and when anticipation for both distracters and reward were manipulated trial-to-trial. Thus, these results indicate that reward prospect interacts with the distracter expectation during trial-by-trial preparatory processes for potential distraction. These findings highlight how reward guides cue-driven attentional preparation.

The self in conflict: actors and agency in the mediated sequential Simon task

Executive control refers to the ability to withstand interference in order to achieve task goals. The effect of conflict adaptation describes that after experiencing interference, subsequent conflict effects are weaker. However, changes in the source of conflict have been found to disrupt conflict adaptation. Previous studies indicated that this specificity is determined by the degree to which one source causes episodic retrieval of a previous source. A virtual reality version of the Simon task was employed to investigate whether changes in a visual representation of the self would similarly affect conflict adaptation. Participants engaged in a mediated Simon task via 3D "avatar" models that either mirrored the participants' movements, or were presented statically. A retrieval cue was implemented as the identity of the avatar: switching it from a male to a female avatar was expected to disrupt the conflict adaptation effect (CAE). The results show that only in static conditions did the CAE depend on the avatar identity, while in dynamic conditions, changes did not cause disruption. We also explored the effect of conflict and adaptation on the degree of movement made with the task-irrelevant hand and replicated the reaction time pattern. The findings add to earlier studies of source-specific conflict adaptation by showing that a visual representation of the self in action can provide a cue that determines episodic retrieval. Furthermore, the novel paradigm is made openly available to the scientific community and is described in its significance for studies of social cognition, cognitive psychology, and human-computer interaction.

The influence of negative stimulus features on conflict adaption: evidence from fluency of processing

Cognitive control enables adaptive behavior in a dynamically changing environment. In this context, one prominent adaptation effect is the sequential conflict adjustment, i.e., the observation of reduced response interference on trials following conflict trials. Increasing evidence suggests that such response conflicts are registered as aversive signals. So far, however, the functional role of this aversive signal for conflict adaptation to occur has not been put to test directly. In two experiments, the affective valence of conflict stimuli was manipulated by fluency of processing (stimulus contrast). Experiment 1 used a flanker interference task, Experiment 2 a color-word Stroop task. In both experiments, conflict adaptation effects were only present in fluent, but absent in disfluent trials. Results thus speak against the simple idea that any aversive stimulus feature is suited to promote specific conflict adjustments. Two alternative but not mutually exclusive accounts, namely resource competition and adaptation-by-motivation, will be discussed.

Reward anticipation enhances brain activation during response inhibition

The chance to achieve a reward starts up the required neurobehavioral mechanisms to adapt our thoughts and actions in order to accomplish our objective. However, reward does not equally reinforce everybody but depends on interindividual motivational dispositions. Thus, immediate reward contingencies can modulate the cognitive process required for goal achievement, while individual differences in personality can affect this modulation. We aimed to test the interaction between inhibition-related brain response and motivational processing in a stop signal task by reward anticipation and whether individual differences in sensitivity to reward (SR) modulate such interaction. We analyzed the cognitive-motivational interaction between the brain pattern activation of the regions involved in correct and incorrect response inhibition and the association between such brain activations and SR scores. We also analyzed the behavioral effects of reward on both reaction times for the "go" trials before and after correct and incorrect inhibition in order to test error prediction performance and postinhibition adjustment. Our results show enhanced activation during response inhibition under reward contingencies in frontal, parietal, and subcortical areas. Moreover, activation of the right insula and the left putamen positively correlates with the SR scores. Finally, the possibility of reward outcome affects not only response inhibition performance (e.g., reducing stop signal reaction time), but also error prediction performance and postinhibition adjustment. Therefore, reward contingencies improve behavioral performance and enhance brain activation during response inhibition, and SR is related to brain activation. Our results suggest the conditions and factors that subserve cognitive control strategies in cognitive motivational interactions during response inhibition.

The differential influences of positive affect, random reward, and performance-contingent reward on cognitive control

Growing evidence suggests that positive affect and reward have differential effects on cognitive control. So far, however, these effects have never been studied together. Here, the authors present one behavioral study investigating the influences of positive affect and reward (contingent and noncontingent) on proactive control. A modified version of the AX-continuous performance task, which has repeatedly been shown to be sensitive to reward and affect manipulations, was used. In a first phase, two experimental groups received either neutral or positive affective pictures before every trial. In a second phase, the two halves of a given affect group additionally received, respectively, performance-contingent or random rewards. The results replicated the typical affect effect, in terms of reduced proactive control under positive as compared to neutral affect. Also, the typical reward effects associated with increased proactive control were replicated. Most interestingly, performance-contingent reward counteracted the positive affect effect, whereas random reward mirrored that effect. In sum, this study provides first evidence that performance-contingent reward, on the one hand, and positive affect and performance-noncontingent reward, on the other hand, have oppositional effects on cognitive control: Only performance-contingent reward showed a motivational effect in terms of a strategy shift toward increased proactive control, whereas positive affect alone and performance-noncontingent reward reduced proactive control. Moreover, the integrative design of this study revealed the vulnerability of positive affect effects to motivational manipulations. The results are discussed with respect to current neuroscientific theories of the effects of dopamine on affect, reward, and cognitive control.

The influence of approach-avoidance motivational orientation on conflict adaptation

To deal effectively with a continuously changing environment, our cognitive system adaptively regulates resource allocation. Earlier findings showed that an avoidance orientation (induced by arm extension), relative to an approach orientation (induced by arm flexion), enhanced sustained cognitive control. In avoidance conditions, performance on a cognitive control task was enhanced, as indicated by a reduced congruency effect, relative to approach conditions. Extending these findings, in the present behavioral studies we investigated dynamic adaptations in cognitive control-that is, conflict adaptation. We proposed that an avoidance state recruits more resources in response to conflicting signals, and thereby increases conflict adaptation. Conversely, in an approach state, conflict processing diminishes, which consequently weakens conflict adaptation. As predicted, approach versus avoidance arm movements affected both behavioral congruency effects and conflict adaptation: As compared to approach, avoidance movements elicited reduced congruency effects and increased conflict adaptation. These results are discussed in line with a possible underlying neuropsychological model.

Emotional foundations of cognitive control

Often seen as the paragon of higher cognition, here we suggest that cognitive control is dependent on emotion. Rather than asking whether control is influenced by emotion, we ask whether control itself can be understood as an emotional process. Reviewing converging evidence from cybernetics, animal research, cognitive neuroscience, and social and personality psychology, we suggest that cognitive control is initiated when goal conflicts evoke phasic changes to emotional primitives that both focus attention on the presence of goal conflicts and energize conflict resolution to support goal-directed behavior. Critically, we propose that emotion is not an inert byproduct of conflict but is instrumental in recruiting control. Appreciating the emotional foundations of control leads to testable predictions that can spur future research.

Limits of control: the effects of uncontrollability experiences on the efficiency of attentional control

Two experiments were conducted to explore the effects of experiencing uncontrollability on the efficiency of attentional control. The experience of uncontrollability was induced either by unsolvable tasks (Experiment 1) or by tasks in which non-contingent feedback was provided (Experiment 2). A version of the Attentional Network Test-Interactions with an additional measure of vigilance (ANTI-V) was used to evaluate the efficiency of the attentional networks (i.e., alerting, orienting, and executive). Results of both experiments revealed a decreased efficiency of executive attention in participants who experienced stable control deprivation but no negative effects in participants who were able to restore their sense of previously deprived control. Additionally, when participants were asked to perform unsolvable tasks and did not receive feedback (Experiment 1), detrimental effects on the orienting network and vigilance were observed. The motivational and cognitive mechanisms underlying the effects of various uncontrollability experiences on conflict resolution and attentional control are discussed.

Individual Differences in the Context-Dependent Recruitment of Cognitive Control: Evidence From Action Versus State Orientation

The ability to flexibly adapt to deviations from optimal performance is an important aspect of self-control. In the present study, the authors present first evidence that the personality trait action versus state orientation (Kuhl, 2000) modulates the ability of adaptive control adjustments in response to experienced conflicts. Sixty-two German individuals with extreme scores on the action-state dimension performed a response interference task, that is, 31 extreme action-oriented individuals (30 females; Mage  = 20.35 years) and 31 extreme state-oriented individuals (20 females; Mage  = 23.23 years), respectively. Action-oriented individuals displayed a stronger conflict adaptation effect as evidenced by a stronger reduction of interference on trials following conflict. These results were further corroborated by a correlational analysis including a sample of 105 participants: the higher the score on the action-state dimension, the lower the interference effect following conflict (i.e., stronger conflict adaptation). The results provide evidence that even low-level, bottom-up-driven processes of self-control such as conflict adaptation are systematically moderated by individual differences in control modes and provide insights into the cognitive mechanisms underlying action versus state orientation.