Maybe a free thinker but not a critical one: High conspiracy belief is associated with low critical thinking ability

No evidence that belief in conspiracy theories is negatively related to attitudes toward transhumanism

Transhumanism is a movement that emphasizes the improvement of the human condition by developing technologies and making them widely available. Conspiracy theories regularly refer to the allegedly transhumanist agenda of elites. We hypothesized that belief in conspiracy theories would be related to more unfavorable attitudes toward the transhumanist movement. We examined this association through two pre-registered studies (based on two French samples, total N after exclusion = 550). We found no evidence of a negative relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and attitudes toward transhumanism. This null result was further corroborated by Bayesian analysis, an equivalence test, and an internal mini meta-analysis. This work plays a precursory role in understanding attitudes toward an international cultural and intellectual movement that continues to grow in popularity and influence.

Critical Thinking, Intelligence, and Unsubstantiated Beliefs: An Integrative Review

A review of the research shows that critical thinking is a more inclusive construct than intelligence, going beyond what general cognitive ability can account for. For instance, critical thinking can more completely account for many everyday outcomes, such as how thinkers reject false conspiracy theories, paranormal and pseudoscientific claims, psychological misconceptions, and other unsubstantiated claims. Deficiencies in the components of critical thinking (in specific reasoning skills, dispositions, and relevant knowledge) contribute to unsubstantiated belief endorsement in ways that go beyond what standardized intelligence tests test. Specifically, people who endorse unsubstantiated claims less tend to show better critical thinking skills, possess more relevant knowledge, and are more disposed to think critically. They tend to be more scientifically skeptical and possess a more rational-analytic cognitive style, while those who accept unsubstantiated claims more tend to be more cynical and adopt a more intuitive-experiential cognitive style. These findings suggest that for a fuller understanding of unsubstantiated beliefs, researchers and instructors should also assess specific reasoning skills, relevant knowledge, and dispositions which go beyond what intelligence tests test.

Dunning-Kruger effect and flat-earthers: An exploratory analysis

This article aims to analyze the factors influencing belief in a flat Earth. We focus on Spain, a country that sadly has some of the most relevant figures on this topic in the Spanish-speaking world. After a qualitative analysis of YouTube videos on the main channels on the subject, a survey was carried out on 1252 individuals. The results point to two conclusions. First is the presence of a considerable Dunning-Kruger effect among flat-earthers. There is a significant negative correlation between science literacy-overall and practically all its dimensions-and overconfidence in science in this group. The second, evaluated through a regression tree, confirms that the interaction of low scientific literacy and overconfidence is highly relevant in explaining the belief in a flat earth. Neither factor alone is determinant, but the combination of the two (low scientific literacy and high overconfidence) leads to high levels of flat earth belief.

Conspiracy believers claim to be free thinkers but (Under)Use advice like everyone else

Conspiracy believers often claim to be critical thinkers their 'own research' instead of relying on others' testimony. In two preregistered behavioural studies conducted in the United Kingdom and Pakistan (Nparticipants  = 864, Ntrials  = 5408), we test whether conspiracy believers have a general tendency to discount social information (in favour of their own opinions and intuitions). We found that conspiracy mentality is not associated with social information use in text-based (Study 1) and image-based (Study 2) advice-taking tasks. Yet, we found discrepancies between self-reported and actual social information use. Conspiracy believers were more likely to report relying less on social information than actually relying less on social information in the behavioural tasks. Our results suggest that the scepticism of conspiracy believers towards epistemic authorities is unlikely to be the manifestation of a general tendency to discount social information. Conspiracy believers may be more permeable to social influence than they sometimes claim.

Narcissistic susceptibility to conspiracy beliefs exaggerated by education, reduced by cognitive reflection

Conspiracy theories are alternate viewpoints of provided explanations; sensational stories revolving around small groups exerting control for nefarious reasons. Recent events and research have outlined myriad negative social and personal outcomes for those who endorse them. Prior research suggests several predictors of susceptibility to conspiracy theories, including narcissistic personality traits (grandiosity, need for uniqueness), cognitive processes (critical thinking, confirmation bias) and lack of education. The aim of the current paper was to explore how facets of narcissism predict susceptibility to conspiracy theories. It was expected that narcissism would be a positive predictor, but education and cognitive reflection would act as protective factors, reducing this effect. Study one utilized an international survey (N = 323) to investigate the role of education as a protective tool in the relationship between narcissistic traits and conspiratorial beliefs. Support was found for the hypotheses that individuals with higher levels of grandiosity, vulnerable narcissism, a strive for uniqueness, and a strive for supremacy predicted higher levels of conspiracy endorsement. Higher education and STEM education were associated with lower levels of conspiracy endorsement, however all significant moderations indicated that for narcissistic individuals, education increased their likelihood of adopting conspiracy beliefs, contrary to expectation. To investigate this further, study two analyzed a large-scale publicly available dataset (N = 51,404) to assess the relationship between narcissism, critical thinking skills (specifically cognitive reflection) and conspiracy beliefs pertaining to the COVID-19 pandemic. As expected, analysis found narcissism and poor cognitive reflection (intuitive thinking) as predictors of conspiracy beliefs. Higher levels of cognitive reflection were found to be protective, moderating and reducing the impact of narcissism on endorsement of conspiracy theories. The findings suggest that cognitive reflection, but not education protect against narcissistic conspiracy belief. Moreover, that cognitive reflection may have a lessened effect against conspiracy theories adopted for social or ideological reasons. These findings improve understanding of both the role and limitations of education/critical thinking skills as protective factors against conspiracy theory endorsement.

Distractions, analytical thinking and falling for fake news: A survey of psychological factors

Analytical thinking safeguards us against believing or spreading fake news. In various forms, this common assumption has been reported, investigated, or implemented in fake news education programs. Some have associated this assumption with the inverse claim, that distractions from analytical thinking may render us vulnerable to believing or spreading fake news. This paper surveys the research done between 2016 and 2022 on psychological factors influencing one's susceptibility to believing or spreading fake news, considers which of the psychological factors are plausible distractors to one's exercise of analytical thinking, and discusses some implications of considering them as distractors to analytical thinking. From these, the paper draws five conclusions: (1) It is not analytical thinking per se, but analytical thinking directed to evaluating the truth that safeguards us from believing or spreading fake news. (2) While psychological factors can distract us from exercising analytical thinking and they can also distract us in exercising analytical thinking. (3) Whether a psychological factor functions as a distractor from analytical thinking or in analytical thinking may depend on contextual factors. (4) Measurements of analytical thinking may not indicate vulnerability to believing or spreading fake news. (5) The relevance of motivated reasoning to our tendency to believe fake news should not yet be dismissed. These findings may be useful to guide future research in the intersection of analytical thinking and susceptibility to believing or spreading fake news.

Contemporary trends in psychological research on conspiracy beliefs. A systematic review

Background

The number of psychological studies on conspiracy beliefs has been systematically growing for about a dozen years, but in recent years, the trend has intensified. We provided a review covering the psychological literature on conspiracy beliefs from 2018 to 2021. Halfway through this period, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, accompanied by an explosion of movements based on conspiracy theories, intensifying researchers' interest in this issue.

Methods

Adhering to PRISMA guidelines, the review systematically searched for relevant journal articles published between 2018 and 2021. A search was done on Scopus and Web of Science (only peer-reviewed journals). A study was included if it contained primary empirical data, if specific or general conspiracy belief(s) were measured and if its correlation with at least one other psychological variable was reported. All the studies were grouped for the descriptive analysis according to the methodology used, the participants' characteristics, the continent of origin, the sample size, and the conspiracy beliefs measurement tools. Due to substantial methodological heterogeneity of the studies, narrative synthesis was performed. The five researchers were assigned specific roles at each stage of the analysis to ensure the highest quality of the research.

Results

Following the proposed methodology, 308 full-text articles were assessed for eligibility and 274 articles (417 studies) meeting the inclusion criteria were identified and included in the review. Almost half of the studies (49.6%) were conducted in European countries. The vast majority of the studies (85.7%) were carried out on samples of adult respondents. The research presents antecedents as well as (potential) consequences of conspiracy beliefs. We grouped the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs into six categories: cognitive (e.g., thinking style) motivational (e.g., uncertainty avoidance), personality (e.g., collective narcissism), psychopathology (e.g., Dark Triad traits), political (e.g., ideological orientation), and sociocultural factors (e.g., collectivism).

Conclusion and limitations

The research presents evidence on the links between conspiracy beliefs and a range of attitudes and behaviors considered unfavorable from the point of view of individuals and of the society at large. It turned out that different constructs of conspiracy thinking interact with each other. The limitations of the study are discussed in the last part of the article.

Do conspiracy theorists think too much or too little?

Conspiracy theories explain distressing events as malevolent actions by powerful groups. Why do people believe in secret plots when other explanations are more probable? On the one hand, conspiracy theorists seem to disregard accuracy; they tend to endorse mutually incompatible conspiracies, think intuitively, use heuristics, and hold other irrational beliefs. But by definition, conspiracy theorists reject the mainstream explanation for an event, often in favor of a more complex account. They exhibit a general distrust of others and expend considerable effort to find 'evidence' supporting their beliefs. In searching for answers, conspiracy theorists likely expose themselves to misleading information online and overestimate their own knowledge. Understanding when elaboration and cognitive effort might backfire is crucial, as conspiracy beliefs lead to political disengagement, environmental inaction, prejudice, and support for violence.

Comparing beliefs in falsehoods based on satiric and non-satiric news

This article seeks to quantify the extent to which Americans hold beliefs that are consistent with interpreting satiric news literally, and to assess whether factors known to promote misperceptions work differently depending on whether the source of the misperception is satire. We also test the robustness of those factors across a diverse set of real-world falsehoods. The study uses secondary data analysis, relying on data drawn from a 12-wave six-month panel conducted in 2019. Analyses focus on participants' beliefs about 120 falsehoods derived from high-profile political content in circulation before each survey wave, including 48 based on satiric news. A non-trivial number of participants believed claims originating in satire, but it is less than the proportion who believed falsehoods derived from other misleading content. Results also confirm the robustness of established predictors of misperceptions while demonstrating that the associations differ in magnitude between satiric and non-satiric news.

Individual, intergroup and nation-level influences on belief in conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories are part of mainstream public life, with the potential to undermine governments, promote racism, ignite extremism and threaten public health efforts. Psychological research on conspiracy theories is booming, with more than half of the academic articles on the topic published since 2019. In this Review, we synthesize the literature with an eye to understanding the psychological factors that shape willingness to believe conspiracy theories. We begin at the individual level, examining the cognitive, clinical, motivational, personality and developmental factors that predispose people to believe conspiracy theories. Drawing on insights from social and evolutionary psychology, we then review research examining conspiracy theories as an intergroup phenomenon that reflects and reinforces societal fault lines. Finally, we examine how conspiracy theories are shaped by the economic, political, cultural and socio-historical contexts at the national level. This multilevel approach offers a deep and broad insight into conspiracist thinking that increases understanding of the problem and offers potential solutions.

Defining and explaining conspiracy theories: Comparing the lay representations of conspiracy believers and non-believers

Despite a growing literature on the topic, little is known about how individuals perceive the label “conspiracy theory”. In two studies, we compare social representations of conspiracy theories, and how these are influenced by individuals’ own conspiracy beliefs. In addition, we examine how these representations relate to how scholars define and explain conspiracy theories. In Study 1, we used lexicometric analysis to explore the vocabulary that French participants (n = 939) spontaneously associated with the notion of ‘conspiracy theory’ and the personal definitions they provided. The representation of participants scoring high on the generic conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the content of conspiracy theories (e.g., “lies” or “government”). By contrast, the representation of participants scoring low on the conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the believer (e.g., “paranoia” or “cognitive biases”). They proposed definitions of conspiracy theories centred on the function(s) conspiracy theories supposedly fulfil for the believer (e.g., simplify complex realities). To make sure that these results did not merely express participants’ endorsement or rejection of conspiracy theories, we carried out a second study. In Study 2 (n = 272), we found that the more participants endorsed generic conspiracist beliefs, the less they mobilised intra-individual causes (e.g., reasoning biases) to explain why some people believe in conspiracy theories that they did not endorse themselves. This research shows that people’s representations of conspiracy theories differ depending on their conspiracy beliefs.

“I Did My Own Research”: Overconfidence, (Dis)trust in Science, and Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories

Epistemically suspect beliefs, such as endorsement of conspiracy theories or pseudoscientific claims, are widespread even among highly educated individuals. The phenomenon of conspiratorial thinking is not new, yet the COVID-19 pandemic, causing a global health crisis of an unprecedented scale, facilitated the emergence and rapid spread of some rather radical health-related pseudoscientific fallacies. Numerous correlates of the tendency to endorse conspiracy theories have already been addressed. However, many of them are not subject to an intervention. In this study, we have tested a model that includes predictors ranging from stable characteristics such as demographics (gender, age, education, and size of the place of residence), less stable general traits such as conservatism and overconfidence in one’s own reasoning abilities, to relatively changeable worldviews such as trust in science. A hierarchical regression analysis (N = 859 participants) showed that included predictors explained a total of 46% of the variance of believing in COVID-19 conspiracy theories, with only gender, overconfidence, and trust in science yielding significance. Trust in science was the strongest predictor, implying that campaigns aimed at enhancing public trust in both science as a process, and scientists as individuals conducting it, might contribute to the reduction in susceptibility to pseudoscientific claims. Furthermore, overconfidence in one’s own reasoning abilities was negatively correlated with an objective measure of reasoning (syllogisms test) and positively correlated with the endorsement of conspiracy theories, indicating that the so-called Dunning-Kruger effect plays a role in pseudoscientific conspiratorial thinking regarding COVID-19.

Reflective thinking predicts lower conspiracy beliefs: A meta-analysis

One of the many established predictors of conspiracy beliefs is reflective thinking, but no meta-analysis so far has examined this relationship. In the current meta-analysis of published and unpublished correlational data (145 samples, 181 effect sizes), we found a significant negative association between reflective thinking and conspiracy beliefs with a medium-level effect size (r = –.189) . Similar levels of correlations were found across different types of measures (self-report vs. performance-based) and conspiracy beliefs (generic vs. specific). Further, no evidence suggested publication bias in this body of work. Suggestions for future research are discussed.

Who Believes in Conspiracy Theories about the COVID-19 Pandemic in Romania? An Analysis of Conspiracy Theories Believers’ Profiles

The current COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by the circulation of an unprecedented amount of “polluted” information, especially in the social media environment, among which are false narratives and conspiracy theories about both the pandemic and vaccination against COVID-19. The effects of such questionable information primarily concern the lack of compliance with restrictive measures and a negative attitude towards vaccination campaigns, as well as more complex social effects, such as street protests or distrust in governments and authorities in general. Even though there is a lot of scholarly attention given to these narratives in many countries, research about the profile of people who are more prone to believe or spread them is rather scarce. In this context, we investigate the role of age, compared with other socio-demographic factors (such as education and religiosity), as well as the role of the media (the frequency of news consumption, the perceived usefulness of social media, and the perceived incidence of fake information about the virus in the media) and the critical thinking disposition of people who tend to believe such misleading narratives. To address these issues, we conducted a national survey (N = 945) in April 2021 in Romania. Using a hierarchical OLS regression model, we found that people who perceive higher incidence of fake news (ß = 0.33, p < 0.001), find social media platforms more useful (ß = 0.13, p < 0.001), have lower education (ß = −0.17, p < 0.001), and have higher levels of religiosity (ß = 0.08, p < 0.05) are more prone to believe COVID-19-related misleading narratives. At the same time, the frequency of news consumption (regardless of the type of media), critical thinking disposition, and age do not play a significant role in the profile of the believer in conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 pandemic. Somewhat surprisingly, age does not play a role in predicting belief in conspiracy theories, even though there are studies that suggest that older people are more prone to believe conspiracy narratives. As far as media is concerned, the frequency of news media consumption does not significantly differ for believers and non-believers. We discuss these results within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Conspiratorial Beliefs and Cognitive Styles: An Integrated Look on Analytic Thinking, Critical Thinking, and Scientific Reasoning in Relation to (Dis)trust in Conspiracy Theories

The tendency to believe in conspiracy theories (implying secret and malevolent plots by scheming groups or individuals), incites growing decennial interest among psychological researchers (exploring the associated personality traits, worldviews and cognitive styles of people). The link between the conspiratorial beliefs and the cognitive styles remains of particular interest to scholars, requiring integrated theoretical considerations. This perspective article will focus on the relationship between the propensity to (dis)trust conspiracy theories and three cognitive styles: analytic thinking, critical thinking, and scientific reasoning. Analytic thinking (inclination toward slow and deliberate processing of information in a conscious effort to mitigate biases and reach objective understanding of facts), is a well-studied concept in the context of conspiratorial beliefs, while the negative mutual relationship seems well-evidenced. On the other hand, the evidence on the link with the critical thinking (readiness to consider, reason, appraise, review, and interpret facts to update existing beliefs) has only started to emerge in the last years. Finally, scientific reasoning (ability to apply principles of scientific inquiry to formulate, test, revise and update knowledge in accordance with new evidence), is the least studied of the three cognitive styles in relation to conspiracy theories. The present article will: (a) revise the (lack of) scientific consensus on the definitional and conceptual aspects (by providing theoretical framework); (b) summarize the state of the art on the subject (by providing overview of empirical evidence); (c) discuss directions for future research (especially in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic). An integrated perspective on the relationship between conspiratorial beliefs and cognitive styles of people, may serve to inspire future behavioral interventions.

Stakes of Knowing the Truth: A Motivational Perspective on the Popularity of a Controversial Scientific Theory

The aim of this article is to provide a different perspective on people's beliefs regarding controversial scientific information. We emphasize that, although people generally aim at getting a fair representation of reality, accuracy about scientific issues only matters to the extent that individuals perceive it as useful to achieve their own goals. This has important consequences in terms of how anti-science attitudes as well as epistemically questionable beliefs must be interpreted, which has consequences for addressing misinformation. We argue that most people who endorse scientific misinformation are not truly interested in its accuracy, and rather that plausibility at face value often suffices when it is meant to be used for social purposes only. We illustrate this view with the example of hydroxychloroquine, which was considered as potential treatment for Covid-19, and which has been the subject of much media hype and public concern, particularly in France.