The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-analysis

The effects of the framing of time on delay discounting

We examined the effects of the framing of time on delay discounting. Delay discounting is the process by which delayed outcomes are devalued as a function of time. Time in a titrating delay discounting task is often framed in calendar units (e.g., as 1 week, 1 month, etc.). When time is framed as a specific date, delayed outcomes are discounted less compared to the calendar format. Other forms of framing time; however, have not been explored. All participants completed a titrating calendar unit delay-discounting task for money. Participants were also assigned to one of two delay discounting tasks: time as dates (e.g., June 1st, 2015) or time in units of days (e.g., 5000 days), using the same delay distribution as the calendar delay-discounting task. Time framed as dates resulted in less discounting compared to the calendar method, whereas time framed as days resulted in greater discounting compared to the calendar method. The hyperboloid model fit best compared to the hyperbola and exponential models. How time is framed may alter how participants attend to the delays as well as how the delayed outcome is valued. Altering how time is framed may serve to improve adherence to goals with delayed outcomes.

A versatile task for assessing decision-making abilities: the truck dispatcher framework

In neuropsychological decision-making research, several different tasks are used to measure decision-making competences in patients and healthy study participants. Unfortunately, the existing tasks are often inflexible for modification, use different scenarios, and include several gambling cues. Therefore, comparisons between participants' performances in different tasks are difficult. We developed the Truck Dispatcher Framework (TDF), in which different decision-making tasks can be designed within one unitary, flexible, and real-world-oriented story line. To test the story line, TDF analogues of three standard decision-making tasks (Game of Dice Task, Probability-Associated Gambling task, Iowa Gambling Task) were developed. In three studies with brain-healthy participants, the behavior in standard decision-making tasks and the TDF analogues of those tasks were compared. Similar behaviors indicate that the TDF tasks measure decision making appropriately. Thus, the TDF is recommended for experimental and clinical research because it allows for examining decision-making competences in tasks with different demands that take place within one unitary story line.

Framing (implicitly) matters: the role of religion in attitudes toward immigrants and Muslims in Denmark

Denmark is currently experiencing the highest immigration rate in its modern history. Population surveys indicate that negative public attitudes toward immigrants actually stem from attitudes toward their (perceived) Islamic affiliation. We used a framing paradigm to investigate the explicit and implicit attitudes of Christian and Atheist Danes toward targets framed as Muslims or as immigrants. The results showed that explicit and implicit attitudes were more negative when the target was framed as a Muslim, rather than as an immigrant. Interestingly, implicit attitudes were qualified by the participants' religion. Specifically, analyses revealed that Christians demonstrated more negative implicit attitudes toward immigrants than Muslims. Conversely, Atheists demonstrated more negative implicit attitudes toward Muslims than Atheists. These results suggest a complex relationship between religion, and implicit and explicit prejudice. Both the religious affiliation of the perceiver and the perceived religious affiliation of the target are key factors in social perception.

Framing effect in evaluation of others’ predictions

This paper explored how frames influence people’s evaluation of others’ probabilistic predictions in light of the outcomes of binary events. Most probabilistic predictions (e.g., “there is a 75% chance that Denver will win the Super Bowl”) can be partitioned into two components: A qualitative component that describes the predicted outcome (“Denver will win the Super Bowl”), and a quantitative component that represents the chance of the outcome occurring (“75% chance”). Various logically equivalent variations of a single prediction can be created through different combinations of these components and their logical or numerical complements (e.g., “25% chance that Denver will lose the Super Bowl”, “75% chance that Seattle will lose the Super Bowl”). Based on the outcome of the predicted event, these logically equivalent predictions can be categorized into two classes: Congruently framed predictions, in which the qualitative component matches the outcome, and incongruently framed predictions, in which it does not. Although the two classes of predictions are logically equivalent, we hypothesize that people would judge congruently framed predictions to be more accurate. The paper tested this hypothesis in seven experiments and found supporting evidence across a number of domains and experimental manipulations, and even when the congruently framed prediction was logically inferior. It also found that this effect held even for subjects who saw both congruently framed and incongruently framed versions of a prediction and judged the two to be logically equivalent.

Review of disability weight studies: comparison of methodological choices and values

INTRODUCTION

The disability-adjusted life year (DALY) is widely used to assess the burden of different health problems and risk factors. The disability weight, a value anchored between 0 (perfect health) and 1 (equivalent to death), is necessary to estimate the disability component (years lived with disability, YLDs) of the DALY. After publication of the ground-breaking Global Burden of Disease (GBD) 1996, alternative sets of disability weights have been developed over the past 16 years, each using different approaches with regards to the panel, health state description, and valuation methods. The objective of this study was to review all studies that developed disability weights and to critically assess the methodological design choices (health state and time description, panel composition, and valuation method). Furthermore, disability weights of eight specific conditions were compared.

METHODS

Disability weights studies (1990¿2012) in international peer-reviewed journals and grey literature were identified with main inclusion criteria being that the study assessed DALY disability weights for several conditions or a specific group of illnesses. Studies were collated by design and methods and evaluation of results.

RESULTS

Twenty-two studies met the inclusion criteria of our review. There is considerable variation in methods used to derive disability weights, although most studies used a disease-specific description of the health state, a panel that consisted of medical experts, and nonpreference-based valuation method to assess the values for the majority of the disability weights. Comparisons of disability weights across 15 specific disease and injury groups showed that the subdivision of a disease into separate health states (stages) differed markedly across studies. Additionally, weights for similar health states differed, particularly in the case of mild diseases, for which the disability weight differed by a factor of two or more.

CONCLUSIONS

In terms of comparability of the resulting YLDs, the global use of the same set of disability weights has advantages, though practical constraints and intercultural differences should be taken into account into such a set.

Responsibility judgments of wins and losses in the 2013 chess championship

We report two studies on the perceived responsibility of opponents competing for a goal that can be attained by only one of them. Responsibility judgments were collected in seven samples of lay people and experts before, during, and after the World Chess Championship in 2013. Participants assessed the responsibility of the two players, their supporting teams, local conditions, and chance factors for four hypothetical outcomes (large and small loss/win for each player), along with probabilities for these outcomes, demonstrating subadditivity (sums exceeding 100%) in all samples, even among chess experts. The winner was consistently perceived to be more responsible than the loser, and more for outcomes with large than small margins. There was also an effect of focal player, as Carlsen was given more responsibility both for losses and wins than Anand, by the present (Norwegian) pro-Carlsen samples. However, this effect could be modified by describing the outcomes as Anand’s (rather than Carlsen’s) wins and losses. Thus the study adds to the valence framing literature by showing how responsibility judgments are affected by the way outcomes are framed.

Effects of track and threat information on judgments of hurricane strike probability

Although evacuation is one of the best strategies for protecting citizens from hurricane threat, the ways that local elected officials use hurricane data in deciding whether to issue hurricane evacuation orders is not well understood. To begin to address this problem, we examined the effects of hurricane track and intensity information in a laboratory setting where participants judged the probability that hypothetical hurricanes with a constant bearing (i.e., straight line forecast track) would make landfall in each of eight 45 degree sectors around the Gulf of Mexico. The results from 162 participants in a student sample showed that the judged strike probability distributions over the eight sectors within each scenario were, unsurprisingly, unimodal and centered on the sector toward which the forecast track pointed. More significantly, although strike probability judgments for the sector in the direction of the forecast track were generally higher than the corresponding judgments for the other sectors, the latter were not zero. Most significantly, there were no appreciable differences in the patterns of strike probability judgments for hurricane tracks represented by a forecast track only, an uncertainty cone only, or forecast track with an uncertainty cone-a result consistent with a recent survey of coastal residents threatened by Hurricane Charley. The study results suggest that people are able to correctly process basic information about hurricane tracks but they do make some errors. More research is needed to understand the sources of these errors and to identify better methods of displaying uncertainty about hurricane parameters.

Decision-Making Under Risk: Integrating Perspectives From Biology, Economics, and Psychology

Decision-making under risk has been variably characterized and examined in many different disciplines. However, interdisciplinary integration has not been forthcoming. Classic theories of decision-making have not been amply revised in light of greater empirical data on actual patterns of decision-making behavior. Furthermore, the meta-theoretical framework of evolution by natural selection has been largely ignored in theories of decision-making under risk in the human behavioral sciences. In this review, I critically examine four of the most influential theories of decision-making from economics, psychology, and biology: expected utility theory, prospect theory, risk-sensitivity theory, and heuristic approaches. I focus especially on risk-sensitivity theory, which offers a framework for understanding decision-making under risk that explicitly involves evolutionary considerations. I also review robust empirical evidence for individual differences and environmental/situational factors that predict actual risky decision-making that any general theory must account for. Finally, I offer steps toward integrating various theoretical perspectives and empirical findings on risky decision-making.

Does perceived risk influence the effects of message framing? A new investigation of a widely held notion

Health-promoting messages can be framed in terms of the beneficial consequences of healthy behaviour (gain-framed messages) or the detrimental consequences of unhealthy behaviour (loss-framed messages). An influential notion holds that the perceived risk associated with the recommended behaviour determines the relative persuasiveness of gain- and loss-framed messages. This 'risk-framing hypothesis', as we call it, was derived from prospect theory, has been central to health message framing research for the last two decades, and does not cease to appeal to researchers. The present paper examines the validity of the risk-framing hypothesis. We performed six empirical studies on the interaction between perceived risk and message framing. These studies were conducted in two different countries and employed framed messages targeting skin cancer prevention and detection, physical activity, breast self-examination and vaccination behaviour. Behavioural intention served as the outcome measure. None of these studies found evidence in support of the risk-framing hypothesis. We conclude that the empirical evidence in favour of the hypothesis is weak and discuss the ramifications of this for future message framing research.

Testing the effects of message framing, kernel state, and exercise guideline adherence on exercise intentions and resolve

OBJECTIVES

To study the effects of framed messages on exercise intention and resolve.

DESIGN

Two (type of frame: gain or loss) × 2 (type of kernel state: desirable or undesirable outcome) post-test study.

METHODS

Participants were recruited online and questioned about their previous exercise behaviour and their exercise risk perception. After this, they were randomly allocated to one of four messages that were different in terms of positive or negative outcomes (type of frame) and in terms of attained or avoided outcomes (type of kernel state). After reading the message, participants indicated their intention and resolve to engage in sufficient exercise.

RESULTS

No effects were found for intention. For resolve, there was a significant interaction between type of frame, type of kernel state, and exercise adherence. Those who did not adhere to the exercise guideline and read the loss-framed message with attained outcomes reported significantly higher resolve than all other participants.

CONCLUSIONS

This study indicates the relevance of including attained outcomes in message framing exercise interventions as well as a focus on exercise resolve.

STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTION

What is already known on this subject? Message framing is commonly used to increase exercise intentions and behaviour. Meta-analyses do not provide consistent support for this theory. Very little attention has been paid to resolve and message factors on framing effects. What does this study add? Framed messages have an effect on exercise resolve, but not on intention. Loss-framed messages with attained outcomes are most persuasive for those who do not adhere to exercise guidelines. Exercise framing studies should include behavioural resolve next to intention. .

The impacts of vicarious illness experience on response to gain- versus loss-framed breast cancer screening (BCS) messages

Although vicarious experience with certain illnesses has been found to be influential on people's illness perceptions and related behaviors, the concept of vicarious experience has been understudied in health communication research. This study aims to ground possible effects of vicarious illness experience (VIE) into theory, specifically concerning the developments in gain versus loss framing literature. An experiment using 154 African American participants (mean age = 46 years) found that participants who had close women affected by breast cancer and those who had no close women affected by breast cancer responded to gain- versus loss-framed breast cancer screening (BCS) messages differently. Compared to the loss frame, the gain frame was more effective for participants with VIE in increasing their favorable attitudes toward BCS, BCS recommendation intentions, and memory of the BCS message. In contrast, when compared to the gain frame, the loss frame was more effective for those without VIE in increasing their cognitive elaboration of the BCS message. The findings suggest the strategic potential of VIE in developing health interventions, and they also provide practical implications for health communication practitioners into how to strategically use gain versus loss framing in accordance with their target publics.

Stress effects on framed decisions: there are differences for gains and losses

Recent studies have shown that acute stress can lead to riskier decision making. Yet, the underlying mechanisms of the stress effects on decisions under risk remain poorly understood. To gain a better understanding of decision-making processes and potential strategy application under stress, we investigated decision making in pure gain and loss domains with unequal expected values (EVs) across alternatives. We conducted an experimental study with a 2 × 2 design (stress vs. no stress and gain domain vs. loss domain). The Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) was utilized to induce acute stress. Controls performed the placebo-TSST (p-TSST). To validate the stress response we measured salivary cortisol and alpha-amylase concentrations. We used a modified version of the Game of Dice Task (GDT) to assess decision-making performance in a gain and a loss domain. Results showed that non-stressed participants made less risky decisions in the gain domain compared to those of the loss domain. This behavior is in accordance with previous studies and indicates the stability of the framing effect in even more complex tasks with changing EVs across alternatives. Stress did not alter risk taking behavior in the gain domain. Yet, in the loss domain stressed participants made less risky decisions compared to controls. Additionally, the data support earlier findings of longer reaction times in loss compared to gain domains due to higher cognitive effort for loss-framed decisions. It is discussed that stress may lead to reduced amygdala activation, which has been found to reduce riskier decisions in a loss domain. With respect to earlier results of riskier decisions in tasks that unite both gain and loss domains, it is discussed whether stress leads to a stronger evaluation of high gains and a neglect of losses.

A neuroimaging investigation of attribute framing and individual differences

Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to evaluate the neural basis of framing effects. We tested the reflexive and reflective systems model of social cognition as it relates to framing. We also examined the relationships among frame susceptibility, intelligence and personality measures. Participants evaluated whether personal attributes applied to themselves from multiple perspectives and in positive and negative frames. Participants rated whether each statement was descriptive or not and endorsed positive frames more than negative frames. Individual differences on frame decisions enabled us to form high and low frame susceptibility groups. Endorsement of frame-consistent attributes was associated with personality factors, cognitive reflection and intelligence. Reflexive brain regions were associated with positive frames while reflective areas were associated with negative frames. Region of Interest analyses showed that frame-inconsistent responses were associated with increased activation within reflective cognitive control regions including the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), dorsomedial PFC and left ventrolateral PFC. Frame-consistent responses were associated with increased activation in the right orbitofrontal cortex. These results demonstrate that individual differences in frame susceptibility influence personal attribute evaluations. Overall, this study clarifies the neural correlates of the reflective and reflexive systems of social cognition as applied to decisions about social attributions.

Framing effects in medical situations: distinctions of attribute, goal and risky choice frames

OBJECTIVE

To verify whether three different framing effects (risky choice, attribute and goal) exist in simulated medical situations and to analyse any differences.

METHODS

Medical decision-making problems were established, relating to medical skill evaluation, patient compliance and a selection of treatment options. All problems were described in positive and negative frame conditions.

RESULTS

Significantly more positive evaluations were made if the doctor's medical records were described as 'of 100 patients, 70 patients became better' compared with those described as 'of 100 patients, 30 patients didn't become better'. Doctor's advice described in a negative frame resulted in significantly more decisions to comply, compared with advice described in a positive frame. Treatment options described in terms of survival rates resulted in significantly more adventurous choices compared with options described in terms of mortality rates. Decision-making reversal appeared in the risky choice and attribute frames, but not the goal frame.

CONCLUSIONS

Framing effects were shown to exist in simulated medical situations, but there were significant differences among the three kinds of such effects.

On avoiding framing effects in experienced decision makers

The present study aimed to (a) demonstrate the effect of positive–negative framing on experienced criminal justice decision makers, (b) examine the debiasing effect of visually structured risk messages, and (c) investigate whether risk perceptions mediate the debiasing effect of visual aids on decision making. In two phases, 60 senior police officers estimated the accuracy of a counterterrorism technique in identifying whether a known terror suspect poses an imminent danger and decided whether they would recommend the technique to policy makers. Officers also rated their confidence in this recommendation. When information about the effectiveness of the counterterrorism technique was presented in a numerical format, officers' perceptions of accuracy and recommendation decisions were susceptible to the framing effect: The technique was perceived to be more accurate and was more likely to be recommended when its effectiveness was presented in a positive than in a negative frame. However, when the information was represented visually using icon arrays, there were no such framing effects. Finally, perceptions of accuracy mediated the debiasing effect of visual aids on recommendation decisions. We offer potential explanations for the debiasing effect of visual aids and implications for communicating risk to experienced, professional decision makers.

Five different types of framing effects in medical situation: a preliminary exploration

Background

Considerable reports concerned the framing effect in medical situations. But quite few of them noticed to explore the differences among the various kinds of framing effects.

Objectives

In the present study, five different types of framing effects were examined and the effect sizes of them were compared.

Materials and Methods

Medical decision making problems concerning medicine effect evaluation, patient's compliance, treatment and doctor options selection were established. All the problems were described in both positive and negative frames. 500 undergraduates as participants were randomly divided into ten groups. Participants from each group were asked to finish one decision making task.

Results

All the frames that were examined leaded to significant framing effects: When the Asia Disease Problem was described in a positive frame, the participants preferred the conservative frame than the risky one, while if in a negative frame, the preference reversed (P < 0.01). If the drug effect was described as “of 100 patients taking this kind of medicine, 70 patients became better”, people tended to make more positive evaluations, compared with described as “of 100 patients taking this kind of medicine, 30 patients didn’t become better” (P < 0.01). Doctors’ advices were respectively described in a baneful or beneficial frame and the former one resulted in a better compliance (P < 0.05). If treatment options were described with a survival rate, people tended to choose risky option, while if described with a mortality rate, people tended to choose conservative option (P < 0.05). The number sized framing effect was also tested to be significant (P < 0.01). The five types of framing effects were small to big in effect size.

Conclusions

Medical decision making can be affected by frame descriptions. Attentions should be paid on the standardization of description in medical practice.

Web-conferencing as a viable method for group decision research

Studying group decision-making is challenging for multiple reasons. An important logistic difficulty is studying a sufficiently large number of groups, each with multiple participants. Assembling groups online could make this process easier and also provide access to group members more representative of real-world work groups than the sample of college students that typically comprise lab Face-to-Face (FtF) groups. The main goal of this paper is to compare the decisions of online groups to those of FtF groups. We did so in a study that manipulated gain/loss framing of a risky decision between groups and examined the decisions of both individual group members and groups. All of these dependent measures are compared for an online and an FtF sample. Our results suggest that web-conferencing can be a substitute for FtF interaction in group decision-making research, as we found no moderation effects of communication medium on individual or group decision outcome variables. The effects of medium that were found suggest that the use of online groups may be the preferred method for group research. To wit, discussions among the online groups were shorter, but generated a greater number of thought units, i.e., they made more efficient use of time.

Anchor effects in decision making can be reduced by the interaction between goal monitoring and the level of the decision maker's executive functions

Models of decision making postulate that interactions between contextual conditions and characteristics of the decision maker determine decision-making performance. We tested this assumption by using a possible positive contextual influence (goals) and a possible negative contextual influence (anchor) in a risky decision-making task (Game of Dice Task, GDT). In this task, making advantageous choices is well known to be closely related to a specific decision maker variable: the individual level of executive functions. One hundred subjects played the GDT in one of four conditions: with self-set goal for final balance (n = 25), with presentation of an anchor (a fictitious Top 10 list, showing high gains of other participants; n = 25), with anchor and goal definition (n = 25), and with neither anchor nor goal setting (n = 25). Subjects in the conditions with anchor made more risky decisions irrespective of the negative feedback, but this anchor effect was influenced by goal monitoring and moderated by the level of the subjects' executive functions. The findings imply that impacts of situational influences on decision making as they frequently occur in real life depend upon the individual's cognitive abilities. Anchor effects can be overcome by subjects with good cognitive abilities.

How framing statistical statements affects subjective veracity: validation and application of a multinomial model for judgments of truth

Extending the well-established negativity bias in human cognition to truth judgments, it was recently shown that negatively framed statistical statements are more likely to be considered true than formally equivalent statements framed positively. However, the underlying processes responsible for this effect are insufficiently understood. Therefore, a multinomial processing tree model is herein proposed to distinguish between differences in (a) knowledge or (b) response bias that may account for the framing effect. Three model validation experiments supported the psychological interpretability of model parameters. Model application revealed that the framing effect can be considered a bias: Given insufficient knowledge, individuals more likely guessed "true" when faced with a negatively framed statistical statement. The probability of conclusive knowledge, however, remained constant across frames. In summary, this article puts forwards and validates a formal model that can be used more generally to investigate processes underlying truth judgments. Based on this model, it is herein shown that one particular phenomenon - framing effects observed for statistical statements - can be considered a response bias, rather than the upshot of differential knowledge.

Processing Differences between Descriptions and Experience: A Comparative Analysis Using Eye-Tracking and Physiological Measures

Do decisions from description and from experience trigger different cognitive processes? We investigated this general question using cognitive modeling, eye-tracking, and physiological arousal measures. Three novel findings indeed suggest qualitatively different processes between the two types of decisions. First, comparative modeling indicates that evidence-accumulation models assuming averaging of all fixation-sampled outcomes predict choices best in decisions from experience, whereas Cumulative Prospect Theory predicts choices best in decisions from descriptions. Second, arousal decreased with increasing difference in expected value between gambles in description-based choices but not in experience. Third, the relation between attention and subjective weights given to outcomes was stronger for experience-based than for description-based tasks. Overall, our results indicate that processes in experience-based risky choice can be captured by sampling-and-averaging evidence-accumulation model. This model cannot be generalized to description-based decisions, in which more complex mechanisms are involved.

The Foreign-Language Effect

Would you make the same decisions in a foreign language as you would in your native tongue? It may be intuitive that people would make the same choices regardless of the language they are using, or that the difficulty of using a foreign language would make decisions less systematic. We discovered, however, that the opposite is true: Using a foreign language reduces decision-making biases. Four experiments show that the framing effect disappears when choices are presented in a foreign tongue. Whereas people were risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses when choices were presented in their native tongue, they were not influenced by this framing manipulation in a foreign language. Two additional experiments show that using a foreign language reduces loss aversion, increasing the acceptance of both hypothetical and real bets with positive expected value. We propose that these effects arise because a foreign language provides greater cognitive and emotional distance than a native tongue does.

Decision-making heuristics and biases across the life span

We outline a contextual and motivational model of judgment and decision-making (JDM) biases across the life span. Our model focuses on abilities and skills that correspond to deliberative, experiential, and affective decision-making processes. We review research that addresses links between JDM biases and these processes as represented by individual differences in specific abilities and skills (e.g., fluid and crystallized intelligence, executive functioning, emotion regulation, personality traits). We focus on two JDM biases-the sunk-cost fallacy (SCF) and the framing effect. We trace the developmental trajectory of each bias from preschool through middle childhood, adolescence, early adulthood, and later adulthood. We conclude that life-span developmental trajectories differ depending on the bias investigated. Existing research suggests relative stability in the framing effect across the life span and decreases in the SCF with age, including in later life. We highlight directions for future research on JDM biases across the life span, emphasizing the need for process-oriented research and research that increases our understanding of JDM biases in people's everyday lives.

Framing of health information messages

BACKGROUND

The same information about the evidence on health effects can be framed either in positive words or in negative words. Some research suggests that positive versus negative framing can lead to different decisions, a phenomenon described as the framing effect. Attribute framing is the positive versus negative description of a specific attribute of a single item or a state, for example, "the chance of survival with cancer is 2/3" versus "the chance of mortality with cancer is 1/3". Goal framing is the description of the consequences of performing or not performing an act as a gain versus a loss, for example, "if you undergo a screening test for cancer, your survival will be prolonged" versus "if you don't undergo screening test for cancer, your survival will be shortened".

OBJECTIVES

To evaluate the effects of attribute (positive versus negative) framing and of goal (gain versus loss) framing of the same health information, on understanding, perception of effectiveness, persuasiveness, and behavior of health professionals, policy makers, and consumers.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL, The Cochrane Library, issue 3 2007), MEDLINE (Ovid) (1966 to October 2007), EMBASE (Ovid) (1980 to October 2007), PsycINFO (Ovid) (1887 to October 2007). There were no language restrictions. We reviewed the reference lists of related systematic reviews, included studies and of excluded but closely related studies. We also contacted experts in the field.

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included randomized controlled trials, quasi-randomised controlled trials, and cross-over studies with health professionals, policy makers, and consumers evaluating one of the two types of framing.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Two review authors extracted data in duplicate and independently. We graded the quality of evidence for each outcome using the GRADE approach. We standardized the outcome effects using standardized mean difference (SMD). We stratified the analysis by the type of framing (attribute, goal) and conducted pre-planned subgroup analyses based on the type of message (screening, prevention, and treatment). The primary outcome was behaviour. We did not assess any adverse outcomes.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 35 studies involving 16,342 participants (all health consumers) and reporting 51 comparisons.In the context of attribute framing, participants in one included study understood the message better when it was framed negatively than when it was framed positively (1 study; SMD -0.58 (95% confidence interval (CI) -0.94 to -0.22); moderate effect size; low quality evidence). Although positively-framed messages may have led to more positive perception of effectiveness than negatively-framed messages (2 studies; SMD 0.36 (95% CI -0.13 to 0.85); small effect size; low quality evidence), there was little or no difference in persuasiveness (11 studies; SMD 0.07 (95% CI -0.23 to 0.37); low quality evidence) and behavior (1 study; SMD 0.09 (95% CI -0.14 to 0.31); moderate quality evidence).In the context of goal framing, loss messages led to a more positive perception of effectiveness compared to gain messages for screening messages (5 studies; SMD -0.30 (95% CI -0.49 to -0.10); small effect size; moderate quality evidence) and may have been more persuasive for treatment messages (3 studies; SMD -0.50 (95% CI -1.04 to 0.04); moderate effect size; very low quality evidence). There was little or no difference in behavior (16 studies; SMD -0.06 (95% CI -0.15 to 0.03); low quality evidence). No study assessed the effect on understanding.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Contrary to commonly held beliefs, the available low to moderate quality evidence suggests that both attribute and goal framing may have little if any consistent effect on health consumers' behaviour. The unexplained heterogeneity between studies suggests the possibility of a framing effect under specific conditions. Future research needs to investigate these conditions.

Is there evidence of publication biases in JDM research?

It is a long known problem that the preferential publication of statistically significant results (publication bias) may lead to incorrect estimates of the true effects being investigated. Even though other research areas (e.g., medicine, biology) are aware of the problem, and have identified strong publication biases, researchers in judgment and decision making (JDM) largely ignore it. We reanalyzed two current meta-analyses in this area. Both showed evidence of publication biases that may have led to a substantial overestimation of the true effects they investigated. A review of additional JDM meta-analyses shows that most meta-analyses conducted no or insufficient analyses of publication bias. However, given our results and the rareness of non-significant effects in the literature, we suspect that biases occur quite often. These findings suggest that (a) conclusions based on meta-analyses without reported tests of publication bias should be interpreted with caution and (b) publication policies and standard research practices should be revised to overcome the problem.

Preaching to the choir? The influence of personal relevance on the effects of gain- and loss-framed health-promoting messages

This article examines the moderating influence of personal relevance on the persuasive effects of gain- and loss-framed messages. We assessed current behaviour as a proxy for personal relevance, provided 169 participants with gain- and loss-framed messages advocating skin self-examination (SSE) and assessed intention to engage in SSE as the outcome measure. The results showed that loss-framed information was more persuasive than gain-framed information, but only for low-relevance participants. This suggests that loss-framed information might be mainly effective for recipients who need little persuading and, in fact, runs the risk of ‘preaching to the choir’.

Academic Decision Making and Prospect Theory

Two studies are reported that investigate the applicability of prospect theory to college students' academic decision making. Exp. 1 failed to provide support for the risk-seeking portion of the fourfold pattern predicted by prospect theory but did find the greater weighting of losses over gains. Using a more sensitive dependent measure, in Exp. 2 the results of the first experiment were replicated in terms of the gain-loss effect and also found some support for the fourfold pattern in the interaction between probabilities and gain versus loss. The greatest risk-seeking was found in the high probability loss condition.