Situational Cues in Thoughts About the Future

Abstract: Based on stimulus–response learning accounts, we argue that including situational cues in thought about intended actions is an important aspect of self-regulation success in general and in successfully implementing delayed intentions. Accordingly, in Study 1 ( N = 328), we replicate a previous study and show a positive relationship between the self-reported inclusion of situational cues in thoughts about intended actions and beliefs of self-regulation success. In Study 2 ( N = 136), we find a similar tendency when measuring self-regulation success with an assigned task to be completed within one week. Our results fit with if-then planning perspectives on how to facilitate novel behavior and recent perspectives that attribute self-regulation success to beneficial habits.

Self-regulation of time: The importance of time estimation accuracy

Time management is one central aspect of students' self-regulated learning. In addition, biased time estimation seems to be central to students' self-regulation of their time. In this study, we explored college students' time estimation bias. In addition, we were interested in whether the activation of task beliefs influenced students' time estimation bias and how specific beliefs about task difficulty influence time estimation bias. Findings suggested that students tended to demonstrate bias in their estimations of the time their academic tasks would take. Additionally, the activation of task beliefs did not influence students' time estimation accuracy. Finally, both prior task difficulty and anticipated difficulty influenced students' time estimation bias. These findings highlight the complexity of students' time estimation bias and point to the opportunities for future directions.

How Does the Accuracy of Children’s Number Representations Influence the Accuracy of Their Numerical Predictions?

Predictions begin with an extrapolation of the properties of their underlying representations to forecast a future state not presently in evidence. For numerical predictions, sets of numbers are summarized and the result forms the basis of and constrains numerical predictions. One open question is how the accuracy of underlying representations influences predictions, particularly numerical predictions. It is possible that inaccuracies in individual number representations are randomly distributed and averaged over during summarization (e.g., wisdom of crowds). It is also possible that inaccuracies are not random and lead to errors in predictions. We investigated this question by measuring the accuracy of individual number representations of 279 children ages 8–12 years, using a 0–1,000 number line, and numerical predictions, measured using a home run derby task. Consistent with prior research, our results from mixed random effects models evaluating percent absolute error (PAE; prediction error) demonstrated that third graders’ representations of individual numbers were less accurate, characterized by overestimation errors, and were associated with overpredictions (i.e., predictions above the set mean). Older children had more accurate individual number representations and a slight tendency to underpredict (i.e., predictions below the set mean). The results suggest that large, systematic inaccuracies appear to skew predictions while small, random errors appear to be averaged over during summarization. These findings add to our understanding of summarization and its role in numerical predictions.

The Effects of Mindset on Behavior: Self-Regulation in Deliberative and Implemental Frames of Mind

The effects of deliberative and implemental mindsets—cognitive and motivational states associated with predecisional and postdecisional frames of mind, respectively—were examined in the context of the self-regulation of behavior. Participants who had been induced to deliberate the merits of participating in a specified task formulated more pessimistic expectations about this task than did participants who had been induced to imagine implementing a plan to complete the task. Moreover, participants in the deliberation condition underperformed relative to the participants in the implemental condition, demonstrating that deliberative and implemental thinking can influence behavior as well as cognition.

Implementation Intentions, Perfectionism, and Goal Progress: Perhaps the Road to Hell Is Paved With Good Intentions

Two studies explored whether perfectionism moderates the impact of implementation intentions on goal progress. Study 1 used an implementation intention manipulation to examine the effects of these plans in interaction with perfectionism on the progress of New Year’s resolutions. Study 2 added a repeated implementation intention condition and monitored affect and monthly goal progress. The results of both studies revealed a significant backfire effect of the implementation intentions on goal progress for participants high on a particular dimension of perfectionism (socially prescribed perfectionism). These perfectionists reported doing significantly worse at reaching their personal goals when they were asked to formulate implementation intentions than when they completed a control exercise. There also was evidence that implementation planning aroused negative affect for socially prescribed perfectionists. These results are the first to suggest that implementation planning may be contra-indicated for individuals with self-critical tendencies.

Taking Stock of Unrealistic Optimism

Researchers have used terms such as unrealistic optimism and optimistic bias to refer to concepts that are similar but not synonymous. Drawing from three decades of research, we critically discuss how researchers define unrealistic optimism and we identify four types that reflect different measurement approaches: unrealistic absolute optimism at the individual and group level and unrealistic comparative optimism at the individual and group level. In addition, we discuss methodological criticisms leveled against research on unrealistic optimism and note that the criticisms are primarily relevant to only one type-the group form of unrealistic comparative optimism. We further clarify how the criticisms are not nearly as problematic even for unrealistic comparative optimism as they might seem. Finally, we note boundary conditions on the different types of unrealistic optimism and reflect on five broad questions that deserve further attention.

The Role of Deliberative Versus Implemental Mindsets in Time Prediction and Task Accomplishment

The Model of Action Phases ( Gollwitzer, 1990 , 2012 ) distinguishes an implemental mindset evoked by planning goal-directed actions, from a deliberative mindset evoked by pondering pros/cons of adopting a particular goal. The present research demonstrates that mindsets affect time predictions. In Study 1 (N = 151), participants in an implemental mindset made shorter time predictions with respect to completing personal goals than participants in a deliberative mindset. In Study 2 (N = 78), we tested a mediating mechanism for the mindset effect by varying the motivation to return a report. The mindset effect was replicated in the low- but not in the high-motivation condition with participants in an implemental mindset returning the report earlier, and being as accurate in their predictions as participants in a deliberative mindset. Results indicate that an implemental (vs. deliberative) mindset increases motivation and therefore leads to shorter, but equally biased time predictions.

How to Beat Procrastination

Procrastination, defined as the subjectively aversive inability to initiate or complete the pursuit of a given goal, is a common phenomenon in academic contexts. This theoretical paper presents a dynamic model that centers on the role of goal focus in influencing procrastination during goal pursuit. Our central hypothesis is that focusing on the means of goal pursuit (i.e., adopting a process focus) reduces procrastination, particularly when fear of failure is high. Focusing on the means should decrease the salience of performance outcomes and thereby reduce fear of failure. This, in turn, should facilitate the initiation and maintenance of goal pursuit. In contrast, when means are perceived as unpleasant (high task aversiveness), focusing more on the outcome of goal pursuit (i.e., adopting an outcome focus) should reduce procrastination by directing attention away from the means while highlighting the importance of goal achievement. Furthermore, the model takes account of dynamic contextual factors, particularly the distance to a given deadline.

Predictors and Consequences of Daily Goal Adaptation

Efficient self-regulation has been argued to consist of more than just setting goals and tenaciously pursuing them – it also requires that people adapt their goals to changing circumstances. Although previous studies have already focused on interindividual differences in goal disengagement (one aspect of goal adaptation), so far, no study has looked at predictors and consequences of daily work goal adaptation. As predicted, daily goal adaptation was related to the amount of unplanned tasks and the extent to which the time needed for tasks was underestimated. However, unlike previous research on goal disengagement, daily goal adaptation had a negative (and not a positive) effect on well-being and subjective productivity. It is suggested that the emotional aspect of goal adaptation/goal disengagement needs more research attention.

Bias in memory predicts bias in estimation of future task duration

Both anecdotal accounts and experimental evidence suggest that people underestimate how long it will take them to complete future tasks. A possible reason for this tendency is that people remember tasks as taking less time than they actually did, with these biased memories causing a corresponding bias in prediction. Two experiments were performed to determine whether or not a systematic bias in memory could explain a similar systematic bias in prediction. In support, it was found that (1) the tendency to underestimate future duration disappears when the task is novel, (2) there is similar bias in estimation of both past and future durations, and (3) variables that affect memory of duration, such as level of experience with the task and duration of delay before estimation, affect prediction of duration in the same way. It appears that, at least in part, people underestimate future event duration because they underestimate past event duration.

Mindfulness-based parent training: strategies to lessen the grip of automaticity in families with disruptive children

Disagreements and conflicts in families with disruptive children often reflect rigid patterns of behavior that have become overlearned and automatized with repeated practice. These patterns are mindless: They are performed with little or no awareness and are highly resistant to change. This article introduces a new, mindfulness-based model of parent training and contrasts the model's assumptions with those of behavioral (operant) parent training. The new model informs 3 strategies to lessen the grip of automaticity in families with disruptive children: facilitative listening, distancing, and motivated action plans. The article does not oppose mindfulness to mindlessness or suggest that the former is always better than the latter but instead proposes that each is most useful at different times in the parenting process. I conclude by calling for empirical investigations of mindfulness-based parent training and, if those are successful, for the development of an integrated model that blends behavioral and mindfulness-based principles to inform all facets of intervention.

Underestimating the Duration of Future Events: Memory Incorrectly Used or Memory Bias?

People frequently underestimate how long it will take them to complete a task. The prevailing view is that during the prediction process, people incorrectly use their memories of how long similar tasks have taken in the past because they take an overly optimistic outlook. A variety of evidence is reviewed in this article that points to a different, although not mutually exclusive, explanation: People base predictions of future duration on their memories of how long past events have taken, but these memories are systematic underestimates of past duration. People appear to underestimate future event duration because they underestimate past event duration.

What's in a name: implicit self-esteem and the automatic self

This article explores the links between implicit self-esteem and the automatic self (D. L. Paulhus, 1993). Across 4 studies, name letter evaluations were positively biased, confirming that implicit self-esteem is generally positive (A. G. Greenwald & M. R. Banaji, 1995). Study 1 found that this name letter bias was stable over a 4-week period. Study 2 found that positive bias for name letters and positive bias for birth date numbers were correlated and that both biases became inhibited when participants were induced to respond in a deliberative manner. Studies 3-4 found that implicit self-evaluations corresponded with self-reported self-evaluations, but only when participants were evaluating themselves very quickly (Study 3) or under cognitive load (Study 4). Together, these findings support the notion that implicit self-esteem phenomena are driven by self-evaluations that are activated automatically and without conscious self-reflection.