The orbitofrontal cortex

Frontal lobe contributions to theory of mind

"Theory of mind," the ability to make inferences about others" mental states, seems to be a modular cognitive capacity that underlies humans" ability to engage in complex social interaction. It develops in several distinct stages, which can be measured with social reasoning tests of increasing difficulty. Individuals with Asperger"s syndrome, a mild form of autism, perform well on simpler theory of mind tests but show deficits on more developmentally advanced theory of mind tests. We tested patients with bilateral damage to orbito-frontal cortex (n = 5) and unilateral damage in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (n = 5) on a series of theory of mind tasks varying in difficulty. Bilateral orbito-frontal lesion patients performed similarly to individuals with Asperger"s syndrome, performing well on simpler tests and showing deficits on tasks requiring more subtle social reasoning, such as the ability to recognize a faux pas. In contrast, no specific theory of mind deficits were evident in the unilateral dorsolateral frontal lesion patients. The dorsolateral lesion patients had difficulty only on versions of the tasks that placed demands on working memory.

Orbitofrontal cortex and basolateral amygdala encode expected outcomes during learning

Reciprocal connections between the orbitofrontal cortex and the basolateral nucleus of the amygdala may provide a critical circuit for the learning that underlies goal-directed behavior. We examined neural activity in rat orbitofrontal cortex and basolateral amygdala during instrumental learning in an olfactory discrimination task. Neurons in both regions fired selectively during the anticipation of rewarding or aversive outcomes. This selective activity emerged early in training, before the rats had learned reliably to avoid the aversive outcome. The results support the concept that the basolateral amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex cooperate to encode information that may be used to guide goal-directed behavior.

Memory after frontal/temporal disconnection in monkeys: conditional and non-conditional tasks, unilateral and bilateral frontal lesions

Seven Cynomolgus monkeys (Macaca fascicularis) learned a series of reward-visual conditional discrimination problems, in which the arrival or non-arrival of a food pellet at the beginning of each trial acted as an instruction cue, signalling which of two visually distinct stimulus objects the animal should choose on that trial in order to obtain a further food pellet reward. Following surgical removal of the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex in one hemisphere and the inferior temporal cortex in the contralateral hemisphere, combined with forebrain commissurotomy, the four operated animals were severely impaired at relearning this task. They were not impaired, however, in non-conditional visual discrimination learning. Extending the unilateral frontal lesion to include the ventromedial prefrontal cortex had no detrimental effect, nor did complete unilateral removal of the frontal cortex. In a third experiment, the operated animals underwent a further surgery to remove either ventrolateral, ventral or complete frontal cortex similar to that in the opposite hemisphere. Compared to their previous level of performance, the animals with bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal lesions were now mildly impaired and the animals with the bilateral lesion extended to the ventromedial cortex more severely impaired on the non-conditional visual discrimination task. The bilaterally lobectomized animals were unable to relearn the task. We suggest that behaviour in visual learning tasks is controlled by cortical convergence upon subcortical structures, possibly by striatal efferents from both the visual cortex and frontal cortex, and that intrahemispheric convergence of these two efferents within the corpus striatum of one hemisphere could allow detailed control of visual choices by non-visual information, while subcortical interhemispheric transfer allows only less detailed, more general control.

Syndrome E

The transformation of groups of previously nonviolent individuals into repetitive killers of defenceless members of society has been a recurring phenomenon throughout history. This transformation is characterised by a set of symptoms and signs suggesting a common syndrome--Syndrome E. Affected individuals show obsessive ideation, compulsive repetition, rapid desensitisation to violence, diminished affective reactivity, hyperarousal, environmental dependency, group contagion, and failure to adapt to changing stimulus-reinforcement associations. Yet memory, language, planning, and problem-solving skills remain intact. The main risk factors are male sex and age between 15 and 50. A pathophysiological model--"cognitive fracture"--is hypothesised, where hyperaroused orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal cortices tonically inhibit the amygdala and are no longer regulated by visceral and somatic homoeostatic controls ordinarily supplied by subcortical systems. It is proposed that the syndrome is a product of neocortical development rather than the manifestation of a disinhibited primitive brain. Early recognition of symptoms and signs could lead to prevention through education and isolation of affected individuals.

Neuroscience and appetitive behavior research: 25 years

Neuroscience techniques have made major contributions to the understanding of appetitive behavior. Highlights in six areas are summarized to illustrate progress during the 25 years of the Columbia Appetitive Behavior Seminar: (1) discovery of angiotensin and aldosterone in the control of thirst and salt appetite; (2) electrophysiological decoding of chemoreceptive information in the brain; (3) a new foundation in the hypothalamus built on peptides, such as neuropeptide Y and galanin, interacting with monoamines and steroids in the control of appetite for macronutrients; (4) discovery of numerous peptides that mediate and integrate satiety, such as cholecystokinin, insulin, leptin and enterostatin, and other systems that suppress eating during illness; (5) better understanding of appetite suppressant drugs, and (6) exploration of a circuit that translates hypothalamic signals into behavioral action through connections to brainstem reflex arcs and forebrain instrumental response systems.

Consciousness in Neural Networks?

A combined neurophysiological and computational approach is reviewed that leads to a proposal for how neural networks in the temporal cortical visual areas of primates could function to produce invariant object representation and identification. A similar approach is then reviewed which leads to a theory of how the hippocampus could rapidly store memories, especially episodic memories including spatial context, and how later recall of the information to the neocortex could occur. Third, it is argued that the visual and memory mechanisms described could operate without consciousness, and that a different type of processing is related to consciousness. It is suggested that the type of processing related to consciousness involves higher-order thoughts ("thoughts about thoughts"), and evolved to allow plans, formulated in a language, with many steps, to be corrected. It is suggested that it would feel like something to be a system that can think linguistically (using syntax) about its own thoughts, and that the subjective or phenomenal aspects of consciousness arise in this way. It is further suggested that "raw sensory feels" arise in evolution because once some types of processing feel like something by virtue of a system capable of higher-order thoughts, it is then parsimonious to postulate that sensory and related processing, which has to be taken into account in that processing system, should feel like something. It is suggested that it is this type of processing, which must be implemented in neural networks, which is related to consciousness.