Trust in Testimony: Children's Use of True and False Statements

"Why does rain fall?": children prefer to learn from an informant who uses noncircular explanations

These two studies explored 3- and 5-year-olds' evaluation of noncircular and circular explanations, and their use of such explanations to determine informant credibility. Although 5-year-olds demonstrated a selective preference for noncircular over circular explanations (Experiment 1: Long Explanations; Experiment 2: Short Explanations), 3-year-olds only demonstrated a preference for the noncircular when the explanations were shortened (Experiment 2). Children's evaluation of the explanations extended to their inferences about the informants' future credibility. Both age groups demonstrated a selective preference for learning novel explanations from an informant who had previously provided noncircular explanations-although only 5-year-olds also preferred to learn novel labels from her. The implications and scope of children's ability to monitor the quality of an informant's explanation are discussed.

Heralding the authoritarian? Orientation toward authority in early childhood

In the research reported here, we examined whether individual differences in authoritarianism have expressions in early childhood. We expected that young children would be more responsive to cues of deviance and status to the extent that their parents endorsed authoritarian values. Using a sample of 43 preschoolers and their parents, we found support for both expectations. Children of parents high in authoritarianism trusted adults who adhered to convention (vs. adults who did not) more than did children of parents low in authoritarianism. Furthermore, compared with children of parents low in authoritarianism, children of parents high in authoritarianism gave greater weight to a status-based "adult = reliable" heuristic in trusting an ambiguously conventional adult. Findings were consistent using two different measures of parents' authoritarian values. These findings demonstrate that children's trust-related behaviors vary reliably with their parents' orientations toward authority and convention, and suggest that individual differences in authoritarianism express themselves well before early adulthood.

The relation between 8- to 17-year-olds’ judgments of other’s honesty and their own past honest behaviors

The present investigation examined whether school-aged children and adolescents’ own deceptive behavior of cheating and lying influenced their honesty judgments of their same-aged peers. Eighty 8- to 17-year-olds who had previously participated in a study examining cheating and lie-telling behaviors were invited to make honesty judgments of their peers’ denials of having peeked at the answers to a test. While participants’ accuracy rates for making honesty judgments were at chance levels, judgment biases were found based on participants own past cheating and lie-telling behaviors. Specifically, those who cheated and lied were biased towards believing that their peers would behave in the same manner. In contrast, participants who had not cheated were biased towards judging their peers as honest. These findings suggest that by 8 years of age there is a relation between one’s own deceptive behaviors and judgments of other’s honesty.

In beauty we trust: children prefer information from more attractive informants

Preschool children were presented with slides on a computer screen showing a novel object, together with two informants, one with an attractive and one with a less attractive face. Children were asked which informant they would like to ask about the name of the novel object. After hearing the informants provide conflicting names, they were asked who they thought was correct. Children were more likely to endorse names provided by the person with the more attractive face, a bias that cannot be justified on epistemic grounds. The implications of this finding are discussed.

Is a Bird an Apple? The Effect of Speaker Labeling Accuracy on Infants' Word Learning, Imitation, and Helping Behaviors

This study examined infants' sensitivity to a speaker's verbal accuracy and whether the reliability of the speaker had an effect on their selective trust. Forty-nine 18-month-old infants were exposed to a speaker who either accurately or inaccurately labeled familiar objects. Subsequently, the speaker administered a series of tasks in which infants had an opportunity to: learn a novel word, imitate the speaker's "irrational" actions, and help the speaker obtain an out-of-reach object. In contrast to infants in the accurate (reliable) condition, those in the inaccurate (unreliable) condition performed more poorly on a word-learning task and were less likely to imitate. All infants demonstrated high rates of instrumental helping behavior. These results are the first to demonstrate that infants as young as 18 months of age cannot only detect a speaker's verbal inaccuracy but also use this information to attenuate their word recognition and learning of novel actions.

Five-year-olds are willing, but 4-year-olds refuse, to trust informants who offer new and unfamiliar labels for parts of the body

This study employed the selective trust paradigm to examine how children interpret novel labels when compared with labels they already know to be accurate or inaccurate within the biological domain. The participants--3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N=144)--were allocated to one of three conditions. In the accurate versus inaccurate condition, one informant labeled body parts correctly, whereas the other labeled them incorrectly (e.g., calling an eye an "arm"). In the accurate versus novel condition, one informant labeled body parts accurately, whereas the other provided novel labels (e.g., calling an eye a "roke"). Finally, in the inaccurate versus novel condition, one informant labeled body parts incorrectly, whereas the other offered novel labels. In subsequent test trials, the two informants provided conflicting labels for unfamiliar internal organs. In the accurate versus inaccurate condition, children sought and endorsed labels from the accurate informant. In the accurate versus novel condition, only 4- and 5-year-olds preferred the accurate informant, whereas 3-year-olds did not selectively prefer either informant. In the inaccurate versus novel condition, only 5-year-olds preferred the novel informant, whereas 3- and 4-year-olds did not demonstrate a selective preference. Results are supportive of previous studies suggesting that 3-year-olds are sensitive to inaccuracy and that 4-year-olds privilege accuracy. However, 3- and 4-year-olds appear to be unsure as to how the novel informant should be construed. In contrast, 5-year-olds appreciate that speakers offering new information are more trustworthy than those offering inaccurate information, but they are cautious in judging such informants as being "better" at providing that information.

The Development of Reasoning about Beliefs: Fact, Preference, and Ideology

The beliefs people hold about the social and physical world are central to self-definition and social interaction. The current research analyzes reasoning about three kinds of beliefs: those that concern matters of fact (e.g., dinosaurs are extinct), preference (e.g., green is the prettiest color), and ideology (e.g., there is only one God). The domain of ideology is of unique interest because it is hypothesized to contain elements of both facts and preferences. If adults' distinct reasoning about ideological beliefs is the result of prolonged experience with the physical and social world, children and adults should reveal distinct patterns of differentiating kinds of beliefs, and this difference should be particularly pronounced with respect to ideological beliefs. On the other hand, if adults' reasoning about beliefs is a basic component of social cognition, children and adults should demonstrate similar belief representations and patterns of belief differentiation. Two experiments demonstrate that 5-10 year old children and adults similarly judged religious beliefs to be intermediate between factual beliefs (where two disagreeing people cannot both be right) and preferences (where they can). From the age of 5 years and continuing into adulthood, individuals distinguished ideological beliefs from other types of mental states and demonstrated limited tolerance for belief-based disagreements.

The role of honesty and benevolence in children’s judgments of trustworthiness

The present investigation examined the relation between honesty, benevolence, and trust in children. One hundred and eight 7-, 9-, and 11-year-olds were read four story types in which the character’s honesty (honesty or dishonest) was crossed with their intentions (helping or harming). Children rated the story character’s honesty, benevolence, and whether they trusted the character. Results indicated that 7- to 11-year-olds considered both honesty and benevolence when making trust judgments, and older children were more likely than younger children to trust helpful lie-tellers. Further, the relation between dishonesty and trust judgments was mediated by children’s judgments of benevolence. These findings suggest that at least from 7 years onward, children have a nuanced understanding about the relationship between honesty and trust.

Four- and six-year-olds use pragmatic competence to guide word learning

The present study investigates whether four- and six-year-old children use pragmatic competence as a criterion for learning from someone else. Specifically, we ask whether children use others' adherence to Gricean maxims to determine whether they will offer valid labels for novel objects. Six-year-olds recognized adherence to the maxims of quality and relation and subsequently trusted the labels provided by a maxim adherer. Four-year-olds displayed this pattern when judging adherence to quality but not relation. A linear regression revealed that children's ability to identify maxim adherers predicted their ability to choose the correct object during word-learning trials. This research demonstrates that children use others' pragmatic history when judging the reliability of the information they offer.

Informants' traits weigh heavily in young children's trust in testimony and in their epistemic inferences

This study examined how informants' traits affect how children seek information, trust testimony, and make inferences about informants' knowledge. Eighty-one 3- to 6-year-olds and 26 adults completed tasks where they requested and endorsed information provided by one of two informants with conflicting traits (e.g., honesty vs. dishonesty). Participants also completed tasks where they simultaneously considered informants' traits and visual access to information when inferring their knowledge and trusting their testimony. Children and adults preferred to ask and endorse information provided by people who are nice, smart, and honest. Moreover, these traits influenced the knowledge that young children attributed to informants. Children younger than 5 years of age reported that people with positive traits were knowledgeable even when they lacked access to relevant information.

Preschoolers' selective learning is guided by the principle of relevance

We investigate whether preschoolers' word learning is selectively attuned to learning word-referent links that they expect will be relevant to their everyday communicative contexts. In two studies, 4-year-olds were taught the name of an unfamiliar toy that they were told was purchased either nearby or faraway. Children's memory for the link was assessed either by a speaker who was not present when it was taught or by the same speaker who taught it to them. Children who were told that the toys were from nearby learned the word-referent link, whereas children who were told the toys were from faraway did not. Our findings suggest that 4-year-olds' word learning is "attuned to relevance" - they selectively acquire new word meanings that will have communicative utility in their linguistic community. These findings provide the first evidence that children's selective word learning is driven by an overarching principle of prospective relevance.

Take it as read: origins of trust in knowledge gained from print

The ability to read opens up the possibility of learning about the world indirectly via print sources, providing a powerful new opportunity for children who have for years learned effectively from what people tell them. We compared children's trust in printed versus oral information. We also examined whether children who showed preferential trust in an informant with print assumed that the informant was still reliable about new information offered without print support. Children (N=89 aged 3-6 years) received conflicting suggestions from two dolls about which picture showed an unfamiliar target. Only one doll's suggestion referred to a printed label read aloud. Prereaders, despite their exposure to print and presumed experience of others treating print sources as authoritative, showed no clear evidence of preferential trust in the suggestions with print support. Early readers, in contrast, consistently preferred the suggestions with print support. Importantly, despite having treated the doll with print as having a history of accuracy, early readers no longer showed trust in that doll when it subsequently had no print support. Children at the very earliest stages of reading treated the doll with print appropriately as having gained only specific information from the print sources.

Learning foreign labels from a foreign speaker: the role of (limited) exposure to a second language

Three- and four-year-olds (N = 144) were introduced to novel labels by an English speaker and a foreign speaker (of Nordish, a made-up language), and were asked to endorse one of the speaker's labels. Monolingual English-speaking children were compared to bilingual children and English-speaking children who were regularly exposed to a language other than English. All children tended to endorse the English speaker's labels when asked 'What do you call this?', but when asked 'What do you call this in Nordish?', children with exposure to a second language were more likely to endorse the foreign label than monolingual and bilingual children. The findings suggest that, at this age, exposure to, but not necessarily immersion in, more than one language may promote the ability to learn foreign words from a foreign speaker.

Reconstructing constructivism: causal models, Bayesian learning mechanisms, and the theory theory

We propose a new version of the "theory theory" grounded in the computational framework of probabilistic causal models and Bayesian learning. Probabilistic models allow a constructivist but rigorous and detailed approach to cognitive development. They also explain the learning of both more specific causal hypotheses and more abstract framework theories. We outline the new theoretical ideas, explain the computational framework in an intuitive and nontechnical way, and review an extensive but relatively recent body of empirical results that supports these ideas. These include new studies of the mechanisms of learning. Children infer causal structure from statistical information, through their own actions on the world and through observations of the actions of others. Studies demonstrate these learning mechanisms in children from 16 months to 4 years old and include research on causal statistical learning, informal experimentation through play, and imitation and informal pedagogy. They also include studies of the variability and progressive character of intuitive theory change, particularly theory of mind. These studies investigate both the physical and the psychological and social domains. We conclude with suggestions for further collaborative projects between developmental and computational cognitive scientists.

Emotional expression and vocabulary learning in adults and children

A great deal of what we know about the world has not been learned via first-hand observation but thanks to others' testimony. A crucial issue is to know which kind of cues people use to evaluate information provided by others. In this context, recent studies in adults and children underline that informants' facial expressions could play an essential role. To test the importance of the other's emotions in vocabulary learning, we used two avatars expressing happiness, anger or neutral emotions when proposing different verbal labels for an unknown object. Experiment 1 revealed that adult participants were significantly more likely than chance to choose the label suggested by the avatar displaying a happy face over the label suggested by the avatar displaying an angry face. Experiment 2 extended these results by showing that both adults and children as young as 3 years old showed this effect. These data suggest that decision making concerning newly acquired information depends on informant's expressions of emotions, a finding that is consistent with the idea that behavioural intents have facial signatures that can be used to detect another's intention to cooperate.

Does valence matter? Effects of negativity on children's early understanding of the truth and lies

Early deceptive behavior often involves acts of wrongdoings on the part of children. As a result, it has often been assumed, although not tested directly, that children are better at identifying lies about wrongdoing than lies about other activities. We tested this assumption in two studies. In Study 1, 67 3- to 5-year-olds viewed vignettes in which a character truthfully or falsely claimed to have committed a good or bad act. Children were biased to label claims that the character had committed a good act as the truth and claims that the character had committed a bad act as lies. In Study 2, 51 4- to 6-year-olds viewed vignettes in which characters either admitted or denied committing a good or bad act. Children were better at identifying truth-tellers and liars when the acts were good. Results suggest that young children initially overgeneralize the concept of lie to include all negative acts and the concept of the truth to include all good acts and only gradually make a distinction between act valence and honesty. As a result, including wrongdoing in scenarios to test children's early understanding of the meaning of lying is likely to underestimate children's abilities.

Beyond semantic accuracy: preschoolers evaluate a speaker's reasons

Children's sensitivity to the quality of epistemic reasons and their selective trust in the more reasonable of 2 informants was investigated in 2 experiments. Three-, 4-, and 5-year-old children (N = 90) were presented with speakers who stated different kinds of evidence for what they believed. Experiment 1 showed that children of all age groups appropriately judged looking, reliable testimony, and inference as better reasons for belief than pretense, guessing, and desiring. Experiment 2 showed that 3- and 4-year-old children preferred to seek and accept new information from a speaker who was previously judged to use the "best" way of thinking. The findings demonstrate that children distinguish certain good from bad reasons and prefer to learn from those who showcased good reasoning in the past.

Speaker reliability in preschoolers' inferences about the meanings of novel words

Preschoolers participated in a modified version of the disambiguation task, designed to test whether the pragmatic environment generated by a reliable or unreliable speaker affected how children interpreted novel labels. Two objects were visible to children, while a third was only visible to the speaker (a fact known by the child). Manipulating whether a novel object was visible to both interlocutors or hidden from the child tested the child's understanding of pragmatic expectations of interlocutor competence. When interacting with a speaker with a history of accurately labeling familiar objects, children responded appropriately in both cases. When interacting with a speaker who previously generated inaccurate labels for familiar objects, children's behavior and eye-movements reflected their belief that the speaker was not a competent communicator. These data support the hypothesis that children consider the pragmatic environment constructed by an interlocutor when that speaker asks them to make a lexical inference.

Learning about causes from people and about people as causes: probabilistic models and social causal reasoning

A major challenge children face is uncovering the causal structure of the world around them. Previous research on children's causal inference has demonstrated their ability to learn about causal relationships in the physical environment using probabilistic evidence. However, children must also learn about causal relationships in the social environment, including discovering the causes of other people's behavior, and understanding the causal relationships between others' goal-directed actions and the outcomes of those actions. In this chapter, we argue that social reasoning and causal reasoning are deeply linked, both in the real world and in children's minds. Children use both types of information together and in fact reason about both physical and social causation in fundamentally similar ways. We suggest that children jointly construct and update causal theories about their social and physical environment and that this process is best captured by probabilistic models of cognition. We first present studies showing that adults are able to jointly infer causal structure and human action structure from videos of unsegmented human motion. Next, we describe how children use social information to make inferences about physical causes. We show that the pedagogical nature of a demonstrator influences children's choices of which actions to imitate from within a causal sequence and that this social information interacts with statistical causal evidence. We then discuss how children combine evidence from an informant's testimony and expressed confidence with evidence from their own causal observations to infer the efficacy of different potential causes. We also discuss how children use these same causal observations to make inferences about the knowledge state of the social informant. Finally, we suggest that psychological causation and attribution are part of the same causal system as physical causation. We present evidence that just as children use covariation between physical causes and their effects to learn physical causal relationships, they also use covaration between people's actions and the environment to make inferences about the causes of human behavior.

Why do Infants Look at and Use Positive Information from Some Informants Rather Than Others in Ambiguous Situations?

Three laboratory experiments on social referencing examined whether infants' tendencies to look at and use positive information from the experimenter could be interpreted from a perspective of novelty or expertise. In Study 1, novelty was manipulated. Forty-eight 12-month-old infants participated. In a between-subject design, a more novel or a less novel experimenter presented an ambiguous object and provided positive information. The infants looked more at and regulated their behavior more in accordance with information coming from the less novel experimenter. In Study 2, expertise was manipulated. Forty-eight 12-month-old infants were exposed to one experimenter who showed expertise about the laboratory situation and one experimenter who did not show such competence. The infants looked more at and regulated their behavior more in accordance with information coming from the expert. In Study 3, 40 12-month-old infants participated. The infants were exposed to a toy-expert who was either novel or familiar. The infants, in both groups, looked as much at the toy-experts and used the information regardless of whether the novel or familiar toy-expert had provided information. The findings suggest that novelty does not increase looking in ambiguous situations. Instead, the results support the expertise perspective of infant looking preferences.

Trust in testimony about strangers: young children prefer reliable informants who make positive attributions

Young children have been described as critical consumers of information, particularly in the domain of language learning. Indeed, children are more likely to learn novel words from people with accurate histories of object labeling than with inaccurate ones. But what happens when informant testimony conflicts with a tendency to see the world in a particular way? In impression formation, children exhibit a positivity bias in personality judgments. This study examined whether 3- to 7-year-olds would accept reliable testimony about a stranger's personality that conflicted with a putative positivity bias (i.e., a negative trait attribution). Overall, participants accepted testimony from reliable informants more often than expected by chance, although they were significantly more likely to do so when the information was positive than when it was negative. These findings indicate that in addition to the reliability status of informants, information processing biases have a substantial impact on children's use of informant testimony to learn about the social world.

Children's event reports: factors affecting responses to repeated questions in vignette scenarios and event recall interviews

When adults repeat questions, children often give inconsistent answers. This study aimed to test the claim that these inconsistencies occur because children infer that their first answer was unsatisfactory, and that the adult expects them to change their answer. Children aged 4, 6, and 8 years (N= 134) were asked about vignettes in which an adult repeated a question, with manipulation of the adult's overt dissatisfaction (high vs. low pressure) and knowledge about the information sought. On a separate occasion, the children were given an unrelated event recall interview containing repeated questions. All age groups showed sensitivity to adult dissatisfaction, interpreting question repetition as an implicit request for answer change more frequently in the high than in the low-pressure vignettes. Overall, however, these 'change-expected' interpretations were least frequent in the younger children, who were the most prone to shifting. Also there was no evidence that these interpretations were associated with more frequent shifting in the recall interview. The results do not provide clear support for a simple conversational inference account of shifting, especially in younger children.

Epistemic states and traits: preschoolers appreciate the differential informativeness of situation-specific and person-specific cues to knowledge

Previous research has demonstrated that preschoolers can use situation-specific (e.g., visual access) and person-specific (e.g., prior accuracy) cues to infer what others know. The present studies investigated whether 4- and 5-year-olds appreciate the differential informativeness of these types of cues. In Experiment 1 (N = 50), children used others' prior labeling accuracy as a cue when learning labels for, but not the visual identity of, hidden objects. In Experiment 2 (N = 64), with both cues present, children attended more to visual access than prior accuracy when learning the visual identity of, but not labels for, hidden objects. These findings demonstrate that children appreciate the difference between situation- and person-specific cues and flexibly evaluate these cues depending on what information they are seeking.

When being right is not enough: four-year-olds distinguish knowledgeable informants from merely accurate informants

Recent evidence demonstrates that children are selective in their social learning, preferring to learn from a previously accurate speaker than from a previously inaccurate one. We examined whether children assessing speakers' reliability take into account how speakers achieved their prior accuracy. In Study 1, when faced with two accurate informants, 4- and 5-year-olds (but not 3-year-olds) were more likely to seek novel information from an informant who had previously given the answers unaided than from an informant who had always relied on help from a third party. Similarly, in Study 2, 4-year-olds were more likely to trust the testimony of an unaided informant over the testimony provided by an assisted informant. Our results indicate that when children reach around 4 years of age, their selective trust extends beyond simple generalizations based on informants' past accuracy to a more sophisticated selectivity that distinguishes between truly knowledgeable informants and merely accurate informants who may not be reliable in the long term.

The role of external sources of information in children's evaluative food categories

Evaluative food categories are value-laden assessments which reflect the healthfulness and palatability of foods (e.g., healthy/unhealthy, yummy/yucky). In a series of three studies, this research examines how 3- to 4-year-old children (N = 147) form evaluative food categories based on input from external sources of information. The results indicate that children prefer to ask a mom and teacher over a cartoon and child for information about the evaluative status of foods. However, children are cautious to accept information about healthy foods from all of the external sources compared to unhealthy, yummy, and yucky foods. The results also indicate that providing information about the positive taste of healthy foods helps to encourage children to select healthy foods to eat. Taken together, these results have potential implications for children's health and nutrition education.

The development of distrust

Preschool-age children's reasoning about the reliability of deceptive sources was investigated. Ninety 3- to 5-year-olds watched several trials in which an informant gave advice about the location of a hidden sticker. Informants were either helpers who were happy to give correct advice, or trickers who were happy to give incorrect advice. Three-year-olds tended to accept all advice from both helpers and trickers. Four-year-olds were more skeptical but showed no preference for advice from helpers over trickers, even though they differentiated between helpers and trickers on metacognitive measures. Five-year-olds systematically preferred advice from helpers. Selective trust was associated with children's ability to make mental state inferences.

The good, the strong, and the accurate: preschoolers' evaluations of informant attributes

Much recent evidence shows that preschoolers are sensitive to the accuracy of an informant. Faced with two informants, one of whom names familiar objects accurately and the other inaccurately, preschoolers subsequently prefer to learn the names and functions of unfamiliar objects from the more accurate informant. This study examined the inference process underlying this preference. We asked whether preschoolers make narrow inferences about informants, broader trait-based inferences, or more global evaluative inferences. We further asked what inferences preschoolers make about a potential informant based on distinctions in the unrelated domain of physical strength. The results indicate that preschoolers make relatively narrow inferences when observing individual differences in accuracy even though they are prone to global evaluative inferences when observing individual differences in strength. Preschoolers' burgeoning understanding of others as expert language users may underlie their selective endorsement of a more accurate informant.

Determining who to question, what to ask, and how much information to ask for: the development of inquiry in young children

To obtain reliable information, it is important to identify and effectively question knowledgeable informants. Two experiments examined how age and the ease of distinguishing between reliable and unreliable sources influence children's ability to effectively question those sources to solve problems. A sample of 3- to 5-year-olds was introduced to a knowledgeable informant contrasted with an informant who always gave inaccurate answers or one who always indicated ignorance. Children were generally better at determining which informant to question when a knowledgeable informant was contrasted with an ignorant informant than when a knowledgeable informant was contrasted with an inaccurate informant. In some cases, age also influenced the ability to determine who to question and what to ask. Importantly, in both experiments, the strongest predictor of accuracy was whether children had acquired sufficient information; successful problem solving required integrating knowledge of who to question, what to ask, and how much information to ask for.