Lying to recommend unqualified friends: Diverging implications for interpersonal and epistemic trust inferences

When people are asked to recommend individuals they care about, they often grapple with conflicts regarding the level of honesty they should maintain when being truthful could potentially hinder those individuals' chances of receiving beneficial opportunities. In the current study, we examined how adolescents evaluate people based on how they respond to such dilemmas, with a focus on how it affects judgments of interpersonal and epistemic trustworthiness. We tested a sample of high school students in the southwestern United States (N = 78; Mage = 16.45 years), who were asked about a moral dilemma in which a story character needed to decide whether to recommend an unqualified friend. We experimentally manipulated whether the friend was very close to the standard (requiring a small exaggeration) or was far from the standard (requiring a large exaggeration) between participants. Across both exaggeration conditions, we observed a dissociation in judgments of epistemic and interpersonal trustworthiness: Lie-tellers were judged to be more interpersonally trustworthy than epistemically trustworthy, whereas truth-tellers were judged to be more epistemically trustworthy than interpersonally trustworthy. These results show that adolescents are capable of using information about an individual's lie-telling versus truth-telling decisions to make highly nuanced social inferences.

Updating beliefs about pain following advice: Trustworthiness of social advice predicts pain expectations and experience

Prior expectations influence pain experience. These expectations, in turn, rely on prior pain experience, but they may also be socially influenced. Yet, most research has focused on self rather than social expectations about pain, and hardly any studies examined their combined effects on pain. Here, we adopted a Bayesian learning perspective to investigate how explicitly communicated social expectations ('advice about pain tolerance') affect own pain expectations, and ultimately pain tolerance, under varying conditions of social epistemic uncertainty (trustworthiness of the advice). N = 72 female participants took part in a coldpressor (cold water) task before (self-learning baseline) and after (socially-influenced learning) receiving advice about their likely pain tolerance from a confederate, the trustworthiness of whom was experimentally manipulated. We used path analysis to test the hypothesis that social advice from a highly trustworthy confederate would influence participants' expectations about pain more than advice from a less trustworthy source, and that the degree of this social influence would in turn predict pain tolerance. We further used a simplified, Bayesian learning, computational approach for explicit belief updating to examine the role of latent parameters of precision optimisation in how participants subsequently changed their future pain expectations (prospective posterior beliefs) based on the combined effect of the confederate's advice on their own pain expectations, and their own task experience. Results confirmed that participants adjusted their pain expectations towards the confederate's advice more in the high- vs. low-trustworthiness condition, and this advice taking predicted their pain tolerance. Furthermore, the confederate's trustworthiness influenced how participants weighted the confederate's advice in relation to their own expectations and task experience in forming prospective posterior beliefs. When participants received advice from a less trustworthy confederate, their own sensory experience was weighted more highly than their socially-influenced prior expectations. Thus, explicit social advice appears to impact pain by influencing one's own pain expectations, but low social trustworthiness leads to these expectations becoming more malleable to novel, sensory learning.

Improvements of complex post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms during a multimodal psychodynamic inpatient rehabilitation treatment - results of an observational single-centre pilot study

Background: Complex post-traumatic stress disorder (CPTSD) describes chronic disturbances in self-organization (i.e. affect dysregulation; negative self-concept; severe difficulties in relationships) which are frequently observed in survivors of prolonged, repeated or multiple traumatic stressors. So far, evidence of psychodynamic treatment approaches for CPTSD is scarce.Methods: In this single-centre observational pilot study, symptom change during a 6-week psychodynamic inpatient treatment in a multimodal psychosomatic rehabilitation centre was evaluated using repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Patients completed questionnaires on PTSD and CPTSD symptoms (ITQ), anxiety, depression and somatization (BSI-18), functional impairment (WHODAS) and epistemic trust, mistrust and credulity (ETMCQ) before (T1) and at the end of treatment (T2). A hierarchical linear regression analysis was calculated to identify factors associated with improved CPTSD symptoms.Results: A total of n = 50 patients with CPTSD were included in the study, of whom n = 40 (80%) completed treatment. Patients reported a significant reduction of CPTSD symptoms during treatment with a large effect size (-3.9 points; p < .001; η2 = .36), as well as a significant reduction of psychological distress (p < .001; η2 = .55) and functional impairment (p < .001; η2 = .59). At the end of treatment, 41.0% of patients no longer fulfilled the diagnostic criteria for CPTSD. Changes in epistemic stance included improved epistemic trust (β = -.34, p = .026) and decreased epistemic credulity (β = .37, p = .017), which together with lower age (β = .43, p = .012) and lower depression levels at baseline (β = .35, p = .054) were significantly associated with baseline adjusted mean change of CPTSD symptoms during therapy and explained 48% of its variance.Discussion: In our study, patients reported a significant reduction of CPTSD symptoms and comorbid symptoms during a multimodal psychodynamic inpatient rehabilitation treatment. Improved epistemic trust may facilitate the establishment of a trusting therapeutic relationship, thus fostering an environment of openness for knowledge transfer (i.e. social learning) and the exploration of diverse viewpoints and perspectives in the therapeutic process.

AI-driven decision support systems and epistemic reliance: a qualitative study on obstetricians' and midwives' perspectives on integrating AI-driven CTG into clinical decision making

BACKGROUND

Given that AI-driven decision support systems (AI-DSS) are intended to assist in medical decision making, it is essential that clinicians are willing to incorporate AI-DSS into their practice. This study takes as a case study the use of AI-driven cardiotography (CTG), a type of AI-DSS, in the context of intrapartum care. Focusing on the perspectives of obstetricians and midwives regarding the ethical and trust-related issues of incorporating AI-driven tools in their practice, this paper explores the conditions that AI-driven CTG must fulfill for clinicians to feel justified in incorporating this assistive technology into their decision-making processes regarding interventions in labor.

METHODS

This study is based on semi-structured interviews conducted online with eight obstetricians and five midwives based in England. Participants were asked about their current decision-making processes about when to intervene in labor, how AI-driven CTG might enhance or disrupt this process, and what it would take for them to trust this kind of technology. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and analyzed with thematic analysis. NVivo software was used to organize thematic codes that recurred in interviews to identify the issues that mattered most to participants. Topics and themes that were repeated across interviews were identified to form the basis of the analysis and conclusions of this paper.

RESULTS

There were four major themes that emerged from our interviews with obstetricians and midwives regarding the conditions that AI-driven CTG must fulfill: (1) the importance of accurate and efficient risk assessments; (2) the capacity for personalization and individualized medicine; (3) the lack of significance regarding the type of institution that develops technology; and (4) the need for transparency in the development process.

CONCLUSIONS

Accuracy, efficiency, personalization abilities, transparency, and clear evidence that it can improve outcomes are conditions that clinicians deem necessary for AI-DSS to meet in order to be considered reliable and therefore worthy of being incorporated into the decision-making process. Importantly, healthcare professionals considered themselves as the epistemic authorities in the clinical context and the bearers of responsibility for delivering appropriate care. Therefore, what mattered to them was being able to evaluate the reliability of AI-DSS on their own terms, and have confidence in implementing them in their practice.

To trust or not to trust in the thrall of the COVID-19 pandemic: Conspiracy endorsement and the role of adverse childhood experiences, epistemic trust, and personality functioning

RATIONALE

Conspiracy endorsement is a public health challenge for the successful containment of the COVID-19 pandemic. While usually considered a societal phenomenon, little is known about the equally important developmental backdrops and personality characteristics like mistrust that render an individual prone to conspiracy endorsement. There is a growing body of evidence implying a detrimental role of adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) - a highly prevalent developmental burden - in the development of epistemic trust and personality functioning. This study aimed to investigate the association between ACEs and conspiracy endorsement in the general population, specifically questioning a mediating role of epistemic trust and personality functioning.

METHODS

Based on cross-sectional data from a representative German survey collected during the COVID-19 pandemic (N = 2501), we conducted structural equation modelling (SEM) where personality functioning (OPD-SQS) and epistemic trust (ETMCQ) were included as mediators of the association between ACEs and conspiracy endorsement. Bootstrapped confidence intervals (5000 samples, 95%-CI) are presented for all paths.

RESULTS

ACEs were significantly associated with conspiracy endorsement (β = 0.25, p < 0.001) and explained 6% of its variance. Adding epistemic trust and personality functioning as mediators increased the explained variance of conspiracy endorsement to 19% while the direct association between ACEs and conspiracy endorsement was diminished (β = 0.12, p < 0.001), indicating an indirect effect of personality functioning and epistemic trust in the association between ACEs and conspiracy endorsement. Fit indices confirmed good model fit.

CONCLUSIONS

Establishing an association between ACEs and conspiracy endorsement further increases the evidence for early childhood adversities' far-reaching and detrimental effects. By including epistemic trust and personality functioning, these findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms in the way that ACEs may be associated with conspiracy endorsement.

PsyCARE study: assessing impact, cost-effectiveness, and transdiagnostic factors of the Italian ministry of health's "psychological bonus" policy

BACKGROUND

The prevalence of anxiety and depression disorders is surging worldwide, prompting a pressing demand for psychological interventions, especially in less severe cases. Responding to this need, the Italian government implemented the "Psychological Bonus" (PB) policy, allotting 25 million euros for mental health support. This policy entitles individuals to a minimum of four to twelve psychological sessions. In collaboration with the National Board of Italian Psychologists, our study assesses this policy's effectiveness. Indeed, the PsyCARE study aims to examine the utilization of the Psychological Bonus, evaluate its impact on adult and adolescent participants' psychological well-being through pre- and post-intervention assessments and six-month follow-up, and conduct a longitudinal cost-effectiveness analysis of this policy. A secondary aim is to investigate the influence of these interventions on transdiagnostic factors, including emotion regulation and epistemic trust.

METHODS

The study involves licensed psychotherapists and their patients, both adults and adolescents, benefiting from the Psychological Bonus. Data collection is underway and set to conclude in December 2023. Psychotherapists will provide diagnostic information and assess patient functioning. In addition, patients will be evaluated on mental health aspects such as clinical symptoms, emotion regulation, epistemic trust, and quality of life. We will employ linear mixed-effects models to analyze the outcomes, accounting for both fixed and random effects to capture the hierarchical structure of the data.

DISCUSSION

We anticipate the study's findings will highlight reduced psychological distress and improved quality of life for participants and demonstrate the Psychological Bonus policy's cost-effectiveness. The study will gather data on the role of specific versus nonspecific therapeutic factors in psychotherapy while adopting a patient-tailored approach to identify effective therapeutic elements and examine transdiagnostic factors. Overall, this study's findings will guide future measures within the Italian healthcare system, fostering a psychological health culture and providing valuable insights to the broader public.

STUDY REGISTRATION

https://osf.io/6zk2j.

Childhood adversity and adolescent acting-out behaviors: the mediating role of mentalizing difficulties and epistemic vigilance

Childhood adversity is a well-established risk factor for adolescent acting-out behaviors such as self-harm, bingeing, substance abuse, and aggressive behavior. From a mentalizing perspective, acting-out behaviors are understood as resulting from a combination of impairments in mentalizing and epistemic vigilance that are a consequence of childhood adversity. Yet, few studies have investigated these assumptions. The current study investigated the potential mediating role of mentalizing impairments and epistemic vigilance in the relationship between childhood adversity and acting-out behaviors in adolescents, oversampled for risk status for psychopathology (N = 451, mean age = 15.40 years). Structural equation modeling showed a strong, direct relationship between childhood adversity and acting-out behaviors, confirming the importance of traumatic childhood experiences for adolescent acting-out behaviors. This relationship was partially mediated by both mentalizing difficulties and epistemic vigilance, explaining about 40% of the total variance. These results support the importance of focusing on strengthening mentalizing abilities and lowering epistemic hypervigilance in psychotherapeutic work with adolescents who have experienced childhood trauma.

Infants' selective imitation of a transitive agent and an intransitive agent

This study examined how the reliability (i.e., transitivity) of an agent's object choices affects 16-month-old infants' (N = 48) imitation of her unconventional way of turning on a touch light box with her head when her hands were available. When the agent made transitive choices (i.e., she chose Object A over Object B, Object B over Object C, and then A over C), infants imitated her head touch actions. When the agent made intransitive choices (i.e., after choosing A over B and B over C, she chose C over A), infants were more likely to use only their hands to touch the light box. In addition, when it was presumably difficult for infants to judge the transitivity of the agent's choices (i.e., she chose B over C, A over B, and then A over C), they used their hands more. These results demonstrate that infants' understanding informs their decisions to selectively imitate others' specific ways to act on novel artifacts, consistent with young children's selective trust in information provided by other people based on their epistemic reliability.

Evaluations of epistemic and practical reasons for belief in a predominantly White U.S. sample of preschoolers

Parents and educators commonly seek to influence children's behavior by providing them with practical incentives, but how should we understand the influence of such incentives on children's beliefs? Are children capable of distinguishing between speech acts that provide practical reasons for believing, such as requests and offers, from speech acts that provide straightforward epistemic reasons, such as simple acts of telling? To investigate these questions, we randomly assigned 3- to 6-year-old children (N = 97) to one of two conditions (Request or Offer) in which two speakers each commented on a series of four exotic animals. In each condition, an agent who stated what an object was called with a simple telling ("This is a tanzer") was contrasted with an agent who made either a doxastic request ("I want you to think that this is a tanzer") or a doxastic offer ("If you think that this is a tanzer, I'll let you play with this new toy"). We then measured children's endorsement of and semantic memory for the claims as well as their knowledge attributions and resource allocation decisions. Our results suggest that children appreciate the epistemic reasons inherent in acts of telling when contrasted with doxastic requests, as evidenced by their general preference to learn from, attribute knowledge to, and share with the teller in the Request condition. When tellings were contrasted with doxastic offers, children were less systematic in their preferences. We discuss various interpretations of this finding and offer suggestions for future research.

A generative framework for the study of delusions

Despite the ubiquity of delusional information processing in psychopathology and everyday life, formal characterizations of such inferences are lacking. In this article, we propose a generative framework that entails a computational mechanism which, when implemented in a virtual agent and given new information, generates belief updates (i.e., inferences about the hidden causes of the information) that resemble those seen in individuals with delusions. We introduce a particular form of Dirichlet process mixture model with a sampling-based Bayesian inference algorithm. This procedure, depending on the setting of a single parameter, preferentially generates highly precise (i.e. over-fitting) explanations, which are compartmentalized and thus can co-exist despite being inconsistent with each other. Especially in ambiguous situations, this can provide the seed for delusional ideation. Further, we show by simulation how the excessive generation of such over-precise explanations leads to new information being integrated in a way that does not lead to a revision of established beliefs. In all configurations, whether delusional or not, the inference generated by our algorithm corresponds to Bayesian inference. Furthermore, the algorithm is fully compatible with hierarchical predictive coding. By virtue of these properties, the proposed model provides a basis for the empirical study and a step toward the characterization of the aberrant inferential processes underlying delusions.

Improving treatment outcomes for adolescents with borderline personality disorder through a socioecological approach

BACKGROUND

There is a dearth of studies evaluating treatment efficacy for adolescents diagnosed with borderline personality disorder. The few available randomized controlled trials that have been conducted show modest results and treatments appear to have equivalent effects. The current paper draws on (a) the lessons learnt from the last 50 years of psychotherapy research in general and (b) recent advances in mentalization-based understanding of why treatment works, which together point to the importance of following a socioecological approach in the treatment of personality problems in adolescence - a developmental period that insists on a treatment approach that goes beyond the therapist-client dyad.

CASE PRESENTATION

Here, we describe such an approach, and offer a clinical case example with a young 16-year old girl diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, to illustrate what a shift toward a more socioecological approach would entail.

CONCLUSIONS

The clinical impact of the socioecological approach and the potential benefits as illustrated in the current case illustration, offers a framework that justifies and allows for the expansion of service delivery for youth with borderline personality disorder beyond dyadic therapist-client work.

Science, politics and regulation: The trust-based approach to the demarcation problem

Drawing on literature on values in science and a case-study of UK cancer policy, this paper argues for a novel account of the demarcation project in terms of trustworthiness. The first part of the paper addresses the relationship between science, politics and demarcation. In 2010, the UK government decided to pay more for cancer drugs than for drugs for other diseases; in 2016, this Cancer Drugs Fund was reformed so as to lower the evidential standards for approving cancer drugs, rather than paying more for them. Are these two ways of treating cancer as "special" importantly different? This paper argues that, if we the argument from inductive risk seriously, they seem equivalent. This result provides further reason to doubt the notion of demarcating science from non-science. However, the second part of the paper complicates this story, arguing that considerations of epistemic trust might give us reasons to prefer epistemic communities centred around "broadly acceptable" standards, and which are "sociologically well-ordered", regardless of inductive risk concerns. After developing these claims through the cancer case-study, the final section suggests how these concerns might motivate novel versions of the demarcation project.

Trust in the time of corona: epistemic practice beyond hard evidence

The spread of the coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) is undoubtedly one of the most extraordinary challenges in recent history. Amidst this global crisis, various controversies have been emerging about how to manage the virus, ranging from whether face masks should be required as a preventive measure to whether hydroxychloroquine is an appropriate treatment. There has been a barrage of contradictory claims related to these issues. However, in many cases, it is not possible for an individual to wait until consensus is reached before deciding on a course of action. Meanwhile, to avoid misplacing trust, trust must be well grounded. Conventional school science largely focuses on the trustworthiness of data and evidence, rather than that of the people making scientific claims. This failure to consider the human factor renders conventional school science inadequate for helping students make informed judgements about granting trust. Drawing on the literature in epistemic practice, this paper highlights four epistemic processes potentially useful for students to ground their trust, including (1) identifying whether recognition from peer reviewers has been obtained; (2) examining the credentials of those who claim expertise; (3) determining the level of expert consensus; and (4) identifying possible sources of bias. Through critical reflection on events related to the Covid-19 pandemic as examples, this paper examines how these epistemic processes inform judgement about the trustworthiness of people in terms of their competence and motives. The discussion highlights the need to develop students' capacity to identify expertise/ credentials, the nature of journals and of organisations when trust is assigned. This paper offers a frame for science educators on guiding students to place trust as a part of their decision-making process. The capability would be relevant to contexts beyond the Covid-19 pandemic.

Future directions in personality pathology

This article suggests two areas of future development in the realm of personality pathology. First, a reconceptualization of personality pathology in the context of research evidence suggestive of a single model for psychopathology. Recent work on the 'p factor', in combination with findings from clinical research, behavior genetics, molecular biology, and neurobiological models are considered in relation to this reconceptualization of personality pathology. Second, a cultural-developmental model for personality pathology is proposed, based on Gergely and Csibra's work on natural pedagogy, Tomasello's work on joint attention and intentionality, and our recent work on epistemic trust and the social-communicative nature of psychopathology.

Attachment Facilitates Acculturative Learning and Adversity Moderates: Validating the Theory of Epistemic Trust in a Natural Experiment

Acculturation has consequences for immigrant health, and provides a natural experimental context in which to test Fonagy and Allison's theory of epistemic trust. Their theory posits that secure attachment in the caregiver-youth dyad is a key mechanism for supporting, and exposure to childhood adversity and trauma is thought to block, the cultural learning process. The aim of this study was to validate the theory of epistemic trust by examining secure attachment as a predictor of acculturation across time and adverse childhood experiences as a moderator in 100 recently immigrated high school students followed for one year. Growth parameters were extracted and regressed on key study variables. Results indicated a significant main effect of maternal attachment on acculturation across time, as well an interaction in which the aforementioned link was blocked by adverse childhood experiences. In the context of acculturative learning, two tenets of the theory of epistemic trust were supported.

Trust in early childhood

Children need to build trust in their primary caregivers or significant others, as well as people who are unrelated to them, including those who belong to different social groups. The present chapter focuses on children's trust in unfamiliar individuals. How do they determine who to trust? Does putting trust in another person operate differently depending on the specific issue at hand? To address these questions, we differentiate between two forms of trust: children's trust in others' epistemic states to learn from others (epistemic trust) and trusting others for social support and reassurance (social trust), for example, when to expect that interaction partners will be truthful and keep promises. We first review the literature on epistemic trust to show that young children seem to value others' accuracy and competence when learning from them, even when these individuals are from different linguistic or racial groups than their own. We then present findings on social trust suggesting that young children trust those who are well-meaning and who keep their promises. Finally, we raise the question of whether there are environmental influences on the interaction of both epistemic and social trust with intergroup factors such as race, and we propose that research with infants will be useful to better illuminate the developmental roots of human trust.

Children's and adults' epistemic trust in and impressions of inaccurate informants

As children and adults interact with new individuals, they make and revise inferences about these individuals' traits and intentions; they build and refine psychological profiles. Here, we examined how this ability develops during early childhood and manifests during adulthood by focusing on the construction of psychological profiles for individuals who have repeatedly provided inaccurate information. Children aged 4-7 years (n = 66) and adults (n = 62) played six rounds of a game in which they needed to find a hidden sticker. In each round, an informant made a claim about the sticker's location, and then participants guessed the sticker's location. In each round, after participants guessed, it was revealed that the informant's claim was incorrect. Across trials, children and adults quickly lost trust in the informant's claims. Children's impressions of the informant's smartness, niceness, and intentions became slightly more negative across trials. In contrast, adults' impressions of the informant's smartness increased, whereas their impressions of the informant's niceness decreased, and adults nearly unanimously judged the informant to be purposely (rather than mistakenly) inaccurate. In sum, children and adults track the accuracy of an informant over time and use this information to update their epistemic trust in the informant. However, based on the same data, children and adults end up with different interpretations of the informant's psychological characteristics-her traits and intentions.

Mentalizing, Epistemic Trust and the Phenomenology of Psychotherapy

This paper seeks to elucidate the phenomenological experience of psychotherapy in the context of the theory of mentalizing and epistemic trust. We describe two related phenomenological experiences that are the domain of psychotherapeutic work. The first is the patient's direct experience of their own personal narrative being recognized, marked and reflected back to them by the therapist. Secondly, this intersubjective recognition makes possible the regulation and alignment of the patient's imaginative capacity in relation to phenomenological experiences. In describing three aspects of the communication process that unfold in effective psychotherapeutic interventions - (1) the epistemic match, (2) improving mentalizing and (3) the re-emergence of social learning - the way in which any effective treatment is embedded in metacognitive processes about the self in relation to perceptual social reality is explained. In particular, attention is drawn to wider social determinants of psychopathology. We discuss the possible mechanism for the relationship between the socioeconomic environment and psychopathology, and the implications of this for psychotherapeutic treatment.

The relation between epistemic trust and borderline pathology in an adolescent inpatient sample

BACKGROUND

Recent extensions of mentalization theory have included the hypothesis that a reduced capacity for epistemic trust in the context of attachment relationships may represent a core vulnerability for the development of borderline personality disorder (BPD). The first aim of the current study was to explore empirical relationships between epistemic trust and symptoms of BPD. The second aim was to explore the effect of epistemic trust on treatment response.

METHODS

Data were collected from 322 inpatient adolescents. The Inventory of Parent and Peer Attachment (IPPA) trust in mother and father subscales were used to approximate epistemic trust in the absence of a validated measure. A multimodal approach was used to measure BPD including self-report, parent-report, and interviewer ratings. Regression analyses were performed to explore the relationship between IPPA trust scores and measures of BPD. Mixed-design analyses of variance were conducted to evaluate whether self-reported parent trust at admission influenced progress in treatment.

RESULTS

As hypothesized, results indicated that reduced IPPA trust in parents correlated with BPD symptoms across various measures. Levels of IPPA trust in parents at admission did not moderate a reduction in BPD symptoms over the course of treatment.

CONCLUSIONS

This study provides support for the theoretical association between deficits in epistemic trust and BPD while also highlighting the need for a validated measure of epistemic trust. Although parent trust at admission did not moderate a reduction in BPD symptoms over the course of treatment, this result may suggest that progress in treatment, and perhaps the ability to cultivate trust in the treatment setting and providers, may not be overly determined by levels of parent trust.

Developing an assessment of epistemic trust: a research protocol

Epistemic trust (ET) describes the willingness to accept new information from another person as trustworthy, generalizable, and relevant. It has been recently proposed that a pervasive failure to establish epistemic trust may underpin personality disorders. Although the introduction of the concept of ET has been inspiring to clinicians and is already impacting the field, the idea that there may be individual differences in ET has yet to be operationalized and tested empirically. This report illustrates the development of an Epistemic trust assessment and describes the protocol for its validation. The sample will include 60 university students. The Trier Social Stress Test for Groups will be administered to induce a state of uncertainty and stress, thereby increasing the relevance of information for the participants. The experiment will entail asking information from the participants about their performance and internal states during a simulated employment interview, and then tracking how participants are able to revise their own judgments about themselves in light of the feedback coming from an expert committee. To control for social desirability and personality disorder traits, the short scale for social desirability (Kurzskala Soziale Erwunschtheit-Gamma) and the Inventory of Personality Organization are utilized. After the procedure, the participants will complete an app-based Epistemic trust questionnaire (ETQ) app. Confirmatory Factor Analysis will be utilized to investigate the structure and dimensionality of the ETQ, and ANOVAs will be used to investigate mean differences within and between persons for ET scores by item category. This study operationalizes a newly developed ET paradigm and provides a framework for the investigation of the theoretical assumptions about the connection of ET and personality functioning.

A role for epistemic trust in speech-language pathology: A tutorial paper

This paper provides an introduction to epistemic trust for speech-language pathologists (SLPs). 'Epistemic trust' describes a specific form of trust that an individual places in others when learning about the world, particularly the social world. To date, the relevance of epistemic trust to SLP clinical practice has received little theoretical or empirical attention. The aim of this paper is to define epistemic trust and explain its relationship with parent-child attachment and mentalization which have, in turn, been linked with language development and use. Suggestions are made for ways in which SLPs may encourage epistemic trust in clients, emphasizing the need to establish strong therapeutic alliances. The authors conclude that epistemic trust is an important consideration for SLPs and that further research exploring the relationship between epistemic trust and language skills is needed to better understand the interplay of these variables and inform clinical practice.

Parameterizing developmental changes in epistemic trust

Children rely on others for much of what they learn, and therefore must track who to trust for information. Researchers have debated whether to interpret children's behavior as inferences about informants' knowledgeability only or as inferences about both knowledgeability and intent. We introduce a novel framework for integrating results across heterogeneous ages and methods. The framework allows application of a recent computational model to a set of results that span ages 8 months to adulthood and a variety of methods. The results show strong fits to specific findings in the literature trust, and correctly fails to fit one representative result from an adjacent literature. In the aggregate, the results show a clear development in children's reasoning about informants' intent and no appreciable changes in reasoning about informants' knowledgeability, confirming previous results. The results extend previous findings by modeling development over a much wider age range and identifying and explaining differences across methods.

Understanding deceptive intentions behind pointing gestures in 12-15-month-old infants

We examined the comprehension of deceptive intentions revealed in searching task in infancy, on the theoretical basis of natural pedagogy and epistemic trust. The main findings showed that 12-15-month-old infants are able to discriminate the reliable and the deceptive actions of adults, but they do not generalize their previous experience in connection with a novel person, who is treated as a new reliable source of information.

Borderline personality disorder, epistemic trust and the developmental significance of social communication

In Part 1 of this paper, we discussed emerging evidence suggesting that a general psychopathology or 'p' factor underlying the various forms of psychopathology should be conceptualized in terms of the absence of resilience, that is, the absence of positive reappraisal mechanisms when faced with adversity. These impairments in the capacity for positive reappraisal seem to provide a comprehensive explanation for the association between the p factor and comorbidity, future caseness, and the 'hard-to-reach' character of many patients with severe personality pathology, most notably borderline personality disorder (BPD). In this, the second part of the paper, we trace the development of the absence of resilience to disruptions in the emergence of human social communication, based on recent evolutionary and developmental psychopathology accounts. We argue that BPD and related disorders may be reconceptualized as a form of social understanding in which epistemic hypervigilance, distrust or outright epistemic freezing is an adaptive consequence of the social learning environment. Negative appraisal mechanisms become overriding, particularly in situations of attachment stress. This constitutes a shift towards a more socially oriented perspective on personality psychopathology in which the absence of psychological resilience is seen as a learned response to the transmission of social knowledge. This shift in our views has also forced us to reconsider the role of attachment in BPD. The implications for prevention and intervention of this novel approach are discussed.

What we have changed our minds about: Part 1. Borderline personality disorder as a limitation of resilience

This paper sets out a recent transition in our thinking in relation to psychopathology associated with personality disorder, in an approach that integrates our thinking about attachment, mentalizing (understanding ourselves and others in terms of intentional mental states) and epistemic trust (openness to the reception of social communication that is personally relevant and of generalizable significance) with recent findings on the structure of both adult and child psychopathology and resilience. In this paper - the first of two parts - we review evidence suggesting that a general psychopathology or p factor underlies vulnerability for psychopathology. We link this p factor to a lack of resilience using Kalisch and colleagues' positive appraisal style theory of resilience (PASTOR). We argue that vulnerability for (severe) psychopathology results from impairments in three central mechanisms underlying resilience - positive situation classification, retrospective reappraisal of threat, and inhibition of retraumatizing triggers - which in turn result from a lack of flexibility in terms of social communicative processes. We suggest that, from this perspective, personality disorders, and borderline personality disorder (BPD) in particular, can be considered to be the prototype of disorders characterized by a lack of resilience. Part 2 proposes an evolutionary developmental psychopathology account linking this inflexibility in social communication to problems with the development of epistemic trust - that is, an evolutionary pre-wired social communication system that normally facilitates resilience through salutogenesis, that is, the capacity to learn and derive benefit from the (social) environment.

Developing expectations regarding the boundaries of expertise

Three experiments examined elementary school-aged children's and adults' expectations regarding what specialists (i.e., those with narrow domains of expertise) and generalists (i.e., those with broad domains of expertise) are likely to know. Experiment 1 demonstrated developmental differences in the ability to differentiate between generalists and specialists, with younger children believing generalists have more specific trivia knowledge than older children and adults believed. Experiment 2 demonstrated that children and adults expected generalists to have more underlying principles knowledge than specific trivia knowledge about unfamiliar animals. However, they believed that generalists would have more of both types of knowledge than themselves. Finally, Experiment 3 demonstrated that children and adults recognized that underlying principles knowledge can be generalized between topics closely related to the specialists' domains of expertise. However, they did not recognize when this knowledge was generalizable to topics slightly less related, expecting generalists to know only as much as they would. Importantly, this work contributes to the literature by showing how much of and what kinds of knowledge different types of experts are expected to have. In sum, this work provides insight into some of the ways children's notions of expertise change over development. The current research demonstrates that between the ages of 5 and 10, children are developing the ability to recognize how experts' knowledge is likely to be limited. That said, even older children at times struggle to determine the breadth of an experts' knowledge.

Preschoolers trust novel members of accurate speakers' groups and judge them favourably

By age 3, children track a speaker's record of past accuracy and use it as a cue to current reliability. Two experiments (N=95 children) explored whether preschoolers' judgements about, and trust in, the accuracy of a previously reliable informant extend to other members of the informant's group. In Experiment 1, both 3- and 4-year-olds consistently judged an animated character who was associated with a previously accurate speaker more likely to be correct than a character associated with a previously inaccurate speaker, despite possessing no information about these characters' individual records of reliability. They continued to show this preference one week later. Experiment 2 presented 4- and 5-year-olds with a related task using videos of human actors. Both showed preferences for members of previously accurate speakers' groups on a common measure of epistemic trust. This result suggests that by at least age 4, children's trust in speaker testimony spreads to members of a previously accurate speaker's group.

Five-year-olds are willing, but 4-year-olds refuse, to trust informants who offer new and unfamiliar labels for parts of the body

This study employed the selective trust paradigm to examine how children interpret novel labels when compared with labels they already know to be accurate or inaccurate within the biological domain. The participants--3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N=144)--were allocated to one of three conditions. In the accurate versus inaccurate condition, one informant labeled body parts correctly, whereas the other labeled them incorrectly (e.g., calling an eye an "arm"). In the accurate versus novel condition, one informant labeled body parts accurately, whereas the other provided novel labels (e.g., calling an eye a "roke"). Finally, in the inaccurate versus novel condition, one informant labeled body parts incorrectly, whereas the other offered novel labels. In subsequent test trials, the two informants provided conflicting labels for unfamiliar internal organs. In the accurate versus inaccurate condition, children sought and endorsed labels from the accurate informant. In the accurate versus novel condition, only 4- and 5-year-olds preferred the accurate informant, whereas 3-year-olds did not selectively prefer either informant. In the inaccurate versus novel condition, only 5-year-olds preferred the novel informant, whereas 3- and 4-year-olds did not demonstrate a selective preference. Results are supportive of previous studies suggesting that 3-year-olds are sensitive to inaccuracy and that 4-year-olds privilege accuracy. However, 3- and 4-year-olds appear to be unsure as to how the novel informant should be construed. In contrast, 5-year-olds appreciate that speakers offering new information are more trustworthy than those offering inaccurate information, but they are cautious in judging such informants as being "better" at providing that information.