Responding with restraint: what are the neurocognitive mechanisms?

Response suppression by automatic retrieval of stimulus-stop association: evidence from transcranial magnetic stimulation

Behavioral studies show that subjects respond more slowly to stimuli to which they previously stopped. This response slowing could be explained by "automatic inhibition" (i.e., the reinstantiation of motor suppression when a stimulus retrieves a stop association). Here we tested this using TMS. In Experiment 1, participants were trained to go or no-go to stimuli. Then, in a test phase, we compared the corticospinal excitability for go stimuli that were previously associated with stopping (no-go_then_go) with go stimuli that were previously associated with going (go_then_go). Corticospinal excitability was reduced for no-go_then_go compared with go_then_go stimuli at a mere 100 msec poststimulus. Although these results fit with automatic inhibition, there was, surprisingly, no suppression for no-go_then_no-go stimuli, although this should occur. We speculated that automatic inhibition lies within a continuum between effortful top-down response inhibition and no inhibition at all. When the need for executive control and active response suppression disappears, so does the manifestation of automatic inhibition. Therefore, it should emerge during go/no-go learning and disappear as performance asymptotes. Consistent with this idea, in Experiment 2, we demonstrated reduced corticospinal excitability for no-go versus go trials most prominently in the midphase of training but it wears off as performance asymptotes. We thus provide neurophysiological evidence for an inhibition mechanism that is automatically reinstantiated when a stimulus retrieves a learned stopping episode, but only in an executive context in which active suppression is required. This demonstrates that automatic and top-down inhibition jointly contribute to goal-directed behavior.

The role of the right presupplementary motor area in stopping action: two studies with event-related transcranial magnetic stimulation

Rapidly stopping action engages a network in the brain including the right presupplementary motor area (preSMA), the right inferior frontal gyrus, and the basal ganglia. Yet the functional role of these different regions within the overall network still remains unclear. Here we focused on the role of the right preSMA in behavioral stopping. We hypothesized that the underlying neurocognitive function of this region is one or more of setting up a stopping rule in advance, modulating response tendencies (e.g., slowing down in anticipation of stopping), and implementing stopping when the stop signal occurs. We performed two experiments with magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)-guided, event-related, transcranial magnetic stimulation(TMS), during the performance of variants of the stop signal task. In experiment 1 we show that stimulation of the right preSMA versus vertex (control site) slowed the implementation of stopping (measured via stop signal reaction time) but had no influence on modulation of response tendencies. In experiment 2, we showed that stimulation of the right preSMA slowed implementation of stopping in a mechanistically selective form of stopping but had no influence on setting up stopping rules. The results go beyond the replication of prior findings by showing that TMS of the right preSMA impairs stopping behavior (including a behaviorally selective form of stopping) through a specific disruption of the implementation of stopping. Future studies are required to establish whether this was due to stimulation of the right preSMA itself or because of remote effects on the wider stopping network.

Proactive inhibitory control of response as the default state of executive control

Refraining from reacting does not only involve reactive inhibitory mechanisms. It was recently found that inhibitory control also relies strongly on proactive mechanisms. However, since most available studies have focused on reactive stopping, little is known about how proactive inhibition of response is implemented. Two behavioral experiments were conducted to identify the temporal dynamics of this executive function. They manipulated respectively the time during which inhibitory control must be sustained until a stimulus occurs, and the time limit allowed to set up inhibition before a stimulus occurs. The results show that inhibitory control is not set up after but before instruction, and is not transient and sporadic but sustained across time. Consistent with our previous neuroimaging findings, these results suggest that proactive inhibition of response is the default mode of executive control. This implies that top-down control of sensorimotor reactivity would consist of a temporary release (up to several seconds), when appropriate (when the environment becomes predictable), of the default locking state. This conclusion is discussed with regard to current anatomo-functional models of inhibitory control, and to methodological features of studies of attention and sensorimotor control.

Cognitive control reflects context monitoring, not motoric stopping, in response inhibition

The inhibition of unwanted behaviors is considered an effortful and controlled ability. However, inhibition also requires the detection of contexts indicating that old behaviors may be inappropriate – in other words, inhibition requires the ability to monitor context in the service of goals, which we refer to as context-monitoring. Using behavioral, neuroimaging, electrophysiological and computational approaches, we tested whether motoric stopping per se is the cognitively-controlled process supporting response inhibition, or whether context-monitoring may fill this role. Our results demonstrate that inhibition does not require control mechanisms beyond those involved in context-monitoring, and that such control mechanisms are the same regardless of stopping demands. These results challenge dominant accounts of inhibitory control, which posit that motoric stopping is the cognitively-controlled process of response inhibition, and clarify emerging debates on the frontal substrates of response inhibition by replacing the centrality of controlled mechanisms for motoric stopping with context-monitoring.

Expectations and violations: delineating the neural network of proactive inhibitory control

The ability to stop a prepared response (reactive inhibition) appears to depend on the degree to which stopping is expected (proactive inhibition). Functional MRI studies have shown that activation during proactive and reactive inhibition overlaps, suggesting that the whole neural network for reactive inhibition becomes already activated in anticipation of stopping. However, these studies measured proactive inhibition as the effect of stop-signal probability on activation during go trials. Therefore, activation could reflect expectation of a stop-signal (evoked by the stop-signal probability cue), but also violation of this expectation because stop-signals do not occur on go trials. We addressed this problem, using a stop-signal task in which the stop-signal probability cue and the go-signal were separated in time. Hence, we could separate activation during the cue, reflecting expectation of the stop-signal, from activation during the go-signal, reflecting expectation of the stop-signal or violation of that expectation. During the cue, the striatum, the supplementary motor complex (SMC), and the midbrain activated. During the go-signal, the right inferior parietal cortex (IPC) and the right inferior frontal cortex (IFC) activated. These findings suggest that the neural network previously associated with proactive inhibition can be subdivided into two components. One component, including the striatum, the SMC, and the midbrain, activated during the cue, implicating this network in proactive inhibition. Another component, consisting of the right IPC and the right IFC, activated during the go-signal. Rather than being involved in proactive inhibition, this network appears to be involved in processes associated with violation of expectations.

The influence of different Stop-signal response time estimation procedures on behavior-behavior and brain-behavior correlations

The fundamental cognitive-control function of inhibitory control over motor behavior has been extensively investigated using the Stop-signal task. The critical behavioral parameter describing stopping efficacy is the Stop-signal response time (SSRT), and correlations with estimates of this parameter are commonly used to establish that other variables (e.g., other behavioral measures or brain activity measures) are closely related to inhibitory motor control. Recently, however, it has been argued that SSRT estimates can be strongly distorted if participants strategically slow down their responses over the course of the experiment, resulting in the SSRT no longer reliably representing response-inhibition efficacy. Here, we performed new analyses on behavioral and functional data from an fMRI version of the Stop-signal task to gauge the consequences of using different SSRT estimation approaches that are differentially prone to the influence of strategic response slowing. The results indicate that the SSRT estimation approach can dramatically change behavior-behavior correlations. Specifically, a correlation between the SSRT and Go-trial accuracy that was highly significant with one estimation approach, virtually disappeared for the other. Additional analyses indeed supported that this effect was related to strategic response slowing. Concerning brain-behavior correlations, only the left anterior insula was found to be significantly correlated with the SSRT within the set of areas tested here. Interestingly, this brain-behavior correlation differed little for the different SSRT-estimation procedures. In sum, the current results highlight that different SSRT-estimation procedures can strongly influence the distribution of SSRT values across subjects, which in turn can ramify into correlational analyses with other parameters.

Stopping a response has global or nonglobal effects on the motor system depending on preparation

Much research has focused on how people stop initiated response tendencies when instructed by a signal. Stopping of this kind appears to have global effects on the motor system. For example, by delivering transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the leg area of the primary motor cortex, it is possible to detect suppression in the leg when the hand is being stopped (Badry R et al. Suppression of human cortico-motoneuronal excitability during the stop-signal task. Clin Neurophysiol 120: 1717-1723, 2009). Here, we asked if such "global suppression" can be observed proactively, i.e., when people anticipate they might have to stop. We used a conditional stop signal task, which allows the measurement of both an "anticipation phase" (i.e., where proactive control is applied) and a "stopping" phase. TMS was delivered during the anticipation phase (experiment 1) and also during the stopping phase (experiments 1 and 2) to measure leg excitability. During the anticipation phase, we did not observe leg suppression, but we did during the stopping phase, consistent with Badry et al. (2009). Moreover, when we split the subject groups into those who slowed down behaviorally (i.e., exercised proactive control) and those who did not, we found that subjects who slowed did not show leg suppression when they stopped, whereas those who did not slow did show leg suppression when they stopped. These results suggest that if subjects prepare to stop, then they do so without global effects on the motor system. Thus, preparation allows them to stop more selectively.

Roles for the pre-supplementary motor area and the right inferior frontal gyrus in stopping action: electrophysiological responses and functional and structural connectivity

Both the pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA) and the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) are important for stopping action outright. These regions are also engaged when preparing to stop. We aimed to elucidate the roles of these regions by harnessing the high spatio-temporal resolution of electrocorticography (ECoG), and by using a task that engages both preparing to stop and stopping outright. First, we validated the task using fMRI in 16 healthy control participants to confirm that both the preSMA and the rIFG were active. Next, we studied a rare patient with intracranial grid coverage of both these regions, using macrostimulation, diffusion tractography, cortico-cortical evoked potentials (CCEPs) and task-based ECoG. Macrostimulation of the preSMA induced behavioral motor arrest. Diffusion tractography revealed a structural connection between the preSMA and rIFG. CCEP analysis showed that stimulation of the preSMA evoked strong local field potentials within 30 ms in rIFG. During the task, when preparing to stop, there was increased high gamma amplitude (~70-250 Hz) in both regions, with preSMA preceding rIFG by ~750 ms. For outright stopping there was also a high gamma amplitude increase in both regions, again with preSMA preceding rIFG. Further, at the time of stopping, there was an increase in beta band activity (~16 Hz) in both regions, with significantly stronger inter-regional coherence for successful vs. unsuccessful stop trials. The results complement earlier reports of a structural/functional action control network between the preSMA and rIFG. They go further by revealing between-region timing differences in the high gamma band when preparing to stop and stopping outright. They also reveal strong between-region coherence in the beta band when stopping is successful. Implications for theories of action control are discussed.

Deep brain stimulation of subthalamic nuclei affects arm response inhibition in Parkinson's patients

The precise localizations of the neural substrates of voluntary inhibition are still debated. It has been hypothesized that, in humans, this executive function relies upon a right-lateralized pathway comprising the inferior frontal gyrus and the presupplementary motor area, which would control the neural processes for movement inhibition acting through the right subthalamic nucleus (STN). We assessed the role of the right STN, via a countermanding reaching task, in 10 Parkinson's patients receiving high-frequency electrical stimulation of the STN of both hemispheres (deep brain stimulation, DBS) and in 13 healthy subjects. We compared the performance of Parkinson's patients in 4 experimental conditions: DBS-ON, DBS-OFF, DBS-OFF right, and DBS-OFF left. We found that 1) inhibitory control is improved only when both DBS are active, that is, the reaction time to the stop signal is significantly shorter in the DBS-ON condition than in all the others, 2) bilateral stimulation of STN restores the inhibitory control to a near-normal level, and 3) DBS does not cause a general improvement in task-related motor function as it does not affect the length of the reaction times of arm movements, that is, in our experimental context, STN seems to play a selective role in response inhibition.

From reactive to proactive and selective control: developing a richer model for stopping inappropriate responses

A better understanding of the neural systems underlying impulse control is important for psychiatry. Although most impulses are motivational or emotional rather than motoric per se, it is research into the neural architecture of motor response control that has made the greatest strides. This article reviews recent developments in the cognitive neuroscience of stopping responses. Most research of this kind has focused on reactive control-that is, how subjects stop a response outright when instructed by a signal. It is argued that reactive paradigms are limited as models of control relevant to psychiatry. Instead, a set of paradigms is advocated that begins to model proactive inhibitory control-that is, how a subject prepares to stop an upcoming response tendency. Proactive inhibitory control is generated according to the goals of the subject rather than by an external signal, and it can be selectively targeted at a particular response tendency. This may have wider validity than reactive control as an experimental model for stopping inappropriate responses.

Effective connectivity reveals important roles for both the hyperdirect (fronto-subthalamic) and the indirect (fronto-striatal-pallidal) fronto-basal ganglia pathways during response inhibition

Fronto-basal ganglia pathways play a crucial role in voluntary action control, including the ability to inhibit motor responses. Response inhibition might be mediated via a fast hyperdirect pathway connecting the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) and the presupplementary motor area (preSMA) with the subthalamic nucleus or, alternatively, via the indirect pathway between the cortex and caudate. To test the relative contribution of these two pathways to inhibitory action control, we applied an innovative quantification method for effective brain connectivity. Functional magnetic resonance imaging data were collected from 20 human participants performing a Simon interference task with an occasional stop signal. A single right-lateralized model involving both the hyperdirect and indirect pathways best explained the pattern of brain activation on stop trials. Notably, the overall connection strength of this combined model was highest on successfully inhibited trials. Inspection of the relationship between behavior and connection values revealed that fast inhibitors showed increased connectivity between rIFG and right caudate (rCaudate), whereas slow inhibitors were associated with increased connectivity between preSMA and rCaudate. In compliance, connection strengths from the rIFG and preSMA into the rCaudate were correlated negatively. If participants failed to stop, the magnitude of experienced interference (Simon effect), but not stopping latency, was predictive for the hyperdirect-indirect model connections. Together, the present results suggest that both the hyperdirect and indirect pathways act together to implement response inhibition, whereas the relationship between performance control and the fronto-basal ganglia connections points toward a top-down mechanism that underlies voluntary action control.

Dissociable Brain Mechanisms Underlying the Conscious and Unconscious Control of Behavior

Cognitive control allows humans to overrule and inhibit habitual responses to optimize performance in challenging situations. Contradicting traditional views, recent studies suggest that cognitive control processes can be initiated unconsciously. To further capture the relation between consciousness and cognitive control, we studied the dynamics of inhibitory control processes when triggered consciously versus unconsciously in a modified version of the stop task. Attempts to inhibit an imminent response were often successful after unmasked (visible) stop signals. Masked (invisible) stop signals rarely succeeded in instigating overt inhibition but did trigger slowing down of response times. Masked stop signals elicited a sequence of distinct ERP components that were also observed on unmasked stop signals. The N2 component correlated with the efficiency of inhibitory control when elicited by unmasked stop signals and with the magnitude of slowdown when elicited by masked stop signals. Thus, the N2 likely reflects the initiation of inhibitory control, irrespective of conscious awareness. The P3 component was much reduced in amplitude and duration on masked versus unmasked stop trials. These patterns of differences and similarities between conscious and unconscious cognitive control processes are discussed in a framework that differentiates between feedforward and feedback connections in yielding conscious experience.

On the role of the striatum in response inhibition

BACKGROUND

Stopping a manual response requires suppression of the primary motor cortex (M1) and has been linked to activation of the striatum. Here, we test three hypotheses regarding the role of the striatum in stopping: striatum activation during successful stopping may reflect suppression of M1, anticipation of a stop-signal occurring, or a slower response build-up.

METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Twenty-four healthy volunteers underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while performing a stop-signal paradigm, in which anticipation of stopping was manipulated using a visual cue indicating stop-signal probability, with their right hand. We observed activation of the striatum and deactivation of left M1 during successful versus unsuccessful stopping. In addition, striatum activation was proportional to the degree of left M1 deactivation during successful stopping, implicating the striatum in response suppression. Furthermore, striatum activation increased as a function of stop-signal probability and was to linked to activation in the supplementary motor complex (SMC) and right inferior frontal cortex (rIFC) during successful stopping, suggesting a role in anticipation of stopping. Finally, trial-to-trial variations in response time did not affect striatum activation.

CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE

The results identify the striatum as a critical node in the neural network associated with stopping motor responses. As striatum activation was related to both suppression of M1 and anticipation of a stop-signal occurring, these findings suggest that the striatum is involved in proactive inhibitory control over M1, most likely in interaction with SMC and rIFC.

Intracranial EEG reveals a time- and frequency-specific role for the right inferior frontal gyrus and primary motor cortex in stopping initiated responses

Inappropriate response tendencies may be stopped via a specific fronto/basal ganglia/primary motor cortical network. We sought to characterize the functional role of two regions in this putative stopping network, the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the primary motor cortex (M1), using electocorticography from subdural electrodes in four patients while they performed a stop-signal task. On each trial, a motor response was initiated, and on a minority of trials a stop signal instructed the patient to try to stop the response. For each patient, there was a greater right IFG response in the beta frequency band ( approximately 16 Hz) for successful versus unsuccessful stop trials. This finding adds to evidence for a functional network for stopping because changes in beta frequency activity have also been observed in the basal ganglia in association with behavioral stopping. In addition, the right IFG response occurred 100-250 ms after the stop signal, a time range consistent with a putative inhibitory control process rather than with stop-signal processing or feedback regarding success. A downstream target of inhibitory control is M1. In each patient, there was alpha/beta band desynchronization in M1 for stop trials. However, the degree of desynchronization in M1 was less for successfully than unsuccessfully stopped trials. This reduced desynchronization on successful stop trials could relate to increased GABA inhibition in M1. Together with other findings, the results suggest that behavioral stopping is implemented via synchronized activity in the beta frequency band in a right IFG/basal ganglia network, with downstream effects on M1.

Having a goal to stop action is associated with advance control of specific motor representations

An important aspect of cognitive control consists in the ability to stop oneself from making inappropriate responses. In an earlier study we demonstrated that there are different mechanisms for stopping: global and selective [Aron, A. R., Verbruggen, F. (2008). Stop the presses: Dissociating a selective from a global mechanism for stopping. Psychological Science, 19(11) 1146-1153]. We argued that participants are more likely to use a global mechanism when speed is of the essence, whereas they are more likely to use a selective mechanism when they have foreknowledge of which response tendency they may need to stop. Here we further investigate the relationship between foreknowledge and selective stopping. In Experiment 1 we adapted the earlier design to show that individual differences in recall accuracy for the stopping goal correlate with the selectivity of the stopping. This confirms that encoding and using a foreknowledge memory cue is a key enabler for a selective stopping mechanism. In Experiment 2, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), to test the hypothesis that foreknowledge "sets up" a control set whereby control is applied onto the response representation that may need to be stopped in the future. We applied TMS to the left motor cortex and measured motor evoked potentials (MEPs) from the right hand while participants performed a similar behavioral paradigm as Experiment 1. In the foreknowledge period, MEPs were significantly reduced for trials where the right hand was the one that might need to be stopped relative to when it was not. This shows that having a goal of what response may need to be stopped in the future consists in applying advance control onto a specific motor representation.