Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate

A spiral model of musical decision-making

This paper describes a model of how musicians make decisions about performing notated music. The model builds on psychological theories of decision-making and was developed from empirical studies of Western art music performance that aimed to identify intuitive and deliberate processes of decision-making, a distinction consistent with dual-process theories of cognition. The model proposes that the proportion of intuitive (Type 1) and deliberate (Type 2) decision-making processes changes with increasing expertise and conceptualizes this change as movement along a continually narrowing upward spiral where the primary axis signifies principal decision-making type and the vertical axis marks level of expertise. The model is intended to have implications for the development of expertise as described in two main phases. The first is movement from a primarily intuitive approach in the early stages of learning toward greater deliberation as analytical techniques are applied during practice. The second phase occurs as deliberate decisions gradually become automatic (procedural), increasing the role of intuitive processes. As a performer examines more issues or reconsiders decisions, the spiral motion toward the deliberate side and back to the intuitive is repeated indefinitely. With increasing expertise, the spiral tightens to signify greater control over decision type selection. The model draws on existing theories, particularly Evans’ (2011) Intervention Model of dual-process theories, Cognitive Continuum Theory Hammond et al. (1987), Hammond (2007), Baylor’s (2001) U-shaped model for the development of intuition by level of expertise. By theorizing how musical decision-making operates over time and with increasing expertise, this model could be used as a framework for future research in music performance studies and performance science more generally.

Agent tracking: a psycho-historical theory of the identification of living and social agents

To explain agent-identification behaviours, universalist theories in the biological and cognitive sciences have posited mental mechanisms thought to be universal to all humans, such as agent detection and face recognition mechanisms. These universalist theories have paid little attention to how particular sociocultural or historical contexts interact with the psychobiological processes of agent-identification. In contrast to universalist theories, contextualist theories appeal to particular historical and sociocultural contexts for explaining agent-identification. Contextualist theories tend to adopt idiographic methods aimed at recording the heterogeneity of human behaviours across history, space, and cultures. Defenders of the universalist approach tend to criticise idiographic methods because such methods can lead to relativism or may lack generality. To overcome explanatory limitations of proposals that adopt either universalist or contextualist approaches in isolation, I propose a philosophical model that integrates contributions from both traditions: the psycho-historical theory of agent-identification. This theory investigates how the tracking processes that humans use for identifying agents interact with the unique socio-historical contexts that support agent-identification practices. In integrating hypotheses about the history of agents with psychological and epistemological principles regarding agent-identification, the theory can generate novel hypotheses regarding the distinction between recognition-based, heuristic-based, and explanation-based agent-identification.

Risky business: rhesus monkeys exhibit persistent preferences for risky options

Rhesus monkeys have been shown to prefer risky over safe options in experiential decision-making tasks. These findings might be due, however, to specific contextual factors, such as small amounts of fluid reward and minimal costs for risk-taking. To better understand the factors affecting decision-making under risk in rhesus monkeys, we tested multiple factors designed to increase the stakes including larger reward amounts, distinct food items rather than fluid reward, a smaller number of trials per session, and risky options with greater variation that also included non-rewarded outcomes. We found a consistent preference for risky options, except when the expected value of the safe option was greater than the risky option. Thus, with equivalent mean utilities between the safe and risky options, rhesus monkeys appear to have a robust preference for the risky options in a broad range of circumstances, akin to the preferences found in human children and some adults in similar tasks. One account for this result is that monkeys make their choices based on the salience of the largest payoff, without integrating likelihood and value across trials. A related idea is that they fail to override an impulsive tendency to select the option with the potential to obtain the highest possible outcome. Our results rule out strict versions of both accounts and contribute to an understanding of the diversity of risky decision-making among primates.

Intuitive logic revisited: new data and a Bayesian mixed model meta-analysis

Recent research on syllogistic reasoning suggests that the logical status (valid vs. invalid) of even difficult syllogisms can be intuitively detected via differences in conceptual fluency between logically valid and invalid syllogisms when participants are asked to rate how much they like a conclusion following from a syllogism (Morsanyi & Handley, 2012). These claims of an intuitive logic are at odds with most theories on syllogistic reasoning which posit that detecting the logical status of difficult syllogisms requires effortful and deliberate cognitive processes. We present new data replicating the effects reported by Morsanyi and Handley, but show that this effect is eliminated when controlling for a possible confound in terms of conclusion content. Additionally, we reanalyze three studies (n = 287) without this confound with a Bayesian mixed model meta-analysis (i.e., controlling for participant and item effects) which provides evidence for the null-hypothesis and against Morsanyi and Handley's claim.

New normative standards of conditional reasoning and the dual-source model

There has been a major shift in research on human reasoning toward Bayesian and probabilistic approaches, which has been called a new paradigm. The new paradigm sees most everyday and scientific reasoning as taking place in a context of uncertainty, and inference is from uncertain beliefs and not from arbitrary assumptions. In this manuscript we present an empirical test of normative standards in the new paradigm using a novel probabilized conditional reasoning task. Our results indicated that for everyday conditional with at least a weak causal connection between antecedent and consequent only the conditional probability of the consequent given antecedent contributes unique variance to predicting the probability of conditional, but not the probability of the conjunction, nor the probability of the material conditional. Regarding normative accounts of reasoning, we found significant evidence that participants' responses were confidence preserving (i.e., p-valid in the sense of Adams, 1998) for MP inferences, but not for MT inferences. Additionally, only for MP inferences and to a lesser degree for DA inferences did the rate of responses inside the coherence intervals defined by mental probability logic (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2005, 2010) exceed chance levels. In contrast to the normative accounts, the dual-source model (Klauer et al., 2010) is a descriptive model. It posits that participants integrate their background knowledge (i.e., the type of information primary to the normative approaches) and their subjective probability that a conclusion is seen as warranted based on its logical form. Model fits showed that the dual-source model, which employed participants' responses to a deductive task with abstract contents to estimate the form-based component, provided as good an account of the data as a model that solely used data from the probabilized conditional reasoning task.

Evaluation of Physicians’ Cognitive Styles

Background. Patient outcomes critically depend on accuracy of physicians’ judgment, yet little is known about individual differences in cognitive styles that underlie physicians’ judgments. The objective of this study was to assess physicians’ individual differences in cognitive styles relative to age, experience, and degree and type of training. Methods. Physicians at different levels of training and career completed a web-based survey of 6 scales measuring individual differences in cognitive styles (maximizing v. satisficing, analytical v. intuitive reasoning, need for cognition, intolerance toward ambiguity, objectivism, and cognitive reflection). We measured psychometric properties (Cronbach’s α) of scales; relationship of age, experience, degree, and type of training; responses to scales; and accuracy on conditional inference task. Results. The study included 165 trainees and 56 attending physicians (median age 31 years; range 25–69 years). All 6 constructs showed acceptable psychometric properties. Surprisingly, we found significant negative correlation between age and satisficing ( r = −0.239; P = 0.017). Maximizing (willingness to engage in alternative search strategy) also decreased with age ( r = −0.220; P = 0.047). Number of incorrect inferences negatively correlated with satisficing ( r = −0.246; P = 0.014). Disposition to suppress intuitive responses was associated with correct responses on 3 of 4 inferential tasks. Trainees showed a tendency to engage in analytical thinking ( r = 0.265; P = 0.025), while attendings displayed inclination toward intuitive-experiential thinking ( r = 0.427; P = 0.046). However, trainees performed worse on conditional inference task. Conclusion. Physicians capable of suppressing an immediate intuitive response to questions and those scoring higher on rational thinking made fewer inferential mistakes. We found a negative correlation between age and maximizing: Physicians who were more advanced in their careers were less willing to spend time and effort in an exhaustive search for solutions. However, they appeared to have maintained their “mindware” for effective problem solving.

Efficient Kill-Save Ratios Ease Up the Cognitive Demands on Counterintuitive Moral Utilitarianism

The dual-process model of moral judgment postulates that utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas (e.g., accepting to kill one to save five) are demanding of cognitive resources. Here we show that utilitarian responses can become effortless, even when they involve to kill someone, as long as the kill-save ratio is efficient (e.g., 1 is killed to save 500). In Experiment 1, participants responded to moral dilemmas featuring different kill-save ratios under high or low cognitive load. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants responded at their own pace or under time pressure. Efficient kill-save ratios promoted utilitarian responding and neutered the effect of load or time pressure. We discuss whether this effect is more easily explained by a parallel-activation model or by a default-interventionist model.

Some Evidence for Unconscious Lie Detection

To maximize survival and reproductive success, primates evolved the tendency to tell lies and the ability to accurately detect them. Despite the obvious advantage of detecting lies accurately, conscious judgments of veracity are only slightly more accurate than chance. However, findings in forensic psychology, neuroscience, and primatology suggest that lies can be accurately detected when less-conscious mental processes (as opposed to more-conscious mental processes) are used. We predicted that observing someone tell a lie would automatically activate cognitive concepts associated with deception, and observing someone tell the truth would activate concepts associated with truth. In two experiments, we demonstrated that indirect measures of deception detection are significantly more accurate than direct measures. These findings provide a new lens through which to reconsider old questions and approach new investigations of human lie detection.

Does temporal discounting explain unhealthy behavior? A systematic review and reinforcement learning perspective

The tendency to make unhealthy choices is hypothesized to be related to an individual's temporal discount rate, the theoretical rate at which they devalue delayed rewards. Furthermore, a particular form of temporal discounting, hyperbolic discounting, has been proposed to explain why unhealthy behavior can occur despite healthy intentions. We examine these two hypotheses in turn. We first systematically review studies which investigate whether discount rates can predict unhealthy behavior. These studies reveal that high discount rates for money (and in some instances food or drug rewards) are associated with several unhealthy behaviors and markers of health status, establishing discounting as a promising predictive measure. We secondly examine whether intention-incongruent unhealthy actions are consistent with hyperbolic discounting. We conclude that intention-incongruent actions are often triggered by environmental cues or changes in motivational state, whose effects are not parameterized by hyperbolic discounting. We propose a framework for understanding these state-based effects in terms of the interplay of two distinct reinforcement learning mechanisms: a “model-based” (or goal-directed) system and a “model-free” (or habitual) system. Under this framework, while discounting of delayed health may contribute to the initiation of unhealthy behavior, with repetition, many unhealthy behaviors become habitual; if health goals then change, habitual behavior can still arise in response to environmental cues. We propose that the burgeoning development of computational models of these processes will permit further identification of health decision-making phenotypes.

Supra-personal cognitive control and metacognition

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We propose a ‘dual systems’ framework for thinking about metacognition.

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System 1 metacognition is for ‘intra-personal’ cognitive control.

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System 2 metacognition is for ‘supra-personal’ cognitive control.

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The latter allows agents to share metacognitive representations.

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This sharing creates benefits for the group and facilitates cumulative culture.

The human mind is extraordinary in its ability not merely to respond to events as they unfold but also to adapt its own operation in pursuit of its agenda. This ‘cognitive control’ can be achieved through simple interactions among sensorimotor processes, and through interactions in which one sensorimotor process represents a property of another in an implicit, unconscious way. So why does the human mind also represent properties of cognitive processes in an explicit way, enabling us to think and say ‘I’m sure’ or ‘I’m doubtful’? We suggest that ‘system 2 metacognition’ is for supra-personal cognitive control. It allows metacognitive information to be broadcast, and thereby to coordinate the sensorimotor systems of two or more agents involved in a shared task.

Time pressure affects the efficiency of perceptual processing in decisions under conflict

The negative correlation between speed and accuracy in perceptual decision making is often explained as a tradeoff, where lowered decision boundaries under time pressure result in faster but more error-prone responses. Corresponding implementations in sequential sampling models confirmed the success of this account, which has led to the prevalent assumption that a second component of decision making, the efficiency of perceptual processing, is largely independent from temporal demands. To test the generality of this claim, we examined time pressure effects on decisions under conflict. Data from a flanker task were fit with a sequential sampling model that incorporates two successive phases of response selection, driven by the output of an early and late stage of stimulus selection, respectively. The fits revealed the canonical decrease of response boundaries with increasing time pressure. In addition, time pressure reduced the duration of non-decisional processes and impaired the early stage of stimulus selection, together with the subsequent first phase of response selection. The results show that the relation between speed and accuracy not only relies on the strategic adjustment of response boundaries but involves variations of processing efficiency. The findings support recent evidence of drift rate modulations in response to time pressure in simple perceptual decisions and confirm their validity in the context of more complex tasks.

The presumption of consciousness

Throughout this article the authors presume – without justification – that decision making must be a conscious process unless proved otherwise, and they place an unreasonably strict burden of proof on anyone wishing to claim a role for unconscious processing. In addition, I show that their arguments do not, as implied here, impact upon contemporary dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making.

Examining the link between adolescent brain development and risk taking from a social-developmental perspective

The adolescent age period is often characterized as a health paradox because it is a time of extensive increases in physical and mental capabilities, yet overall mortality/morbidity rates increase significantly from childhood to adolescence, often due to preventable causes such as risk taking. Asynchrony in developmental time courses between the affective/approach and cognitive control brain systems, as well as the ongoing maturation of neural connectivity are thought to lead to increased vulnerability for risk taking in adolescence. A critical analysis of the frequency of risk taking behaviors, as well as mortality and morbidity rates across the lifespan, however, challenges the hypothesis that the peak of risk taking occurs in middle adolescence when the asynchrony between the different developmental time courses of the affective/approach and cognitive control systems is the largest. In fact, the highest levels of risk taking behaviors, such as alcohol and drug use, often occur among emerging adults (e.g., university/college students), and highlight the role of the social context in predicting risk taking behavior. Moreover, risk taking is not always unregulated or impulsive. Future research should broaden the scope of risk taking to include risks that are relevant to older adults, such as risky financial investing, gambling, and marital infidelity. In addition, a lifespan perspective, with a focus on how associations between neural systems and behavior are moderated by context and trait-level characteristics, and which includes diverse samples (e.g., divorced individuals), will help to address some important limitations in the adolescent brain development and risk taking literature.

Implicit and explicit social mentalizing: dual processes driven by a shared neural network

Recent social neuroscientific evidence indicates that implicit and explicit inferences on the mind of another person (i.e., intentions, attributions or traits), are subserved by a shared mentalizing network. Under both implicit and explicit instructions, ERP studies reveal that early inferences occur at about the same time, and fMRI studies demonstrate an overlap in core mentalizing areas, including the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). These results suggest a rapid shared implicit intuition followed by a slower explicit verification processes (as revealed by additional brain activation during explicit vs. implicit inferences). These data provide support for a default-adjustment dual-process framework of social mentalizing.

Theory and Metatheory in the Study of Dual Processing

In this article, we respond to the four comments on our target article. Some of the commentators suggest that we have formulated our proposals in a way that renders our account of dual-process theory untestable and less interesting than the broad theory that has been critiqued in recent literature. Our response is that there is a confusion of levels. Falsifiable predictions occur not at the level of paradigm or metatheory—where this debate is taking place—but rather in the instantiation of such a broad framework in task level models. Our proposal that many dual-processing characteristics are only correlated features does not weaken the testability of task-level dual-processing accounts. We also respond to arguments that types of processing are not qualitatively distinct and discuss specific evidence disputed by the commentators. Finally, we welcome the constructive comments of one commentator who provides strong arguments for the reality of the dual-process distinction.