You'll never crawl alone: Neurophysiological evidence for experience-dependent motor resonance in infancy

Neural correlates of action perception at the onset of functional grasping

Event-related potentials were recorded while infants observe congruent or incongruent grasping actions at the age when organized grasping first emerges (4-6 months of age). We demonstrate that the event-related potential component P400 encodes the congruency of power grasps at the age of 6 months (Experiment 1) and in 5-month-old infants that have developed the ability to use power grasps (Experiment 2). This effect does not extend to precision grasps, which infants cannot perform (Experiment 3). Our findings suggest that infants' encoding of the relationship between an object and a grasping hand (the action-perception link) is highly specialized to actions and manual configurations of actions that infants are able to perform.

Enactivism and neonatal imitation: conceptual and empirical considerations and clarifications

Recently within social cognition it has been argued that understanding others is primarily characterized by dynamic and second person interactive processes, rather than by taking a third person observational stance. Within this enactivist view of intersubjective understanding, researchers differ in their claims regarding the innateness of such processes. Here we proposed to distinguish nativist enactivists-who argue that studies on neonatal imitation support the view that infants already have a non-mentalistic embodied form of intersubjective understanding present at birth-from empiricist enactivists, who claim that those intersubjective processes are learned through social interaction. In this article, we critically examine the empirical studies on neonate imitation and conclude that the available evidence is at least mixed for most types of specific gesture imitations. In the end, only the tongue protrusion imitation appears to be consistent across different studies. If neonates imitate only one single gesture, then a more parsimonious explanation for the tongue protrusion effect could be put forward. Consequently, the nativist enactivist claim that understanding others depends on second person interactive processes already present at birth seems no longer plausible. Although other strands of evidence provide converging evidence for the importance of intersubjective processes in adult social cognition, the available evidence on neonatal imitation calls for a more careful view on the innateness of such processes and suggests that this way of interacting needs to be learned over time. Therefore the available empirical evidence on neonate imitation is in our view compatible with the empiricist enactivist position, but not with the nativist enactivist position.

Parental scaffolding as a bootstrapping mechanism for learning grasp affordances and imitation skills

Parental scaffolding is an important mechanism that speeds up infant sensorimotor development. Infants pay stronger attention to the features of the objects highlighted by parents, and their manipulation skills develop earlier than they would in isolation due to caregivers' support. Parents are known to make modifications in infant-directed actions, which are often called “motionese”7. The features that might be associated with motionese are amplification, repetition and simplification in caregivers' movements, which are often accompanied by increased social signalling. In this paper, we extend our previously developed affordances learning framework to enable our hand-arm robot equipped with a range camera to benefit from parental scaffolding and motionese. We first present our results on how parental scaffolding can be used to guide the robot learning and to modify its crude action execution to speed up the learning of complex skills. For this purpose, an interactive human caregiver-infant scenario was realized with our robotic setup. This setup allowed the caregiver's modification of the ongoing reach and grasp movement of the robot via physical interaction. This enabled the caregiver to make the robot grasp the target object, which in turn could be used by the robot to learn the grasping skill. In addition to this, we also show how parental scaffolding can be used in speeding up imitation learning. We present the details of our work that takes the robot beyond simple goal-level imitation, making it a better imitator with the help of motionese.

Confounding the origin and function of mirror neurons

Cook et al. argue that mirror neurons originate in sensorimotor associative learning and that their function is determined by their origin. Both these claims are hard to accept. It is here suggested that a major role in the origin of the mirror mechanism is played by top-down connections rather than by associative learning.

What are you doing? How active and observational experience shape infants' action understanding

From early in life, infants watch other people's actions. How do young infants come to make sense of actions they observe? Here, we review empirical findings on the development of action understanding in infancy. Based on this review, we argue that active action experience is crucial for infants' developing action understanding. When infants execute actions, they form associations between motor acts and the sensory consequences of these acts. When infants subsequently observe these actions in others, they can use their motor system to predict the outcome of the ongoing actions. Also, infants come to an understanding of others' actions through the repeated observation of actions and the effects associated with them. In their daily lives, infants have plenty of opportunities to form associations between observed events and learn about statistical regularities of others' behaviours. We argue that based on these two forms of experience-active action experience and observational experience-infants gradually develop more complex action understanding capabilities.

Tinbergen on mirror neurons

Fifty years ago, Niko Tinbergen defined the scope of behavioural biology with his four problems: causation, ontogeny, survival value and evolution. About 20 years ago, there was another highly significant development in behavioural biology-the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs). Here, I use Tinbergen's original four problems (rather than the list that appears in textbooks) to highlight the differences between two prominent accounts of MNs, the genetic and associative accounts; to suggest that the latter provides the defeasible 'best explanation' for current data on the causation and ontogeny of MNs; and to argue that functional analysis, of the kind that Tinbergen identified somewhat misleadingly with studies of 'survival value', should be a high priority for future research. In this kind of functional analysis, system-level theories would assign MNs a small, but potentially important, role in the achievement of action understanding-or another social cognitive function-by a production line of interacting component processes. These theories would be tested by experimental intervention in human and non-human animal samples with carefully documented and controlled developmental histories.

Mirroring and the development of action understanding

The discovery of mirror neurons in the monkey motor cortex has inspired wide-ranging hypotheses about the potential relationship between action control and social cognition. In this paper, we consider the hypothesis that this relationship supports the early development of a critical aspect of social understanding, the ability to analyse others' actions in terms of goals. Recent investigations of infant action understanding have revealed rich connections between motor development and the analysis of goals in others' actions. In particular, infants' own goal-directed actions influence their analysis of others' goals. This evidence indicates that the cognitive systems that drive infants' own actions contribute to their analysis of goals in others' actions. These effects occur at a relatively abstract level of analysis both in terms of the structure infants perceive in others' actions and relevant structure in infants' own actions. Although the neural bases of these effects in infants are not yet well understood, current evidence indicates that connections between action production and action perception in infancy involve the interrelated neural systems at work in generating planned, intelligent action.

Neural mirroring mechanisms and imitation in human infants

Studying human infants will increase our understanding of the nature, origins and function of neural mirroring mechanisms. Human infants are prolific imitators. Infant imitation indicates observation-execution linkages in the brain prior to language and protracted learning. Investigations of neural aspects of these linkages in human infants have focused on the sensorimotor mu rhythm in the electroencephalogram, which occurs in the alpha frequency range over central electrode sites. Recent results show that the infant mu rhythm is desynchronized during action execution as well as action observation. Current work is elucidating properties of the infant mu rhythm and how it may relate to prelinguistic action processing and social understanding. Here, we consider this neuroscience research in relation to developmental psychological theory, particularly the 'Like-Me' framework, which holds that one of the chief cognitive tasks of the human infant is to map the similarity between self and other. We elucidate the value of integrating neuroscience findings with behavioural studies of infant imitation, and the reciprocal benefit of examining mirroring mechanisms from an ontogenetic perspective.

Cortical Mechanisms Underlying the Organization of Goal-Directed Actions and Mirror Neuron-Based Action Understanding

Our understanding of the functions of motor system evolved remarkably in the last 20 years. This is the consequence not only of an increase in the amount of data on this system but especially of a paradigm shift in our conceptualization of it. Motor system is not considered anymore just a “producer” of movements, as it was in the past, but a system crucially involved in cognitive functions. In the present study we review the data on the cortical organization underlying goal-directed actions and action understanding. Our review is subdivided into two major parts. In the first part, we review the anatomical and functional organization of the premotor and parietal areas of monkeys and humans. We show that the parietal and frontal areas form circuits devoted to specific motor functions. We discuss, in particular, the visuo-motor transformation necessary for reaching and for grasping. In the second part we show how a specific neural mechanism, the mirror mechanism, is involved in understanding the action and intention of others. This mechanism is located in the same parieto-frontal circuits that mediate goal-directed actions. We conclude by indicating future directions for studies on the mirror mechanism and suggest some major topics for forthcoming research.

Action experience, more than observation, influences mu rhythm desynchronization

Since the discovery of mirror neurons in premotor and parietal areas of the macaque monkey, the idea that action and perception may share the same neural code has been of central interest in social, developmental, and cognitive neurosciences. A fundamental question concerns how a putative human mirror neuron system may be tuned to the motor experiences of the individual. The current study tested the hypothesis that prior motor experience modulated the sensorimotor mu and beta rhythms. Specifically, we hypothesized that these sensorimotor rhythms would be more desynchronized after active motor experience compared to passive observation experience. To test our hypothesis, we collected EEG from adult participants during the observation of a relatively novel action: an experimenter used a claw-like tool to pick up a toy. Prior to EEG collection, we trained one group of adults to perform this action with the tool (performers). A second group comprised trained video coders, who only had experience observing the action (observers). Both the performers and the observers had no prior motor and visual experience with the action. A third group of novices was also tested. Performers exhibited the greatest mu rhythm desynchronization in the 8–13 Hz band, particularly in the right hemisphere compared to observers and novices. This study is the first to contrast active tool-use experience and observation experience in the mu rhythm and to show modulation with relatively shorter amounts of experience than prior mirror neuron expertise studies. These findings are discussed with respect to its broader implication as a neural signature for a mechanism of early social learning.

The Infant EEG Mu Rhythm: Methodological Considerations and Best Practices

The EEG mu rhythm, recorded from scalp regions overlying the sensorimotor cortex, appears to exhibit mirroring properties: It is reactive when performing an action and when observing another perform the same action. Recently, there has been an exponential increase in developmental mu rhythm research, partially due to the mu rhythm's potential role in our understanding of others' actions as well as a variety of other social and cognitive processes (e.g., imitation, theory of mind, language). Unfortunately, various methodological issues impede integrating these findings into a comprehensive theory of mu rhythm development. The present manuscript provides a review of the infant mu rhythm literature while focusing on current methodological problems that impede between study comparisons. By highlighting these issues and providing an in depth description and analysis we aim to heighten awareness and propose guidelines (when possible) that will promote rigorous infant mu rhythm research and facilitate between study comparisons. This paper is intended as a resource for developmental scientists, regardless of EEG expertise.

Encouragement is Nothing Without Control: Factors Influencing the Development of Reaching and Face Preference

Four parent-guided training procedures aimed at facilitating independent reaching were compared in 36 three-month-old infants recruited for this study and 36 infants taken from previously published reports. Training procedures systematically varied whether parental encouragement to act on external objects was provided, and whether self-produced experiences of moving an object were present. Reaching behavior was assessed before and after training, and face preference was measured after training by recording infants’ eye gaze in a visual-preference task. Results showed that simultaneous experiences of parental encouragement and self-produced object motion encouraged successful reaching and face preference. Neither experience in isolation was effective, indicating that both external encouragement and self-produced action experiences are necessary to facilitate successful reaching. However, experiences with self-produced object motion increased infants’ face preference. This result provides evidence for a developmental link between self-produced motor experiences and the emergence of face preference in three-month-old infants.

The joint role of trained, untrained, and observed actions at the origins of goal recognition

Recent findings across a variety of domains reveal the benefits of self-produced experience on object exploration, object knowledge, attention, and action perception. The influence of active experience may be particularly important in infancy, when motor development is undergoing great changes. Despite the importance of self-produced experience, we know that infants and young children are eventually able to gain knowledge through purely observational experience. In the current work, three-month-old infants were given experience with object-directed actions in one of three forms and their recognition of the goal of grasping actions was then assessed in a habituation paradigm. All infants were given the chance to manually interact with the toys without assistance (a difficult task for most three-month-olds). Two of the three groups were then given additional experience with object-directed actions, either through active training (in which Velcro mittens helped infants act more efficiently) or observational training. Findings support the conclusion that self-produced experience is uniquely informative for action perception and suggest that individual differences in spontaneous motor activity may interact with observational experience to inform action perception early in life.

Extrapolation and direct matching mediate anticipation in infancy

Why are infants able to anticipate occlusion events and other people's actions but not the movement of self-propelled objects? This study investigated infant and adult anticipatory gaze shifts during observation of self-propelled objects and human goal-directed actions. Six-month-old infants anticipated self-propelled balls but not human actions. This demonstrates that different processes mediate the ability to anticipate human actions (direct matching) versus self-propelled objects (extrapolation).

Learning from their own actions: the unique effect of producing actions on infants' action understanding

Prior research suggests that infants' action production affects their action understanding, but little is known about the aspects of motor experience that render these effects. In Study 1, the relative contributions of self-produced (n = 30) and observational (n = 30) action experience on 3-month-old infants' action understanding was assessed using a visual habituation paradigm. In Study 2, generalization of training to a new context was examined (n = 30). Results revealed a unique effect of active over observational experience. Furthermore, findings suggest that benefits of trained actions do not generalize broadly, at least following brief training.

Exploring the development of the mirror neuron system: finding the right paradigm

Due to its ability to map an observed action onto the observer's own cortical motor circuits, the mirror neuron system (MNS) has been implicated in many facets of social cognition. As such, achieving an understanding of the typical development of this intriguing brain system seems obvious. Only now, however, are studies attempting to explore the processes and principles behind the emergence of the MNS. This article critically reviews a number of experimental paradigms employed in this endeavor. We conclude by suggesting that future neuroscientific investigations should incorporate a response-stimulus procedure, whereby action execution results in, not from, novel sensory stimuli.

Predicting others' intention involves motor resonance: EMG evidence from 6- and 9-month-old infants

The study explores infants' ability to generate on-line predictions about others' action goals through the recruitment of motor resonance mechanisms. To this aim, electromyography was recorded from mouth-opening suprahyoid muscles (SM) of 9-month-old infants while watching a video of an adult agent reaching-to-grasp an object and bringing it either to mouth or head. The results demonstrated, for the first time, that at the age of 9 months there is a dynamic mirror modulation of SM activity by action observation, with the infant's muscles responsible for the action final goal being recruited from the action outset. The comparison with the responses of 6-month-olds tested on the same task showed that in younger and older infants there is a different chronometry of the SM activation with respect to the different phases of the observed action (i.e., bringing vs. grasping, respectively). Results suggest that motor resonance mechanisms triggered within the infants' motor system by action observation undergo gradual development during the first year of life. They also indicate that motor resonance may reflect anticipation of the agent's intention based on the goal of the action.

First-person action experience reveals sensitivity to action efficiency in prereaching infants

Do infants learn to interpret others' actions through their own experience producing goal-directed action, or does some knowledge of others' actions precede first-person experience? Several studies report that motor experience enhances action understanding, but the nature of this effect is not well understood. The present research investigates what is learned during early motoric production, and it tests whether knowledge of goal-directed actions, including an assumption that actors maximize efficiency given environmental constraints, exists before experience producing such actions. Three-month-old infants (who cannot yet effectively reach for and grasp objects) were given novel experience retrieving objects that rested on a surface with no barriers. They were then shown an actor reaching for an object over a barrier and tested for sensitivity to the efficiency of the action. These infants showed heightened attention when the agent reached inefficiently for a goal object; in contrast, infants who lacked successful reaching experience did not differentiate between direct and indirect reaches. Given that the infants could reach directly for objects during training and were given no opportunity to update their actions based on environmental constraints, the training experience itself is unlikely to have provided a basis for learning about action efficiency. We suggest that infants apply a general assumption of efficient action as soon as they have sufficient information (possibly derived from their own action experience) to identify an agent's goal in a given instance.

Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying social learning in infancy: infants' neural processing of the effects of others' actions

Social transmission of knowledge is one of the reasons for human evolutionary success, and it has been suggested that already human infants possess eminent social learning abilities. However, nothing is known about the neurocognitive mechanisms that subserve infants' acquisition of novel action knowledge through the observation of other people's actions and their consequences in the physical world. In an electroencephalogram study on social learning in infancy, we demonstrate that 9-month-old infants represent the environmental effects of others' actions in their own motor system, although they never achieved these effects themselves before. The results provide first insights into the neurocognitive basis of human infants' unique ability for social learning of novel action knowledge.

Parieto-frontal circuits during observation of hidden and visible motor acts in children. A high-density EEG source imaging study

Several studies showed that in the human brain specific premotor and parietal areas are activated during the execution and observation of motor acts. The activation of this premotor-parietal network displaying the so-called Mirror Mechanism (MM) was proposed to underpin basic forms of action understanding. However, the functional properties of the MM in children are still largely unknown. In order to address this issue, we recorded high-density EEG from 12 children (6 female, 6 male; average age 10.5, SD ±2.15). Data were collected when children observed video clips showing hands grasping objects in two different experimental conditions: (1) Full Vision, in which the motor act was fully visible; (2) Hidden, in which the interaction between the hand and the object was not visible. Event-related potentials (ERPs) and topographic map analyses were used to investigate the temporal pattern of the ERPs and their brain source of localization, employing a children template of the Montreal Neurological Institute. Results showed that two different parieto-premotor circuits are activated by the observation of object-related hand reaching-to-grasping motor acts in children. The first circuit comprises the ventral premotor and the inferior parietal cortices. The second one comprises the dorsal premotor and superior parietal cortices. The activation of both circuits is differently lateralized and modulated in time, and influenced by the amount of visual information available about the hand grasping-related portion of the observed motor acts.

An investigation of semantic similarity judgments about action and non-action verbs in Parkinson's disease: implications for the Embodied Cognition Framework

The Embodied Cognition Framework maintains that understanding actions requires motor simulations subserved in part by premotor and primary motor regions. This hypothesis predicts that disturbances to these regions should impair comprehension of action verbs but not non-action verbs. We evaluated the performances of 10 patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) and 10 normal comparison (NC) participants on a semantic similarity judgment task (SSJT) that included four classes of action verbs and two classes of non-action verbs. The patients were tested both ON and OFF medication. The most salient results involved the accuracies and reaction times (RTs) for the action verbs taken as a whole and the non-action verbs taken as a whole. With respect to accuracies, the patients did not perform significantly worse than the NC participants for either the action verbs or the non-action verbs, regardless of whether they were ON or OFF their medication. And with respect to RTs, although the patients' responses were significantly slower than those of the NC participants for the action verbs, comparable processing delays were also observed for the non-action verbs; moreover, there was again no notable influence of medication. The major dissociation was therefore not between action and non-action verbs, but rather between accuracies (relatively intact) and RTs (relatively delayed). Overall, the data suggest that semantic similarity judgments for both action and non-action verbs are correct but slow in individuals with PD. These results provide new insights about language processing in PD, and they raise important questions about the explanatory scope of the Embodied Cognition Framework.

How infants look at others' manual interactions: the role of experience

Human actions are often embedded in contexts of social interactions. However, just a few studies that have explored the development of infants' understanding of other people's manual actions do take this variable into account. In this study, 10- and 18-month-old infants were shown three interactive manual actions which the infants could or could not perform themselves. The infants' gaze shifts to the action target were recorded with an eye tracker. The results indicated that 18-month-old infants look faster to the target than their younger counterparts when they observe actions that they can perform themselves. The results suggest that the infants' own capacity to perform an action facilitates understanding of the goal of the action in a social interaction.

Infant Brain Responses to Object Weight: Exploring Goal-Directed Actions and Self-Experience

Recent work has suggested the value of electroencephalographic (EEG) measures in the study of infants' processing of human action. Studies in this area have investigated desynchronization of the sensorimotor mu rhythm during action execution and action observation in infancy. Untested but critical to theory is whether the mu rhythm shows a differential response to actions which share similar goals but have different motor requirements or sensory outcomes. By varying the invisible property of object weight, we controlled for the abstract goal (reach, grasp, and lift the object), while allowing other aspects of the action to vary. The mu response during 14-month-old infants' own executed actions showed a differential hemispheric response between acting on heavier and lighter objects. EEG responses also showed sensitivity to "expected object weight" when infants simply observed an experimenter reach for objects that the infants' prior experience indicated were heavier versus lighter. Crucially, this neural reactivity was predictive - during the observation of the other reaching toward the object, before lifting occurred. This suggests that infants' own self-experience with a particular object's weight influences their processing of others' actions on the object, with implications for developmental social-cognitive neuroscience.

Neural mirroring systems: exploring the EEG μ rhythm in human infancy

How do human children come to understand the actions of other people? What neural systems are associated with the processing of others' actions and how do these systems develop, starting in infancy? These questions span cognitive psychology and developmental cognitive neuroscience, and addressing them has important implications for the study of social cognition. A large amount of research has used behavioral measures to investigate infants' imitation of the actions of other people; a related but smaller literature has begun to use neurobiological measures to study of infants' action representation. Here we focus on experiments employing electroencephalographic (EEG) techniques for assessing mu rhythm desynchronization in infancy, and analyze how this work illuminates the links between action perception and production prior to the onset of language.

Examining functional mechanisms of imitative learning in infancy: does teleological reasoning affect infants' imitation beyond motor resonance?

Recently, researchers have been debating whether infants' selective imitative learning is primarily based on sensorimotor processes (e.g., motor resonance through action perception) or whether inferential processes such as teleological reasoning (i.e., reasoning about the efficiency of others' actions) predominantly explain selective imitation in infancy. The current study directly investigated two different theoretical notions employing the seminal and widely used head touch paradigm. In two conditions, we manipulated whether the action appeared to be efficient while motor resonance was optimized to enhance imitation performance in general. The results showed that infants imitated the target action to the same extent in both conditions irrespective of the action's efficiency. In addition, in both conditions, more infants imitated the head action than in an additional baseline condition or in a condition where the target action was performed by another effector. The results suggest that 14-month-olds do not imitate novel actions according to their apparent efficiency but that motor resonance is an important factor in infants' imitation.

Who needs a referee? How incorrect basketball actions are automatically detected by basketball players' brain

While the existence of a mirror neuron system (MNS) representing and mirroring simple purposeful actions (such as reaching) is known, neural mechanisms underlying the representation of complex actions (such as ballet, fencing, etc.) that are learned by imitation and exercise are not well understood. In this study, correct and incorrect basketball actions were visually presented to professional basketball players and naïve viewers while their EEG was recorded. The participants had to respond to rare targets (unanimated scenes). No category or group differences were found at perceptual level, ruling out the possibility that correct actions might be more visually familiar. Large, anterior N400 responses of event-related brain potentials to incorrectly performed basketball actions were recorded in skilled brains only. The swLORETA inverse solution for incorrect–correct contrast showed that the automatic detection of action ineffectiveness/incorrectness involved the fronto/parietal MNS, the cerebellum, the extra-striate body area, and the superior temporal sulcus.

A review of intentional and cognitive control in autism

Different clinical studies have provided empirical evidence for impairments in cognitive control in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). The challenge arises, however, when trying to specify the neurocognitive mechanisms behind the reported observations of deviant patterns of goal-directed behavior in ASD. Studies trying to test specific assumptions by applying designs that are based on a more controlled experimental conditions often fail in providing strong evidence for an impairment in specific cognitive functions. In this review, we summarize and critically reflect on behavioral findings and their theoretical explanations regarding cognitive control processing in autism, also from a developmental perspective. The specific focus of this review is the recent evidence of deficits in intentional control – a specific subset of cognitive control processes that biases the choice of our behavioral goals – coming from different research fields. We relate this evidence to the cognitive rigidity observed in ASD and argue that individuals with ASD experience problems at the intentional level rather than at the level of implementation of intentions. Both these processes are related to cognitive control mechanisms but in different ways. Finally, we discuss new directions in studying cognitive control in ASD and how these relate to adaptive cognition.

The mirror mechanism and mu rhythm in social development

Since the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the monkey there has been a renewed interest in motor theories of cognitive and social development in humans by providing a potential neural mechanism underlying an action observation/execution matching system. It has been proposed that this system plays a fundamental role in the development of complex social and cognitive behaviors such as imitation and action recognition. In this review we discuss what is known about MNs from the work using single-cell recordings in the adult monkey, the evidence for the putative MN system in humans, and the extent to which research using electroencephalography (EEG) methods has contributed to our understanding of the development of these motor systems and their role in the social behaviors postulated by the MN hypothesis. We conclude with directions for future research that will improve our understanding of the putative human MN system and the functional role of MNs in social development.

The utility of EEG band power analysis in the study of infancy and early childhood

Research employing electroencephalographic (EEG) techniques with infants and young children has flourished in recent years due to increased interest in understanding the neural processes involved in early social and cognitive development. This review focuses on the functional characteristics of the alpha, theta, and gamma frequency bands in the developing EEG. Examples of how analyses of EEG band power have been applied to specific lines of developmental research are also discussed. These examples include recent work on the infant mu rhythm and action processing, frontal alpha asymmetry and approach-withdrawal tendencies, and EEG power measures in the study of early psychosocial adversity.

What can other animals tell us about human social cognition? An evolutionary perspective on reflective and reflexive processing

Human neuroscience has seen a recent boom in studies on reflective, controlled, explicit social cognitive functions like imitation, perspective-taking, and empathy. The relationship of these higher-level functions to lower-level, reflexive, automatic, implicit functions is an area of current research. As the field continues to address this relationship, we suggest that an evolutionary, comparative approach will be useful, even essential. There is a large body of research on reflexive, automatic, implicit processes in animals. A growing perspective sees social cognitive processes as phylogenically continuous, making findings in other species relevant for understanding our own. One of these phylogenically continuous processes appears to be self-other matching or simulation. Mice are more sensitive to pain after watching other mice experience pain; geese experience heart rate increases when seeing their mate in conflict; and infant macaques, chimpanzees, and humans automatically mimic adult facial expressions. In this article, we review findings in different species that illustrate how such reflexive processes are related to (“higher order”) reflexive processes, such as cognitive empathy, theory of mind, and learning by imitation. We do so in the context of self-other matching in three different domains—in the motor domain (somatomotor movements), in the perceptual domain (eye movements and cognition about visual perception), and in the autonomic/emotional domain. We also review research on the developmental origin of these processes and their neural bases across species. We highlight gaps in existing knowledge and point out some questions for future research. We conclude that our understanding of the psychological and neural mechanisms of self-other mapping and other functions in our own species can be informed by considering the layered complexity these functions in other species.

Action observation in the infant brain: the role of body form and motion

Much research has been carried out to understand how human brains make sense of another agent in motion. Current views based on human adult and monkey studies assume a matching process in the motor system biased toward actions performed by conspecifics and present in the observer's motor repertoire. However, little is known about the neural correlates of action cognition in early ontogeny. In this study, we examined the processes involved in the observation of full body movements in 4-month-old infants using functional near-infrared spectroscopy to measure localized brain activation. In a 2 × 2 design, infants watched human or robotic figures moving in a smooth, familiar human-like manner, or in a rigid, unfamiliar robot-like manner. We found that infant premotor cortex responded more strongly to observe robot-like motion compared with human-like motion. Contrary to current views, this suggests that the infant motor system is flexibly engaged by novel movement patterns. Moreover, temporal cortex responses indicate that infants integrate information about form and motion during action observation. The response patterns obtained in premotor and temporal cortices during action observation in these young infants are very similar to those reported for adults. These findings thus suggest that the brain processes involved in the analysis of an agent in motion in adults become functionally specialized very early in human development.

Neural correlates of being imitated: an EEG study in preverbal infants

A foundational aspect of early social-emotional development is the ability to detect and respond to the actions of others who are coordinating their behavior with that of the self. Behavioral work in this area has found that infants show particular preferences for adults who are imitating them rather than adults who are carrying out noncontingent or mismatching actions. Here, we explore the neural processes related to this tendency of infants to prefer others who act like the self. Electroencephalographic (EEG) signals were recorded from 14-month-old infants while they were observing actions that either matched or mismatched the action the infant had just executed. Desynchronization of the EEG mu rhythm was greater when infants observed an action that matched their own most recently executed action. This effect was strongest immediately prior to the culmination of the goal of the observed action, which is consistent with recent ideas about the predictive nature of brain responses during action observation.

Neural correlates of action understanding in infants: influence of motor experience

Mirror neurons are recognized as a crucial aspect of motor and social learning yet we know little about their origins and development. Two competing hypotheses are highlighted in the literature. One suggests that mirror neurons may be innate and are an adaptation for action understanding. The alternative, proposes that mirror neurons develop through sensorimotor experience. To date, there has been little direct evidence from infant studies to support either argument. In the present study, we explored the temporal dynamics and spatial distribution of electroencephalography (EEG) brain responses in young infants during the observation of three distinct types of actions: (a) actions that are within the motor repertoire of infants, (b) actions that are not within the motor repertoire of infants, and (c) object motion. We show that young infants had significant motor resonance to all types of actions in the sensorimotor regions. Only observation of human goal-directed actions led to significant responses in the parietal regions. Importantly, there was no significant mu desychronization observed in the temporal regions under any observation condition. In addition, the onset of mu desychronization occurred earliest in response to object motion, followed by reaching, and finally walking. Our results suggest that the infants may have a basic, experience-independent sensorimotor mechanism optimized to detect all coherent motion that is modulated by experience.

Searching for roots of entrainment and joint action in early musical interactions

When people play music and dance together, they engage in forms of musical joint action that are often characterized by a shared sense of rhythmic timing and affective state (i.e., temporal and affective entrainment). In order to understand the origins of musical joint action, we propose a model in which entrainment is linked to dual mechanisms (motor resonance and action simulation), which in turn support musical behavior (imitation and complementary joint action). To illustrate this model, we consider two generic forms of joint musical behavior: chorusing and turn-taking. We explore how these common behaviors can be founded on entrainment capacities established early in human development, specifically during musical interactions between infants and their caregivers. If the roots of entrainment are found in early musical interactions which are practiced from childhood into adulthood, then we propose that the rehearsal of advanced musical ensemble skills can be considered to be a refined, mimetic form of temporal and affective entrainment whose evolution begins in infancy.

Sensorimotor Alpha Activity is Modulated in Response to the Observation of Pain in Others

The perception-action account of empathy states that observation of another person's state automatically activates a similar state in the observer. It is still unclear in what way ongoing sensorimotor alpha oscillations are involved in this process. Although they have been repeatedly implicated in (biological) action observation and understanding communicative gestures, less is known about their role in vicarious pain observation. Their role is understood as providing a graded inhibition through functional inhibition, thereby streamlining information flow through the cortex. Although alpha oscillations have been shown to have at least visual and sensorimotor origins, only the latter are expected to be involved in the empathetic response. Here, we used magnetoencephalography, allowing us to spatially distinguish and localize oscillatory components using beamformer source reconstruction. Subjects observed realistic pictures of limbs in painful and no-pain (control) conditions. As predicted, time-frequency analysis indeed showed increased alpha suppression in the pain condition compared to the no-pain condition. Although both pain and no-pain conditions suppressed alpha- and beta-band activity at both posterior and central sensors, the pain condition suppressed alpha more only at central sensors. Source reconstruction localized these differences along the central sulcus. Our results could not be accounted for by differences in the evoked fields, suggesting a unique role of oscillatory activity in empathetic responses. We argue that alpha oscillations provide a unique measure of the underlying functional architecture of the brain, suggesting an automatic disinhibition of the sensorimotor cortices in response to the observation of pain in others.

Development of mu rhythm in infants and preschool children

Mu rhythm is an idling rhythm that originates in the sensorimotor cortex during rest. The frequency of mu rhythm, which is well established in adults, is 8-12 Hz, whereas the limited results available from children suggest a frequency as low as 5.4 Hz at 6 months of age, which gradually increases to the adult value. Understanding the normal development of mu rhythm has important theoretical and clinical implications since we still know very little about this signal in infants and how it develops with age. We measured mu rhythm over the left hemisphere using a pediatric magnetoencephalography (MEG) system in 25 infants (11-47 weeks), 18 preschool children (2-5 years) and 6 adults (20-39 years) for two 5-min sessions during two intermixed conditions: a rest condition in which the hands were at rest, and a prehension condition in which the subject squeezed a pipette with his/her right hand. In all participants, mu rhythm was present over the frontoparietal area during the rest condition, but was clearly suppressed during the prehension condition. Mu rhythm peak frequency, determined from the amplitude spectra, increased rapidly as a function of age from 2.75 Hz at 11 weeks to 8.25 Hz at 47 weeks (r2 = 0.83). It increased very slowly during the preschool period (3.1 ± 0.9 years; 8.5 ± 0.54 Hz). The frequency in these children was, however, lower than in adults (10.3 ± 1.2 Hz). Our results show a rapid maturation in spontaneous mu rhythm during the first year of life.