Somatoparaphrenia: a body delusion. A review of the neuropsychological literature

Disintegration of multisensory signals from the real hand reduces default limb self-attribution: an fMRI study

The perception of our limbs in space is built upon the integration of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals. Accumulating evidence suggests that these signals are combined in areas of premotor, parietal, and cerebellar cortices. However, it remains to be determined whether neuronal populations in these areas integrate hand signals according to basic temporal and spatial congruence principles of multisensory integration. Here, we developed a setup based on advanced 3D video technology that allowed us to manipulate the spatiotemporal relationships of visuotactile (VT) stimuli delivered on a healthy human participant's real hand during fMRI and investigate the ensuing neural and perceptual correlates. Our experiments revealed two novel findings. First, we found responses in premotor, parietal, and cerebellar regions that were dependent upon the spatial and temporal congruence of VT stimuli. This multisensory integration effect required a simultaneous match between the seen and felt postures of the hand, which suggests that congruent visuoproprioceptive signals from the upper limb are essential for successful VT integration. Second, we observed that multisensory conflicts significantly disrupted the default feeling of ownership of the seen real limb, as indexed by complementary subjective, psychophysiological, and BOLD measures. The degree to which self-attribution was impaired could be predicted from the attenuation of neural responses in key multisensory areas. These results elucidate the neural bases of the integration of multisensory hand signals according to basic spatiotemporal principles and demonstrate that the disintegration of these signals leads to "disownership" of the seen real hand.

Turning Body and Self Inside Out

Prominent theories highlight the importance of bodily perception for self-consciousness, but it is currently not known whether bodily perception is based on interoceptive or exteroceptive signals or on integrated signals from these anatomically distinct systems. In the research reported here, we combined both types of signals by surreptitiously providing participants with visual exteroceptive information about their heartbeat: A real-time video image of a periodically illuminated silhouette outlined participants’ (projected, “virtual”) bodies and flashed in synchrony with their heartbeats. We investigated whether these “cardio-visual” signals could modulate bodily self-consciousness and tactile perception. We report two main findings. First, synchronous cardio-visual signals increased self-identification with and self-location toward the virtual body, and second, they altered the perception of tactile stimuli applied to participants’ backs so that touch was mislocalized toward the virtual body. We argue that the integration of signals from the inside and the outside of the human body is a fundamental neurobiological process underlying self-consciousness.

Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily self-consciousness

Recent research on bodily self-consciousness has assumed that it consists of three distinct components: the experience of owning a body (body ownership); the experience of being a body with a given location within the environment (self-location); and the experience of taking a first-person, body-centered, perspective on that environment (perspective). Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components-body ownership and self-location-are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction. We examine these results and consider them in relation to clinical evidence from patients with altered body perception and work on a variety of multisensory, body-related illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion, the full body illusion, the body swap illusion and the enfacement illusion. We conclude by providing a preliminary synthesis of the data on bodily self-consciousness and its neural correlates.

Neural basis of limb ownership in individuals with body integrity identity disorder

Our body feels like it is ours. However, individuals with body integrity identity disorder (BIID) lack this feeling of ownership for distinct limbs and desire amputation of perfectly healthy body parts. This extremely rare condition provides us with an opportunity to study the neural basis underlying the feeling of limb ownership, since these individuals have a feeling of disownership for a limb in the absence of apparent brain damage. Here we directly compared brain activation between limbs that do and do not feel as part of the body using functional MRI during separate tactile stimulation and motor execution experiments. In comparison to matched controls, individuals with BIID showed heightened responsivity of a large somatosensory network including the parietal cortex and right insula during tactile stimulation, regardless of whether the stimulated leg felt owned or alienated. Importantly, activity in the ventral premotor cortex depended on the feeling of ownership and was reduced during stimulation of the alienated compared to the owned leg. In contrast, no significant differences between groups were observed during the performance of motor actions. These results suggest that altered somatosensory processing in the premotor cortex is associated with the feeling of disownership in BIID, which may be related to altered integration of somatosensory and proprioceptive information.

Full body illusion is associated with widespread skin temperature reduction

A central feature of our consciousness is the experience of the self as a unified entity residing in a physical body, termed bodily self-consciousness. This phenomenon includes aspects such as the sense of owning a body (also known as body ownership) and has been suggested to arise from the integration of sensory signals from the body. Several studies have shown that temporally synchronous tactile stimulation of the real body and visual stimulation of a fake or virtual body can induce changes in bodily self-consciousness, typically resulting in a sense of illusory ownership over the fake body. The present study assessed the effect of anatomical congruency of visuo-tactile stimulation on bodily self-consciousness. A virtual body was presented and temporally synchronous visuo-tactile stroking was applied simultaneously to the participants' body and to the virtual body. We manipulated the anatomical locations of the visuo-tactile stroking (i.e., on the back, on the leg), resulting in congruent stroking (stroking was felt and seen on the back or the leg) or incongruent stroking (i.e., stroking was felt on the leg and seen on the back). We measured self-identification with the virtual body and self-location as well as skin temperature. Illusory self-identification with the avatar as well as changes in self-location were experienced in the congruent stroking conditions. Participants showed a decrease in skin temperature across several body locations during congruent stimulation. These data establish that the full-body illusion (FBI) alters bodily self-consciousness and instigates widespread physiological changes in the participant's body.

Sensorimotor incongruence and body perception: an experimental investigation

Objectives: Several studies have shown that mirrored arm or leg movements can induce altered body sensations. This includes the alleviation of chronic pain using congruent mirror feedback and the induction of abnormal sensation in healthy participants using incongruent mirror feedback. Prior research has identified neuronal and conceptual mechanisms of these phenomena. With the rising application of behavior-based methods for pain relief, a structured investigation of these reported effects seems necessary.

Methods: We investigated a mirror setup that included congruent and incongruent hand and arm movements in 113 healthy participants and assessed the occurrence and intensity of unusual physical experiences such as pain, the sensation of missing or additional limbs, or changes in weight or temperature. A wooden surface instead of a mirror condition served as control.

Results: As reported earlier, mirrored movements led to a variety of subjective reactions in both the congruent and incongruent movement condition, with the sensation of possessing a third limb being significantly more intense and frequent in the incongruent mirror condition. Reports of illusory pain were not more frequent during mirrored than during non-mirrored movements.

Conclusion: These results suggest that, while all mirrored hand movements induce abnormal body perceptions, the experience of an extra limb is most pronounced in the incongruent mirror movement condition. The frequent sensation of having a third arm may be related to brain processes designed to integrate input from several senses in a meaningful manner. Painful sensations are not more frequent or intense when a mirror is present.

Xenomelia: a social neuroscience view of altered bodily self-consciousness

Xenomelia, the “foreign limb syndrome,” is characterized by the non-acceptance of one or more of one’s own extremities and the resulting desire for elective limb amputation or paralysis. Formerly labeled “body integrity identity disorder” (BIID), the condition was originally considered a psychological or psychiatric disorder, but a brain-centered Zeitgeist and a rapidly growing interest in the neural underpinnings of bodily self-consciousness has shifted the focus toward dysfunctional central nervous system circuits. The present article outlays both mind-based and brain-based views highlighting their shortcomings. We propose that full insight into what should be conceived a “xenomelia spectrum disorder” will require interpretation of individual symptomatology in a social context. A proper social neuroscience of xenomelia respects the functional neuroanatomy of corporeal awareness, but also acknowledges the brain’s plasticity in response to an individual’s history, which is lived against a cultural background. This integrated view of xenomelia will promote the subfield of consciousness research concerned with the unity of body and self.

Understanding others' feelings: the role of the right primary somatosensory cortex in encoding the affective valence of others' touch

Brain imaging studies in humans have shown the existence of a shared somatosensory representation in the primary somatosensory cortex (S1), putatively involved in understanding others' sensations (Keysers et al., 2010); however, the role of S1 in such a high-level process is still unknown. To ascertain the causal involvement of S1, and its possible hemispheric lateralization, in encoding the affective valence of emotional scenes, depicting, or not, a tactile event, we gave to healthy participants a picture-based affective go/no-go task and low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was chosen as control site. rTMS over the right, but not the left, S1 selectively increased the participants' latencies in the affective go/no-go task, but only when the affective state was conveyed by touch; intriguingly, this interfering effect was associated with the empathic ability to adopt the subjective perspective of others. The left, not the right, DLPFC is also involved in affective go/no-go performance, but regardless of the sight of touch, and independently of empathic abilities. This novel evidence demonstrates the crossmodal role of right S1 in encoding the pleasant and aversive consequences of others' sensations evoked by touch.

Body ownership and attention in the mirror: insights from somatoparaphrenia and the rubber hand illusion

The brain receives and synthesises information about the body from different modalities, coordinates and perspectives, and affords us with a coherent and stable sense of body ownership. We studied this sense in a somatoparaphrenic patient and three control patients, all with unilateral right-hemisphere lesions. We experimentally manipulated the visual perspective (direct- versus mirror-view) and spatial attention (drawn to peripersonal space versus extrapersonal space) in an experiment involving recognising one's own hand. The somatoparaphrenic patient denied limb ownership in all direct view trials, but viewing the hand via a mirror significantly increased ownership. The extent of this increase depended on spatial attention; when attention was drawn to the extrapersonal space (near-the-mirror) the patient showed a near perfect recognition of her arm in the mirror, while when attention was drawn to peripersonal space (near-the-body) the patient recognised her arm in only half the mirror trials. In a supplementary experiment, we used the Rubber Hand Illusion to manipulate the same factors in healthy controls. Ownership of the rubber hand occurred in both direct and mirror view, but shifting attention between peripersonal and extrapersonal space had no effect on rubber-hand ownership. We conclude that the isolation of visual perspectives on the body and the division of attention between two different locations is not sufficient to affect body ownership in healthy individuals and right hemisphere controls. However, in somatoparaphrenia, where first-person body ownership and stimulus-driven attention are impaired by lesions to a right-hemisphere ventral attentional-network, the body can nevertheless be recognised as one's own if perceived in a third-person visual perspective and particularly if top-down, spatial attention is directed away from peripersonal space.

The building blocks of the full body ownership illusion

Previous work has reported that it is not difficult to give people the illusion of ownership over an artificial body, providing a powerful tool for the investigation of the neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying body perception and self consciousness. We present an experimental study that uses immersive virtual reality (IVR) focused on identifying the perceptual building blocks of this illusion. We systematically manipulated visuotactile and visual sensorimotor contingencies, visual perspective, and the appearance of the virtual body in order to assess their relative role and mutual interaction. Consistent results from subjective reports and physiological measures showed that a first person perspective over a fake humanoid body is essential for eliciting a body ownership illusion. We found that the illusion of ownership can be generated when the virtual body has a realistic skin tone and spatially substitutes the real body seen from a first person perspective. In this case there is no need for an additional contribution of congruent visuotactile or sensorimotor cues. Additionally, we found that the processing of incongruent perceptual cues can be modulated by the level of the illusion: when the illusion is strong, incongruent cues are not experienced as incorrect. Participants exposed to asynchronous visuotactile stimulation can experience the ownership illusion and perceive touch as originating from an object seen to contact the virtual body. Analogously, when the level of realism of the virtual body is not high enough and/or when there is no spatial overlap between the two bodies, then the contribution of congruent multisensory and/or sensorimotor cues is required for evoking the illusion. On the basis of these results and inspired by findings from neurophysiological recordings in the monkey, we propose a model that accounts for many of the results reported in the literature.

Dissociations between the horizontal and dorsoventral axes in body-size perception

Body size can vary throughout a person's lifetime, inducing plasticity of the internal body representation. Changes in horizontal width accompany those in dorsal-to-ventral thickness. To examine differences in the perception of different body axes, neural correlates of own-body-size perception in the horizontal and dorsoventral directions were compared using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Original and distorted (-30, -10, +10 and +30%) images of the neck-down region of their own body were presented to healthy female participants, who were then asked whether the images were of their own body or not based explicitly on body size. Participants perceived body images distorted by -10% as their own, whereas those distorted by +30% as belonging to others. Horizontal width images yielded slightly more subjective own-body perceptions than dorsoventral thickness images did. Subjective perception of own-body size was associated with bilateral inferior parietal activity. In contrast, other-body judgments showed pre-supplementary motor and superior parietal activity. Expansion in the dorsoventral direction was associated with the left fusiform gyrus and the right inferior parietal lobule, whereas horizontal expansions were associated with activity in the bilateral somatosensory area. These results suggest neural dissociations between the two body axes: dorsoventral images of thickness may require visual processing, whereas bodily sensations are involved in horizontal body-size perception. Somatosensory rather than visual processes can be critical for the assessment of frontal own-body appearance. Visual body thickness and somatosensory body width may be integrated to construct a whole-body representation.

Hyposchematia without spatial neglect in 2 patients with lesions involving the insula

BACKGROUND

: Hyposchematia is a rare variant of aschematia in which patients underestimate the size of part or all of their body. The term also describes an abnormality in drawing tasks, in which patients underestimate the size of 1 side of an image and draw it too small. Little is known about the neuroanatomy of the syndrome.

CASE REPORTS

: We report 2 patients who developed contralateral hyposchematia without spatial neglect after suffering an ischemic lesion involving the right insula. Both patients felt that the left side of their face and their left arm and leg were disproportionately smaller than their right. On a drawing task, both patients drew the left sides of objects smaller than the right; they perseverated on the left sides of the images, for example, adding extra left-sided petals to a daisy.

CONCLUSIONS

: In 2 reported patients, the cause of hyposchematia may be a lesion involving multiple insular circuits that affect the perception of extrapersonal space and self-related systems.

The Rubber Hand Illusion in a Patient with Hand Disownership

A 78-year-old patient with a right hemispheric sensorimotor ischemic stroke suffered from problems in ownership of her left arm (somatoparaphrenia). After recovering from motor weakness, however, body ownership problems remained present. To assess whether disturbed feelings of ownership coincided with an enhanced or diminished susceptibility for gaining ownership over a foreign hand, we applied the ‘Rubber Hand Illusion’ (RHI) to the ipsi- and contralesional hand. The RHI was significantly stronger for the contralesional left arm than for the right arm. In addition, solely visual exposure to the left rubber hand was sufficient to elicit strong feelings of ownership over the rubber hand. These findings suggest that disturbances in the feeling of body ownership allow a foreign hand to be incorporated more easily.

The prognosis of allocentric and egocentric neglect: evidence from clinical scans

We contrasted the neuroanatomical substrates of sub-acute and chronic visuospatial deficits associated with different aspects of unilateral neglect using computed tomography scans acquired as part of routine clinical diagnosis. Voxel-wise statistical analyses were conducted on a group of 160 stroke patients scanned at a sub-acute stage. Lesion-deficit relationships were assessed across the whole brain, separately for grey and white matter. We assessed lesions that were associated with behavioural performance (i) at a sub-acute stage (within 3 months of the stroke) and (ii) at a chronic stage (after 9 months post stroke). Allocentric and egocentric neglect symptoms at the sub-acute stage were associated with lesions to dissociated regions within the frontal lobe, amongst other regions. However the frontal lesions were not associated with neglect at the chronic stage. On the other hand, lesions in the angular gyrus were associated with persistent allocentric neglect. In contrast, lesions within the superior temporal gyrus extending into the supramarginal gyrus, as well as lesions within the basal ganglia and insula, were associated with persistent egocentric neglect. Damage within the temporo-parietal junction was associated with both types of neglect at the sub-acute stage and 9 months later. Furthermore, white matter disconnections resulting from damage along the superior longitudinal fasciculus were associated with both types of neglect and critically related to both sub-acute and chronic deficits. Finally, there was a significant difference in the lesion volume between patients who recovered from neglect and patients with chronic deficits. The findings presented provide evidence that (i) the lesion location and lesion size can be used to successfully predict the outcome of neglect based on clinical CT scans, (ii) lesion location alone can serve as a critical predictor for persistent neglect symptoms, (iii) wide spread lesions are associated with neglect symptoms at the sub-acute stage but only some of these are critical for predicting whether neglect will become a chronic disorder and (iv) the severity of behavioural symptoms can be a useful predictor of recovery in the absence of neuroimaging findings on clinical scans. We discuss the implications for understanding the symptoms of the neglect syndrome, the recovery of function and the use of clinical scans to predict outcome.

Extending body space in immersive virtual reality: a very long arm illusion

Recent studies have shown that a fake body part can be incorporated into human body representation through synchronous multisensory stimulation on the fake and corresponding real body part - the most famous example being the Rubber Hand Illusion. However, the extent to which gross asymmetries in the fake body can be assimilated remains unknown. Participants experienced, through a head-tracked stereo head-mounted display a virtual body coincident with their real body. There were 5 conditions in a between-groups experiment, with 10 participants per condition. In all conditions there was visuo-motor congruence between the real and virtual dominant arm. In an Incongruent condition (I), where the virtual arm length was equal to the real length, there was visuo-tactile incongruence. In four Congruent conditions there was visuo-tactile congruence, but the virtual arm lengths were either equal to (C1), double (C2), triple (C3) or quadruple (C4) the real ones. Questionnaire scores and defensive withdrawal movements in response to a threat showed that the overall level of ownership was high in both C1 and I, and there was no significant difference between these conditions. Additionally, participants experienced ownership over the virtual arm up to three times the length of the real one, and less strongly at four times the length. The illusion did decline, however, with the length of the virtual arm. In the C2-C4 conditions although a measure of proprioceptive drift positively correlated with virtual arm length, there was no correlation between the drift and ownership of the virtual arm, suggesting different underlying mechanisms between ownership and drift. Overall, these findings extend and enrich previous results that multisensory and sensorimotor information can reconstruct our perception of the body shape, size and symmetry even when this is not consistent with normal body proportions.

Time Slows Down during Accidents

The experienced speed of the passage of time is not constant as time can seem to fly or slow down depending on the circumstances we are in. Anecdotally accidents and other frightening events are extreme examples of the latter; people who have survived accidents often report altered phenomenology including how everything appeared to happen in slow motion. While the experienced phenomenology has been investigated, there are no explanations about how one can have these experiences. Instead, the only recently discussed explanation suggests that the anecdotal phenomenology is due to memory effects and hence not really experienced during the accidents. The purpose of this article is (i) to reintroduce the currently forgotten comprehensively altered phenomenology that some people experience during the accidents, (ii) to explain why the recent experiments fail to address the issue at hand, and (iii) to suggest a new framework to explain what happens when people report having experiences of time slowing down in these cases. According to the suggested framework, our cognitive processes become rapidly enhanced. As a result, the relation between the temporal properties of events in the external world and in internal states becomes distorted with the consequence of external world appearing to slow down. That is, the presented solution is a realist one in a sense that it maintains that sometimes people really do have experiences of time slowing down.

Hippocampal temporal-parietal junction interaction in the production of psychotic symptoms: a framework for understanding the schizophrenic syndrome

A framework is described for understanding the schizophrenic syndrome at the brain systems level. It is hypothesized that over-activation of dynamic gesture and social perceptual processes in the temporal-parietal occipital junction (TPJ), posterior superior temporal sulcus (PSTS) and surrounding regions produce the syndrome (including positive and negative symptoms, their prevalence, prodromal signs, and cognitive deficits). Hippocampal system hyper-activity and atrophy have been consistently found in schizophrenia. Hippocampal activity is highly correlated with activity in the TPJ and may be a source of over-excitation of the TPJ and surrounding regions. Strong evidence for this comes from in-vivo recordings in humans during psychotic episodes. Many positive symptoms of schizophrenia can be reframed as the erroneous sense of a presence or other who is observing, acting, speaking, or controlling; these qualia are similar to those evoked during abnormal activation of the TPJ. The TPJ and PSTS play a key role in the perception (and production) of dynamic social, emotional, and attentional gestures for the self and others (e.g., body/face/eye gestures, audiovisual speech and prosody, and social attentional gestures such as eye gaze). The single cell representation of dynamic gestures is multimodal (auditory, visual, tactile), matching the predominant hallucinatory categories in schizophrenia. Inherent in the single cell perceptual signal of dynamic gesture representations is a computation of intention, agency, and anticipation or expectancy (for the self and others). Stimulation of the TPJ resulting in activation of the self representation has been shown to result a feeling of a presence or multiple presences (due to heautoscopy) and also bizarre tactile experiences. Neurons in the TPJ are also tuned, or biased to detect threat related emotions. Abnormal over-activation in this system could produce the conscious hallucination of a voice (audiovisual speech), a person or a touch. Over-activation could interfere with attentional/emotional gesture perception and production (negative symptoms). It could produce the unconscious feeling of being watched, followed, or of a social situation unfolding along with accompanying abnormal perception of intent and agency (delusions). Abnormal activity in the TPJ would also be predicted to create several cognitive disturbances that are characteristic of schizophrenia, including abnormalities in attention, predictive social processing, working memory, and a bias to erroneously perceive threat.

Substitutional reality system: a novel experimental platform for experiencing alternative reality

We have developed a novel experimental platform, referred to as a substitutional reality (SR) system, for studying the conviction of the perception of live reality and related metacognitive functions. The SR system was designed to manipulate people's reality by allowing them to experience live scenes (in which they were physically present) and recorded scenes (which were recorded and edited in advance) in an alternating manner without noticing a reality gap. All of the naïve participants (n = 21) successfully believed that they had experienced live scenes when recorded scenes had been presented. Additional psychophysical experiments suggest the depth of visual objects does not affect the perceptual discriminability between scenes, and the scene switch during head movement enhance substitutional performance. The SR system, with its reality manipulation, is a novel and affordable method for studying metacognitive functions and psychiatric disorders.

Bisecting real and fake body parts: effects of prism adaptation after right brain damage

The representation of body parts holds a special status in the brain, due to their prototypical shape and the contribution of multisensory (visual and somatosensory-proprioceptive) information. In a previous study (Sposito et al., 2010), we showed that patients with left unilateral spatial neglect exhibit a rightward bias in setting the midpoint of their left forearm, which becomes larger when bisecting a cylindrical object comparable in size. This body part advantage, found also in control participants, suggests partly different processes for computing the extent of body parts and objects. In this study we tested 16 right-brain-damaged patients, and 10 unimpaired participants, on a manual bisection task of their own (real) left forearm, or a size-matched fake forearm. We then explored the effects of adaptation to rightward displacing prism exposure, which brings about leftward aftereffects. We found that all participants showed prism adaptation (PA) and aftereffects, with right-brain-damaged patients exhibiting a reduction of the rightward bias for both real and fake forearm, with no overall differences between them. Second, correlation analyses highlighted the role of visual and proprioceptive information for the metrics of body parts. Third, single-patient analyses showed dissociations between real and fake forearm bisections, and the effects of PA, as well as a more frequent impairment with fake body parts. In sum, the rightward bias shown by right-brain-damaged patients in bisecting body parts is reduced by prism exposure, as other components of the neglect syndrome; discrete spatial representations for real and fake body parts, for which visual and proprioceptive codes play different roles, are likely to exist. Multisensory information seems to render self bodily segments more resistant to the disruption brought about by right-hemisphere injury.

The role of self-touch in somatosensory and body representation disorders after stroke

Somatosensory impairments occur in about half of the cases of stroke. These impairments range from primary deficits in tactile detection and the perception of features, to higher order impairments in haptic object recognition and bodily experience. In this paper, we review the influence of active- and self-touch on somatosensory impairments after stroke. Studies have shown that self-touch improves tactile detection in patients with primary tactile deficits. A small number of studies concerned with the effect of self-touch on bodily experience in healthy individuals have demonstrated that self-touch influences the structural representation of one's own body. In order to better understand the effect of self-touch on body representations, we present an informal study of a stroke patient with somatoparaphrenia and misoplegia. The role of self-touch on body ownership was investigated by asking the patient to stroke the impaired left hand and foreign hands. The patient reported ownership and a change in affect over all presented hands through self-touch. The time it took to accomplish ownership varied, based on the resemblance of the foreign hand to the patient's own hand. Our findings suggest that self-touch can modulate impairments in body ownership and affect, perhaps by helping to reinstate the representation of the body.

"That's not my arm": a hypnotic analogue of somatoparaphrenia

INTRODUCTION

"Instrumental hypnosis" allows researchers to model clinical symptoms in the laboratory, creating "virtual patients" with reversible disturbances in, for example, perception, action, memory, or belief. We used hypnosis to temporarily recreate somatoparaphrenia, a delusional belief that one's own limb belongs to someone else.

METHODS

We compared a "Fully Formed" somatoparaphrenia suggestion with a "Factor 1 + Factor 2" suggestion that attempted to generate the delusional belief from analogues of its hypothesised underlying factors (i.e., paralysis plus disrupted critical belief evaluation). We tested and then challenged subjects' responses to these suggestions.

RESULTS

Although many hypnotic subjects experienced temporary paralysis, only a minority claimed their arm did not belong to them. Notably, the Fully Formed suggestion was more successful in recreating features of somatoparaphrenia than the Factor 1 + Factor 2 suggestion. In response to the challenges, some of those who developed temporary somatoparaphrenia maintained their belief throughout the hypnosis session. CONCLUSIONS. We discuss these findings in terms of the "two-factor" theory of delusions and we highlight the advantages versus disadvantages of using hypnosis to explore such delusional beliefs in the laboratory.

The Rubber Hand Illusion: two's a company, but three's a crowd

On the one hand, it is often assumed that the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) is constrained by a structural body model so that one cannot implement supernumerary limbs. On the other hand, several recent studies reported illusory duplication of the right hand in subjects exposed to two adjacent rubber hands. The present study tested whether spatial constraints may affect the possibility of inducing the sense of ownership to two rubber hands located side by side to the left of the subject's hand. We found that only the closest rubber hand appeared both objectively (proprioceptive drift) and subjectively (ownership rating) embodied. Crucially, synchronous touch of a second, but farther, rubber hand disrupted the objective measure of the RHI, but not the subjective one. We concluded that, in order to elicit a genuine RHI for multiple rubber hands, the two rubber hands must be at the same distance from the subject's hand/body.

Body integrity identity disorder: the persistent desire to acquire a physical disability

BACKGROUND

Body integrity identity disorder (BIID) is a rare and unusual psychiatric condition characterized by a persistent desire to acquire a physical disability (e.g., amputation, paraplegia) since childhood that to date has not been formally described in the psychiatric nosology. Most BIID sufferers experience a chronic and dysphoric sense of inappropriateness regarding their being able-bodied, and many have been driven to actualize their desired disability through surreptitious surgical or other more dangerous methods. This review aims to characterize the history and phenomenology of this condition, to present its differential diagnosis, and to consider possible etiologies, treatment options, and ethical considerations.

SAMPLING AND METHOD

Review of the psychiatric and neurological literature.

RESULTS

A growing body of data suggests the existence of a discrete entity with onset by early adolescence and a negative impact on functioning. Parallel neurological conditions and preliminary experimental investigations suggest a possible neurobiological component in at least a portion of cases. While attempts at treatment have been described, no systematic evidence for efficacy has emerged.

DISCUSSION

BIID is a unique nosological entity with significant consequences for its sufferers and as such may warrant inclusion in some form in the forthcoming DSM-5 and ICD-11.

Facial macrosomatognosia and pain in a case of Wallenberg's syndrome: selective effects of vestibular and transcutaneous stimulations

Macro- and micro-somatognosia refer to rare disorders of the cerebral representation of the body whereby patients perceive body parts as disproportionately large or small. Here we report the experimental study of a patient who, following a left lateral medullary stroke (Wallenberg's syndrome, including vestibular deficits) complained of a persistent somatosensory illusory sensation of swelling, confined to the left side of his face (i.e., left macrosomatognosia). This hemifacial somatosensory distortion was associated with a left facial anesthesia, and a neuropathic pain affecting the three branches of the left trigeminal nerve. In this study, we first document quantitatively the patient's somatosensory illusion by using a somatosensory-to-visual matching task in which the patient modified the picture of his own face to fit his left-sided somatosensory misperception. The patient's performance revealed that macrosomatognosia was confined to the second branch of the left trigeminal nerve. Perception of the size of visual objects was comparatively preserved. Second, we investigated the effects of two peripheral stimulations, which may affect the spatial component of somatosensory deficits (caloric vestibular stimulation, CVS; transcutaneous electrical nervous stimulation, TENS) and pain (TENS). Left CVS abolished the facial somatosensory illusion, for about 30min, but had no effect on the left facial pain. Conversely, left TENS substantially reduced the neuropathic pain during stimulation, but had no effect on macrosomatognosia, indicating a double dissociation between the two disorders. These results reveal that facial macrosomatognosia may be regarded as a high-order deficit of somatosensory perception of the shape and volume of the face, which fits the definition of 'hyperschematia' (i.e., when the body takes up too much room) originally proposed by Bonnier (1905). Our data also indicate that CVS may favor the restoration of the conscious representation of the shape and size of the face. Overall, these findings lend support to the view that afferent inputs from the vestibular system can affect in a specific fashion the activity of cerebral structures involved in the building up and updating of the topological description of body parts.

Body integrity identity disorder: deranged body processing, right fronto-parietal dysfunction, and phenomenological experience of body incongruity

Body integrity identity disorder (BIID) is characterised by profound experience of incongruity between the biological and desired body structure. The condition manifests in "non-belonging" of body parts, and the subsequent desire to amputate, paralyse or disable a limb. Little is known about BIID; however, a neuropsychological model implicating right fronto-parietal and insular networks is emerging, with potential disruption to body representation. We argue that, as there is scant systematic research on BIID published to date and much of the research is methodologically weak, it is premature to assume that the only process underlying bodily experience that is compromised is body representation. The present review systematically investigates which aspects of neurological processing of the body, and sense of self, may be compromised in BIID. We argue that the disorder most likely reflects dysregulation in multiple levels of body processing. That is, the disunity between self and the body could arguably come about through congenital and/or developmental disruption of body representations, which, together with altered multisensory integration, may preclude the experience of self-attribution and embodiment of affected body parts. Ulimately, there is a need for official diagnostic criteria to facilitate epidemiological characterisation of BIID, and for further research to systematically investigate which aspects of body representation and processing are truly compromised in the disorder.

Body integrity identity disorder: from a psychological to a neurological syndrome

Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) is a condition in which individuals experience an intense desire for amputation of an healthy limb. Recently, McGeoch and colleagues provided the first direct evidence that this syndrome may be neurological rather than psychological in its origin. However, before including BIID in body ownership disorders, several concerns should be clarified, exploring other components of body representation and not only somatosensory perception.

Disturbances in body ownership in schizophrenia: evidence from the rubber hand illusion and case study of a spontaneous out-of-body experience

Background

A weakened sense of self may contribute to psychotic experiences. Body ownership, one component of self-awareness, can be studied with the rubber hand illusion (RHI). Watching a rubber hand being stroked while one's unseen hand is stroked synchronously can lead to a sense of ownership over the rubber hand, a shift in perceived position of the real hand, and a limb-specific drop in stimulated hand temperature. We aimed to assess the RHI in schizophrenia using quantifiable measures: proprioceptive drift and stimulation-dependent changes in hand temperature.

Methods

The RHI was elicited in 24 schizophrenia patients and 21 matched controls by placing their unseen hand adjacent to a visible rubber hand and brushing real and rubber hands synchronously or asynchronously. Perceived finger location was measured before and after stimulation. Hand temperature was taken before and during stimulation. Subjective strength of the illusion was assessed by a questionnaire.

Results

Across groups, the RHI was stronger during synchronous stimulation, indicated by self-report and proprioceptive drift. Patients reported a stronger RHI than controls. Self-reported strength of RHI was associated with schizotypy in controls Proprioceptive drift was larger in patients, but only following synchronous stimulation. Further, we observed stimulation-dependent changes in skin temperature. During right hand stimulation, temperature dropped in the stimulated hand and rose in the unstimulated hand. Interestingly, induction of RHI led to an out-of-body experience in one patient, linking body disownership and psychotic experiences.

Conclusions

The RHI is quantitatively and qualitatively stronger in schizophrenia. These findings suggest that patients have a more flexible body representation and weakened sense of self, and potentially indicate abnormalities in temporo-parietal networks implicated in body ownership. Further, results suggest that these body ownership disturbances might be at the heart of a subset of the pathognomonic delusions of passivity.

Differential effects of perceived hand location on the disruption of embodiment by apparent physical encroachment of the limb

while much is known about the processes underlying the embodiment of non-corporeal objects, less research has been conducted to explore the mechanisms that prevent embodiment. The current study investigates the effect of violation of the human body template on embodiment of fake limbs by appearing to encroach the fake limb with a solid object. Encroachment of the limb disrupted embodiment, but only when the limb was far from the body. When the encroached limb was close to the body, it was not disembodied despite such clear violations of knowledge related to the body. The representation of the limb in the body schema was similarly robust to near-hand violations, suggesting that competing representations of the limb that are close to the body are preferred to those that are far from the body.

Detection of visual-tactile contingency in the first year after birth

It is well documented that in the first year after birth, infants are able to identify self-performed actions. This ability has been regarded as the basis of conscious self-perception. However, it is not yet known whether infants are also sensitive to aspects of the self when they cannot control the sensory feedback by means of self-performed actions. Therefore, we investigated the contribution of visual-tactile contingency to self-perception in infants. In Experiment 1, 7- and 10-month-olds were presented with two video displays of lifelike baby doll legs. The infant's left leg was stroked contingently with only one of the video displays. The results showed that 7- and 10-month-olds looked significantly longer at the contingent display than at the non-contingent display. Experiment 2 was conducted to investigate the role of morphological characteristics in contingency detection. Ten-month-olds were presented with video displays of two neutral objects (i.e., oblong wooden blocks of approximately the same size as the doll legs) being stroked in the same way as in Experiment 1. No preference was found for either the contingent or the non-contingent display but our results confirm a significant decrease in looking time to the contingent display compared to Experiment 1. These results indicate that detection of visual-tactile contingency as one important aspect of self-perception is present very early in ontogeny. Furthermore, this ability appears to be limited to the perception of objects that strongly resemble the infant's body, suggesting an early sensitivity to the morphology of one's own body.