Imitation: is cognitive neuroscience solving the correspondence problem?

Cognitive underpinnings of social interaction

Human social interaction is part of what defines us. Here I present an overview of recent studies of imitation, a subdomain of social interaction that can be dissected and examined in a scientific fashion. I use these studies to test two core claims: (a) that there is more than one copying mechanism in the human brain and (b) that mimicry (a form of copying) is particularly relevant for understanding social behaviour. Evidence in favour of the first claim comes from neuroimaging studies that show distinct brain systems for understanding action kinematics, action goals, and irrational actions. Further studies of participants with autism show abnormal copying of irrational actions. Evidence in favour of the second claim comes from behavioural studies of the social cues that prime mimicry and from neuroimaging studies of the pathways involved in this priming. These studies suggest that medial prefrontal cortex has a core role in controlling mimicry responses and support the STORM (social top-down response modulation) model. Future work should determine what organizing principles govern the control of social responses and how these critical mechanisms for interpersonal connection differ in autism.

The Control of Automatic Imitation Based on Bottom–Up and Top–Down Cues to Animacy: Insights from Brain and Behavior

Humans automatically imitate other people's actions during social interactions, building rapport and social closeness in the process. Although the behavioral consequences and neural correlates of imitation have been studied extensively, little is known about the neural mechanisms that control imitative tendencies. For example, the degree to which an agent is perceived as human-like influences automatic imitation, but it is not known how perception of animacy influences brain circuits that control imitation. In the current fMRI study, we examined how the perception and belief of animacy influence the control of automatic imitation. Using an imitation–inhibition paradigm that involves suppressing the tendency to imitate an observed action, we manipulated both bottom–up (visual input) and top–down (belief) cues to animacy. Results show divergent patterns of behavioral and neural responses. Behavioral analyses show that automatic imitation is equivalent when one or both cues to animacy are present but reduces when both are absent. By contrast, right TPJ showed sensitivity to the presence of both animacy cues. Thus, we demonstrate that right TPJ is biologically tuned to control imitative tendencies when the observed agent both looks like and is believed to be human. The results suggest that right TPJ may be involved in a specialized capacity to control automatic imitation of human agents, rather than a universal process of conflict management, which would be more consistent with generalist theories of imitative control. Evidence for specialized neural circuitry that “controls” imitation offers new insight into developmental disorders that involve atypical processing of social information, such as autism spectrum disorders.

Predictive coding accounts of shared representations in parieto-insular networks

The discovery of mirror neurons in the ventral premotor cortex (area F5) and inferior parietal cortex (area PFG) in the macaque monkey brain has provided the physiological evidence for direct matching of the intrinsic motor representations of the self and the visual image of the actions of others. The existence of mirror neurons implies that the brain has mechanisms reflecting shared self and other action representations. This may further imply that the neural basis self-body representations may also incorporate components that are shared with other-body representations. It is likely that such a mechanism is also involved in predicting other's touch sensations and emotions. However, the neural basis of shared body representations has remained unclear. Here, we propose a neural basis of body representation of the self and of others in both human and non-human primates. We review a series of behavioral and physiological findings which together paint a picture that the systems underlying such shared representations require integration of conscious exteroception and interoception subserved by a cortical sensory-motor network involving parieto-inner perisylvian circuits (the ventral intraparietal area [VIP]/inferior parietal area [PFG]-secondary somatosensory cortex [SII]/posterior insular cortex [pIC]/anterior insular cortex [aIC]). Based on these findings, we propose a computational mechanism of the shared body representation in the predictive coding (PC) framework. Our mechanism proposes that processes emerging from generative models embedded in these specific neuronal circuits play a pivotal role in distinguishing a self-specific body representation from a shared one. The model successfully accounts for normal and abnormal shared body phenomena such as mirror-touch synesthesia and somatoparaphrenia. In addition, it generates a set of testable experimental predictions.

Marmosets as model species in neuroscience and evolutionary anthropology

Marmosets are increasingly used as model species by both neuroscientists and evolutionary anthropologists, but with a different rationale for doing so. Whereas neuroscientists stress that marmosets share many cognitive traits with humans due to common descent, anthropologists stress those traits shared with marmosets - and callitrichid monkeys in general - due to convergent evolution, as a consequence of the cooperative breeding system that characterizes both humans and callitrichids. Similarities in socio-cognitive abilities due to convergence, rather than homology, raise the question whether these similarities also extend to the proximate regulatory mechanisms, which is particularly relevant for neuroscientific investigations. In this review, we first provide an overview of the convergent adaptations to cooperative breeding at the psychological and cognitive level in primates, which bear important implications for our understanding of human cognitive evolution. In the second part, we zoom in on two of these convergent adaptations, proactive prosociality and social learning, and compare their proximate regulation in marmosets and humans with regard to oxytocin and cognitive top down regulation. Our analysis suggests considerable similarity in these regulatory mechanisms presumably because the convergent traits emerged due to small motivational changes that define how pre-existing cognitive mechanisms are quantitatively combined. This finding reconciles the prima facie contradictory rationale for using marmosets as high priority model species in neuroscience and anthropology.

The joint Simon effect: a review and theoretical integration

The social or joint Simon effect has been developed to investigate how and to what extent people mentally represent their own and other persons' action/task and how these cognitive representations influence an individual's own behavior when interacting with another person. Here, we provide a review of the available evidence and theoretical frameworks. Based on this review, we suggest a comprehensive theory that integrates aspects of earlier approaches–the Referential Coding Account. This account provides an alternative to the social interpretation of the (joint) go-nogo Simon effect (aka the social Simon effect) and is able to integrate seemingly opposite findings on joint action.

Loudness perception and speech intensity control in Parkinson's disease

The aim of this study was to examine loudness perception in individuals with hypophonia and Parkinson's disease. The participants included 17 individuals with hypophonia related to Parkinson's disease (PD) and 25 age-equivalent controls. The three loudness perception tasks included a magnitude estimation procedure involving a sentence spoken at 60, 65, 70, 75 and 80 dB SPL, an imitation task involving a sentence spoken at 60, 65, 70, 75 and 80 dB SPL, and a magnitude production procedure involving the production of a sentence at five different loudness levels (habitual, two and four times louder and two and four times quieter). The participants with PD produced a significantly different pattern and used a more restricted range than the controls in their perception of speech loudness, imitation of speech intensity, and self-generated estimates of speech loudness. The results support a speech loudness perception deficit in PD involving an abnormal perception of externally generated and self-generated speech intensity.

LEARNING OUTCOMES

Readers will recognize that individuals with hypophonia related to Parkinson's disease may demonstrate a speech loudness perception deficit involving the abnormal perception of externally generated and self-generated speech intensity.

Balancing cognitive control: how observed movements influence motor performance in a task with balance constraints

We investigated the influence of observed movements on executed movements in a task requiring lifting one foot from the floor while maintaining whole-body balance. Sixteen young participants (20-30 years) performed foot lift movements, which were either cued symbolically by a letter (L/R, indicating to lift the left/right foot) or by a short movie showing a foot lift movement. In the symbol cue condition, stimuli from the movie cue condition were used as distractors, and vice versa. Anticipatory postural adjustments (APAs) and actual foot lifts were recorded using force plates and optical motion capture. Foot lift responses were generally faster in response to the movie compared to the symbol cue condition. Moreover, incongruent movement distractors interfered with performance in the symbol cue condition, as shown by longer response times and increased number of APAs. Latencies of the first (potentially wrong) APA in a trial were shorter for movie compared to symbol cues but were not affected by cue-distractor congruency. Amplitude of the first APA was smaller when it was followed by additional APAs compared to trials with a single APA. Our results show that automatic imitation tendencies are integrated with postural control in a task with balance constraints. Analysis of the number, timing and amplitude of APAs indicates that conflicts between intended and observed movements are not resolved at a purely cognitive level but directly influence overt motor performance, emphasizing the intimate link between perception, cognition and action.

Hebbian learning and predictive mirror neurons for actions, sensations and emotions

Spike-timing-dependent plasticity is considered the neurophysiological basis of Hebbian learning and has been shown to be sensitive to both contingency and contiguity between pre- and postsynaptic activity. Here, we will examine how applying this Hebbian learning rule to a system of interconnected neurons in the presence of direct or indirect re-afference (e.g. seeing/hearing one's own actions) predicts the emergence of mirror neurons with predictive properties. In this framework, we analyse how mirror neurons become a dynamic system that performs active inferences about the actions of others and allows joint actions despite sensorimotor delays. We explore how this system performs a projection of the self onto others, with egocentric biases to contribute to mind-reading. Finally, we argue that Hebbian learning predicts mirror-like neurons for sensations and emotions and review evidence for the presence of such vicarious activations outside the motor system.

The left inferior parietal lobe represents stored hand-postures for object use and action prediction

Action semantics enables us to plan actions with objects and to predict others' object-directed actions as well. Previous studies have suggested that action semantics are represented in a fronto-parietal action network that has also been implicated to play a role in action observation. In the present fMRI study it was investigated how activity within this network changes as a function of the predictability of an action involving multiple objects and requiring the use of action semantics. Participants performed an action prediction task in which they were required to anticipate the use of a centrally presented object that could be moved to an associated target object (e.g., hammer—nail). The availability of actor information (i.e., presenting a hand grasping the central object) and the number of possible target objects (i.e., 0, 1, or 2 target objects) were independently manipulated, resulting in different levels of predictability. It was found that making an action prediction based on actor information resulted in an increased activation in the extrastriate body area (EBA) and the fronto-parietal action observation network (AON). Predicting actions involving a target object resulted in increased activation in the bilateral IPL and frontal motor areas. Within the AON, activity in the left inferior parietal lobe (IPL) and the left premotor cortex (PMC) increased as a function of the level of action predictability. Together these findings suggest that the left IPL represents stored hand-postures that can be used for planning object-directed actions and for predicting other's actions as well.

A breath of new life into human social cognition

Sniffing has historically been considered an olfactory behavior because inhalation is a necessary step in odor perception. Growing evidence, however, has demonstrated that the display of sniffing surpasses the bounds of those contexts that are olfactory in nature. In this issue of Chemical Senses, Arzi, Shedlesky, Secundo, and Sobel demonstrate that humans mimic visually and auditory-observed sniffing, independent of experimentally applied olfactory sensory input. These findings raise important and exciting questions about the possible roles of sniffing in the social context and highlight the need for chemosensory researchers to reconsider the significance of sniffing.

Motor imagery during action observation modulates automatic imitation effects in rhythmical actions

We have previously shown that passively observing a task-irrelevant rhythmical action can bias the cycle time of a subsequently executed rhythmical action. Here we use the same paradigm to investigate the impact of different forms of motor imagery (MI) during action observation (AO) on this automatic imitation (AI) effect. Participants saw a picture of the instructed action followed by a rhythmical distractor movie, wherein cycle time was subtly manipulated across trials. They then executed the instructed rhythmical action. When participants imagined performing the instructed action in synchrony with the distractor action (AO + MI), a strong imitation bias was found that was significantly greater than in our previous study. The bias was pronounced equally for compatible and incompatible trials, wherein observed and imagined actions were different in type (e.g., face washing vs. painting) or plane of movement, or both. In contrast, no imitation bias was observed when MI conflicted with AO. In Experiment 2, motor execution synchronized with AO produced a stronger imitation bias compared to AO + MI, showing an advantage in synchronization for overt execution over MI. Furthermore, the bias was stronger when participants synchronized the instructed action with the distractor movie, compared to when they synchronized the distractor action with the distractor movie. Although we still observed a significant bias in the latter condition, this finding indicates a degree of specificity in AI effects for the identity of the synchronized action. Overall, our data show that MI can substantially modulate the effects of AO on subsequent execution, wherein: (1) combined AO + MI can enhance AI effects relative to passive AO; (2) observed and imagined actions can be flexibly coordinated across different action types and planes; and (3) conflicting AO + MI can abolish AI effects. Therefore, combined AO + MI instructions should be considered in motor training and rehabilitation.

EEG sensorimotor correlates of translating sounds into actions

Understanding the actions of others is a necessary foundational cornerstone for effective and affective social interactions. Such understanding may result from a mapping of observed actions as well as heard sounds onto one's own motor representations of those events. To examine the electrophysiological basis of action-related sounds, EEG data were collected in two studies from adults who were exposed to auditory events in one of three categories: action (either hand- or mouth-based sounds), non-action (environmental sounds), and control sounds (scrambled versions of action sounds). In both studies, triplets of sounds of the same category were typically presented, although occasionally, to ensure an attentive state, trials containing a sound from a different category were presented within the triplet and participants were asked to respond to this oddball event either covertly in one study or overtly in another. Additionally, participants in both studies were asked to mimic hand- and mouth-based motor actions associated with the sounds (motor task). Action sounds elicited larger EEG mu rhythm (8–13 Hz) suppression, relative to control sounds, primarily over left hemisphere, while non-action sounds showed larger mu suppression primarily over right hemisphere. Furthermore, hand-based sounds elicited greater mu suppression over the hand area in sensorimotor cortex compared to mouth-based sounds. These patterns of mu suppression across cortical regions to different categories of sounds and to effector-specific sounds suggest differential engagement of a mirroring system in the human brain when processing sounds.

The Linked Dual Representation model of vocal perception and production

The voice is one of the most important media for communication, yet there is a wide range of abilities in both the perception and production of the voice. In this article, we review this range of abilities, focusing on pitch accuracy as a particularly informative case, and look at the factors underlying these abilities. Several classes of models have been posited describing the relationship between vocal perception and production, and we review the evidence for and against each class of model. We look at how the voice is different from other musical instruments and review evidence about both the association and the dissociation between vocal perception and production abilities. Finally, we introduce the Linked Dual Representation (LDR) model, a new approach which can account for the broad patterns in prior findings, including trends in the data which might seem to be countervailing. We discuss how this model interacts with higher-order cognition and examine its predictions about several aspects of vocal perception and production.

Mirror-neuron system recruitment by action observation: effects of focal brain damage on mu suppression

Mu suppression is the attenuation of EEG power in the alpha frequency range (8-12 Hz), recorded over the sensorimotor cortex during execution and observation of motor actions. Based on this dual characteristic mu suppression is thought to signalize activation of a human analogue of the mirror neuron system (MNS) found in macaque monkeys. However, much uncertainty remains concerning its specificity and full significance. To further explore the hypothesized relationship between mu suppression and MNS activation, we investigated how it is affected by damage to cortical regions, including areas where the MNS is thought to reside. EEG was recorded in 33 first-event stroke patients during observation of video clips showing reaching and grasping hand movements. We examined the modulation of EEG oscillations at central and occipital sites, and analyzed separately the lower (8-10 Hz) and higher (10-12 Hz) segments of the alpha/mu range. Suppression was determined relative to observation of a non-biological movement. Normalized lesion data were used to investigate how damage to regions of the fronto-parietal cortex affects the pattern of suppression. The magnitude of mu suppression during action observation was significantly reduced in the affected hemisphere compared to the unaffected hemisphere. Differences between the hemispheres were significant at central (sensorimotor) sites but not at occipital (visual) sites. Total hemispheric volume loss did not correlate with mu suppression. Suppression in the lower mu range in the unaffected hemisphere (C3) correlated with lesion extent within the right inferior parietal cortex. Our lesion study supports the role of mu suppression as a marker of MNS activation, confirming previous studies in normal subjects.

A specific deficit of imitation in autism spectrum disorder

Imitation is a potentially crucial aspect of social cognitive development. Although deficits in imitation ability have been widely demonstrated in autism spectrum disorder (ASD), the specificity and significance of the findings is unclear, due largely to methodological limitations. We developed a novel assessment of imitation ability, using objective movement parameters (path length and action duration) derived from a touch-sensitive tablet laptop during drawing actions on an identical tablet. By direct comparison of the kinematics of a model's actions with those of the participant who observed them, measures of imitation accuracy were obtained. By replaying the end-point of the movement as a spot on the screen, imitation accuracy was compared against a "ghost control" condition, with no human actor but only the end-point of the movement seen [object movement reenactment (OMR)]. Hence, demands of the control task were closely matched to the experimental task with respect to motor, memory, and attentional abilities. Adolescents with ASD showed poorer accuracy for copying object size and action duration on both the imitation and OMR tasks, but were significantly more impaired for imitation of object size. Our results provide evidence that some of the imitation deficit in ASD is specific to a self-other mapping problem, and cannot be explained by general factors such as memory, spatial reasoning, motor control, or attention, nor related to the social demands of the testing situation.

The shared neural basis of empathy and facial imitation accuracy

Empathy involves experiencing emotion vicariously, and understanding the reasons for those emotions. It may be served partly by a motor simulation function, and therefore share a neural basis with imitation (as opposed to mimicry), as both involve sensorimotor representations of intentions based on perceptions of others' actions. We recently showed a correlation between imitation accuracy and Empathy Quotient (EQ) using a facial imitation task and hypothesised that this relationship would be mediated by the human mirror neuron system. During functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), 20 adults observed novel 'blends' of facial emotional expressions. According to instruction, they either imitated (i.e. matched) the expressions or executed alternative, pre-prescribed mismatched actions as control. Outside the scanner we replicated the association between imitation accuracy and EQ. During fMRI, activity was greater during mismatch compared to imitation, particularly in the bilateral insula. Activity during imitation correlated with EQ in somatosensory cortex, intraparietal sulcus and premotor cortex. Imitation accuracy correlated with activity in insula and areas serving motor control. Overlapping voxels for the accuracy and EQ correlations occurred in premotor cortex. We suggest that both empathy and facial imitation rely on formation of action plans (or a simulation of others' intentions) in the premotor cortex, in connection with representations of emotional expressions based in the somatosensory cortex. In addition, the insula may play a key role in the social regulation of facial expression.

Skin color has no impact on motor resonance: evidence from mu rhythm suppression and imitation

It has been suggested that physical similarity with an observed model facilitates action-perception and understanding. Indeed, a number of studies have shown that observing actors of one's own race facilitate motor, sensory and pain resonance, possibly mediated by the human mirror-neuron system (hMNS). However, most of these studies have used stimuli that included emotional or cultural components, hence obscuring the precise contribution of physical similarity to resonance phenomena per se. The goal of the present study was to assess the effect of physical similarity (skin color) on motor resonance using stimuli that have no emotional and cultural components. We used both behavioral (imitation) and electrophysiological measures (mu-rhythm) to assess the effects of skin color on the hMNS during the observation of simple finger movements. Our results show that, in line with previous results, observation of biological movements resulted in faster reaction times and greater mu-rhythm suppression compared to non-biological movements. However, physical similarity did not affect imitation speed or mu-rhythm desynchronization. These results suggest that physical similarity with an observed action in terms of skin color does not modulate hMNS activity, and that the enhanced resonance effects reported in the previous studies are likely attributable to cultural and emotional aspects.

Is it what you do, or when you do it? The roles of contingency and similarity in pro-social effects of imitation

Being imitated has a wide range of pro-social effects, but it is not clear how these effects are mediated. Naturalistic studies of the effects of being imitated have not established whether pro-social outcomes are due to the similarity and/or the contingency between the movements performed by the actor and those of the imitator. Similarity is often assumed to be the active ingredient, but we hypothesized that contingency might also be important, as it produces positive affect in infants and can be detected by phylogenetically ancient mechanisms of associative learning. We manipulated similarity and contingency between performed and observed actions in a computerized task. Similarity had no positive effects; however, contingency resulted in greater enjoyment of the task, reported closeness to others, and helping behavior. These results suggest that the pro-social effects of being imitated may rely on associative mechanisms.

Modeling the minimal newborn's intersubjective mind: the visuotopic-somatotopic alignment hypothesis in the superior colliculus

The question whether newborns possess inborn social skills is a long debate in developmental psychology. Fetal behavioral and anatomical observations show evidences for the control of eye movements and facial behaviors during the third trimester of pregnancy whereas specific sub-cortical areas, like the superior colliculus (SC) and the striatum appear to be functionally mature to support these behaviors. These observations suggest that the newborn is potentially mature for developing minimal social skills. In this manuscript, we propose that the mechanism of sensory alignment observed in SC is particularly important for enabling the social skills observed at birth such as facial preference and facial mimicry. In a computational simulation of the maturing superior colliculus connected to a simulated facial tissue of a fetus, we model how the incoming tactile information is used to direct visual attention toward faces. We suggest that the unisensory superficial visual layer (eye-centered) and the deep somatopic layer (face-centered) in SC are combined into an intermediate layer for visuo-tactile integration and that multimodal alignment in this third layer allows newborns to have a sensitivity to configuration of eyes and mouth. We show that the visual and tactile maps align through a Hebbian learning stage and and strengthen their synaptic links from each other into the intermediate layer. It results that the global network produces some emergent properties such as sensitivity toward the spatial configuration of face-like patterns and the detection of eyes and mouth movement.

Multimodal interactions in typically and atypically developing children: natural versus artificial environments

This review addresses the central role played by multimodal interactions in neurocognitive development. We first analyzed our studies of multimodal verbal and nonverbal cognition and emotional interactions within neuronal, that is, natural environments in typically developing children. We then tried to relate them to the topic of creating artificial environments using mobile toy robots to neurorehabilitate severely autistic children. By doing so, both neural/natural and artificial environments are considered as the basis of neuronal organization and reorganization. The common thread underlying the thinking behind this approach revolves around the brain's intrinsic properties: neuroplasticity and the fact that the brain is neurodynamic. In our approach, neural organization and reorganization using natural or artificial environments aspires to bring computational perspectives into cognitive developmental neuroscience.

Effects of model orientation on the visuomotor imitation of arm movements: the role of mental rotation

An experiment was conducted to examine whether visual perspective has an effect on visuomotor imitation. The experiment presented varied visual perspectives in terms of spatial disparity between a model and an observer (model-observer-disparity) on six levels. Female participants were asked to imitate different arm movements presented in videos by animated models. These arm movements were elbow-extension-flexion movements with one (lower complexity) or three (higher complexity) reversals of movement direction. The results showed that model-observer-disparity affects spatial trajectories and velocities in the performance of motor imitations. The movements' complexity did not affect orientation dependence. Due to the non-linearity of the data, it is questionable if orientation dependence can be at least partially explained by mental rotation processes or differential ideomotor effects. According to these results, high model-observer-disparity should be avoided when using visual instructions in visuomotor imitation.

In praise of a model but not its conclusions: commentary on Cooper, Catmur, and Heyes (2012)

Cooper et al. (this issue) develop an interactive activation model of spatial and imitative compatibilities that simulates the key results from Catmur and Heyes (2011) and thus conclude that both compatibilities are mediated by the same processes since their single model can predict all the results. Although the model is impressive, the conclusions are premature because they are based on an incomplete review of the relevant literature and because the model includes some questionable assumptions. Moreover, a competing model (Scheutz & Bertenthal, 2012) is introduced that suggests the two compatibilities are not mediated by the same processes. We propose that more research is necessary before concluding that spatial and imitative compatibilities are mediated by the same processes.

At the mercy of strategies: the role of motor representations in language understanding

Classical cognitive theories hold that word representations in the brain are abstract and amodal, and are independent of the objects’ sensorimotor properties they refer to. An alternative hypothesis emphasizes the importance of bodily processes in cognition: the representation of a concept appears to be crucially dependent upon perceptual-motor processes that relate to it. Thus, understanding action-related words would rely upon the same motor structures that also support the execution of the same actions. In this context, motor simulation represents a key component. Our approach is to draw parallels between the literature on mental rotation and the literature on action verb/sentence processing. Here we will discuss recent studies on mental imagery, mental rotation, and language that clearly demonstrate how motor simulation is neither automatic nor necessary to language understanding. These studies have shown that motor representations can or cannot be activated depending on the type of strategy the participants adopt to perform tasks involving motor phrases. On the one hand, participants may imagine the movement with the body parts used to carry out the actions described by the verbs (i.e., motor strategy); on the other, individuals may solve the task without simulating the corresponding movements (i.e., visual strategy). While it is not surprising that the motor strategy is at work when participants process action-related verbs, it is however striking that sensorimotor activation has been reported also for imageable concrete words with no motor content, for “non-words” with regular phonology, for pseudo-verb stimuli, and also for negations. Based on the extant literature, we will argue that implicit motor imagery is not uniquely used when a body-related stimulus is encountered, and that it is not the type of stimulus that automatically triggers the motor simulation but the type of strategy. Finally, we will also comment on the view that sensorimotor activations are subjected to a top-down modulation.

Differential activation of brain regions involved with error-feedback and imitation based motor simulation when observing self and an expert's actions in pilots and non-pilots on a complex glider landing task

In this fMRI study we investigate neural processes related to the action observation network using a complex perceptual-motor task in pilots and non-pilots. The task involved landing a glider (using aileron, elevator, rudder, and dive brake) as close to a target as possible, passively observing a replay of one's own previous trial, passively observing a replay of an expert's trial, and a baseline do nothing condition. The objective of this study is to investigate two types of motor simulation processes used during observation of action: imitation based motor simulation and error-feedback based motor simulation. It has been proposed that the computational neurocircuitry of the cortex is well suited for unsupervised imitation based learning, whereas, the cerebellum is well suited for error-feedback based learning. Consistent with predictions, pilots (to a greater extent than non-pilots) showed significant differential activity when observing an expert landing the glider in brain regions involved with imitation based motor simulation (including premotor cortex PMC, inferior frontal gyrus IFG, anterior insula, parietal cortex, superior temporal gyrus, and middle temporal MT area) than when observing one's own previous trial which showed significant differential activity in the cerebellum (only for pilots) thought to be concerned with error-feedback based motor simulation. While there was some differential brain activity for pilots in regions involved with both Execution and Observation of the flying task (potential Mirror System sites including IFG, PMC, superior parietal lobule) the majority was adjacent to these areas (Observation Only Sites) (predominantly in PMC, IFG, and inferior parietal loblule). These regions showing greater activity for observation than for action may be involved with processes related to motor-based representational transforms that are not necessary when actually carrying out the task.

Being moved by the self and others: influence of empathy on self-motion perception

BACKGROUND

The observation of conspecifics influences our bodily perceptions and actions: Contagious yawning, contagious itching, or empathy for pain, are all examples of mechanisms based on resonance between our own body and others. While there is evidence for the involvement of the mirror neuron system in the processing of motor, auditory and tactile information, it has not yet been associated with the perception of self-motion.

METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

We investigated whether viewing our own body, the body of another, and an object in motion influences self-motion perception. We found a visual-vestibular congruency effect for self-motion perception when observing self and object motion, and a reduction in this effect when observing someone else's body motion. The congruency effect was correlated with empathy scores, revealing the importance of empathy in mirroring mechanisms.

CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE

The data show that vestibular perception is modulated by agent-specific mirroring mechanisms. The observation of conspecifics in motion is an essential component of social life, and self-motion perception is crucial for the distinction between the self and the other. Finally, our results hint at the presence of a "vestibular mirror neuron system".

Normal psychomotor development

"Psychomotor" development refers to changes in a child's cognitive, emotional, motor, and social capacities from the beginning of life throughout fetal and neonatal periods, infancy, childhood, and adolescence. It occurs in a variety of domains and a wide range of theories makes understanding children's development a challenging undertaking. Different models have tried to interpret the origins of human behavior, the pattern of developmental changes over time, and the individual and contextual factors that could direct child development. No single theory has been able to account for all aspects of child development, but each of them may contribute an important piece to the child development puzzle. Although theories sometimes disagree, much of their information is complementary rather than contradictory. The knowledge of child typical development and related theories and models is greatly useful for clinical practice, leading to recognition of developmental disorders and the ways in which they can be approached and treated. In this chapter, traditional and more modern concepts around functional development of psychomotor abilities are reported, firstly more in general and then specifically in the motor domain.

Gesture imitation in schizophrenia

Recent evidence suggests that individuals with schizophrenia (SZ) are impaired in their ability to imitate gestures and movements generated by others. This impairment in imitation may be linked to difficulties in generating and maintaining internal representations in working memory (WM). We used a novel quantitative technique to investigate the relationship between WM and imitation ability. SZ outpatients and demographically matched healthy control (HC) participants imitated hand gestures. In Experiment 1, participants imitated single gestures. In Experiment 2, they imitated sequences of 2 gestures, either while viewing the gesture online or after a short delay that forced the use of WM. In Experiment 1, imitation errors were increased in SZ compared with HC. Experiment 2 revealed a significant interaction between imitation ability and WM. SZ produced more errors and required more time to imitate when that imitation depended upon WM compared with HC. Moreover, impaired imitation from WM was significantly correlated with the severity of negative symptoms but not with positive symptoms. In sum, gesture imitation was impaired in schizophrenia, especially when the production of an imitation depended upon WM and when an imitation entailed multiple actions. Such a deficit may have downstream consequences for new skill learning.

Human toddlers' attempts to match two simple behaviors provide no evidence for an inherited, dedicated imitation mechanism

Influential theories of imitation have proposed that humans inherit a neural mechanism - an "active intermodal matching " (AIM) mechanism or a mirror neuron system - that functions from birth to automatically match sensory input from others' actions to motor programs for performing those same actions, and thus produces imitation. To test these proposals, 160 1- to 2½-year-old toddlers were asked to imitate two simple movements- bending the arm to make an elbow, and moving the bent elbow laterally. Both behaviors were almost certain to be in each child's repertoire, and the lateral movement was goal-directed (used to hit a plastic cup). Thus, one or both behaviors should have been imitable by toddlers with a functioning AIM or mirror neuron system. Each child saw the two behaviors repeated 18 times, and was encouraged to imitate. Children were also asked to locate their own elbows. Almost no children below age 2 imitated either behavior. Instead, younger children gave clear evidence of a developmental progression, from reproducing only the outcome of the models' movements (hitting the object), through trying (but failing) to reproduce the model's arm posture and/or the arm-cup relations they had seen, to accurate imitation of arm bending by age 2 and of both movements by age 2½. Across age levels, almost all children who knew the word 'elbow' imitated both behaviors: very few who did not know the word imitated either behavior. The evidence is most consistent with a view of early imitation as the product of a complex system of language, cognitive, social, and motor competencies that develop in infancy. The findings do not rule out a role for an inherited neural mechanism, but they suggest that such a system would not by itself be sufficient to explain imitation at any age.

Facial self-imitation: objective measurement reveals no improvement without visual feedback

Imitation of facial gestures requires the cognitive system to equate the seen-but-unfelt with the felt-but-unseen. Rival accounts propose that this "correspondence problem" is solved either by an innate supramodal mechanism (the active intermodal-mapping, or AIM, model) or by learned, direct links between the corresponding visual and proprioceptive representations of actions (the associative sequence-learning, or ASL, model). Two experiments tested these alternative models using a new technology that permits, for the first time, the automated objective measurement of imitative accuracy. Euclidean distances, measured in image-derived principal component space, were used to quantify the accuracy of adult participants' attempts to replicate their own facial expressions before, during, and after training. Results supported the ASL model. In Experiment 1, participants reliant solely on proprioceptive feedback got progressively worse at self-imitation. In Experiment 2, participants who received visual feedback that did not match their execution of facial gestures also failed to improve. However, in both experiments, groups that received visual feedback contingent on their execution of facial gestures showed progressive improvement.

And yet they act together: interpersonal perception modulates visuo-motor interference and mutual adjustments during a joint-grasping task

Prediction of “when” a partner will act and “what” he is going to do is crucial in joint-action contexts. However, studies on face-to-face interactions in which two people have to mutually adjust their movements in time and space are lacking. Moreover, while studies on passive observation have shown that somato-motor simulative processes are disrupted when the observed actor is perceived as an out-group or unfair individual, the impact of interpersonal perception on joint-actions has never been directly addressed. Here we explored this issue by comparing the ability of pairs of participants who did or did not undergo an interpersonal perception manipulation procedure to synchronise their reach-to-grasp movements during: i) a guided interaction, requiring pure temporal reciprocal coordination, and ii) a free interaction, requiring both time and space adjustments. Behavioural results demonstrate that while in neutral situations free and guided interactions are equally challenging for participants, a negative interpersonal relationship improves performance in guided interactions at the expense of the free interactive ones. This was paralleled at the kinematic level by the absence of movement corrections and by low movement variability in these participants, indicating that partners cooperating within a negative interpersonal bond executed the cooperative task on their own, without reciprocally adapting to the partner's motor behaviour. Crucially, participants' performance in the free interaction improved in the manipulated group during the second experimental session while partners became interdependent as suggested by higher movement variability and by the appearance of interference between the self-executed actions and those observed in the partner. Our study expands current knowledge about on-line motor interactions by showing that visuo-motor interference effects, mutual motor adjustments and motor-learning mechanisms are influenced by social perception.

Grist and mills: on the cultural origins of cultural learning

Cumulative cultural evolution is what 'makes us odd'; our capacity to learn facts and techniques from others, and to refine them over generations, plays a major role in making human minds and lives radically different from those of other animals. In this article, I discuss cognitive processes that are known collectively as 'cultural learning' because they enable cumulative cultural evolution. These cognitive processes include reading, social learning, imitation, teaching, social motivation and theory of mind. Taking the first of these three types of cultural learning as examples, I ask whether and to what extent these cognitive processes have been adapted genetically or culturally to enable cumulative cultural evolution. I find that recent empirical work in comparative psychology, developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience provides surprisingly little evidence of genetic adaptation, and ample evidence of cultural adaptation. This raises the possibility that it is not only 'grist' but also 'mills' that are culturally inherited; through social interaction in the course of development, we not only acquire facts about the world and how to deal with it (grist), we also build the cognitive processes that make 'fact inheritance' possible (mills).

Understanding and imitating unfamiliar actions: distinct underlying mechanisms

The human “mirror neuron system” has been proposed to be the neural substrate that underlies understanding and, possibly, imitating actions. However, since the brain activity with mirror properties seems insufficient to provide a good description for imitation of actions outside one’s own repertoire, the existence of supplementary processes has been proposed. Moreover, it is unclear whether action observation requires the same neural mechanisms as the explicit access to their meaning. The aim of this study was two-fold as we investigated whether action observation requires different processes depending on 1) whether the ultimate goal is to imitate or understand the presented actions and 2) whether the to-be-imitated actions are familiar or unfamiliar to the subject. Participants were presented with both meaningful familiar actions and meaningless unfamiliar actions that they had to either imitate or discriminate later. Event-related Potentials were used as differences in brain activity could have been masked by the use of other techniques with lower temporal resolution. In the imitation task, a sustained left frontal negativity was more pronounced for meaningless actions than for meaningful ones, starting from an early time-window. Conversely, observing unfamiliar versus familiar actions with the intention of discriminating them led to marked differences over right centro-posterior scalp regions, in both middle and latest time-windows. These findings suggest that action imitation and action understanding may be sustained by dissociable mechanisms: while imitation of unfamiliar actions activates left frontal processes, that are likely to be related to learning mechanisms, action understanding involves dedicated operations which probably require right posterior regions, consistent with their involvement in social interactions.

Automatic imitation and spatial compatibility in a key-pressing task

Automatic imitation has been often confounded with spatial compatibility effects. Heyes (2011) called attention to this confound, and proposed some criteria which must be satisfied before these effects could be unequivocally taken to be an index of the functioning of the human mirror system. Evidence satisfying such criteria has been reported by Catmur and Heyes (2011), using a relatively unfamiliar finger abduction movement. However, because many previous studies relied on more familiar actions, we aimed at testing whether analogous effects could be obtained with a more practiced key-pressing task. In Experiment 1, we used anatomical controls (i.e., views of right vs. left hands) under conditions affording mirror imitation, and showed that spatial compatibility masked the effects of automatic imitation. Experiment 2 used rotated conditions to control for this spatial-anatomical confound, and it showed unequivocal effects of automatic imitation, which were obtained regardless of its relation to the spatial stimulus-response mapping. These results cast some doubts on the interpretation of previous reports relying exclusively on scenes presented from a mirror perspective, and suggest the convenience of using both rotated scenes and anatomical controls in order to assess automatic imitation.

Neural networks for action representation: a functional magnetic-resonance imaging and dynamic causal modeling study

Automatic mimicry is based on the tight linkage between motor and perception action representations in which internal models play a key role. Based on the anatomical connection, we hypothesized that the direct effective connectivity from the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) to the ventral premotor area (PMv) formed an inverse internal model, converting visual representation into a motor plan, and that reverse connectivity formed a forward internal model, converting the motor plan into a sensory outcome of action. To test this hypothesis, we employed dynamic causal-modeling analysis with functional magnetic-resonance imaging (fMRI). Twenty-four normal participants underwent a change-detection task involving two visually-presented balls that were either manually rotated by the investigator's right hand (“Hand”) or automatically rotated. The effective connectivity from the pSTS to the PMv was enhanced by hand observation and suppressed by execution, corresponding to the inverse model. Opposite effects were observed from the PMv to the pSTS, suggesting the forward model. Additionally, both execution and hand observation commonly enhanced the effective connectivity from the pSTS to the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), the IPL to the primary sensorimotor cortex (S/M1), the PMv to the IPL, and the PMv to the S/M1. Representation of the hand action therefore was implemented in the motor system including the S/M1. During hand observation, effective connectivity toward the pSTS was suppressed whereas that toward the PMv and S/M1 was enhanced. Thus, the action-representation network acted as a dynamic feedback-control system during action observation.

What can other animals tell us about human social cognition? An evolutionary perspective on reflective and reflexive processing

Human neuroscience has seen a recent boom in studies on reflective, controlled, explicit social cognitive functions like imitation, perspective-taking, and empathy. The relationship of these higher-level functions to lower-level, reflexive, automatic, implicit functions is an area of current research. As the field continues to address this relationship, we suggest that an evolutionary, comparative approach will be useful, even essential. There is a large body of research on reflexive, automatic, implicit processes in animals. A growing perspective sees social cognitive processes as phylogenically continuous, making findings in other species relevant for understanding our own. One of these phylogenically continuous processes appears to be self-other matching or simulation. Mice are more sensitive to pain after watching other mice experience pain; geese experience heart rate increases when seeing their mate in conflict; and infant macaques, chimpanzees, and humans automatically mimic adult facial expressions. In this article, we review findings in different species that illustrate how such reflexive processes are related to (“higher order”) reflexive processes, such as cognitive empathy, theory of mind, and learning by imitation. We do so in the context of self-other matching in three different domains—in the motor domain (somatomotor movements), in the perceptual domain (eye movements and cognition about visual perception), and in the autonomic/emotional domain. We also review research on the developmental origin of these processes and their neural bases across species. We highlight gaps in existing knowledge and point out some questions for future research. We conclude that our understanding of the psychological and neural mechanisms of self-other mapping and other functions in our own species can be informed by considering the layered complexity these functions in other species.

The body knows what it should do: automatic motor compensation for illusory heaviness contagion

We can share various feelings with others just through observation, as if it were an automatic resonance. This connective function between the self and others could promote the facilitation of our social communication; however, it is still unclear as to how it works in terms of self-other representation. In this study, we showed participants a picture of a model holding a ball, which was weighted with sand. We instructed participants to move one of their arms to a horizontal position and hold it immobile. Those participants who knew the actual weight of the ball (1 kg) tended to raise this arm above the horizontal, in response to their expectation of the need to resist the weight of the ball. This compensatory reaction to the illusion of heaviness suggests that our bodily resonance could be mandatory and predictive. We discuss this new behavioral phenomenon in terms of motor simulation or the mirror-neuron system.