Update on Vaccine-Derived Poliovirus Outbreaks - Worldwide, July 2019-February 2020

Updated Characterization of Outbreak Response Strategies for 2019-2029: Impacts of Using a Novel Type 2 Oral Poliovirus Vaccine Strain

Delays in achieving the global eradication of wild poliovirus transmission continue to postpone subsequent cessation of all oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use. Countries must stop OPV use to end all cases of poliomyelitis, including vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) and cases caused by vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of all type 2 OPV (OPV2) use in routine immunization in 2016 but did not successfully end the transmission of type 2 VDPVs (VDPV2s), and consequently continues to use type 2 OPV (OPV2) for outbreak response activities. Using an updated global poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model, we characterize outbreak response options for 2019-2029 related to responding to VDPV2 outbreaks with a genetically stabilized novel OPV (nOPV2) strain or with the currently licensed monovalent OPV2 (mOPV2). Given uncertainties about the properties of nOPV2, we model different assumptions that appear consistent with the evidence on nOPV2 to date. Using nOPV2 to respond to detected cases may reduce the expected VDPV and VAPP cases and the risk of needing to restart OPV2 use in routine immunization compared to mOPV2 use for outbreak response. The actual properties, availability, and use of nOPV2 will determine its effects on type 2 poliovirus transmission in populations. Even with optimal nOPV2 performance, countries and the GPEI would still likely need to restart OPV2 use in routine immunization in OPV-using countries if operational improvements in outbreak response to stop the transmission of cVDPV2s are not implemented effectively.

Mutation, Selection, and Bottlenecks in Polio Vaccine Reversion

Troubled by an unstable world beset by new and emerging viruses? Virus evolution is here to help. Through detailed studies of poliovirus vaccine reversion to virulence, Valesano and colleagues remind us that some things in life can, indeed, be counted on.

Safety and immunogenicity of two novel type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine candidates compared with a monovalent type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine in children and infants: two clinical trials

BACKGROUND

Continued emergence and spread of circulating vaccine-derived type 2 polioviruses and vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis from Sabin oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs) has stimulated development of two novel type 2 OPV candidates (OPV2-c1 and OPV2-c2) designed to have similar immunogenicity, improved genetic stability, and less potential to reacquire neurovirulence. We aimed to assess safety and immunogenicity of the two novel OPV candidates compared with a monovalent Sabin OPV in children and infants.

METHODS

We did two single-centre, multi-site, partly-masked, randomised trials in healthy cohorts of children (aged 1-4 years) and infants (aged 18-22 weeks) in Panama: a control phase 4 study with monovalent Sabin OPV2 before global cessation of monovalent OPV2 use, and a phase 2 study with low and high doses of two novel OPV2 candidates. All participants received one OPV2 vaccination and subsets received two doses 28 days apart. Parents reported solicited and unsolicited adverse events. Type 2 poliovirus neutralising antibodies were measured at days 0, 7, 28, and 56, and stool viral shedding was assessed up to 28 days post-vaccination. Primary objectives were to assess safety in all participants and non-inferiority of novel OPV2 day 28 seroprotection versus monovalent OPV2 in infants (non-inferiority margin 10%). These studies were registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT02521974 and NCT03554798.

FINDINGS

The control study took place between Oct 23, 2015, and April 29, 2016, and the subsequent phase 2 study between Sept 19, 2018, and Sept 30, 2019. 150 children (50 in the control study and 100 of 129 assessed for eligibility in the novel OPV2 study) and 684 infants (110 of 114 assessed for eligibility in the control study and 574 of 684 assessed for eligibility in the novel OPV2 study) were enrolled and received at least one study vaccination. Vaccinations were safe and well tolerated with no causally associated serious adverse events or important medical events in any group. Solicited and unsolicited adverse events were overwhelmingly mild or moderate irrespective of vaccine or dose. Nearly all children were seroprotected at baseline, indicating high baseline immunity. In children, the seroprotection rate 28 days after one dose was 100% for monovalent OPV2 and both novel OPV2 candidates. In infants at day 28, 91 (94% [95% CI 87-98]) of 97 were seroprotected after receiving monovalent OPV2, 134 (94% [88-97]) of 143 after high-dose novel OPV2-c1, 122 (93% [87-97]) of 131 after low-dose novel OPV2-c1, 138 (95% [90-98]) of 146 after high-dose novel OPV2-c2, and 115 (91% [84-95]) of 127 after low-dose novel OPV2-c2. Non-inferiority was shown for low-dose and high-dose novel OPV2-c1 and high-dose novel OPV2-c2 despite monovalent OPV2 recipients having higher baseline immunity.

INTERPRETATION

Both novel OPV2 candidates were safe, well tolerated, and immunogenic in children and infants. Novel OPV2 could be an important addition to our resources against poliovirus given the current epidemiological situation.

FUNDING

Fighting Infectious Diseases in Emerging Countries and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Safety and immunogenicity of two novel type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine candidates compared with a monovalent type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine in healthy adults: two clinical trials

BACKGROUND

Two novel type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) candidates, novel OPV2-c1 and novel OPV2-c2, designed to be more genetically stable than the licensed Sabin monovalent OPV2, have been developed to respond to ongoing polio outbreaks due to circulating vaccine-derived type 2 polioviruses.

METHODS

We did two randomised studies at two centres in Belgium. The first was a phase 4 historical control study of monovalent OPV2 in Antwerp, done before global withdrawal of OPV2, and the second was a phase 2 study in Antwerp and Ghent with novel OPV2-c1 and novel OPV2-c2. Eligible participants were healthy adults aged 18-50 years with documented history of at least three polio vaccinations, including OPV in the phase 4 study and either OPV or inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in the novel OPV2 phase 2 study, with no dose within 12 months of study start. In the historical control trial, participants were randomly assigned to either one dose or two doses of monovalent OPV2. In the novel OPV2 trial, participants with previous OPV vaccinations were randomly assigned to either one or two doses of novel OPV2-c1 or to one or two doses of novel OPV2-c2. IPV-vaccinated participants were randomly assigned to receive two doses of either novel OPV2-c1, novel OPV2-c2, or placebo. Vaccine administrators were unmasked to treatment; medical staff performing safety and reactogenicity assessments or blood draws for immunogenicity assessments were masked. Participants received the first vaccine dose on day 0, and a second dose on day 28 if assigned to receive a second dose. Primary objectives were assessments and comparisons of safety up to 28 days after each dose, including solicited adverse events and serious adverse events, and immunogenicity (seroprotection rates on day 28 after the first vaccine dose) between monovalent OPV2 and the two novel OPV2 candidates. Primary immunogenicity analyses were done in the per-protocol population. Safety was assessed in the total vaccinated population-ie, all participants who received at least one dose of their assigned vaccine. The phase 4 control study is registered with EudraCT (2015-003325-33) and the phase 2 novel OPV2 study is registered with EudraCT (2018-001684-22) and ClinicalTrials.gov (NCT04544787).

FINDINGS

In the historical control study, between Jan 25 and March 18, 2016, 100 volunteers were enrolled and randomly assigned to receive one or two doses of monovalent OPV2 (n=50 in each group). In the novel OPV2 study, between Oct 15, 2018, and Feb 27, 2019, 200 previously OPV-vaccinated volunteers were assigned to the four groups to receive one or two doses of novel OPV2-c1 or novel OPV2-c2 (n=50 per group); a further 50 participants, previously vaccinated with IPV, were assigned to novel OPV2-c1 (n=17), novel OPV2-c2 (n=16), or placebo (n=17). All participants received the first dose of assigned vaccine or placebo and were included in the total vaccinated population. All vaccines appeared safe; no definitely vaccine-related withdrawals or serious adverse events were reported. After first doses in previously OPV-vaccinated participants, 62 (62%) of 100 monovalent OPV2 recipients, 71 (71%) of 100 recipients of novel OPV2-c1, and 74 (74%) of 100 recipients of novel OPV2-c2 reported solicited systemic adverse events, four (monovalent OPV2), three (novel OPV2-c1), and two (novel OPV2-c2) of which were considered severe. In IPV-vaccinated participants, solicited adverse events occurred in 16 (94%) of 17 who received novel OPV2-c1 (including one severe) and 13 (81%) of 16 who received novel OPV2-c2 (including one severe), compared with 15 (88%) of 17 placebo recipients (including two severe). In previously OPV-vaccinated participants, 286 (97%) of 296 were seropositive at baseline; after one dose, 100% of novel OPV2 vaccinees and 97 (97%) of monovalent OPV2 vaccinees were seropositive.

INTERPRETATION

Novel OPV2 candidates were as safe, well tolerated, and immunogenic as monovalent OPV2 in previously OPV-vaccinated and IPV-vaccinated adults. These data supported the further assessment of the vaccine candidates in children and infants.

FUNDING

University of Antwerp and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

The impact of surveillance and other factors on detection of emergent and circulating vaccine derived polioviruses

Background: Circulating vaccine derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks remain a threat to polio eradication. To reduce cases of polio from cVDPV of serotype 2, the serotype 2 component of the vaccine has been removed from the global vaccine supply, but outbreaks of cVDPV2 have continued. The objective of this work is to understand the factors associated with later detection in order to improve detection of these unwanted events. Methods: The number of nucleotide differences between each cVDPV outbreak and the oral polio vaccine (OPV) strain was used to approximate the time from emergence to detection. Only independent emergences were included in the analysis. Variables such as serotype, surveillance quality, and World Health Organization (WHO) region were tested in a negative binomial regression model to ascertain whether these variables were associated with higher nucleotide differences upon detection. Results: In total, 74 outbreaks were analysed from 24 countries between 2004-2019. For serotype 1 (n=10), the median time from seeding until outbreak detection was 572 (95% uncertainty interval (UI) 279-2016), for serotype 2 (n=59), 276 (95% UI 172-765) days, and for serotype 3 (n=5), 472 (95% UI 392-603) days. Significant improvement in the time to detection was found with increasing surveillance of non-polio acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) and adequate stool collection. Conclusions: cVDPVs remain a risk; all WHO regions have reported at least one VDPV outbreak since the first outbreak in 2000 and outbreak response campaigns using monovalent OPV type 2 risk seeding future outbreaks. Maintaining surveillance for poliomyelitis after local elimination is essential to quickly respond to both emergence of VDPVs and potential importations as low-quality AFP surveillance causes outbreaks to continue undetected. Considerable variation in the time between emergence and detection of VDPVs were apparent, and other than surveillance quality and inclusion of environmental surveillance, the reasons for this remain unclear.

The experiences of using polio outbreak simulation exercises to strengthen national outbreaks preparedness and response plans in sub-Saharan Africa

Introduction

globally, by 2020 the paralytic poliomyelitis disease burden decreased to over 99% of the reported cases in 1988 when resolution 41.8 was endorsed by the World Health Assembly (WHA) for global polio eradication. It is clearly understood that, if there is Wild Poliovirus (WPV) and circulating Vaccines Derived Poliovirus (cVDPV) in the world, no country is safe from polio outbreaks. All countries remain at high risk of re-importation depending on the level of the containment of the types vaccine withdrawn, the laboratory poliovirus isolates, and the population immunity induced by the vaccination program. In this regard, countries to have polio outbreak preparedness and response plans, and conducting the polio outbreak simulation exercises for these plans remain important.

Methods

we conducted a cross-section qualitative study to review to 8 countries conducted polio outbreak simulation exercises in the East and Southern Africa from 2016 to 2018. The findings were categorized into 5 outbreak response thematic areas analyzed qualitatively and summarized them on their strengths and weaknesses.

Results

we found out that, most countries have the overall technical capacities and expertise to deal with outbreaks to a certain extent. Nevertheless, we noted that the national polio outbreak preparedness and response plans were not comprehensive enough to provide proper guidance in responding to outbreaks. The guidelines were inadequately aligned with the WHO POSOPs, and IHR 2005. Additionally, most participants who participated in the simulation exercises were less familiar with their preparedness and response plans, the WHO POSOPs, and therefore reported to be sensitized.

Conclusion

we also realized that, in all countries where the polio simulation exercise conducted, their national polio outbreak preparedness and response plan was revised to be improved in line with the WHO POSOPs and IHR 2005. we, therefore, recommend the polio outbreak simulation exercises to be done in every country with an interval of 3-5 years.

Update on Immunodeficiency-Associated Vaccine-Derived Polioviruses - Worldwide, July 2018-December 2019

Since establishment of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative* in 1988, polio cases have declined >99.9% worldwide; extensive use of live, attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in routine childhood immunization programs and mass campaigns has led to eradication of two of the three wild poliovirus (WPV) serotypes (types 2 and 3) (1). Despite its safety record, OPV can lead to rare emergence of vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) when there is prolonged circulation or replication of the vaccine virus. In areas with inadequate OPV coverage, circulating VDPVs (cVDPVs) that have reverted to neurovirulence can cause outbreaks of paralytic polio (2). Immunodeficiency-associated VDPVs (iVDPVs) are isolated from persons with primary immunodeficiency (PID). Infection with iVDPV can progress to paralysis or death of patients with PID, and excretion risks seeding cVDPV outbreaks; both risks might be reduced through antiviral treatment, which is currently under development. This report updates previous reports and includes details of iVDPV cases detected during July 2018-December 2019 (3). During this time, 16 new iVDPV cases were reported from five countries (Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Philippines, and Tunisia). Alongside acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance (4), surveillance for poliovirus infections among patients with PID has identified an increased number of persons excreting iVDPVs (5). Expansion of PID surveillance will facilitate early detection and follow-up of iVDPV excretion among patients with PID to mitigate the risk for iVDPV spread. This will be critical to help identify all poliovirus excretors and thus achieve and maintain eradication of all polioviruses.

Progress Toward Polio Eradication - Worldwide, January 2018-March 2020

Since the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was established in 1988, two of the three wild poliovirus (WPV) serotypes (types 2 and 3) have been eradicated.* Transmission of WPV type 1 (WPV1) remains uninterrupted only in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This report summarizes progress toward global polio eradication during January 1, 2018-March 31, 2020 and updates previous reports (1,2). In 2019, Afghanistan and Pakistan reported the highest number of WPV1 cases (176) since 2014. During January 1-March 31, 2020 (as of June 19), 54 WPV1 cases were reported, an approximate fourfold increase from 12 cases during the corresponding period in 2019. Paralytic poliomyelitis can also be caused by circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV), which emerges when attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) virus reverts to neurovirulence following prolonged circulation in underimmunized populations (3). Since the global withdrawal of type 2-containing OPV (OPV2) in April 2016, cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreaks have increased in number and geographic extent (4). During January 2018-March 2020, 21 countries reported 547 cVDPV2 cases. Complicating increased poliovirus transmission during 2020, the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and mitigation efforts have resulted in suspension of immunization activities and disruptions to poliovirus surveillance. When the COVID-19 emergency subsides, enhanced support will be needed to resume polio eradication field activities.

Surveillance to Track Progress Toward Polio Eradication - Worldwide, 2018-2019

Since the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was launched in 1988, the number of polio cases worldwide has declined approximately 99.99%; only two countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan) have never interrupted wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission (1). The primary means of detecting poliovirus circulation is through surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) among children aged <15 years with testing of stool specimens for WPV and vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) (genetically reverted strains of the vaccine virus that regain neurovirulence) in World Health Organization (WHO)-accredited laboratories (2,3). In many locations, AFP surveillance is supplemented by environmental surveillance, the regular collection and testing of sewage to provide awareness of the extent and duration of poliovirus circulation (3). This report presents 2018-2019 poliovirus surveillance data, focusing on 40 priority countries* with WPV or VDPV outbreaks or at high risk for importation because of their proximity to a country with an outbreak. The number of priority countries rose from 31 in 2018 to 40 in 2019 because of a substantial increase in the number of VDPV outbreaks^† (2,4). In areas with low poliovirus immunity, VDPVs can circulate in the community and cause outbreaks of paralysis; these are known as circulating vaccine derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) (4). In 2019, only 25 (63%) of the 40 designated priority countries met AFP surveillance indicators nationally; subnational surveillance performance varied widely and indicated focal weaknesses. High quality, sensitive surveillance is important to ensure timely detection and response to cVDPV and WPV transmission.