Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of neurological origin

Functional neuroimaging of conversion disorder: the role of ancillary activation

Background

Previous functional neuroimaging studies investigating the neuroanatomy of conversion disorder have yielded inconsistent results that may be attributed to small sample sizes and disparate methodologies. The objective of this study was to better define the functional neuroanatomical correlates of conversion disorder.

Methods

Ten subjects meeting clinical criteria for unilateral sensory conversion disorder underwent fMRI during which a vibrotactile stimulus was applied to anesthetic and sensate areas. A block design was used with 4 s of stimulation followed by 26 s of rest, the pattern repeated 10 times. Event-related group averages of the BOLD response were compared between conditions.

Results

All subjects were right-handed females, with a mean age of 41. Group analyses revealed 10 areas that had significantly greater activation (p < .05) when stimulation was applied to the anesthetic body part compared to the contralateral sensate mirror region. They included right paralimbic cortices (anterior cingulate cortex and insula), right temporoparietal junction (angular gyrus and inferior parietal lobule), bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (middle frontal gyri), right orbital frontal cortex (superior frontal gyrus), right caudate, right ventral-anterior thalamus and left angular gyrus. There was a trend for activation of the somatosensory cortex contralateral to the anesthetic region to be decreased relative to the sensate side.

Conclusions

Sensory conversion symptoms are associated with a pattern of abnormal cerebral activation comprising neural networks implicated in emotional processing and sensory integration. Further study of the roles and potential interplay of these networks may provide a basis for an underlying psychobiological mechanism of conversion disorder.

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fMRI was used to study subjects with unilateral sensory conversion disorder.

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Sensory stimulation of anesthetic body part compared to sensate mirror region

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10 brain regions, including right limbic cortices and TPJ, were abnormally active.

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Implicated neural networks may provide a mechanism for conversion disorder.

Tickle me, I think I might be dreaming! Sensory attenuation, self-other distinction, and predictive processing in lucid dreams

The contrast between self- and other-produced tickles, as a special case of sensory attenuation for self-produced actions, has long been a target of empirical research. While in standard wake states it is nearly impossible to tickle oneself, there are interesting exceptions. Notably, participants awakened from REM (rapid eye movement-) sleep dreams are able to tickle themselves. So far, however, the question of whether it is possible to tickle oneself and be tickled by another in the dream state has not been investigated empirically or addressed from a theoretical perspective. Here, we report the results of an explorative web-based study in which participants were asked to rate their sensations during self-tickling and being tickled during wakefulness, imagination, and lucid dreaming. Our results, though highly preliminary, indicate that in the special case of lucid control dreams, the difference between self-tickling and being tickled by another is obliterated, with both self- and other produced tickles receiving similar ratings as self-tickling during wakefulness. This leads us to the speculative conclusion that in lucid control dreams, sensory attenuation for self-produced tickles spreads to those produced by non-self dream characters. These preliminary results provide the backdrop for a more general theoretical and metatheoretical discussion of tickling in lucid dreams in a predictive processing framework. We argue that the primary value of our study lies not so much in our results, which are subject to important limitations, but rather in the fact that they enable a new theoretical perspective on the relationship between sensory attenuation, the self-other distinction and agency, as well as suggest new questions for future research. In particular, the example of tickling during lucid dreaming raises the question of whether sensory attenuation and the self-other distinction can be simulated largely independently of external sensory input.

Sliding perspectives: dissociating ownership from self-location during full body illusions in virtual reality

Bodily illusions have been used to study bodily self-consciousness and disentangle its various components, among other the sense of ownership and self-location. Congruent multimodal correlations between the real body and a fake humanoid body can in fact trigger the illusion that the fake body is one's own and/or disrupt the unity between the perceived self-location and the position of the physical body. However, the extent to which changes in self-location entail changes in ownership is still matter of debate. Here we address this problem with the support of immersive virtual reality. Congruent visuotactile stimulation was delivered on healthy participants to trigger full body illusions from different visual perspectives, each resulting in a different degree of overlap between real and virtual body. Changes in ownership and self-location were measured with novel self-posture assessment tasks and with an adapted version of the cross-modal congruency task. We found that, despite their strong coupling, self-location and ownership can be selectively altered: self-location was affected when having a third person perspective over the virtual body, while ownership toward the virtual body was experienced only in the conditions with total or partial overlap. Thus, when the virtual body is seen in the far extra-personal space, changes in self-location were not coupled with changes in ownership. If a partial spatial overlap is present, ownership was instead typically experienced with a boosted change in the perceived self-location. We discussed results in the context of the current knowledge of the multisensory integration mechanisms contributing to self-body perception. We argue that changes in the perceived self-location are associated to the dynamical representation of peripersonal space encoded by visuotactile neurons. On the other hand, our results speak in favor of visuo-proprioceptive neuronal populations being a driving trigger in full body ownership illusions.

Vestibular function in the temporal and parietal cortex: distinct velocity and inertial processing pathways

A number of behavioral and neuroimaging studies have reported converging data in favor of a cortical network for vestibular function, distributed between the temporo-parietal cortex and the prefrontal cortex in the primate. In this review, we focus on the role of the cerebral cortex in visuo-vestibular integration including the motion sensitive temporo-occipital areas i.e., the middle superior temporal area (MST) and the parietal cortex. Indeed, these two neighboring cortical regions, though they both receive combined vestibular and visual information, have distinct implications in vestibular function. In sum, this review of the literature leads to the idea of two separate cortical vestibular sub-systems forming (1) a velocity pathway including MST and direct descending pathways on vestibular nuclei. As it receives well-defined visual and vestibular velocity signals, this pathway is likely involved in heading perception and rapid top-down regulation of eye/head coordination and (2) an inertial processing pathway involving the parietal cortex in connection with the subcortical vestibular nuclei complex responsible for velocity storage integration. This vestibular cortical pathway would be implicated in high-order multimodal integration and cognitive functions, including world space and self-referential processing.

Augmentation-related brain plasticity

Today, the anthropomorphism of the tools and the development of neural interfaces require reconsidering the concept of human-tools interaction in the framework of human augmentation. This review analyses the plastic process that the brain undergoes when it comes into contact with augmenting artificial sensors and effectors and, on the other hand, the changes that the use of external augmenting devices produces in the brain. Hitherto, few studies investigated the neural correlates of augmentation, but clues on it can be borrowed from logically-related paradigms: sensorimotor training, cognitive enhancement, cross-modal plasticity, sensorimotor functional substitution, use and embodiment of tools. Augmentation modifies function and structure of a number of areas, i.e., primary sensory cortices shape their receptive fields to become sensitive to novel inputs. Motor areas adapt the neuroprosthesis representation firing-rate to refine kinematics. As for normal motor outputs, the learning process recruits motor and premotor cortices and the acquisition of proficiency decreases attentional recruitment, focuses the activity on sensorimotor areas and increases the basal ganglia drive on the cortex. Augmentation deeply relies on the frontoparietal network. In particular, premotor cortex is involved in learning the control of an external effector and owns the tool motor representation, while the intraparietal sulcus extracts its visual features. In these areas, multisensory integration neurons enlarge their receptive fields to embody supernumerary limbs. For operating an anthropomorphic neuroprosthesis, the mirror system is required to understand the meaning of the action, the cerebellum for the formation of its internal model and the insula for its interoception. In conclusion, anthropomorphic sensorized devices can provide the critical sensory afferences to evolve the exploitation of tools through their embodiment, reshaping the body representation and the sense of the self.

Near-death experiences in non-life-threatening events and coma of different etiologies

Background: Near death experiences (NDEs) are increasingly being reported as a clearly identifiable physiological and psychological reality of clinical significance. However, the definition and causes of the phenomenon as well as the identification of NDE experiencers is still a matter of debate. To date, the most widely used standardized tool to identify and characterize NDEs in research is the Greyson NDE scale. Using this scale, retrospective and prospective studies have been trying to estimate their incidence in various populations but few studies have attempted to associate the experiences' intensity and content to etiology.

Methods: This retrospective investigation assessed the intensity and the most frequently recounted features of self-reported NDEs after a non-life-threatening event (i.e., “NDE-like” experience) or after a pathological coma (i.e., “real NDE”) and according to the etiology of the acute brain insult. We also compared our retrospectively acquired data in anoxic coma with historical data from the published literature on prospective post-anoxic studies using the Greyson NDE scale.

Results: From our 190 reports who met the criteria for NDE (i.e., Greyson NDE scale total score >7/32), intensity (i.e., Greyson NDE scale total score) and content (i.e., Greyson NDE scale features) did not differ between “NDE-like” (n = 50) and “real NDE” (n = 140) groups, nor within the “real NDE” group depending on the cause of coma (anoxic/traumatic/other). The most frequently reported feature was peacefulness (89–93%). Only 2 patients (1%) recounted a negative experience. The overall NDE core features' frequencies were higher in our retrospective anoxic cohort when compared to historical published prospective data.

Conclusions: It appears that “real NDEs” after coma of different etiologies are similar to “NDE-like” experiences occurring after non-life threatening events. Subjects reporting NDEs retrospectively tend to have experienced a different content compared to the prospective experiencers.

Signs of increased cortical hyperexcitability selectively associated with spontaneous anomalous bodily experiences in a nonclinical population

INTRODUCTION

The current study examined the presence of cortical hyperexcitability, in nonclinical hallucinators, reporting different forms of anomalous bodily experiences (ABEs). Groups reporting visual out-of-body experiences and nonvisual sensed-presence experiences were examined. It was hypothesised that only those hallucinators whose experiences contained visual elements would show increased signs of visual cortical hyperexcitability.

METHODS

One hundred and eighty-two participants completed the "Pattern-glare task" (involving the viewing of striped gratings with spatial frequencies irritable to visual cortex)-a task known to reflect degrees of cortical hyperexcitability associated with hallucinatory/aura experiences in neurological samples. Participants also completed questionnaire measures of anomalous "temporal-lobe experience" and predisposition to anomalous visual experiences.

RESULTS

Those reporting increased levels of anomalous bodily experiences provided significantly elevated scores on measures of temporal-lobe experience. Only the visual OBE group reported significantly elevated levels of cortical hyperexcitability as assessed by the pattern-glare task.

CONCLUSIONS

Collectively, the results are consistent with there being an increased degree of background cortical hyperexcitability in the cortices of individuals predisposed to some ABE-type hallucinations, even in the nonclinical population. The present study also establishes the clinical utility of the pattern-glare task for examining signs of aberrant visual connectivity in relation to visual hallucinations.

The vestibular system: a spatial reference for bodily self-consciousness

Self-consciousness is the remarkable human experience of being a subject: the "I". Self-consciousness is typically bound to a body, and particularly to the spatial dimensions of the body, as well as to its location and displacement in the gravitational field. Because the vestibular system encodes head position and movement in three-dimensional space, vestibular cortical processing likely contributes to spatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness. We review here recent data showing vestibular effects on first-person perspective (the feeling from where "I" experience the world) and self-location (the feeling where "I" am located in space). We compare these findings to data showing vestibular effects on mental spatial transformation, self-motion perception, and body representation showing vestibular contributions to various spatial representations of the body with respect to the external world. Finally, we discuss the role for four posterior brain regions that process vestibular and other multisensory signals to encode spatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness: temporoparietal junction, parietoinsular vestibular cortex, ventral intraparietal region, and medial superior temporal region. We propose that vestibular processing in these cortical regions is critical in linking multisensory signals from the body (personal and peripersonal space) with external (extrapersonal) space. Therefore, the vestibular system plays a critical role for neural representations of spatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness.

Voluntary Out-of-Body Experience: An fMRI Study

The present single-case study examined functional brain imaging patterns in a participant that reported being able, at will, to produce somatosensory sensations that are experienced as her body moving outside the boundaries of her physical body all the while remaining aware of her unmoving physical body. We found that the brain functional changes associated with the reported extra-corporeal experience (ECE) were different than those observed in motor imagery. Activations were mainly left-sided and involved the left supplementary motor area and supramarginal and posterior superior temporal gyri, the last two overlapping with the temporal parietal junction that has been associated with out-of-body experiences. The cerebellum also showed activation that is consistent with the participant’s report of the impression of movement during the ECE. There was also left middle and superior orbital frontal gyri activity, regions often associated with action monitoring. The results suggest that the ECE reported here represents an unusual type of kinesthetic imagery.

The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy

This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call “conscious thought” is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as mental agency, explicit, consciously experienced goal-directedness, or availability for veto control. I claim that for roughly two thirds of our conscious life-time we do not possess mental autonomy (M-autonomy) in this sense. Empirical data from research on mind wandering and nocturnal dreaming clearly show that phenomenally represented cognitive processing is mostly an automatic, non-agentive process and that personal-level cognition is an exception rather than the rule. This raises an interesting new version of the mind-body problem: How is subpersonal cognition causally related to personal-level thought? More fine-grained phenomenological descriptions for what we called “conscious thought” in the past are needed, as well as a functional decomposition of umbrella terms like “mind wandering” into different target phenomena and a better understanding of the frequent dynamic transitions between spontaneous, task-unrelated thought and meta-awareness. In an attempt to lay some very first conceptual foundations for the now burgeoning field of research on mind wandering, the third section proposes two new criteria for individuating single episodes of mind-wandering, namely, the “self-representational blink” (SRB) and a sudden shift in the phenomenological “unit of identification” (UI). I close by specifying a list of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection between mind wandering research and philosophy of mind.

A neuroscientific account of how vestibular disorders impair bodily self-consciousness

The consequences of vestibular disorders on balance, oculomotor control, and self-motion perception have been extensively described in humans and animals. More recently, vestibular disorders have been related to cognitive deficits in spatial navigation and memory tasks. Less frequently, abnormal bodily perceptions have been described in patients with vestibular disorders. Altered forms of bodily self-consciousness include distorted body image and body schema, disembodied self-location (out-of-body experience), altered sense of agency, as well as more complex experiences of dissociation and detachment from the self (depersonalization). In this article, I suggest that vestibular disorders create sensory conflict or mismatch in multisensory brain regions, producing perceptual incoherence and abnormal body and self perceptions. This hypothesis is based on recent functional mapping of the human vestibular cortex, showing vestibular projections to the primary and secondary somatosensory cortex and in several multisensory areas found to be crucial for bodily self-consciousness.

Shared action spaces: a basis function framework for social re-calibration of sensorimotor representations supporting joint action

The article explores the possibilities of formalizing and explaining the mechanisms that support spatial and social perspective alignment sustained over the duration of a social interaction. The basic proposed principle is that in social contexts the mechanisms for sensorimotor transformations and multisensory integration (learn to) incorporate information relative to the other actor(s), similar to the “re-calibration” of visual receptive fields in response to repeated tool use. This process aligns or merges the co-actors’ spatial representations and creates a “Shared Action Space” (SAS) supporting key computations of social interactions and joint actions; for example, the remapping between the coordinate systems and frames of reference of the co-actors, including perspective taking, the sensorimotor transformations required for lifting jointly an object, and the predictions of the sensory effects of such joint action. The social re-calibration is proposed to be based on common basis function maps (BFMs) and could constitute an optimal solution to sensorimotor transformation and multisensory integration in joint action or more in general social interaction contexts. However, certain situations such as discrepant postural and viewpoint alignment and associated differences in perspectives between the co-actors could constrain the process quite differently. We discuss how alignment is achieved in the first place, and how it is maintained over time, providing a taxonomy of various forms and mechanisms of space alignment and overlap based, for instance, on automaticity vs. control of the transformations between the two agents. Finally, we discuss the link between low-level mechanisms for the sharing of space and high-level mechanisms for the sharing of cognitive representations.

Fractionating the unitary notion of dissociation: disembodied but not embodied dissociative experiences are associated with exocentric perspective-taking

It has been argued that hallucinations which appear to involve shifts in egocentric perspective (e.g., the out-of-body experience, OBE) reflect specific biases in exocentric perspective-taking processes. Via a newly devised perspective-taking task, we examined whether such biases in perspective-taking were present in relation to specific dissociative anomalous body experiences (ABE) - namely the OBE. Participants also completed the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS; Sierra and Berrios, 2000) which provided measures of additional embodied ABE (unreality of self) and measures of derealization (unreality of surroundings). There were no reliable differences in the level of ABE, emotional numbing, and anomalies in sensory recall reported between the OBE and control group as measured by the corresponding CDS subscales. In contrast, the OBE group did provide significantly elevated measures of derealization ("alienation from surroundings" CDS subscale) relative to the control group. At the same time we also found that the OBE group was significantly more efficient at completing all aspects of the perspective-taking task relative to controls. Collectively, the current findings support fractionating the typically unitary notion of dissociation by proposing a distinction between embodied dissociative experiences and disembodied dissociative experiences - with only the latter being associated with exocentric perspective-taking mechanisms. Our findings - obtained with an ecologically valid task and a homogeneous OBE group - also call for a re-evaluation of the relationship between OBEs and perspective-taking in terms of facilitated disembodied experiences.

Awareness as observational heterarchy

Libet et al. (1983) revealed that brain activity precedes conscious intention. For convenience in this study, we divide brain activity into two parts: a conscious field (CF) and an unconscious field (UF). Most studies have assumed a comparator mechanism or an illusion of CF and discuss the difference of prediction and postdiction. We propose that problems to be discussed here are a twisted sense of agency between CF and UF, and another definitions of prediction and postdiction in a mediation process for the twist. This study specifically examines the definitions throughout an observational heterarchy model based on internal measurement. The nature of agency must be emergence that involves observational heterarchy. Consequently, awareness involves processes having duality in the sense that it is always open to the world (postdiction) and that it also maintains self robustly (prediction).

Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily self-consciousness

Recent research on bodily self-consciousness has assumed that it consists of three distinct components: the experience of owning a body (body ownership); the experience of being a body with a given location within the environment (self-location); and the experience of taking a first-person, body-centered, perspective on that environment (perspective). Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components-body ownership and self-location-are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction. We examine these results and consider them in relation to clinical evidence from patients with altered body perception and work on a variety of multisensory, body-related illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion, the full body illusion, the body swap illusion and the enfacement illusion. We conclude by providing a preliminary synthesis of the data on bodily self-consciousness and its neural correlates.

Plasticity in unimodal and multimodal brain areas reflects multisensory changes in self-face identification

Nothing provides as strong a sense of self as seeing one's face. Nevertheless, it remains unknown how the brain processes the sense of self during the multisensory experience of looking at one's face in a mirror. Synchronized visuo-tactile stimulation on one's own and another's face, an experience that is akin to looking in the mirror but seeing another's face, causes the illusory experience of ownership over the other person's face and changes in self-recognition. Here, we investigate the neural correlates of this enfacement illusion using fMRI. We examine activity in the human brain as participants experience tactile stimulation delivered to their face, while observing either temporally synchronous or asynchronous tactile stimulation delivered to another's face on either a specularly congruent or incongruent location. Activity in the multisensory right temporo-parietal junction, intraparietal sulcus, and the unimodal inferior occipital gyrus showed an interaction between the synchronicity and the congruency of the stimulation and varied with the self-reported strength of the illusory experience, which was recorded after each stimulation block. Our results highlight the important interplay between unimodal and multimodal information processing for self-face recognition, and elucidate the neurobiological basis for the plasticity required for identifying with our continuously changing visual appearance.

Neurobiology and clinical implications of lucid dreaming

Several lines of evidence converge to the idea that rapid eye movement sleep (REMS) is a good model to foster our understanding of psychosis. Both REMS and psychosis course with internally generated perceptions and lack of rational judgment, which is attributed to a hyperlimbic activity along with hypofrontality. Interestingly, some individuals can become aware of dreaming during REMS, a particular experience known as lucid dreaming (LD), whose neurobiological basis is still controversial. Since the frontal lobe plays a role in self-consciousness, working memory and attention, here we hypothesize that LD is associated with increased frontal activity during REMS. A possible way to test this hypothesis is to check whether transcranial magnetic or electric stimulation of the frontal region during REMS triggers LD. We further suggest that psychosis and LD are opposite phenomena: LD as a physiological awakening while dreaming due to frontal activity, and psychosis as a pathological intrusion of dream features during wake state due to hypofrontality. We further suggest that LD research may have three main clinical implications. First, LD could be important to the study of consciousness, including its pathologies and other altered states. Second, LD could be used as a therapy for recurrent nightmares, a common symptom of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. Finally, LD may allow for motor imagery during dreaming with possible improvement of physical rehabilitation. In all, we believe that LD research may clarify multiple aspects of brain functioning in its physiological, altered and pathological states.

"Self pop-out": agency enhances self-recognition in visual search

In real-life situations, we are often required to recognize our own movements among movements originating from other people. In social situations, these movements are often correlated (for example, when dancing or walking with others) adding considerable difficulty to self-recognition. Studies from visual search have shown that visual attention can selectively highlight specific features to make them more salient. Here, we used a novel visual search task employing virtual reality and motion tracking to test whether visual attention can use efferent information to enhance self-recognition of one's movements among four or six moving avatars. Active movements compared to passive movements allowed faster recognition of the avatar moving like the subject. Critically, search slopes were flat for the active condition but increased for passive movements, suggesting efficient search for active movements. In a second experiment, we tested the effects of using the participants' own movements temporally delayed as distractors in a self-recognition discrimination task. We replicated the results of the first experiment with more rapid self-recognition during active trials. Importantly, temporally delayed distractors increased reaction times despite being more perceptually different than the spatial distractors. The findings demonstrate the importance of agency in self-recognition and self-other discrimination from movement in social settings.

Multisensory origin of the subjective first-person perspective: visual, tactile, and vestibular mechanisms

In three experiments we investigated the effects of visuo-tactile and visuo-vestibular conflict about the direction of gravity on three aspects of bodily self-consciousness: self-identification, self-location, and the experienced direction of the first-person perspective. Robotic visuo-tactile stimulation was administered to 78 participants in three experiments. Additionally, we presented participants with a virtual body as seen from an elevated and downward-directed perspective while they were lying supine and were therefore receiving vestibular and postural cues about an upward-directed perspective. Under these conditions, we studied the effects of different degrees of visuo-vestibular conflict, repeated measurements during illusion induction, and the relationship to a classical measure of visuo-vestibular integration. Extending earlier findings on experimentally induced changes in bodily self-consciousness, we show that self-identification does not depend on the experienced direction of the first-person perspective, whereas self-location does. Changes in bodily self-consciousness depend on visual gravitational signals. Individual differences in the experienced direction of first-person perspective correlated with individual differences in visuo-vestibular integration. Our data reveal important contributions of visuo-vestibular gravitational cues to bodily self-consciousness. In particular we show that the experienced direction of the first-person perspective depends on the integration of visual, vestibular, and tactile signals, as well as on individual differences in idiosyncratic visuo-vestibular strategies.

The building blocks of the full body ownership illusion

Previous work has reported that it is not difficult to give people the illusion of ownership over an artificial body, providing a powerful tool for the investigation of the neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying body perception and self consciousness. We present an experimental study that uses immersive virtual reality (IVR) focused on identifying the perceptual building blocks of this illusion. We systematically manipulated visuotactile and visual sensorimotor contingencies, visual perspective, and the appearance of the virtual body in order to assess their relative role and mutual interaction. Consistent results from subjective reports and physiological measures showed that a first person perspective over a fake humanoid body is essential for eliciting a body ownership illusion. We found that the illusion of ownership can be generated when the virtual body has a realistic skin tone and spatially substitutes the real body seen from a first person perspective. In this case there is no need for an additional contribution of congruent visuotactile or sensorimotor cues. Additionally, we found that the processing of incongruent perceptual cues can be modulated by the level of the illusion: when the illusion is strong, incongruent cues are not experienced as incorrect. Participants exposed to asynchronous visuotactile stimulation can experience the ownership illusion and perceive touch as originating from an object seen to contact the virtual body. Analogously, when the level of realism of the virtual body is not high enough and/or when there is no spatial overlap between the two bodies, then the contribution of congruent multisensory and/or sensorimotor cues is required for evoking the illusion. On the basis of these results and inspired by findings from neurophysiological recordings in the monkey, we propose a model that accounts for many of the results reported in the literature.

Dissociations between the horizontal and dorsoventral axes in body-size perception

Body size can vary throughout a person's lifetime, inducing plasticity of the internal body representation. Changes in horizontal width accompany those in dorsal-to-ventral thickness. To examine differences in the perception of different body axes, neural correlates of own-body-size perception in the horizontal and dorsoventral directions were compared using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Original and distorted (-30, -10, +10 and +30%) images of the neck-down region of their own body were presented to healthy female participants, who were then asked whether the images were of their own body or not based explicitly on body size. Participants perceived body images distorted by -10% as their own, whereas those distorted by +30% as belonging to others. Horizontal width images yielded slightly more subjective own-body perceptions than dorsoventral thickness images did. Subjective perception of own-body size was associated with bilateral inferior parietal activity. In contrast, other-body judgments showed pre-supplementary motor and superior parietal activity. Expansion in the dorsoventral direction was associated with the left fusiform gyrus and the right inferior parietal lobule, whereas horizontal expansions were associated with activity in the bilateral somatosensory area. These results suggest neural dissociations between the two body axes: dorsoventral images of thickness may require visual processing, whereas bodily sensations are involved in horizontal body-size perception. Somatosensory rather than visual processes can be critical for the assessment of frontal own-body appearance. Visual body thickness and somatosensory body width may be integrated to construct a whole-body representation.

The bilocated mind: new perspectives on self-localization and self-identification

Does the human mind allow for self-locating at more than one place at a time? Evidence from neurology, cognitive neuroscience, and experimental psychology suggests that mental bilocation is a complex, but genuine experience, occurring more frequently than commonly thought. In this article, we distinguish between different components of bilocated self-representation: self-localization in two different places at the same time, self-identification with another body, reduplication of first-person perspective. We argue that different forms of mental bilocation may result from the combination of these components. To illustrate this, we discuss evidence of mental bilocation in pathological conditions such as heautoscopy, during immersion in virtual environments, and in everyday life, during social interaction. Finally, we consider the conditions for mental bilocation and speculate on the possible role of mental bilocation in the context of social interaction, suggesting that self-localization at two places at the same time may prove advantageous for the construction of a shared space.

Anomalous bodily-self experiences among recreational ketamine users

INTRODUCTION

Out-of-body experiences present a unique paradigm to investigate cognitive and neural mechanisms of bodily-self processes and their disorders. Previous work on out-of-body experiences associated with sleep paralysis supported a model in which illusory movement experiences reflect disrupted bodily-self integration generating anomalous vestibular and motor sensations. Further disintegration and progression of the experience may then give rise to out-of-body feelings, which in turn may instigate out-of-body autoscopy.

METHODS

The current study assesses the disintegration model through analyses of out-of-body experiences reports from an online survey of individuals reporting recreational ketamine use (n=128) and cross-validation in a sample of nonketamine polydrug users (n=64). Path analyses using intensity and frequency measures of anomalous experiences assess the fit of seven competing models.

RESULTS

The disintegration model (illusory movement → out-of-body feelings → out-of-body autoscopy) emerged as the best fitting model overall and results support full mediation of the relation between illusory movement experiences and out-of-body autoscopy by out-of-body feelings. Moreover, lifetime measures of ketamine use predicted the frequency of illusory movement experiences.

CONCLUSIONS

The results corroborate this structural model of out-of-body phenomena and encourage a framework for future studies into aetiological mechanisms of out-of-body experiences to include neurochemical systems.

Meditation-related activations are modulated by the practices needed to obtain it and by the expertise: an ALE meta-analysis study

The brain network governing meditation has been studied using a variety of meditation practices and techniques practices eliciting different cognitive processes (e.g., silence, attention to own body, sense of joy, mantras, etc.). It is very possible that different practices of meditation are subserved by largely, if not entirely, disparate brain networks. This assumption was tested by conducting an activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis of meditation neuroimaging studies, which assessed 150 activation foci from 24 experiments. Different ALE meta-analyses were carried out. One involved the subsets of studies involving meditation induced through exercising focused attention (FA). The network included clusters bilaterally in the medial gyrus, the left superior parietal lobe, the left insula and the right supramarginal gyrus (SMG). A second analysis addressed the studies involving meditation states induced by chanting or by repetition of words or phrases, known as “mantra.” This type of practice elicited a cluster of activity in the right SMG, the SMA bilaterally and the left postcentral gyrus. Furthermore, the last analyses addressed the effect of meditation experience (i.e., short- vs. long-term meditators). We found that frontal activation was present for short-term, as compared with long-term experience meditators, confirming that experts are better enabled to sustain attentional focus, rather recruiting the right SMG and concentrating on aspects involving disembodiment.

Abnormal brain activation of adolescent internet addict in a ball-throwing animation task: possible neural correlates of disembodiment revealed by fMRI

While adolescent internet addicts are immersed in cyberspace, they are easily able to experience 'disembodied state'. The purposes of this study were to investigate the difference of brain activity between adolescent internet addicts and normal adolescents in a state of disembodiment, and to find the correlation between the activities of disembodiment-related areas and the behavioral characteristics related to internet addiction. The fMRI images were taken while the addiction group (N=17) and the control group (N=17) were asked to perform the task composed with ball-throwing animations. The task reflected on either self-agency about ball-throwing or location of a ball. And each block was shown with either different (Changing View) or same animations (Fixed View). The disembodiment-related condition was the interaction between Agency Task and Changing View. Within-group analyses revealed that the addiction group exhibited higher activation in the thalamus, bilateral precentral area, bilateral middle frontal area, and the area around the right temporo-parietal junction. And between-group analyses showed that the addiction group exhibited higher activation in the area near the left temporo-parieto-occipital junction, right parahippocampal area, and other areas than the control group. Finally, the duration of internet use was significantly correlated with the activity of posterior area of left middle temporal gyrus in the addiction group. These results show that the disembodiment-related activation of the brain is easily manifested in adolescent internet addicts. Internet addiction of adolescents could be significantly unfavorable for their brain development related with identity formation.

Near-death experiences between science and prejudice

Science exists to refute dogmas; nevertheless, dogmas may be introduced when undemonstrated scientific axioms lead us to reject facts incompatible with them. Several studies have proposed psychobiological interpretations of near-death experiences (NDEs), claiming that NDEs are a mere byproduct of brain functions gone awry; however, relevant facts incompatible with the ruling physicalist and reductionist stance have been often neglected. The awkward transcendent look of NDEs has deep epistemological implications, which call for: (a) keeping a rigorously neutral position, neither accepting nor refusing anything a priori; and (b) distinguishing facts from speculations and fallacies. Most available psychobiological interpretations remain so far speculations to be demonstrated, while brain disorders and/or drug administration in critical patients yield a well-known delirium in intensive care and anesthesia, the phenomenology of which is different from NDEs. Facts can be only true or false, never paranormal. In this sense, they cannot be refused a priori even when they appear implausible with respect to our current knowledge: any other stance implies the risk of turning knowledge into dogma and the adopted paradigm into a sort of theology.

Body context and posture affect mental imagery of hands

Different visual stimuli have been shown to recruit different mental imagery strategies. However the role of specific visual stimuli properties related to body context and posture in mental imagery is still under debate. Aiming to dissociate the behavioural correlates of mental processing of visual stimuli characterized by different body context, in the present study we investigated whether the mental rotation of stimuli showing either hands as attached to a body (hands-on-body) or not (hands-only), would be based on different mechanisms. We further examined the effects of postural changes on the mental rotation of both stimuli. Thirty healthy volunteers verbally judged the laterality of rotated hands-only and hands-on-body stimuli presented from the dorsum- or the palm-view, while positioning their hands on their knees (front postural condition) or behind their back (back postural condition). Mental rotation of hands-only, but not of hands-on-body, was modulated by the stimulus view and orientation. Additionally, only the hands-only stimuli were mentally rotated at different speeds according to the postural conditions. This indicates that different stimulus-related mechanisms are recruited in mental rotation by changing the bodily context in which a particular body part is presented. The present data suggest that, with respect to hands-only, mental rotation of hands-on-body is less dependent on biomechanical constraints and proprioceptive input. We interpret our results as evidence for preferential processing of visual- rather than kinesthetic-based mechanisms during mental transformation of hands-on-body and hands-only, respectively.

Translocation of the embodied self without visuospatial neglect

This is the case report of RB, a 68-year-old retired woman who, following an extensive right sided ischaemic stroke, showed hemiplegia, anosognosia and allochiria, but no somato-sensory deficits and no visuospatial neglect. A high resolution 3D MRI structural scan of her brain was acquired to define the structural damage in detail. Morphometric analyses of grey and white matter data revealed a large lesion which involved most of her right parietal, temporal, and mesial frontal cortex, with partial sparing of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and part of the posterior corpus callosum. Detailed examination showed that RB attributed sensory stimuli, both on the left and on the right, to the opposite side of her body. This mirror reversed representation of her body caused misattribution of items even in the absence of stimulation, as for instance when the patient spontaneously reported pain in her right knee while pointing to her left knee. RB's neuropsychological profile showed normal or borderline performance on most cognitive tasks. Language comprehension was intact and she could tell left from right without difficulty in all instances except for those referable to her soma. To our knowledge this is the first description of severe allochiria for body representation in the absence of neglect. The evidence from this case supports the developing concept that the body representation is not simply a systematic registration of proprioceptive inputs, but that the brain has a more sophisticated high level representation of one's body map which is updated on the basis of multimodal information.

Multi-sensory and sensorimotor foundation of bodily self-consciousness - an interdisciplinary approach

Scientific investigations on the nature of the self have so far focused on high-level mechanisms. Recent evidence, however, suggests that low-level bottom-up mechanisms of multi-sensory integration play a fundamental role in encoding specific components of bodily self-consciousness, such as self-location and first-person perspective (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Self-location and first-person perspective are abnormal in neurological patients suffering from out-of-body experiences (Blanke et al., 2004), and can be manipulated experimentally in healthy subjects by imposing multi-sensory conflicts (Lenggenhager et al., 2009). Activity of the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) reflects experimentally induced changes in self-location and first-person perspective (Ionta et al., 2011), and dysfunctions in TPJ are causally associated with out-of-body experiences (Blanke et al., 2002). We argue that TPJ is one of the key areas for multi-sensory integration of bodily self-consciousness, that its levels of activity reflect the experience of the conscious "I" as embodied and localized within bodily space, and that these mechanisms can be systematically investigated using state of the art technologies such as robotics, virtual reality, and non-invasive neuroimaging.

Disturbances in body ownership in schizophrenia: evidence from the rubber hand illusion and case study of a spontaneous out-of-body experience

Background

A weakened sense of self may contribute to psychotic experiences. Body ownership, one component of self-awareness, can be studied with the rubber hand illusion (RHI). Watching a rubber hand being stroked while one's unseen hand is stroked synchronously can lead to a sense of ownership over the rubber hand, a shift in perceived position of the real hand, and a limb-specific drop in stimulated hand temperature. We aimed to assess the RHI in schizophrenia using quantifiable measures: proprioceptive drift and stimulation-dependent changes in hand temperature.

Methods

The RHI was elicited in 24 schizophrenia patients and 21 matched controls by placing their unseen hand adjacent to a visible rubber hand and brushing real and rubber hands synchronously or asynchronously. Perceived finger location was measured before and after stimulation. Hand temperature was taken before and during stimulation. Subjective strength of the illusion was assessed by a questionnaire.

Results

Across groups, the RHI was stronger during synchronous stimulation, indicated by self-report and proprioceptive drift. Patients reported a stronger RHI than controls. Self-reported strength of RHI was associated with schizotypy in controls Proprioceptive drift was larger in patients, but only following synchronous stimulation. Further, we observed stimulation-dependent changes in skin temperature. During right hand stimulation, temperature dropped in the stimulated hand and rose in the unstimulated hand. Interestingly, induction of RHI led to an out-of-body experience in one patient, linking body disownership and psychotic experiences.

Conclusions

The RHI is quantitatively and qualitatively stronger in schizophrenia. These findings suggest that patients have a more flexible body representation and weakened sense of self, and potentially indicate abnormalities in temporo-parietal networks implicated in body ownership. Further, results suggest that these body ownership disturbances might be at the heart of a subset of the pathognomonic delusions of passivity.

Brain and Psyche in Early Christian Asceticism

This study is an 11-part investigation of the psychology and neuropsychology of early Christian asceticism as represented by Evagrius Ponticus (AD 345–399), the tradition's first ascetical theologian and possibly its most influential. Evagrius's biography is reviewed in the first section. The living circumstances and perceptual consequences of desert asceticism are considered in the second. Penitence, dispassion, and the mysticism of “pure prayer” are discussed in the third. Austerities are addressed in the fourth section, particularly fasting, prostrations, and prolonged standing. Ascetical perspectives on sleep, dreams, and the hypnogogic state are analyzed in the fifth. The depressive syndrome of acedia is discussed in the sixth. Evagrius's reports of auditory, olfactory, and visual hallucinations are analyzed in the seventh. Multiple complementary interpretations of demonic phenomena are developed in the eighth section. Evagrius's psychotherapy for anger is reviewed in the ninth. Interpersonal relations among ascetics are considered in the tenth section. The study concludes with a summary.

Spatial Perspective and Coordinate Systems in Autoscopy: A Case Report of a “Fantome de Profil” in Occipital Brain Damage

Autoscopic phenomena refer to complex experiences involving the illusory reduplication of one's own body. Here we report the third long-lasting case of autoscopy in a patient with right occipital lesion. Instead of the commonly reported frontal mirror view (fantôme spéculaire), the patient saw her head and upper trunk laterally in side view (fantôme de profil). We found that the visual appearance and completeness of the autoscopic image could be selectively modulated by active and passive movements, without being influenced by imagining the same movements or by tactile and auditory stimulation. Eyes closure did not disrupt either the perception of the autoscopic body or the effects of the motor stimulation. Moreover, the visual body reduplication was coded neither in purely eye-centered nor in head-centered frames of reference, suggesting the involvement of egocentric coordinate systems (eyes and head centered). A follow-up examination highlighted the stability of the visual characteristics of the body reduplication and its shift induced by displacement of both head and eyes. These findings support the view that autoscopic phenomena have a multisensory motor origin and proprioceptive signals may play an important role in modulating the illusory visual reduplication of the patient's own body, most likely via cross-modal modulation of extrastriate areas involved in body and face perception.

Leg muscle vibration modulates bodily self-consciousness: integration of proprioceptive, visual, and tactile signals

Behavioral studies have used visuo-tactile conflicts between a participant's body and a visually presented fake or virtual body to investigate the importance of bodily perception for self-consciousness (bodily self-consciousness). Illusory self-identification with a fake body and changes in tactile processing—modulation of visuo-tactile cross-modal congruency effects (CCEs)—were reported in previous findings. Although proprioceptive signals are deemed important for bodily self-consciousness, their contribution to the representation of the full body has not been studied. Here we investigated whether and how self-identification and tactile processing (CCE magnitude) could be modified by altering proprioceptive signals with 80-Hz vibrations at the legs. Participants made elevation judgments of tactile cues (while ignoring nearby lights) during synchronous and asynchronous stroking of a seen fake body. We found that proprioceptive signals during vibrations altered the magnitude of self-identification and mislocalization of touch (CCE) in a synchrony-dependent fashion: we observed an increase of self-identification and CCE magnitude during asynchronous stroking. In a second control experiment we studied whether proprioceptive signals per se, or those from the lower limbs in particular, were essential for these changes. We applied vibrations at the upper limbs (which provide no information about the position of the participant's body in space) and in this case observed no modulation of bodily self-consciousness or tactile perception. These data link proprioceptive signals from the legs that are conveyed through the dorsal column-medial lemniscal pathway to bodily self-consciousness. We discuss their integration with bodily signals from vision and touch for full-body representations.

The perspective matters! Multisensory integration in ego-centric reference frames determines full-body ownership

Recent advances in experimental science have made it possible to investigate the perceptual processes involved in generating a sense of owning an entire body. This is achieved by full-body ownership illusions which make use of specific patterns of visual and somatic stimuli integration. Here we investigate the fundamental question of the reference frames used in the process of attributing an entire body to the self. We quantified the strength of the body-swap illusion in conditions where the participants were observing this artificial body from the perspective of the first or third person. Consistent results from subjective reports and physiological recordings show that the first person visual perspective is critical for the induction of this full-body ownership illusion. This demonstrates that the multisensory integration processes producing the sense of corporeal self operates in an ego-centric reference frame.

Reversal of vision metamorphopsia caused by pons and cerebellum infarction

Metamorphopsia is a visual illusion related to the perception of an object's shape, size, colour or angle. Reversal of vision metamorphopsia is a rare, transient form of metamorphopsia described as an inversion of the field of vision, usually a 180-degree reversion within the frontal plane. We describe the case of a 64-year-old male patient who first experienced a 90-degree rotation of the field of vision and then had the impression of his body rotating in space. The symptoms were preceded by disequilibrium, astigmatism and vomiting. Magnetic resonance imaging of the head showed focuses of vasogenic lesions in the pons and left cerebellar hemisphere. Magnetic resonance angiography of cerebral vessels did not reveal the left vertebral artery. This is the first described case of reversal of vision metamorphopsia with 90-degree rotation of the field of vision with accompanying disorder of the spatial position of the body.