Neural Circuits Involved in the Recognition of Actions Performed by Nonconspecifics: An fMRI Study

The mirror neuron system: new frontiers

Since the discovery of mirror neurons, much effort has been invested into studying their location and properties in the human brain. Here we review these original findings and introduce the main topics of this special issue of Social Neuroscience. What does the mirror system code? How is the mirror system embedded into the mosaic of circuits that compose our brain? How does the mirror system contribute to communication, language and social interaction? Can the principle of mirror neurons be extended to emotions, sensations and thoughts? Papers using a wide range of methods, including single cell recordings, fMRI, TMS, EEG and psychophysics, collected in this special issue, start to give us some impressive answers.

Application of neuroscience to technology in stroke rehabilitation

The past decade has seen remarkable advances in our understanding of mechanisms that drive functional neuroplastic change after brain injury and the mirror neuron system that appears essential for language learning and communicative interaction. This article describes five neuroscience-based interventions available for clinical practice, with a discussion of the potential value of mirror neurons in stroke rehabilitation. Case-study data on three adults with aphasia who received various combinations of neuroscience-derived technological interventions are provided to inform the clinician of the potential advantages of technology as an adjunct to, not a substitution for, conventional therapeutic intervention.

Culture in the mind's mirror: how anthropology and neuroscience can inform a model of the neural substrate for cultural imitative learning

Cultural neuroscience, the study of how cultural experience shapes the brain, is an emerging subdiscipline in the neurosciences. Yet, a foundational question to the study of culture and the brain remains neglected by neuroscientific inquiry: "How does cultural information get into the brain in the first place?" Fortunately, the tools needed to explore the neural architecture of cultural learning - anthropological theories and cognitive neuroscience methodologies - already exist; they are merely separated by disciplinary boundaries. Here we review anthropological theories of cultural learning derived from fieldwork and modeling; since cultural learning theory suggests that sophisticated imitation abilities are at the core of human cultural learning, we focus our review on cultural imitative learning. Accordingly we proceed to discuss the neural underpinnings of imitation and other mechanisms important for cultural learning: learning biases, mental state attribution, and reinforcement learning. Using cultural neuroscience theory and cognitive neuroscience research as our guides, we then propose a preliminary model of the neural architecture of cultural learning. Finally, we discuss future studies needed to test this model and fully explore and explain the neural underpinnings of cultural imitative learning.

Juggling with the brain - thought and action in the human motor system

Empirical findings from various research fields indicate that cognitive and motor processes are far less dissimilar than previously thought. The present chapter takes a neuroscientific perspective and offers evidence for similarities between cognition and action focusing on three key players of the classical motor system: the primary motor cortex, the cerebellum, and the premotor cortex. Briefly, although movement execution is apparently supported in part by the same cerebral resources engaged in cognitive processes, the three brain regions reviewed here are differentially engaged in more or less action-bound cognitive processes.

Visuomotor priming effects in Parkinson's disease patients depend on the match between the observed and the executed action

Evidence exists that action observation activates the same cortical motor areas that are involved in the performance of the observed actions. An untested idea is whether subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia play a role in the coding of other people's actions. This study used kinematics to examine how Parkinson's disease patients react to the observation of an action which they were subsequently requested to perform. In each trial a model and an observer, which could be either a Parkinsonian patient or a neurologically healthy participant, were seated facing each other. The model was requested to grasp a stimulus (action condition), to perform a kicking action towards the stimulus (control-action condition), and to not perform any action (control condition). The task for the observer was always to grasp the stimulus after having watched the model performing her task. Results show that Parkinson's disease patients did show facilitation effects only when the model was a Parkinsonian patient. Whereas, neurologically healthy participants' movements were facilitated following the observation of either the Parkinsonian and the healthy model grasping the object. No facilitation effects were found for both the control and the control-action conditions. The fact that normal visuomotor priming takes place in PD patients when the observed action matches with what they can perform suggests that basal ganglia might not be necessary for it. However, damage to the basal ganglia might become relevant when such a match does not occur. In such circumstances, a damage to these structures might prevent the deployment of additional activity which might be necessary to influence cortical functions related to the representations of observed actions.

Exploring the brain basis of joint action: co-ordination of actions, goals and intentions

Humans are frequently confronted with goal-directed tasks that can not be accomplished alone, or that benefit from co-operation with other agents. The relatively new field of social cognitive neuroscience seeks to characterize functional neuroanatomical systems either specifically or preferentially engaged during such joint-action tasks. Based on neuroimaging experiments conducted on critical components of joint action, the current paper outlines the functional network upon which joint action is hypothesized to be dependant. This network includes brain areas likely to be involved in interpersonal co-ordination at the action, goal, and intentional levels. Experiments focusing specifically on joint-action situations similar to those encountered in real life are required to further specify this model.

fMRI adaptation reveals mirror neurons in human inferior parietal cortex

Mirror neurons, as originally described in the macaque, have two defining properties [1, 2]: They respond specifically to a particular action (e.g., bringing an object to the mouth), and they produce their action-specific responses independent of whether the monkey executes the action or passively observes a conspecific performing the same action. In humans, action observation and action execution engage a network of frontal, parietal, and temporal areas. However, it is unclear whether these responses reflect the activity of a single population that represents both observed and executed actions in a common neural code or the activity of distinct but overlapping populations of exclusively perceptual and motor neurons [3]. Here, we used fMRI adaptation to show that the right inferior parietal lobe (IPL) responds independently to specific actions regardless of whether they are observed or executed. Specifically, responses in the right IPL were attenuated when participants observed a recently executed action relative to one that had not previously been performed. This adaptation across action and perception demonstrates that the right IPL responds selectively to the motoric and perceptual representations of actions and is the first evidence for a neural response in humans that shows both defining properties of mirror neurons.

The observation and execution of actions share motor and somatosensory voxels in all tested subjects: single-subject analyses of unsmoothed fMRI data

Many neuroimaging studies of the mirror neuron system (MNS) examine if certain voxels in the brain are shared between action observation and execution (shared voxels, sVx). Unfortunately, finding sVx in standard group analyses is not a guarantee that sVx exist in individual subjects. Using unsmoothed, single-subject analyses we show sVx can be reliably found in all 16 investigated participants. Beside the ventral premotor (BA6/44) and inferior parietal cortex (area PF) where mirror neurons (MNs) have been found in monkeys, sVx were reliably observed in dorsal premotor, supplementary motor, middle cingulate, somatosensory (BA3, BA2, and OP1), superior parietal, middle temporal cortex and cerebellum. For the premotor, somatosensory and parietal areas, sVx were more numerous in the left hemisphere. The hand representation of the primary motor cortex showed a reduced BOLD during hand action observation, possibly preventing undesired overt imitation. This study provides a more detailed description of the location and reliability of sVx and proposes a model that extends the original idea of the MNS to include forward and inverse internal models and motor and sensory simulation, distinguishing the MNS from a more general concept of sVx.

Motor resonance and linguistic focus

Previous studies have demonstrated that verbal descriptions of actions activate compatible motor responses (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). The present study replicates previous findings showing that, within a sentence, such activation is localized on the verb that denotes the action. Moreover, motor resonance is found to yield to linguistic focus. If a postverbal adverb maintains focus on a matching action ("slowly" or "quickly"), motor resonance occurs, but if the adverb shifts the focus to the agent (e.g., "obediently" or "eagerly"), a cessation of motor resonance ensues. These findings are discussed within the context of theories of motor resonance, action understanding, mental simulation, and linguistic focus.

Self-identification and empathy modulate error-related brain activity during the observation of penalty shots between friend and foe

The ability to detect and process errors made by others plays an important role is many social contexts. The capacity to process errors is typically found to rely on sites in the medial frontal cortex. However, it remains to be determined whether responses at these sites are driven primarily by action errors themselves or by the affective consequences normally associated with their commission. Using an experimental paradigm that disentangles action errors and the valence of their affective consequences, we demonstrate that sites in the medial frontal cortex (MFC), including the ventral anterior cingulate cortex (vACC) and pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), respond to action errors independent of the valence of their consequences. The strength of this response was negatively correlated with the empathic concern subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. We also demonstrate a main effect of self-identification by showing that errors committed by friends and foes elicited significantly different BOLD responses in a separate region of the middle anterior cingulate cortex (mACC). These results suggest that the way we look at others plays a critical role in determining patterns of brain activation during error observation. These findings may have important implications for general theories of error processing.

Empathy and identification in Von Donnersmarck's The Lives of Others

Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck's The Lives of Others, set in the German Democratic Republic in 1984, five years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, has been called the first accurate depiction of the psychological terror wielded by the Stasi, the East German secret police, who safeguarded the dictatorship of the proletariat. The film is about the psychological and political transformation of a Stasi officer, Wiesler, who undertakes the surveillance of a prominent playwright and his actress lover. The mechanisms through which Wiesler comes to empathize and identify with the subjects of his investigation, as he observes and listens in on the rich blend of passion, poetry, and politics that characterizes their lives, are explored in depth. Wiesler's transformation is based in part on the capacity to form implicit models of the behavior and experiences of others, based on the mirror neuron system, that Gallese and his colleagues call "embodied simulation." Underpinning the processes of empathy and identification so central to this film, embodied simulation is an unconscious and prereflexive mechanism through which the actions, emotions, and sensations we observe activate internal representations of the bodily and mental states of the other. Embodied simulation also expands our understanding of the power of the primal scene, which has long been identified as a major organizer of unconscious fantasies and conflicts throughout life, and which forms the central metaphor of the film. Embodied simulation scaffolds our aesthetic response to art, music, and literature, underlies the dynamics of spectatorship, and potentially catalyzes resistance to totalitarian mass movements.

Differential involvement of the posterior temporal cortex in mentalizing but not perspective taking

Understanding and predicting other people's mental states and behavior are important prerequisites for social interactions. The capacity to attribute mental states such as desires, thoughts or intentions to oneself or others is referred to as mentalizing. The right posterior temporal cortex at the temporal-parietal junction has been associated with mentalizing but also with taking someone else's spatial perspective onto the world--possibly an important prerequisite for mentalizing. Here, we directly compared the neural correlates of mentalizing and perspective taking using the same stimulus material. We found significantly increased neural activity in the right posterior segment of the superior temporal sulcus only during mentalizing but not perspective taking. Our data further clarify the role of the posterior temporal cortex in social cognition by showing that it is involved in processing information from socially salient visual cues in situations that require the inference about other people's mental states.

Dualism Redux in Recent Neuroscience: “Theory of Mind” and “Embodied Simulation” Hypotheses in Light of Historical Debates about Perception, Cognition, and Mind

How do we, as humans, take in the feelings and thoughts of other people? Theory-of-Mind (ToM) and Embodied Simulation (ES) approaches hypothesize divergent neural and behavioral mechanisms underlying intersubjectivity. ToM investigators assert that humans take in the belief states and intentions of another person by holding “a theory of mind” that cognitively posits the other person's mental contents, with some experiments identifying the right temporo-parietal junction as a specific ToM brain region. ES theorists hypothesize that humans perceive the other's state of mind by simulating his/her actions, emotions, and goals in the “mirror neuron system” in the brain.

A historical review suggests these understandings rely on opposing, dualist models of cognition and perception. William James's intervention on this earlier debate is informative in anticipating recent findings in low-level sensory neuroscience. Of specific interest are studies showing that intersubjectivity and low-level sensory attentional filtering are both processed in the same cortical area (the temporo-parietal junction) suggesting that the ability to entertain other minds may be related to the ability to perceive salient stimuli during attention-demanding tasks.

Spoken Language and arm Gestures are Controlled by the same Motor Control System

Arm movements can influence language comprehension much as semantics can influence arm movement planning. Arm movement itself can be used as a linguistic signal. We reviewed neurophysiological and behavioural evidence that manual gestures and vocal language share the same control system. Studies of primate premotor cortex and, in particular, of the so-called “mirror system”, including humans, suggest the existence of a dual hand/mouth motor command system involved in ingestion activities. This may be the platform on which a combined manual and vocal communication system was constructed. In humans, speech is typically accompanied by manual gesture, speech production itself is influenced by executing or observing transitive hand actions, and manual actions play an important role in the development of speech, from the babbling stage onwards. Behavioural data also show reciprocal influence between word and symbolic gestures. Neuroimaging and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) data suggest that the system governing both speech and gesture is located in Broca's area. In general, the presented data support the hypothesis that the hand motor-control system is involved in higher order cognition.

The Diverging Force of Imitation: Integrating Cognitive Science and Hermeneutics

Recent research on infant and animal imitation and on mirror neuron systems has brought imitation back in focus in psychology and cognitive science. This topic has always been important for philosophical hermeneutics as well, focusing on theory and method of understanding. Unfortunately, relations between the scientific and the hermeneutic approaches to imitation and understanding have scarcely been investigated, to the loss of both disciplines. In contrast to the cognitive scientific emphasis on sharing and convergence of representations, the hermeneutic analysis emphasizes the indeterminacy and openness of action understanding due to preunderstanding, action configuration, and the processual nature of understanding. This article discusses empirical evidence in support of these aspects and concludes that hermeneutics can contribute to the scientific investigation of imitation and understanding. Since, conversely, some grounding—and constraining—aspects of hermeneutics may be derived from cognitive science, both should be integrated in a multilevel explanation of imitation and understanding. This holds also for explanations that are largely based on mirror neuron systems, since these appear to be sensitive to developmental and experiential factors, too.

Somatic and motor components of action simulation

Seminal studies in monkeys report that the viewing of actions performed by other individuals activates frontal and parietal cortical areas typically involved in action planning and execution. That mirroring actions might rely on both motor and somatosensory components is suggested by reports that action observation and execution increase neural activity in motor and in somatosensory areas. This occurs not only during observation of naturalistic movements but also during the viewing of biomechanically impossible movements that tap the afferent component of action, possibly by eliciting strong somatic feelings in the onlooker. Although somatosensory feedback is inherently linked to action execution, information on the possible causative role of frontal and parietal cortices in simulating motor and sensory action components is lacking. By combining low-frequency repetitive and single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation, we found that virtual lesions of ventral premotor cortex (vPMc) and primary somatosensory cortex (S1) suppressed mirror motor facilitation contingent upon observation of possible and impossible movements, respectively. In contrast, virtual lesions of primary motor cortex did not influence mirror motor facilitation. The reported double dissociation suggests that vPMc and S1 play an active, differential role in simulating efferent and afferent components of observed actions.

The neural systems of tool and action semantics: a perspective from functional imaging

This review discusses the contributions of functional imaging (fMRI/PET) to our understanding of how action and tool concepts are represented and processed in the human brain. Category-selective deficits in neuropsychological patients have suggested a fine-grained functional specialization within the neural systems of semantics. However, the underlying principles of semantic organization remain controversial. The feature-based account of semantic memory (or 'sensory-motor theory') predicates category-selective effects (e.g. tool vs. animals) on anatomical segregation for different semantic features (e.g. action vs. visual). Within this framework, we will review functional imaging evidence that semantic processing of tools and actions may rely on activations within the visuo-motor system.

When the hands speak

In the present review we will summarize evidence that the control of spoken language shares the same system involved in the control of arm gestures. Studies of primate premotor cortex discovered the existence of the so-called mirror system as well as of a system of double commands to hand and mouth. These systems may have evolved initially in the context of ingestion, and later formed a platform for combined manual and vocal communication. In humans, manual gestures are integrated with speech production, when they accompany speech. Lip kinematics and parameters of voice spectra during speech production are influenced by executing or observing transitive actions (i.e. guided by an object). Manual actions also play an important role in language acquisition in children, from the babbling stage onwards. Behavioural data reported here even show a reciprocal influence between words and symbolic gestures and studies employing neuroimaging and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) techniques suggest that the system governing both speech and gesture is located in Broca's area.

Neural substrates for action understanding at different description levels in the human brain

Understanding complex movements and abstract action goals is an important skill for our social interactions. Successful social interactions entail understanding of actions at different levels of action description, ranging from detailed movement trajectories that support learning of complex motor skills through imitation to distinct features of actions that allow us to discriminate between action goals and different action styles. Previous studies have implicated premotor, parietal, and superior temporal areas in action understanding. However, the role of these different cortical areas in action understanding at different levels of action description remains largely unknown. We addressed this question using advanced animation and stimulus generation techniques in combination with sensitive functional magnetic resonance imaging adaptation or repetition suppression methods. We tested the neural sensitivity of fronto-parietal and visual areas to differences in the kinematics and goals of actions using kinematic morphs of arm movements. Our findings provide novel evidence for differential involvement of ventral premotor, parietal, and temporal regions in action understanding. We show that the ventral premotor cortex encodes the physical similarity between movement trajectories and action goals that are important for exact copying of actions and the acquisition of complex motor skills. In contrast, whereas parietal regions and the superior temporal sulcus process the perceptual similarity between movements and may support the perception and imitation of abstract action goals and movement styles. Thus, our findings propose that fronto-parietal and visual areas involved in action understanding mediate a cascade of visual-motor processes at different levels of action description from exact movement copies to abstract action goals achieved with different movement styles.

Putting motor resonance in perspective

Perceiving another person's actions changes the spatial perspective people use to describe objects in a scene, possibly because seeing human action induces people to map the actions, including their spatial context, to their own body and motor representations [Lozano, S. C., Hard, B. M., & Tversky, B. (2007). Putting action in perspective. Cognition 103, 480-490]. If so, then the effect of perceived action on perspective should be modulated by action experience. The present studies tested this prediction by showing participants a photograph and asking them to describe the location of one object relative to another. Across studies, adoption of the actor's perspective increased when participants saw actions that were more familiar or were performed with a limb (hand or foot) that observers had more experience performing actions with themselves. The present findings indicate that observers' experience performing observed actions influences their tendency to engage in self-other mapping, and consequently, their interpretations and descriptions of spatial scenes.

Naming dynamic and static actions: neuropsychological evidence

There has been considerable interest in identifying the neural correlates of action naming, but the bulk of previous work on this topic has utilized static stimuli. Recent research comparing the visual processing of dynamic versus static actions suggests that these two types of stimuli engage largely overlapping neural systems, raising the possibility that the higher-order processing requirements for naming dynamic and static actions might not be very different. To explore this issue in greater depth, we developed the Dynamic Action Naming Test (DANT), which consists of 158 video clips 3-5s in length, for each of which the participant is asked to produce the most appropriate verb. We administered the DANT to 78 brain-damaged patients drawn from our Patient Registry, and to a demographically matched group of 50 normal participants. Out of the 16 patients who performed defectively on the DANT, nearly all (15/16) had damage in the left hemisphere. Lesion analysis indicated that the frontal operculum was the most frequent area of damage in the 15 patients; also, damage to the posterolateral temporal-occipital sector (in and near MT) was specifically related to defective dynamic action naming. Most of the brain-damaged participants (n=71) also received our Static Action Naming Test (SANT), and we found that performances on verb items that were common across the DANT and SANT were highly correlated (R=.91). Moreover, patients who failed the DANT almost invariably also failed the SANT. These findings lend further support to the hypothesis that there is considerable commonality in the neural systems underlying the use of verbs to orally name dynamic and static actions, a conclusion that is in turn compatible with the concept of "representational momentum". Our results also contribute more generally to the rapidly growing field of research on embodied cognition.

Cortical circuits for silent speechreading in deaf and hearing people

This fMRI study explored the functional neural organisation of seen speech in congenitally deaf native signers and hearing non-signers. Both groups showed extensive activation in perisylvian regions for speechreading words compared to viewing the model at rest. In contrast to earlier findings, activation in left middle and posterior portions of superior temporal cortex, including regions within the lateral sulcus and the superior and middle temporal gyri, was greater for deaf than hearing participants. This activation pattern survived covarying for speechreading skill, which was better in deaf than hearing participants. Furthermore, correlational analysis showed that regions of activation related to speechreading skill varied with the hearing status of the observers. Deaf participants showed a positive correlation between speechreading skill and activation in the middle/posterior superior temporal cortex. In hearing participants, however, more posterior and inferior temporal activation (including fusiform and lingual gyri) was positively correlated with speechreading skill. Together, these findings indicate that activation in the left superior temporal regions for silent speechreading can be modulated by both hearing status and speechreading skill.

The uniquely human capacity to throw evolved from a non-throwing primate: an evolutionary dissociation between action and perception

Humans are uniquely endowed with the ability to engage in accurate, high-momentum throwing. Underlying this ability is a unique morphological adaptation that enables the characteristic rotation of the arm and pelvis. What is unknown is whether the psychological mechanisms that accompany the act of throwing are also uniquely human. Here we explore this problem by asking whether free-ranging rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), which lack both the morphological and neural structures to throw, nonetheless recognize the functional properties of throwing. Rhesus not only understand that human throwing represents a threat, but that some aspects of a throwing event are more relevant than others; specifically, rhesus are sensitive to the kinematics, direction and speed of the rotating arm, the direction of the thrower's eye gaze and the object thrown. These results suggest that the capacity to throw did not coevolve with psychological mechanisms that accompany throwing; rather, this capacity may have built upon pre-existing perceptual processes. These results are consistent with a growing body of work showing that non-human animals often exhibit perceptual competencies that do not show up in their motor responses, suggesting evolutionary dissociations between the systems of perception that provide understanding of the world and those that mediate action on the world.

Neural substrates of processing path and manner information of a moving event

Languages consistently distinguish the path and the manner of a moving event in different constituents, even if the specific constituents themselves vary across languages. Children also learn to categorize moving events according to their path and manner at different ages. Motivated by these linguistic and developmental observations, we employed fMRI to test the hypothesis that perception of and attention to path and manner of motion is segregated neurally. Moreover, we hypothesize that such segregation respects the "dorsal-where and ventral-what" organizational principle of vision. Consistent with this proposal, we found that attention to the path of a moving event was associated with greater activity within bilateral inferior/superior parietal lobules and the frontal eye-field, while attention to manner was associated with greater activity within bilateral postero-lateral inferior/middle temporal regions. Our data provide evidence that motion perception, traditionally considered as a dorsal "where" visual attribute, further segregates into dorsal path and ventral manner attributes. This neural segregation of the components of motion, which are linguistically tagged, points to a perceptual counterpart of the functional organization of concepts and language.

Modulation of motor cortex excitability by physical similarity with an observed hand action

The passive observation of hand actions is associated with increased motor cortex excitability, presumably reflecting activity within the human mirror neuron system (MNS). Recent data show that in-group ethnic membership increases motor cortex excitability during observation of culturally relevant hand gestures, suggesting that physical similarity with an observed body part may modulate MNS responses. Here, we ask whether the MNS is preferentially activated by passive observation of hand actions that are similar or dissimilar to self in terms of sex and skin color. Transcranial magnetic stimulation-induced motor evoked potentials were recorded from the first dorsal interosseus muscle while participants viewed videos depicting index finger movements made by female or male participants with black or white skin color. Forty-eight participants equally distributed in terms of sex and skin color participated in the study. Results show an interaction between self-attributes and physical attributes of the observed hand in the right motor cortex of female participants, where corticospinal excitability is increased during observation of hand actions in a different skin color than that of the observer. Our data show that specific physical properties of an observed action modulate motor cortex excitability and we hypothesize that in-group/out-group membership and self-related processes underlie these effects.

Prefrontal involvement in imitation learning of hand actions: Effects of practice and expertise

In this event-related fMRI study, we demonstrate the effects of a single session of practising configural hand actions (guitar chords) on cortical activations during observation, motor preparation and imitative execution. During the observation of non-practised actions, the mirror neuron system (MNS), consisting of inferior parietal and ventral premotor areas, was more strongly activated than for the practised actions. This finding indicates a strong role of the MNS in the early stages of imitation learning. In addition, the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was selectively involved during observation and motor preparation of the non-practised chords. This finding confirms Buccino et al.'s [Buccino, G., Vogt, S., Ritzl, A., Fink, G.R., Zilles, K., Freund, H.-J., Rizzolatti, G., 2004a. Neural circuits underlying imitation learning of hand actions: an event-related fMRI study. Neuron 42, 323-334] model of imitation learning: for actions that are not yet part of the observer's motor repertoire, DLPFC engages in operations of selection and combination of existing, elementary representations in the MNS. The pattern of prefrontal activations further supports Shallice's [Shallice, T., 2004. The fractionation of supervisory control. In: Gazzaniga, M.S. (Ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences, Third edition. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 943-956] proposal of a dominant role of the left DLPFC in modulating lower level systems and of a dominant role of the right DLPFC in monitoring operations.

Before and below 'theory of mind': embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition

The automatic translation of folk psychology into newly formed brain modules specifically dedicated to mind-reading and other social cognitive abilities should be carefully scrutinized. Searching for the brain location of intentions, beliefs and desires-as such-might not be the best epistemic strategy to disclose what social cognition really is. The results of neurocognitive research suggest that in the brain of primates, mirror neurons, and more generally the premotor system, play a major role in several aspects of social cognition, from action and intention understanding to language processing. This evidence is presented and discussed within the theoretical frame of an embodied simulation account of social cognition. Embodied simulation and the mirror neuron system underpinning it provide the means to share communicative intentions, meaning and reference, thus granting the parity requirements of social communication.

The Functional Neuroanatomy of Thematic Role and Locative Relational Knowledge

Lexical-semantic investigations in cognitive neuroscience have focused on conceptual knowledge of concrete objects. By contrast, relational concepts have been largely ignored. We examined thematic role and locative knowledge in 14 left-hemisphere-damage patients. Relational concepts shift cognitive focus away from the object to the relationship between objects, calling into question the relevance of traditional sensory-functional accounts of semantics. If extraction of a relational structure is the critical cognitive process common to both thematic and locative knowledge, then damage to neural structures involved in such an extraction would impair both kinds of knowledge. If the nature of the relationship itself is critical, then functional neuroanatomical dissociations should occur. Using a new lesion analysis method, we found that damage to the lateral temporal cortex produced deficits in thematic role knowledge and damage to inferior fronto-parietal regions produced deficits in locative knowledge. In addition, we found that conceptual knowledge of thematic roles dissociates from its mapping onto language. These relational knowledge deficits were not accounted for by deficits in processing nouns or verbs or by a general deficit in making inferences. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that manners of visual motion serve as a point of entry for thematic role knowledge and networks dedicated to eye gaze, whereas reaching and grasping serve as a point of entry for locative knowledge. Intermediary convergence zones that are topographically guided by these sensory-motor points of entry play a critical role in the semantics of relational concepts.

Verbal and gestural communication in children with bilateral perisylvian polymicrogyria

We assessed intelligence and receptive and expressive language skills in 6 children, ages 7 years 9 months to 12 years 4 months, with bilateral perisylvian polymicrogyria of variable extent and with dysarthria of different severity. In view of the recent findings of a close relationship between word and gesture, we also examined the communicative use of gesture. We found that mental retardation was related to the extent of cortical malformation; lexical comprehension, but not morphosyntactic comprehension, and verbal production were more compromised than expected from nonverbal intellectual abilities; lack of verbal language was not compensated by the use of referential gestures. Results are discussed suggesting that compromised verbal and gestural communication in bilateral perisylvian polymicrogyria are not due simply to mental retardation and/or dysarthria but also to dysfunction of Sylvian fissure areas concerned with the totality of language processing.

The mirror neuron system: grasping others? actions from birth?

In the adult human brain, the presence of a system matching the observation and the execution of actions is well established. This mechanism is thought to rely primarily on the contribution of so-called 'mirror neurons', cells that are active when a specific gesture is executed as well as when it is seen or heard. Despite the wealth of evidence detailing the existence of a mirror neuron system (MNS) in the adult brain, little is known about its normal development. Yet, a better understanding of the MNS in infants would be of considerable theoretical and clinical interest, as dysfunctions within the MNS have been demonstrated in neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism spectrum disorder. Arguments in favor of an innate, or very early, mechanism underlying action understanding mainly come from studies of neonatal imitation, the existence of which has been questioned by some. Here, we review evidence suggesting the presence of an MNS in the human child, as well as work that suggests, although indirectly, the existence of a mechanism matching the perception and the execution of actions in the human newborn.

Processing the socially relevant parts of faces

Faces are processed by a distributed neural system in the visual as well as in the non-visual cortex [the "core" and the "extended" systems, J.V. Haxby, E.A. Hoffman, M.I. Gobbini, The distributed human neural system for face perception, Trends Cogn. Sci. 4 (2000) 223-233]. Yet, the functions of the different brain regions included in the face processing system are far from clear. On the basis of the case study of a patient unable to recognize fearful faces, Adolphs et al. [R. Adolphs, F. Gosselin, T.W. Buchanan, D. Tranel, P. Schyns, A.R. Damasio, A mechanism for impaired fear recognition after amygdala damage, Nature 433 (2005) 68-72] suggested that the amygdala might play a role in orienting attention towards the eyes, i.e. towards the region of face conveying most information about fear. In a functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) study comparing patterns of activation during observation of whole faces and parts of faces displaying neutral expressions, we evaluated the neural systems for face processing when only partial information is provided, as well as those involved in processing two socially relevant facial areas (the eyes and the mouth). Twenty-four subjects were asked to perform a gender decision task on pictures showing whole faces, upper faces (eyes and eyebrows), and lower faces (mouth). Our results showed that the amygdala was activated more in response to the whole faces than to parts of faces, indicating that the amygdala is involved in orienting attention toward eye and mouth. Processing of parts of faces in isolation was found to activate other regions within both the "core" and the "extended" systems, as well as structures outside this network, thus suggesting that these structures are involved in building up the representation of the whole face from its parts.