The self to other model of empathy: Providing a new framework for understanding empathy impairments in psychopathy, autism, and alexithymia

Inter-Individual Differences in Vicarious Tactile Perception: a View Across the Lifespan in Typical and Atypical Populations

Touch is our most interpersonal sense, and so it stands to reason that we represent not only our own bodily experiences, but also those felt by others. This review will summarise brain and behavioural research on vicarious tactile perception (mirror touch). Specifically, we will focus on vicarious touch across the lifespan in typical and atypical groups, and will identify the knowledge gaps that are in urgent need of filling by examining what is known about how individuals differ within and between typical and atypical groups.

Alexithymia in Adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorder: Its Relationship to Internalising Difficulties, Sensory Modulation and Social Cognition

Alexithymia is a personality trait frequently found in adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and has been linked to impairments in emotion recognition and empathy. The presentation of alexithymia within ASD at younger ages remains unexplored, and was examined in the present study. Alexithymia rates were significantly elevated in ASD (55%; 31/56 scoring above cut-off) versus non-ASD adolescents (16%; 5/32 scoring above cut-off). Within individuals with ASD, alexithymia was associated with increased self-reported anxiety, parent-reported emotional difficulties, self-reported sensory processing atypicalities, and poorer emotion recognition, but was not associated with theory of mind ability. Overall, our results suggest that alexithymia is highly prevalent, and has selective cognitive correlates in young people with ASD.

Why (and how) should we study the interplay between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind, and inhibitory control to understand moral cognition?

Findings in the field of experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have shed new light on our understanding of the psychological and biological bases of morality. Although a lot of attention has been devoted to understanding the processes that underlie complex moral dilemmas, attempts to represent the way in which individuals generate moral judgments when processing basic harmful actions are rare. Here, we will outline a model of morality which proposes that the evaluation of basic harmful actions relies on complex interactions between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind (ToM) capacities, and inhibitory control resources. This model makes clear predictions regarding the cognitive processes underlying the development of and ability to generate moral judgments. We draw on data from developmental and cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychopathology research to evaluate the model and propose several conceptual and methodological improvements that are needed to further advance our understanding of moral cognition and its development.

Alexithymia, but not autism spectrum disorder, may be related to the production of emotional facial expressions

Background

A prominent diagnostic criterion of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) relates to the abnormal or diminished use of facial expressions. Yet little is known about the mechanisms that contribute to this feature of ASD.

Methods

We showed children with and without ASD emotionally charged video clips in order to parse out individual differences in spontaneous production of facial expressions using automated facial expression analysis software.

Results

Using hierarchical multiple regression, we sought to determine whether alexithymia (characterized by difficulties interpreting one’s own feeling states) contributes to diminished facial expression production. Across groups, alexithymic traits—but not ASD traits, IQ, or sex—were associated with quantity of facial expression production.

Conclusions

These results accord with a growing body of research suggesting that many emotion processing abnormalities observed in ASD may be explained by co-occurring alexithymia. Developmental and clinical considerations are discussed, and it is argued that alexithymia is an important but too often ignored trait associated with ASD that may have implications for subtyping individuals on the autism spectrum.

Dissociable relations between amygdala subregional networks and psychopathy trait dimensions in conduct-disordered juvenile offenders

Psychopathy is a serious psychiatric phenomenon characterized by a pathological constellation of affective (e.g., callous, unemotional), interpersonal (e.g., manipulative, egocentric), and behavioral (e.g., impulsive, irresponsible) personality traits. Though amygdala subregional defects are suggested in psychopathy, the functionality and connectivity of different amygdala subnuclei is typically disregarded in neurocircuit-level analyses of psychopathic personality. Hence, little is known of how amygdala subregional networks may contribute to psychopathy and its underlying trait assemblies in severely antisocial people. We addressed this important issue by uniquely examining the intrinsic functional connectivity of basolateral (BLA) and centromedial (CMA) amygdala networks in relation to affective, interpersonal, and behavioral traits of psychopathy, in conduct-disordered juveniles with a history of serious delinquency (N = 50, mean age = 16.83 ± 1.32). As predicted, amygdalar connectivity profiles exhibited dissociable relations with different traits of psychopathy. Interpersonal psychopathic traits not only related to increased connectivity of BLA and CMA with a corticostriatal network formation accommodating reward processing, but also predicted stronger CMA connectivity with a network of cortical midline structures supporting sociocognitive processes. In contrast, affective psychopathic traits related to diminished CMA connectivity with a frontolimbic network serving salience processing and affective responding. Finally, behavioral psychopathic traits related to heightened BLA connectivity with a frontoparietal cluster implicated in regulatory executive functioning. We suggest that these trait-specific shifts in amygdalar connectivity could be particularly relevant to the psychopathic phenotype, as they may fuel a self-centered, emotionally cold, and behaviorally disinhibited profile. Hum Brain Mapp 37:4017-4033, 2016. © 2016 The Authors Human Brain Mapping Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Processes of believing: Where do they come from? What are they good for?

Despite the long scholarly discourse in Western theology and philosophy on religion, spirituality, and faith, explanations of what a belief and what believing is are still lacking. Recently, cognitive neuroscience research addressed the human capacity of believing. We present evidence suggesting that believing is a human brain function which results in probabilistic representations with attributes of personal meaning and value and thereby guides individuals’ behavior. We propose that the same mental processes operating on narratives and rituals constitute belief systems in individuals and social groups. Our theoretical model of believing is suited to account for secular and non-secular belief formation.

Processes of believing: Where do they come from? What are they good for?

Despite the long scholarly discourse in Western theology and philosophy on religion, spirituality, and faith, explanations of what a belief and what believing is are still lacking. Recently, cognitive neuroscience research addressed the human capacity of believing. We present evidence suggesting that believing is a human brain function which results in probabilistic representations with attributes of personal meaning and value and thereby guides individuals' behavior. We propose that the same mental processes operating on narratives and rituals constitute belief systems in individuals and social groups. Our theoretical model of believing is suited to account for secular and non-secular belief formation.

Self-Other Distinction Enhanced Empathic Responses in Individuals with Alexithymia

Although empathy is important for social interactions, individuals with alexithymia have low empathic ability, particularly where advanced empathy is concerned (empathic concern, perspective taking). It has been argued that awareness of the self-other distinction enhances advanced empathy, and alexithymics are thought to inadequately distinguish the self from others. We therefore tested whether the self-other distinction increases advanced empathy in alexithymics. To this end, we presented painful hand images over participants’ own hands, and required participants to estimate felt pain intensity and their affective states. Half of the participants got specific instructions to distinct themselves from the other in the images. Felt pain intensity (perspective taking) and other-oriented affective responses (empathic concern) were increased by the instructions only when participants had high alexithymia scores as measured by questionnaire, although self-oriented affective responses (personal distress) were not affected by the instructions. These findings indicate that enhancing the self-other distinction enhances alexithymics’ ability to use advanced empathy, but not the primitive empathy.

Alexithymia: a general deficit of interoception

Alexithymia is a sub-clinical construct, traditionally characterized by difficulties identifying and describing one's own emotions. Despite the clear need for interoception (interpreting physical signals from the body) when identifying one's own emotions, little research has focused on the selectivity of this impairment. While it was originally assumed that the interoceptive deficit in alexithymia is specific to emotion, recent evidence suggests that alexithymia may also be associated with difficulties perceiving some non-affective interoceptive signals, such as one's heart rate. It is therefore possible that the impairment experienced by those with alexithymia is common to all aspects of interoception, such as interpreting signals of hunger, arousal, proprioception, tiredness and temperature. In order to determine whether alexithymia is associated with selectively impaired affective interoception, or general interoceptive impairment, we investigated the association between alexithymia and self-reported non-affective interoceptive ability, and the extent to which individuals perceive similarity between affective and non-affective states (both measured using questionnaires developed for the purpose of the current study), in both typical individuals (n = 105 (89 female), mean age = 27.5 years) and individuals reporting a diagnosis of a psychiatric condition (n = 103 (83 female), mean age = 31.3 years). Findings indicated that alexithymia was associated with poor non-affective interoception and increased perceived similarity between affective and non-affective states, in both the typical and clinical populations. We therefore suggest that rather than being specifically associated with affective impairment, alexithymia is better characterized by a general failure of interoception.

The Structure of Social Cognition: In(ter)dependence of Sociocognitive Processes

Social cognition is a topic of enormous interest and much research, but we are far from having an agreed taxonomy or factor structure of relevant processes. The aim of this review is to outline briefly what is known about the structure of social cognition and to suggest how further progress can be made to delineate the in(ter)dependence of core sociocognitive processes. We focus in particular on several processes that have been discussed and tested together in typical and atypical (notably autism spectrum disorder) groups: imitation, biological motion, empathy, and theory of mind. We consider the domain specificity/generality of core processes in social learning, reward, and attention, and we highlight the potential relevance of dual-process theories that distinguish systems for fast/automatic and slow/effortful processing. We conclude with methodological and conceptual suggestions for future progress in uncovering the structure of social cognition.

'Emotional Intelligence': Lessons from Lesions

'Emotional intelligence' (EI) is one of the most highly used psychological terms in popular nomenclature, yet its construct, divergent, and predictive validities are contentiously debated. Despite this debate, the EI construct is composed of a set of emotional abilities - recognizing emotional states in the self and others, using emotions to guide thought and behavior, understanding how emotions shape behavior, and emotion regulation - that undoubtedly influence important social and personal outcomes. In this review, evidence from human lesion studies is reviewed in order to provide insight into the necessary brain regions for each of these core emotional abilities. Critically, we consider how this neuropsychological evidence might help to guide efforts to define and measure EI.

From shared to distinct self-other representations in empathy: evidence from neurotypical function and socio-cognitive disorders

Neuroscientific research has identified two fundamental components of empathy: shared emotional representations between self and other, and self-other distinction. The concept of shared representations suggests that during empathy, we co-represent another person's affect by engaging brain and bodily functions underpinning the first-hand experience of the emotion we are empathizing with. This possible grounding of empathy in our own emotional experiences explains the necessity for self-other distinction, which is the capacity to correctly distinguish between our own affective representations and those related to the other. In spite of the importance of these two components in empathy, several aspects still remain controversial. This paper addresses some of them and focuses on (i) the distinction between shared activations versus representations, raising the question what shared representations entail in terms of the underlying neural mechanisms, (ii) the possible mechanisms behind self-other distinction in the cognitive and the affective domains, and whether they have distinct neural underpinnings and (iii) the consequences associated with a selective impairment of one of the two components, thereby addressing their importance in mental disorders such as autism spectrum disorders, psychopathy and alexithymia.

The role of self-other distinction in understanding others' mental and emotional states: neurocognitive mechanisms in children and adults

Social interactions come with the fundamental problem of trying to understand others' mental and affective states while under the overpowering influence of one's own concurrent thoughts and feelings. The ability to distinguish between simultaneous representations of others' current experiences as well as our own is crucial to navigate our complex social environments successfully. The developmental building blocks of this ability and how this is given rise to by functional and structural brain development remains poorly understood. In this review, I outline some of the key findings on the role of self-other distinction in understanding others' mental as well as emotional states in children and adults. I will begin by clarifying the crucial role for self-other distinction in avoiding egocentric attributions of one's own cognitive as well as affective states to others in adults and outline the underlying neural circuitry in overcoming such egocentricity. This will provide the basis for a discussion of the emergence of self-other distinction in early childhood as well as developmental changes therein throughout childhood and into adulthood. I will demonstrate that self-other distinction of cognitive and emotional states is already dissociable early in development. Concomitantly, I will show that processes of self-other distinction in cognitive and affective domains rely on adjacent but distinct neural circuitry each with unique connectivity profiles, presumably related to the nature of the distinction that needs to be made.

The anatomy of empathy: Vicarious experience and disorders of social cognition

Empathy, the ability to vicariously experience and to understand the affect of other people, is fundamental for successful social-cognitive ability and behaviour. Empathy is thought to be a critical facilitator of prosocial behaviour and is disrupted in a number of psychiatric and neurological disorders. Research has begun to uncover the neural basis of such 'vicarious experience', which has been studied as a proxy measure of empathy. Together, these studies have identified portions of the insula and anterior cingulate cortex as critically involved. A key debate is whether overlapping or non-overlapping brain areas respond to personal and vicarious experience. This review will highlight emerging evidence for both types of brain response. Importantly, animal models have suggested that there are central divisions between the anterior cingulate gyrus and anterior cingulate sulcus that may be crucial for understanding social behaviour. Attention to this specific anatomy of vicarious processing could therefore help shed light on the functional profile of empathy. Studies in individuals with psychopathy and autism spectrum disorders have found that vicarious experience is atypical. However, the precise nature of these atypicalities is mixed. Understanding the mechanisms of vicarious experience can enhance our knowledge of the neural basis of empathy and, ultimately, help those with disorders of social cognition and behaviour.

Are strong empathizers better mentalizers? Evidence for independence and interaction between the routes of social cognition

Although the processes that underlie sharing others' emotions (empathy) and understanding others' mental states (mentalizing, Theory of Mind) have received increasing attention, it is yet unclear how they relate to each other. For instance, are people who strongly empathize with others also more proficient in mentalizing? And (how) do the neural networks supporting empathy and mentalizing interact? Assessing both functions simultaneously in a large sample (N = 178), we show that people's capacities to empathize and mentalize are independent, both on a behavioral and neural level. Thus, strong empathizers are not necessarily proficient mentalizers, arguing against a general capacity of social understanding. Second, we applied dynamic causal modeling to investigate how the neural networks underlying empathy and mentalizing are orchestrated in naturalistic social settings. Results reveal that in highly emotional situations, empathic sharing can inhibit mentalizing-related activity and thereby harm mentalizing performance. Taken together, our findings speak against a unitary construct of social understanding and suggest flexible interplay of distinct social functions.

Neurocomputational mechanisms of prosocial learning and links to empathy

Reinforcement learning theory powerfully characterizes how we learn to benefit ourselves. In this theory, prediction errors-the difference between a predicted and actual outcome of a choice-drive learning. However, we do not operate in a social vacuum. To behave prosocially we must learn the consequences of our actions for other people. Empathy, the ability to vicariously experience and understand the affect of others, is hypothesized to be a critical facilitator of prosocial behaviors, but the link between empathy and prosocial behavior is still unclear. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) participants chose between different stimuli that were probabilistically associated with rewards for themselves (self), another person (prosocial), or no one (control). Using computational modeling, we show that people can learn to obtain rewards for others but do so more slowly than when learning to obtain rewards for themselves. fMRI revealed that activity in a posterior portion of the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex/basal forebrain (sgACC) drives learning only when we are acting in a prosocial context and signals a prosocial prediction error conforming to classical principles of reinforcement learning theory. However, there is also substantial variability in the neural and behavioral efficiency of prosocial learning, which is predicted by trait empathy. More empathic people learn more quickly when benefitting others, and their sgACC response is the most selective for prosocial learning. We thus reveal a computational mechanism driving prosocial learning in humans. This framework could provide insights into atypical prosocial behavior in those with disorders of social cognition.

Not knowing what I feel: Emotional empathy in autism spectrum disorders

While there is a general consensus in the literature that individuals with autism spectrum disorder have difficulty with cognitive empathy, much less is known about emotional empathy processing in these individuals. Most research has employed subjective self-report measures, which can often be misinterpreted or under-reported/over-reported. More objective measures such as psychophysiological recordings of arousal offer a more objective response. Furthermore, combining physiological responses with self-report ratings allows us to explore the relationship between these two responses to emotionally charged stimuli. A total of 25 individuals with autism spectrum disorder were compared with 25 matched controls on their physiological (arousal) and psychological (self-report) responses to emotionally distressing video scenes. These responses were also then compared with self-report cognitive and emotional trait empathy. Results indicate that while individuals with autism spectrum disorder appear to respond similarly to controls physiologically, their interpretation of this response is dampened emotionally. Furthermore, this dampening of self-report emotional response is associated with a general reduction in trait empathy.

Cognitive mechanisms for responding to mimicry from others

Compared to our understanding of neurocognitive processes involved producing mimicry, the downstream consequences of being mimicked are less clear. A wide variety of positive consequences of mimicry, such as liking and helping, have been reported in behavioural research. However, an in-depth review suggests the link from mimicry to liking and other positive outcomes may be fragile. Positive responses to mimicry can break down due to individual factors and social situations where mimicry may be unexpected. It remains unclear how the complex behavioural effects of mimicry relate to neural systems which respond to being mimicked. Mimicry activates regions associated with mirror properties, self-other processing and reward. In this review, we outline three potential models linking these regions with cognitive consequences of being mimicked. The models suggest that positive downstream consequences of mimicry may depend upon self-other overlap, detection of contingency or low prediction error. Finally, we highlight limitations with traditional research designs and suggest alternative methods for achieving highly ecological validity and experimental control. We also highlight unanswered questions which may guide future research.

Encoding of Vicarious Reward Prediction in Anterior Cingulate Cortex and Relationship with Trait Empathy

Empathy--the capacity to understand and resonate with the experiences of others--can depend on the ability to predict when others are likely to receive rewards. However, although a plethora of research has examined the neural basis of predictions about the likelihood of receiving rewards ourselves, very little is known about the mechanisms that underpin variability in vicarious reward prediction. Human neuroimaging and nonhuman primate studies suggest that a subregion of the anterior cingulate cortex in the gyrus (ACCg) is engaged when others receive rewards. Does the ACCg show specialization for processing predictions about others' rewards and not one's own and does this specialization vary with empathic abilities? We examined hemodynamic responses in the human brain time-locked to cues that were predictive of a high or low probability of a reward either for the subject themselves or another person. We found that the ACCg robustly signaled the likelihood of a reward being delivered to another. In addition, ACCg response significantly covaried with trait emotion contagion, a necessary foundation for empathizing with other individuals. In individuals high in emotion contagion, the ACCg was specialized for processing others' rewards exclusively, but for those low in emotion contagion, this region also responded to information about the subject's own rewards. Our results are the first to show that the ACCg signals probabilistic predictions about rewards for other people and that the substantial individual variability in the degree to which the ACCg is specialized for processing others' rewards is related to trait empathy.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT

Successfully cooperating, competing, or empathizing with others can depend on our ability to predict when others are going to get something rewarding. Although many studies have examined how the brain processes rewards we will get ourselves, very little is known about vicarious reward processing. Here, we show that a subregion of the anterior cingulate cortex in the gyrus (ACCg) shows a degree of specialization for processing others' versus one's own rewards. However, the degree to which the ACCg is specialized varies with people's ability to empathize with others. This new insight into how vicarious rewards are processed in the brain and vary with empathy may be key for understanding disorders of social behavior, including psychopathy and autism.

Role of the first and second person perspective for control of behaviour: Understanding other people's facial expressions

Humans typically make probabilistic inferences about another person's affective state based on her/his bodily movements such as emotional facial expressions, emblematic gestures and whole body movements. Furthermore, humans deduce tentative predictions about the other person's intentions. Thus, the first person perspective of a subject is supplemented by the second person perspective involving theory of mind and empathy. Neuroimaging investigations have shown that the medial and lateral frontal cortex are critical nodes in the circuits underlying theory of mind, empathy, as well as intention of action. It is suggested that personal perspective taking in social interactions is paradigmatic for the capability of humans to generate probabilistic accounts of the outside world that underlie a person's control of behaviour.

Digit ratio (2D:4D) and psychopathic traits moderate the effect of exogenous testosterone on socio-cognitive processes in men

Recent evidence suggests that testosterone is negatively correlated with empathic processes in both men and women. Also, administration of testosterone to young women impairs socio-cognitive performance as assessed using the "Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task", especially among those exposed to elevated testosterone concentrations prenatally. However, the extent to which testosterone plays a similar causal role in socio-cognitive abilities in men is currently unknown. Here, using a crossover, double-blind, placebo-controlled, within-subject design, we investigated the extent to which a single administration of testosterone to healthy young men (N=30) would impair socio-cognitive abilities assessed using the "Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task" (RMET). Also, we investigated whether individual differences in 2D:4D ratio and psychopathic traits would moderate the effect of testosterone on task performance. Results indicated that testosterone administration on its own did not impair RMET performance. However, variability in both 2D:4D ratio and psychopathic traits moderated the effect of testosterone on task performance. Specifically, testosterone impaired RMET performance among individuals with relatively low (i.e., masculinized) 2D:4D ratio and among individuals scoring relatively low on the interpersonal/affective facet (i.e., Factor 1) of psychopathy. Our findings highlight the importance of considering theoretically- and empirically-based individual difference factors when attempting to characterize the neuroendocrine mechanisms underlying socio-cognitive processes.

Understanding amygdala responsiveness to fearful expressions through the lens of psychopathy and altruism

Because the face is the central focus of human social interactions, emotional facial expressions provide a unique window into the emotional lives of others. They play a particularly important role in fostering empathy, which entails understanding and responding to others' emotions, especially distress-related emotions such as fear. This Review considers how fearful facial as well as vocal and postural expressions are interpreted, with an emphasis on the role of the amygdala. The amygdala may be best known for its role in the acquisition and expression of conditioned fear, but it also supports the perception and recognition of others' fear. Various explanations have been supplied for the amygdala's role in interpreting and responding to fearful expressions. They include theories that amygdala responses to fearful expressions 1) reflect heightened vigilance in response to uncertain danger, 2) promote heightened attention to the eye region of faces, 3) represent a response to an unconditioned aversive stimulus, or 4) reflect the generation of an empathic fear response. Among these, only empathic fear explains why amygdala lesions would impair fear recognition across modalities. Supporting the possibility of a link between fundamental empathic processes and amygdala responses to fear is evidence that impaired fear recognition in psychopathic individuals results from amygdala dysfunction, whereas enhanced fear recognition in altruistic individuals results from enhanced amygdala function. Empathic concern and caring behaviors may be fostered by sensitivity to signs of acute distress in others, which relies on intact functioning of the amygdala.

The relationship between two types of impaired emotion processing: repressive coping and alexithymia

The constructs of repressive coping and alexithymia are both related to impaired emotion processing, yet individuals with a repressive coping style (repressors) score lower than controls on standard self-report measures of alexithymia. A large body of evidence indicates that repressors avoid negative affect. Therefore, the current study examined the relationship between repressive coping and alexithymia by using independently-rated interviews with the aim of bypassing repressors’ tendency of avoiding negative affect. Results showed that repressors scored high on alexithymia, similar to anxious individuals on the independently-rated interview, but scored low on alexithymia on a questionnaire measure. Our findings confirm a link between alexithymia and repressive coping and stress the need for non-standard measures in exploring the nature of the relationship between repressive coping and alexithymia.

Affective resonance in response to others' emotional faces varies with affective ratings and psychopathic traits in amygdala and anterior insula

Despite extensive research on the neural basis of empathic responses for pain and disgust, there is limited data about the brain regions that underpin affective response to other people's emotional facial expressions. Here, we addressed this question using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging to assess neural responses to emotional faces, combined with online ratings of subjective state. When instructed to rate their own affective response to others' faces, participants recruited anterior insula, dorsal anterior cingulate, inferior frontal gyrus, and amygdala, regions consistently implicated in studies investigating empathy for disgust and pain, as well as emotional saliency. Importantly, responses in anterior insula and amygdala were modulated by trial-by-trial variations in subjective affective responses to the emotional facial stimuli. Furthermore, overall task-elicited activations in these regions were negatively associated with psychopathic personality traits, which are characterized by low affective empathy. Our findings suggest that anterior insula and amygdala play important roles in the generation of affective internal states in response to others' emotional cues and that attenuated function in these regions may underlie reduced empathy in individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits.

Is it me? Self-recognition bias across sensory modalities and its relationship to autistic traits

BACKGROUND

Atypical self-processing is an emerging theme in autism research, suggested by lower self-reference effect in memory, and atypical neural responses to visual self-representations. Most research on physical self-processing in autism uses visual stimuli. However, the self is a multimodal construct, and therefore, it is essential to test self-recognition in other sensory modalities as well. Self-recognition in the auditory modality remains relatively unexplored and has not been tested in relation to autism and related traits. This study investigates self-recognition in auditory and visual domain in the general population and tests if it is associated with autistic traits.

METHODS

Thirty-nine neurotypical adults participated in a two-part study. In the first session, individual participant's voice was recorded and face was photographed and morphed respectively with voices and faces from unfamiliar identities. In the second session, participants performed a 'self-identification' task, classifying each morph as 'self' voice (or face) or an 'other' voice (or face). All participants also completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ). For each sensory modality, slope of the self-recognition curve was used as individual self-recognition metric. These two self-recognition metrics were tested for association between each other, and with autistic traits.

RESULTS

Fifty percent 'self' response was reached for a higher percentage of self in the auditory domain compared to the visual domain (t = 3.142; P < 0.01). No significant correlation was noted between self-recognition bias across sensory modalities (τ = -0.165, P = 0.204). Higher recognition bias for self-voice was observed in individuals higher in autistic traits (τ AQ = 0.301, P = 0.008). No such correlation was observed between recognition bias for self-face and autistic traits (τ AQ = -0.020, P = 0.438).

CONCLUSIONS

Our data shows that recognition bias for physical self-representation is not related across sensory modalities. Further, individuals with higher autistic traits were better able to discriminate self from other voices, but this relation was not observed with self-face. A narrow self-other overlap in the auditory domain seen in individuals with high autistic traits could arise due to enhanced perceptual processing of auditory stimuli often observed in individuals with autism.