Two types of image generation: evidence from PET

Is there more than one method whereby people can generate visual mental images? Participants generated images after learning patterns in two ways. In one condition, they memorized descriptions of how segments are arranged to form patterns; in another, they memorized segments and mentally amalgamated them into patterns. In both conditions, identical stimuli cued them to form images while brain activation was monitored using PET. Comparison of the two imagery conditions revealed different activation between hemispheres when images were formed after patterns were learned by mentally combining segments versus when images were formed from stored verbal descriptions. Thus, images can be generated in at least two ways. However, this laterality difference was subtle; the majority of brain areas were activated in common across conditions. This overall similarity is counter to what would be expected if image generation is simply perceptual exploration in the absence of appropriate stimuli, as is posited by perceptual activity theory.

The imagination: Cognitive, pre-cognitive, and meta-cognitive aspects

This article is an attempt to situate imagination within consciousness complete with its own pre-cognitive, cognitive, and meta-cognitive domains. In the first sections we briefly review traditional philosophical and psychological conceptions of the imagination. The majority have viewed perception and imagination as separate faculties, performing distinct functions. A return to a phenomenological account of the imagination suggests that divisions between perception and imagination are transcended by precognitive factors of sense of reality and non-reality where perception and imagination play an indivisible role. In fact, both imagination and perception define sense of reality jointly according to what is possible and not possible. Absorption in a possible world depends on the strengths of alternative possibilities, and the relationship between core and marginal consciousness. The model may offer a parsimonious account of different states and levels of imaginal consciousness, and of how "believed-in imaginings" develop and become under some circumstances "lived-in experiences."

Time to imagine space: a chronometric exploration of representational neglect

When describing known places from memory, patients with left spatial neglect may mention more right- than left-sided items, thus showing representational, or imaginal, neglect. This suggests that these patients cannot either build or explore left locations in visual mental imagery. However, in place description there is no guarantee that patients are really employing visual mental imagery abilities, rather than verbal-propositional knowledge. Thus, patients providing symmetrical descriptions might be using other strategies than visual mental imagery. To address this issue, we devised a new test which strongly encourages the use of visual mental imagery. Twelve participants without brain damage and 12 right brain-damaged patients, of whom 7 had visual neglect, were invited to conjure up a visual mental image of the map of France. They subsequently had to state by pressing a left- or a right-sided key whether auditorily presented towns or regions were situated to the left or right of Paris on the imagined map. This provided measures of response time and accuracy for imagined locations. A further task, devised to assess response bias, used the words "left" or "right" as stimuli and the same keypress responses. Controls and non-neglect patients performed symmetrically. Neglect patients were slower for left than for right imagined locations. On single-case analysis, two patients with visual neglect had a greater response time asymmetry on the geographical task than predicted by the response bias task, but with symmetrical accuracy. The dissociation between response times and accuracy suggests that, in these patients, the left side of the mental map of space was not lost, but only "explored" less efficiently.

Skill, corporality and alerting capacity in an account of sensory consciousness

We suggest that within a skill-based, sensorimotor approach to sensory consciousness, two measurable properties of perceivers' interaction with the environment, "corporality" and "alerting capacity", explain why sensory stimulation is experienced as having a "sensory feel", unlike thoughts or memories. We propose that the notions of "corporality" and "alerting capacity" make possible the construction of a "phenomenality plot", which charts in a principled way the degree to which conscious phenomena are experienced as having a sensory quality.

Geographic information has to be spatialized to be neglected: a representational neglect case

A patient with unilateral neglect had to evoke mentally the map of France in two different conditions. In the first condition, he was asked to build an iconic representation of the map of France and to list all the towns that he could 'see' on this mental image within two minutes. In the second condition, he had to remember and name as many French towns as possible within two minutes, without being instructed to form a mental image. Left representational neglect was observed in the first condition only, i.e., when an iconic representation was required. These findings, which were replicated four months later, suggest a dual mode of coding, retrieval, or both, of geographic information and show that, although topographic, geographic data has to be spatialized to be neglected.

Blindness and brain plasticity: contribution of mental imagery?

The purpose of this study was to study brain plasticity in the visual cortex, in six subjects totally blind from birth. The protocol we used was the same as that employed in a prior study on blindfolded sighted subjects (Brain Res., 924 (2002) 176). The production of mental images from animal names versus passive listening to abstract words, involved, in the early blind subjects as well as in the blindfolded sighted subjects of our control group, the superior occipital, inferior and superior parietal areas, premotor area, visual association. Activation foci in the somatosensory areas in the left hemisphere, as well as in the temporal and fusiform gyri were only visible in the blind subjects. The experiment, which was repeated after a short period of rest, demonstrated, this time again, predominant involvement of the dorsal pathway and activation of the primary visual area (in a region of interest). With respect to the ongoing debate on brain reorganization, our study shows that the primary visual area is activated in early blind subjects, and that activation persists in a mental imagery task involving no sensory input other than verbal instructions.

Mental models and counterfactual thoughts about what might have been

Counterfactual thoughts about what might have been ('if only em leader ') are pervasive in everyday life. They are related to causal thoughts, they help people learn from experience and they influence diverse cognitive activities, from creativity to probability judgements. They give rise to emotions and social ascriptions such as guilt, regret and blame. People show remarkable regularities in the aspects of the past they mentally 'undo' in their counterfactual thoughts. These regularities provide clues about their mental representations and cognitive processes, such as keeping in mind true possibilities, and situations that are false but temporarily supposed to be true.

The relationship between visual perception and visual mental imagery: a reappraisal of the neuropsychological evidence

Visual perception and visual mental imagery, the faculty whereby we can revisualise a visual item from memory, have often been regarded as cognitive functions subserved by common mechanisms. Thus, the leading cognitive model of visual mental imagery holds that visual perception and visual imagery share a number of mental operations, and rely upon common neural structures, including early visual cortices. In particular, a single visual buffer would be used "bottom-up" to display visual percepts and "top-down" to display internally generated images. The proposed neural substrate for this buffer consists of some cortical visual areas organised retinotopically, that is, the striate and extrastriate occipital areas. Empirical support for this model came from the report of brain-damaged patients showing an imagery deficit which parallels a perceptual impairment in the same cognitive domain. However, recent reports of patients showing double dissociations between perception and imagery abilities challenged the perception-imagery equivalence hypothesis from the functional point of view. From the anatomical point of view, the available evidence suggests that occipital damage is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce imagery deficits. On the other hand, extensive left temporal damage often accompanies imagery deficits for object form or colour. Thus, visual mental imagery abilities might require the integrity of brain areas related to vision, but at an higher level of integration than previously proposed.