Internally generated preactivation of single neurons in human medial frontal cortex predicts volition

Teaching brain-machine interfaces as an alternative paradigm to neuroprosthetics control

Brain-machine interfaces (BMI) usually decode movement parameters from cortical activity to control neuroprostheses. This requires subjects to learn to modulate their brain activity to convey all necessary information, thus imposing natural limits on the complexity of tasks that can be performed. Here we demonstrate an alternative and complementary BMI paradigm that overcomes that limitation by decoding cognitive brain signals associated with monitoring processes relevant for achieving goals. In our approach the neuroprosthesis executes actions that the subject evaluates as erroneous or correct, and exploits the brain correlates of this assessment to learn suitable motor behaviours. Results show that, after a short user's training period, this teaching BMI paradigm operated three different neuroprostheses and generalized across several targets. Our results further support that these error-related signals reflect a task-independent monitoring mechanism in the brain, making this teaching paradigm scalable. We anticipate this BMI approach to become a key component of any neuroprosthesis that mimics natural motor control as it enables continuous adaptation in the absence of explicit information about goals. Furthermore, our paradigm can seamlessly incorporate other cognitive signals and conventional neuroprosthetic approaches, invasive or non-invasive, to enlarge the range and complexity of tasks that can be accomplished.

Preconscious Prediction of a Driver's Decision Using Intracranial Recordings

While driving, we make numerous conscious decisions such as route and turn direction selection. Although drivers are held responsible, the neural processes that govern such decisions are not clear. We recorded intracranial EEG signals from six patients engaged in a computer-based driving simulator. Patients decided which way to turn (left/right) and subsequently reported the time of the decision. We show that power modulations of gamma band oscillations (30–100 Hz) preceding the reported time of decision (up to 5.5 sec) allow prediction of decision content with high accuracy (up to 82.4%) on a trial-by-trial basis, irrespective of subsequent motor output. Moreover, these modulations exhibited a spatiotemporal gradient, differentiating left/right decisions earliest in premotor cortices and later in more anterior and lateral regions. Our results suggest a preconscious role for the premotor cortices in early stages of decision-making, which permits foreseeing and perhaps modifying the content of real-life human choices before they are consciously made.

Modulating conscious movement intention by noninvasive brain stimulation and the underlying neural mechanisms

Conscious intention is a fundamental aspect of the human experience. Despite long-standing interest in the basis and implications of intention, its underlying neurobiological mechanisms remain poorly understood. Using high-definition transcranial DC stimulation (tDCS), we observed that enhancing spontaneous neuronal excitability in both the angular gyrus and the primary motor cortex caused the reported time of conscious movement intention to be ∼60-70 ms earlier. Slow brain waves recorded ∼2-3 s before movement onset, as well as hundreds of milliseconds after movement onset, independently correlated with the modulation of conscious intention by brain stimulation. These brain activities together accounted for 81% of interindividual variability in the modulation of movement intention by brain stimulation. A computational model using coupled leaky integrator units with biophysically plausible assumptions about the effect of tDCS captured the effects of stimulation on both neural activity and behavior. These results reveal a temporally extended brain process underlying conscious movement intention that spans seconds around movement commencement.

Free Language Selection in the Bilingual Brain: An Event-Related fMRI Study

Bilingual speakers may select between two languages either on demand (forced language selection) or on their own volition (free language selection). However, the neural substrates underlying free and forced language selection may differ. While the neural substrates underlying forced language selection have been well-explored with language switching paradigms, those underlying free language selection have remained unclear. Using a modified digit-naming switching paradigm, we addressed the neural substrates underlying free language selection by contrasting free language switching with forced language switching. For a digit-pair trial, Chinese-English bilinguals named each digit in Chinese or English either on demand under forced language selection condition or on their own volition under free language selection condition. The results revealed activation in the frontoparietal regions that mediate volition of language selection. Furthermore, a comparison of free and forced language switching demonstrated differences in the patterns of brain activation. Additionally, free language switching showed reduced switching costs as compared to forced language switching. These findings suggest differences between the mechanism(s) underlying free and forced language switching. As such, the current study suggests interactivity between control of volition and control of language switching in free language selection, providing insights into a model of bilingual language control.

The metaphysical lessons of synthetic biology and neuroscience

In this paper, I examine some important metaphysical lessons that are often presented as derived from two new scientific disciplines: synthetic biology and neuroscience. I analyse four of them: the nature of life, the existence of a soul (the mind-body problem), personhood, and free will. Many caveats are in order, and each 'advance' or each case should be assessed for itself. I conclude that a main lesson can nevertheless be learned: in conjunction with modern science, neuroscience and synthetic biology allow us to enrich old metaphysical debates, to deepen and even renew them. In particular, it becomes less and less plausible to consider life, mind, person, and agency as non-natural or non-physical entities.

Neuronal Reward and Decision Signals: From Theories to Data

Rewards are crucial objects that induce learning, approach behavior, choices, and emotions. Whereas emotions are difficult to investigate in animals, the learning function is mediated by neuronal reward prediction error signals which implement basic constructs of reinforcement learning theory. These signals are found in dopamine neurons, which emit a global reward signal to striatum and frontal cortex, and in specific neurons in striatum, amygdala, and frontal cortex projecting to select neuronal populations. The approach and choice functions involve subjective value, which is objectively assessed by behavioral choices eliciting internal, subjective reward preferences. Utility is the formal mathematical characterization of subjective value and a prime decision variable in economic choice theory. It is coded as utility prediction error by phasic dopamine responses. Utility can incorporate various influences, including risk, delay, effort, and social interaction. Appropriate for formal decision mechanisms, rewards are coded as object value, action value, difference value, and chosen value by specific neurons. Although all reward, reinforcement, and decision variables are theoretical constructs, their neuronal signals constitute measurable physical implementations and as such confirm the validity of these concepts. The neuronal reward signals provide guidance for behavior while constraining the free will to act.

The emergence of single neurons in clinical neurology

Single neuron actions and interactions are the sine qua non of brain function, and nearly all diseases and injuries of the CNS trace their clinical sequelae to neuronal dysfunction or failure. Remarkably, discussion of neuronal activity is largely absent in clinical neuroscience. Advances in neurotechnology and computational capabilities, accompanied by shifts in theoretical frameworks, have led to renewed interest in the information represented by single neurons. Using direct interfaces with the nervous system, millisecond-scale information will soon be extracted from single neurons in clinical environments, supporting personalized treatment of neurologic and psychiatric disease. In this Perspective, we focus on single-neuronal activity in restoring communication and motor control in patients suffering from devastating neurological injuries. We also explore the single neuron's role in epilepsy and movement disorders, surgical anesthesia, and in cognitive processes disrupted in neurodegenerative and neuropsychiatric disease. Finally, we speculate on how technological advances will revolutionize neurotherapeutics.

The neural correlates of movement intentions: A pilot study comparing hypnotic and simulated paralysis

The distinct feeling of wanting to act and thereby causing our own actions is crucial to our self-perception as free human agents. Disturbances of the link between intention and action occur in several disorders. Little is known, however, about the neural correlates of wanting or intending to act. To investigate these for simple voluntary movements, we used a paradigm involving hypnotic paralysis and functional magnetic resonance imaging. Eight healthy women were instructed to sequentially perform left and right hand movements during a normal condition, as well as during simulated weakness, simulated paralysis and hypnotic paralysis of the right hand. Right frontopolar cortex was selectively hypoactivated for attempted right hand movement during simulated paralysis while it was active in all other conditions. Since simulated paralysis was the only condition lacking an intention to move, the activation in frontopolar cortex might be related to the intention or volition to move.

Decoding speech perception from single cell activity in humans

Deciphering the content of continuous speech is a challenging task performed daily by the human brain. Here, we tested whether activity of single cells in auditory cortex could be used to support such a task. We recorded neural activity from auditory cortex of two neurosurgical patients while presented with a short video segment containing speech. Population spiking activity (~20 cells per patient) allowed detection of word onset and decoding the identity of perceived words with significantly high accuracy levels. Oscillation phase of local field potentials (8-12Hz) also allowed decoding word identity although with lower accuracy levels. Our results provide evidence that the spiking activity of a relatively small population of cells in human primary auditory cortex contains significant information for classification of words in ongoing speech. Given previous evidence for overlapping neural representation during speech perception and production, this may have implications for developing brain-machine interfaces for patients with deficits in speech production.

Stimulus onset predictability modulates proactive action control in a Go/No-go task

The aim of the study was to evaluate whether the presence/absence of visual cues specifying the onset of an upcoming, action-related stimulus modulates pre-stimulus brain activity, associated with the proactive control of goal-directed actions. To this aim we asked 12 subjects to perform an equal probability Go/No-go task with four stimulus configurations in two conditions: (1) uncued, i.e., without any external information about the timing of stimulus onset; and (2) cued, i.e., with external visual cues providing precise information about the timing of stimulus onset. During task both behavioral performance and event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Behavioral results showed faster response times in the cued than uncued condition, confirming existing literature. ERPs showed novel results in the proactive control stage, that started about 1 s before the motor response. We observed a slow rising prefrontal positive activity, more pronounced in the cued than the uncued condition. Further, also pre-stimulus activity of premotor areas was larger in cued than uncued condition. In the post-stimulus period, the P3 amplitude was enhanced when the time of stimulus onset was externally driven, confirming that external cueing enhances processing of stimulus evaluation and response monitoring. Our results suggest that different pre-stimulus processing come into play in the two conditions. We hypothesize that the large prefrontal and premotor activities recorded with external visual cues index the monitoring of the external stimuli in order to finely regulate the action.

Adult cortical plasticity studied with chronically implanted electrode arrays

The functional architecture of adult cerebral cortex retains a capacity for experience-dependent change. This is seen after focal binocular lesions as rapid changes in receptive field (RF) of the lesion projection zone (LPZ) in the primary visual cortex (V1). To study the dynamics of the circuitry underlying these changes longitudinally, we implanted microelectrode arrays in macaque (Macaca mulatta) V1, eliminating the possibility of sampling bias, which was a concern in previous studies. With this method, we observed a rapid initial recovery in the LPZ and, during the following weeks, 63-89% of the sites in the LPZ showed recovery of visual responses with significant position tuning. The RFs shifted ∼3° away from the scotoma. In the absence of a lesion, visual stimulation surrounding an artificial scotoma did not elicit visual responses, suggesting that the postlesion RF shifts resulted from cortical reorganization. Interestingly, although both spikes and LFPs gave consistent prelesion position tuning, only spikes reflected the postlesion remapping.

Spectral Signatures of Saccade Target Selection

Action generation relies on a widely distributed network of brain areas. However, little is known about the spatiotemporal dynamics of neuronal activity in the network that gives rise to voluntary action in humans. Here, we used magnetoencephalography (MEG) and source analysis (n = 15, 7 female subjects) to investigate the spectral signatures of human cortical networks engaged in active and intrinsically motivated viewing behavior. We compared neuronal activity of externally cued saccades with saccades to freely chosen targets. For planning and execution of both saccade types, we found an increase in gamma band (~64-128 Hz) activity and a concurrent decrease in beta band (~12-32 Hz) activity in saccadic control areas, including the intraparietal sulcus and the frontal eye fields. Guided compared to voluntary actions were accompanied by stronger transient increases in the gamma and low frequency (<16 Hz) range immediately following the instructional cue. In contrast, action selection between competing alternatives was reflected by stronger sustained fronto-parietal gamma increases that occurred later in time and persisted until movement execution. This sustained enhancement for free target selection was accompanied by a spatially widespread reduction of lower frequency power (~8-45 Hz) in parietal and extrastriate areas. Our results suggest that neuronal population activity in the gamma frequency band in a distributed network of fronto-parietal areas reflects the intrinsically driven process of selection among competing behavioral alternatives.

Sequential activation of premotor, primary somatosensory and primary motor areas in humans during cued finger movements

OBJECTIVE

Human voluntary movements are a final product of complex interactions between multiple sensory, cognitive and motor areas of central nervous system. The objective was to investigate temporal sequence of activation of premotor (PM), primary motor (M1) and somatosensory (S1) areas during cued finger movements.

METHODS

Electrocorticography (ECoG) was used to measure activation timing in human PM, S1, and M1 neurons in preparation for finger movements in 5 subjects with subdural grids for seizure localization. Cortical activation was determined by the onset of high gamma (HG) oscillation (70-150Hz). The three cortical regions were mapped anatomically using a common brain atlas and confirmed independently with direct electrical cortical stimulation, somatosensory evoked potentials and detection of HG response to tactile stimulation. Subjects were given visual cues to flex each finger or pinch the thumb and index finger. Movements were captured with a dataglove and time-locked with ECoG. A windowed covariance metric was used to identify the rising slope of HG power between two electrodes and compute time lag. Statistical constraints were applied to the time estimates to combat the noise. Rank sum testing was used to verify the sequential activation of cortical regions across 5 subjects.

RESULTS

In all 5 subjects, HG activation in PM preceded S1 by an average of 53±13ms (P=0.03), PM preceded M1 by 180±40ms (P=0.001) and S1 activation preceded M1 by 136±40ms (P=0.04).

CONCLUSIONS

Sequential HG activation of PM, S1 and M1 regions in preparation for movements is reported. Activity in S1 prior to any overt body movements supports the notion that these neurons may encode sensory information in anticipation of movements, i.e., an efference copy. Our analysis suggests that S1 modulation likely originates from PM.

SIGNIFICANCE

First electrophysiological evidence of efference copy in humans.

Should I stay or should I go? Conceptual underpinnings of goal-directed actions

All actions, even the simplest like moving an arm to grasp a pen, are associated with energy costs. Thus all mobile organisms possess the ability to evaluate resources and select those behaviors that are most likely to lead to the greatest accrual of valuable items (reward) in the near or, especially in the case of humans, distant future. The evaluation process is performed at all possible stages of the series of decisions that lead to the building of a goal-directed action or to its suppression. This is because all animals have a limited amount of energy and resources; to survive and be able to reproduce they have to minimize the costs and maximize the outcomes of their actions. These computations are at the root of behavioral flexibility. Two executive functions play a major role in generating flexible behaviors: (i) the ability to predict future outcomes of goal-directed actions; and (ii) the ability to cancel them when they are unlikely to accomplish valuable results. These two processes operate continuously during the entire course of a movement: during its genesis, its planning and even its execution, so that the motor output can be modulated or suppressed at any time before its execution. In this review, functional interactions of the extended neural network subserving generation and inhibition of goal-directed movements will be outlined, leading to the intriguing hypothesis that the performance of actions and their suppression are not specified by independent sets of brain regions. Rather, it will be proposed that acting and stopping are functions emerging from specific interactions between largely overlapping brain regions, whose activity is intimately linked (directly or indirectly) to the evaluations of pros and cons of an action. Such mechanism would allow the brain to perform as a highly efficient and flexible system, as different functions could be computed exploiting the same components operating in different configurations.

Neural antecedents of self-initiated actions in secondary motor cortex

The neural origins of spontaneous or self-initiated actions are not well understood and their interpretation is controversial. To address these issues, we used a task in which rats decide when to abort waiting for a delayed tone. We recorded neurons in the secondary motor cortex (M2) and interpreted our findings in light of an integration-to-bound decision model. A first population of M2 neurons ramped to a constant threshold at rates proportional to waiting time, strongly resembling integrator output. A second population, which we propose provide input to the integrator, fired in sequences and showed trial-to-trial rate fluctuations correlated with waiting times. An integration model fit to these data also quantitatively predicted the observed inter-neuronal correlations. Together, these results reinforce the generality of the integration-to-bound model of decision-making. These models identify the initial intention to act as the moment of threshold crossing while explaining how antecedent subthreshold neural activity can influence an action without implying a decision.

Individual differences in attributional style but not in interoceptive sensitivity, predict subjective estimates of action intention

The debate on the existence of free will is on-going. Seminal findings by Libet et al. (1983) demonstrate that subjective awareness of a voluntary urge to act (the W-judgment) occurs before action execution. Libet's paradigm requires participants to perform voluntary actions while watching a clock hand rotate. On response trials, participants make a retrospective judgment related to awareness of their urge to act. This research investigates the relationship between individual differences in performance on the Libet task and self-awareness. We examined the relationship between W-judgment, attributional style (AS; a measure of perceived control) and interoceptive sensitivity (IS; awareness of stimuli originating from one's body; e.g., heartbeats). Thirty participants completed the AS questionnaire (ASQ), a heartbeat estimation task (IS), and the Libet paradigm. The ASQ score significantly predicted performance on the Libet task, while IS did not - more negative ASQ scores indicated larger latency between W-judgment and action execution. A significant correlation was also observed between ASQ score and IS. This is the first research to report a relationship between W-judgment and AS and should inform the future use of electroencephalography (EEG) to investigate the relationship between AS, W-judgment and RP onset. Our findings raise questions surrounding the importance of one's perceived control in determining the point of conscious intention to act. Furthermore, we demonstrate possible negative implications associated with a longer period between conscious awareness and action execution.

The neuroscience of free will: implications for psychiatry

Belief in free will has been a mainstay in philosophy throughout history, grounded in large part in our intuitive sense that we consciously control our actions and could have done otherwise. However, psychology and psychiatry have long sought to uncover mechanistic explanations for human behavior that challenge the notion of free will. In recent years, neuroscientific discoveries have produced a model of volitional behavior that is at odds with the notion of contra-causal free will and our sense of conscious agency. Volitional behavior instead appears to have antecedents in unconscious brain activity that is localizable to specific neuroanatomical structures. Updating notions of free will in favor of a continuous model of volitional self-control provides a useful paradigm to conceptualize and study some forms of psychopathology such as addiction and impulse control disorders. Similarly, thinking of specific symptoms of schizophrenia as disorders of agency may help to elucidate mechanisms of psychosis. Beyond clinical understanding and etiological research, a neuroscientific model of volitional behavior has the potential to modernize forensic notions of responsibility and criminal punishment in order to inform public policy. Ultimately, moving away from the language of free will towards the language of volitional control may result in an enhanced understanding of the very nature of ourselves.

Intentions and voluntary actions: reframing the problem

Nachev and Hacker are justified in drawing our attention to the importance of conceptual clarity and coherence as these are too often overshadowed by technical sophistication and methodological rigor, which by themselves count for little. But can a process of "conceptual analysis" actually help us to avoid pitfalls, or does it merely serve to expose those pitfalls in hindsight? What is needed is a method for making scientific arguments formulaic and laying bare the implicit assumptions. We have tools for this, but not everyone uses them.

Beyond the "urge to move": objective measures for the study of agency in the post-Libet era

The investigation of human volition is a longstanding endeavor from both philosophers and researchers. Yet because of the major challenges associated with capturing voluntary movements in an ecologically relevant state in the research environment, it is only in recent years that human agency has grown as a field of cognitive neuroscience. In particular, the seminal work of Libet et al. (1983) paved the way for a neuroscientific approach to agency. Over the past decade, new objective paradigms have been developed to study agency, drawing upon emerging concepts from cognitive and computational neuroscience. These include the chronometric approach of Libet's study which is embedded in the "intentional binding" paradigm, optimal motor control theory and most recent insights from active inference theory. Here we review these principal methods and their application to the study of agency in health and the insights gained from their application to neurological and psychiatric disorders. We show that the neuropsychological paradigms that are based upon these new approaches have key advantages over traditional experimental designs. We propose that these advantages, coupled with advances in neuroimaging, create a powerful set of tools for understanding human agency and its neurobiological basis.

The acute brain response to levodopa heralds dyskinesias in Parkinson disease

Objective

In Parkinson disease (PD), long‐term treatment with the dopamine precursor levodopa gradually induces involuntary “dyskinesia” movements. The neural mechanisms underlying the emergence of levodopa‐induced dyskinesias in vivo are still poorly understood. Here, we applied functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to map the emergence of peak‐of‐dose dyskinesias in patients with PD.

Methods

Thirteen PD patients with dyskinesias and 13 PD patients without dyskinesias received 200mg fast‐acting oral levodopa following prolonged withdrawal from their normal dopaminergic medication. Immediately before and after levodopa intake, we performed fMRI, while patients produced a mouse click with the right or left hand or no action (No‐Go) contingent on 3 arbitrary cues. The scan was continued for 45 minutes after levodopa intake or until dyskinesias emerged.

Results

During No‐Go trials, PD patients who would later develop dyskinesias showed an abnormal gradual increase of activity in the presupplementary motor area (preSMA) and the bilateral putamen. This hyperactivity emerged during the first 20 minutes after levodopa intake. At the individual level, the excessive No‐Go activity in the predyskinesia period predicted whether an individual patient would subsequently develop dyskinesias (p < 0.001) as well as severity of their day‐to‐day symptomatic dyskinesias (p < 0.001).

Interpretation

PD patients with dyskinesias display an immediate hypersensitivity of preSMA and putamen to levodopa, which heralds the failure of neural networks to suppress involuntary dyskinetic movements. Ann Neurol 2014;75:829–836

Deliberation and commitment in the premotor and primary motor cortex during dynamic decision making

Neurophysiological studies of decision making have primarily focused on decisions about information that is stable over time. However, during natural behavior, animals make decisions in a constantly changing environment. To investigate the neural mechanisms of such dynamic choices, we recorded activity in dorsal premotor (PMd) and primary motor cortex (M1) while monkeys performed a two-choice reaching task in which sensory information about the correct choice was changing within each trial and the decision could be made at any time. During deliberation, activity in both areas did not integrate sensory information but instead tracked it and combined it with a growing urgency signal. Approximately 280 ms before movement onset, PMd activity tuned to the selected target reached a consistent peak while M1 activity tuned to the unselected target was suppressed. We propose that this reflects the resolution of a competition between the potential responses and constitutes the volitional commitment to an action choice.

Spontaneous neural fluctuations predict decisions to attend

Ongoing variability in neural signaling is an intrinsic property of the brain. Often this variability is considered to be noise and ignored. However, an alternative view is that this variability is fundamental to perception and cognition and may be particularly important in decision-making. Here, we show that a momentary measure of occipital alpha-band power (8-13 Hz) predicts choices about where human participants will focus spatial attention on a trial-by-trial basis. This finding provides evidence for a mechanistic account of decision-making by demonstrating that ongoing neural activity biases voluntary decisions about where to attend within a given moment.

Can brain scans prove criminals unaccountable?

Leonard Berlin reports that neuroscientific data play an increasing role in court. They have been used to argue that criminals are not morally responsible for their behaviour because their brains are 'faulty', and there is evidence that such data lead judges to pass more lenient sentences. I raise two concerns about the view that neuroscience can show criminals not to be morally responsible: That the brains of (say) violent criminals differ from most people's brains does not straightforwardly show that violent criminals are less morally responsible. Behavioral states arise inter alia from brain states, and since violent criminals' behavioral states differ from those of most people, it is unsurprising that violent criminals' brains should differ from most people's brains. This no more shows violent criminals to have diminished moral responsibility than differences between the brains of cheerful and uncheerful people show either group to have diminished moral responsibility.Those who view brain abnormalities as evidence of reduced moral responsibility rely on the assumptions that people with normal brains have free will and that we know what sorts of brain activity undermine free will. However, both of these assumptions are highly controversial. As a result, neuroscience is not a reliable source of information about moral responsibility. I conclude that, until we settle whether and under what circumstances brain activity is incompatible with free will, neuroscience cannot tell us anything useful about criminal accountability.

Unconscious influences on decision making: a critical review

To what extent do we know our own minds when making decisions? Variants of this question have preoccupied researchers in a wide range of domains, from mainstream experimental psychology (cognition, perception, social behavior) to cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics. A pervasive view places a heavy explanatory burden on an intelligent cognitive unconscious, with many theories assigning causally effective roles to unconscious influences. This article presents a novel framework for evaluating these claims and reviews evidence from three major bodies of research in which unconscious factors have been studied: multiple-cue judgment, deliberation without attention, and decisions under uncertainty. Studies of priming (subliminal and primes-to-behavior) and the role of awareness in movement and perception (e.g., timing of willed actions, blindsight) are also given brief consideration. The review highlights that inadequate procedures for assessing awareness, failures to consider artifactual explanations of "landmark" results, and a tendency to uncritically accept conclusions that fit with our intuitions have all contributed to unconscious influences being ascribed inflated and erroneous explanatory power in theories of decision making. The review concludes by recommending that future research should focus on tasks in which participants' attention is diverted away from the experimenter's hypothesis, rather than the highly reflective tasks that are currently often employed.

How thoughts give rise to action - conscious motor intention increases the excitability of target-specific motor circuits

The present study shows evidence for conscious motor intention in motor preparation prior to movement execution. We demonstrate that conscious motor intention of directed movement, combined with minimally supra-threshold transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the motor cortex, determines the direction and the force of resulting movements, whilst a lack of intention results in weak and omni-directed muscle activation.

We investigated changes of consciously intended goal directed movements by analyzing amplitudes of motor-evoked potentials of the forearm muscle, flexor carpi radialis (FCR), and extensor carpi radialis (ECR), induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation over the right motor cortex and their motor outcome. Right-handed subjects were asked to develop a strong intention to move their left wrist (flexion or extension), without any overt motor output at the wrist, prior to brain stimulation.

Our analyses of hand acceleration and electromyography showed that during the strong motor intention of wrist flexion movement, it evoked motor potential responses that were significantly larger in the FCR muscle than in the ECR, whilst the opposite was true for an extension movement. The acceleration data on flexion/extension corresponded to this finding. Under no-intention conditions again, which served as a reference for motor evoked potentials, brain stimulation resulted in undirected and minimally simultaneous extension/flexion innervation and virtually no movement.

These results indicate that conscious intentions govern motor function, which in turn shows that a neuronal activation representing an “intention network” in the human brain pre-exists, and that it functionally represents target specific motor circuits. Until today, it was unclear whether conscious motor intention exists prior to movement, or whether the brain constructs such an intention after movement initiation. Our study gives evidence that motor intentions become aware before any motor execution.

What makes the dorsomedial frontal cortex active during reading the mental states of others?

The dorsomedial frontal part of the cerebral cortex is consistently activated when people read the mental states of others, such as their beliefs, desires, and intentions, the ability known as having a theory of mind (ToM) or mentalizing. This ubiquitous finding has led many researchers to conclude that the dorsomedial frontal cortex (DMFC) constitutes a core component in mentalizing networks. Despite this, it remains unclear why the DMFC becomes active during ToM tasks. We argue that key psychological and behavioral aspects in mentalizing are closely associated with DMFC functions. These include executive inhibition, distinction between self and others, prediction under uncertainty, and perception of intentions, all of which are important for predicting others' intention and behavior. We review the literature supporting this claim, ranging in fields from developmental psychology to human neuroimaging and macaque electrophysiology. Because perceiving intentions in others' actions initiates mentalizing and forms the basis of virtually all types of social interaction, the fundamental issue in social neuroscience is to determine the aspects of physical entities that make an observer perceive that they are intentional beings and to clarify the neurobiological underpinnings of the perception of intentionality in others' actions.

The medial frontal-prefrontal network for altered awareness and control of action in corticobasal syndrome

The volitional impairments of alien limb and apraxia are a defining feature of the corticobasal syndrome, but a limited understanding of their neurocognitive aetiology has hampered progress towards effective treatments. Here we combined several key methods to investigate the mechanism of impairments in voluntary action in corticobasal syndrome. We used a quantitative measure of awareness of action that is based on well-defined processes of motor control; structural and functional anatomical information; and evaluation against the clinical volitional disorders of corticobasal syndrome. In patients and healthy adults we measured ‘intentional binding’, the perceived temporal attraction between voluntary actions and their sensory effects. Patients showed increased binding of the perceived time of actions towards their effects. This increase correlated with the severity of alien limb and apraxia, which we suggest share a core deficit in motor control processes, through reduced precision in voluntary action signals. Structural neuroimaging analyses showed the behavioural variability in patients was related to changes in grey matter volume in pre-supplementary motor area, and changes in its underlying white matter tracts to prefrontal cortex. Moreover, changes in functional connectivity at rest between the pre-supplementary motor area and prefrontal cortex were proportional to changes in binding. These behavioural, structural and functional results converge to reveal the frontal network for altered awareness and control of voluntary action in corticobasal syndrome, and provide candidate markers to evaluate new therapies.

Predeliberation activity in prefrontal cortex and striatum and the prediction of subsequent value judgment

Rational, value-based decision-making mandates selecting the option with highest subjective expected value after appropriate deliberation. We examined activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and striatum of monkeys deciding between smaller, immediate rewards and larger, delayed ones. We previously found neurons that modulated their activity in this task according to the animal's choice, while it deliberated (choice neurons). Here we found neurons whose spiking activities were predictive of the spatial location of the selected target (spatial-bias neurons) or the size of the chosen reward (reward-bias neurons) before the onset of the cue presenting the decision-alternatives, and thus before rational deliberation could begin. Their predictive power increased as the values the animals associated with the two decision alternatives became more similar. The ventral striatum (VS) preferentially contained spatial-bias neurons; the caudate nucleus (CD) preferentially contained choice neurons. In contrast, the DLPFC contained significant numbers of all three neuron types, but choice neurons were not preferentially also bias neurons of either kind there, nor were spatial-bias neurons preferentially also choice neurons, and vice versa. We suggest a simple winner-take-all (WTA) circuit model to account for the dissociation of choice and bias neurons. The model reproduced our results and made additional predictions that were borne out empirically. Our data are compatible with the hypothesis that the DLPFC and striatum harbor dissociated neural populations that represent choices and predeliberation biases that are combined after cue onset; the bias neurons have a weaker effect on the ultimate decision than the choice neurons, so their influence is progressively apparent for trials where the values associated with the decision alternatives are increasingly similar.

Multiple aspects of neural activity during reaching preparation in the medial posterior parietal area V6A

The posterior parietal cortex is involved in the visuomotor transformations occurring during arm-reaching movements. The medial posterior parietal area V6A has been shown to be implicated in reaching execution, but its role in reaching preparation has not been sufficiently investigated. Here, we addressed this issue exploring the neural correlates of reaching preparation in V6A. Neural activity of single cells during the instructed delay period of a foveated Reaching task was compared with the activity in the same delay period during a Detection task. In this latter task, animals fixated the target but, instead of performing an arm reaching movement, they responded with a button release to the go signal. Targets were allocated in different positions in 3-D space. We found three types of neurons: cells where delay activity was equally spatially tuned in the two tasks (Gaze cells), cells spatially tuned only during reaching preparation (Set cells), and cells influenced by both gaze and reaching preparation signals (Gaze/Set cells). In cells influenced by reaching preparation, the delay activity in the Reaching task could be higher or lower compared with the Detection task. All the Set cells and a minority of Gaze/Set cells were more active during reaching preparation. Most cells modulated by movement preparation were also modulated with a congruent spatial tuning during movement execution. Present results highlight the convergence of visuospatial information, reach planning and reach execution signals on V6A, and indicate that visuospatial processing and movement execution have a larger influence on V6A activity than the encoding of reach plans.

The beneficial effects of meditation: contribution of the anterior cingulate and locus coeruleus

During functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of meditation the cortical salience detecting and executive networks become active during "awareness of mind wandering," "shifting," and "sustained attention." The anterior cingulate (AC) is activated during "awareness of mind wandering." The AC modulates both the peripheral sympathetic nervous system (SNS) and the central locus coeruleus (LC) norepinephrine systems, which form the principal neuromodulatory system, regulating in multiple ways both neuronal and non-neuronal cells to maximize adaptation in changing environments. The LC is the primary source of central norepinephrine (C-NE) and nearly the exclusive source of cortical norepinephrine. Normally activated by novel or salient stimuli, the AC initially inhibits the SNS reflexively, lowering peripheral norepinephrine and activates the LC, increasing C-NE. Moderate levels of C-NE enhance working memory through alpha 2 adrenergic receptors, while higher levels of C-NE, acting on alpha 1 and beta receptors, enhance other executive network functions such as the stopping of ongoing behavior, attentional set-shifting, and sustained attention. The actions of the AC on both the central and peripheral noradrenergic systems are implicated in the beneficial effects of meditation. This paper will explore some of the known functions and interrelationships of the AC, SNS, and LC with respect to their possible relevance to meditation.

Corticospinal neuroprostheses to restore locomotion after spinal cord injury

In this conceptual review, we highlight our strategy for, and progress in the development of corticospinal neuroprostheses for restoring locomotor functions and promoting neural repair after thoracic spinal cord injury in experimental animal models. We specifically focus on recent developments in recording and stimulating neural interfaces, decoding algorithms, extraction of real-time feedback information, and closed-loop control systems. Each of these complex neurotechnologies plays a significant role for the design of corticospinal neuroprostheses. Even more challenging is the coordinated integration of such multifaceted technologies into effective and practical neuroprosthetic systems to improve movement execution, and augment neural plasticity after injury. In this review we address our progress in rodent animal models to explore the viability of a technology-intensive strategy for recovery and repair of the damaged nervous system. The technical, practical, and regulatory hurdles that lie ahead along the path toward clinical applications are enormous - and their resolution is uncertain at this stage. However, it is imperative that the discoveries and technological developments being made across the field of neuroprosthetics do not stay in the lab, but instead reach clinical fruition at the fastest pace possible.

Neuronal correlates of decisions to speak and act: Spontaneous emergence and dynamic topographies in a computational model of frontal and temporal areas

The neural mechanisms underlying the spontaneous, stimulus-independent emergence of intentions and decisions to act are poorly understood. Using a neurobiologically realistic model of frontal and temporal areas of the brain, we simulated the learning of perception-action circuits for speech and hand-related actions and subsequently observed their spontaneous behaviour. Noise-driven accumulation of reverberant activity in these circuits leads to their spontaneous ignition and partial-to-full activation, which we interpret, respectively, as model correlates of action intention emergence and action decision-and-execution. Importantly, activity emerged first in higher-association prefrontal and temporal cortices, subsequently spreading to secondary and finally primary sensorimotor model-areas, hence reproducing the dynamics of cortical correlates of voluntary action revealed by readiness-potential and verb-generation experiments. This model for the first time explains the cortical origins and topography of endogenous action decisions, and the natural emergence of functional specialisation in the cortex, as mechanistic consequences of neurobiological principles, anatomical structure and sensorimotor experience.

Reticular activating system of a central pattern generator: premovement electrical potentials

For the first time, here we characterize a bulbar reticular activating system (RAS) of neurons in decerebrate, deafferented and decerebellated cats producing a premovement electrical potential that we named obex slow potential (OSP). The OSP occurs about 0.8 ± 0.4 sec prior to the onset of a fictive-scratching-episode. Here, we describe two classes of bulbar neurons, off-on, which are silent but exhibit a 80 ± 56 Hz firing discharge at the beginning of (and during) the OSP, and on-off interneurons, with a 27 ± 14 Hz firing activity that stops at the beginning of (and during) the OSP. We suggest that these OSP-associated neurons belong to a descending RAS, which contributes to the activation of the spinal central pattern generators.

Cognitive control of movement via the cerebellar-recipient thalamus

The cognitive control of behavior was long considered to be centralized in cerebral cortex. More recently, subcortical structures such as cerebellum and basal ganglia have been implicated in cognitive functions as well. The fact that subcortico-cortical circuits for the control of movement involve the thalamus prompts the notion that activity in movement-related thalamus may also reflect elements of cognitive behavior. Yet this hypothesis has rarely been investigated. Using the pathways linking cerebellum to cerebral cortex via the thalamus as a template, we review evidence that the motor thalamus, together with movement-related central thalamus have the requisite connectivity and activity to mediate cognitive aspects of movement control.

Timing and awareness of movement decisions: does consciousness really come too late?

Since Libet's seminal observation that a brain potential related to movement preparation occurs before participants report to be aware of their movement intention, it has been debated whether consciousness has causal influence on movement decisions. Here we review recent advances that provide new insights into the dynamics of human decision-making and question the validity of different markers used for determining the onset of neural and conscious events. Motor decisions involve multiple stages of goal evaluation, intention formation, and action execution. While the validity of the Bereitschaftspotential (BP) as index of neural movement preparation is controversial, improved neural markers are able to predict decision outcome even at early stages. Participants report being conscious of their decisions only at the time of final intention formation, just before the primary motor cortex starts executing the chosen action. However, accumulating evidence suggests that this is an artifact of Libet's clock method used for assessing consciousness. More refined methods suggest that intention consciousness does not appear instantaneously but builds up progressively. In this view, early neural markers of decision outcome are not unconscious but simply reflect conscious goal evaluation stages which are not final yet and therefore not reported with the clock method. Alternatives to the Libet clock are discussed that might allow for assessment of consciousness during decision making with improved sensitivity to early decision stages and with less influence from meta-conscious and perceptual inferences.