Confidence and decision type under matched stimulus conditions: overconfidence in perceptual but not conceptual decisions

Hands of confidence: When gestures increase confidence in spatial problem-solving

This study examined whether the metacognitive system monitors the potential positive effects of gestures on spatial thinking. Participants (N = 59, 31F, Mage = 21.67) performed a mental rotation task, consisting of 24 problems varying in difficulty, and they evaluated their confidence in their answers to problems in either gesture or control conditions. The results revealed that performance and confidence were higher in the gesture condition, in which the participants were asked to use their gestures during problem-solving, compared with the control condition, extending the literature by evidencing gestures' role in metacognition. Yet, the effect was only evident for females, who already performed worse than males, and when the problems were difficult. Encouraging gestures adversely affected performance and confidence in males. Such results suggest that gestures selectively influence cognition and metacognition and highlight the importance of task-related (i.e., difficulty) and individual-related variables (i.e., sex) in elucidating the links between gestures, confidence, and spatial thinking.

How drug cravings affect metacognitive monitoring in methamphetamine abusers

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE

Metacognitive monitoring refers to the process in which an individual analyzes their own mental state, then monitors and adjusts cognitive activities to achieve a predetermined goal. Recent research has suggested a strong link between metacognition and drug cravings. Conversely, few studies on the impact of metacognitive monitoring on methamphetamine (MA) cravings exist. Thus, this study investigated whether drug cravings would impair MA abusers' metacognitive monitoring and explored the prediction effects of drug cravings.

METHOD

Seventy MA abusers from the Zhejiang Compulsory Isolation Drug Rehabilitation Center and 65 non-users from the Wenzhou Medical University were recruited for this experimental study. The judgment of learning (JOL) paradigm was used to examine metacognitive monitoring, and cue-induced pictures were used to induce MA abusers' drug cravings. Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), partial correlation, and regression analysis were performed.

RESULTS

Compared with non-users, MA abusers had significantly poorer metacognitive monitoring and tended to overestimate their performance. Furthermore, there was a significant correlation between the accuracy of JOLs and drug cravings, which indicated that metacognitive monitoring was weakened by drug cravings with higher cravings imposing more severe impacts. In addition, the regression analysis suggested that drug cravings can predict metacognitive monitoring.

Persuasive Features of Scientific Explanations: Explanatory Schemata of Physical and Psychosocial Phenomena

Explanations are central to understanding the causal relationships between entities within the environment. Instead of examining basic heuristics and schemata that inform the acceptance or rejection of scientific explanations, recent studies have predominantly examined complex explanatory models. In the present study, we examined which essential features of explanatory schemata can account for phenomena that are attributed to domain-specific knowledge. In two experiments, participants judged the validity of logical syllogisms and reported confidence in their response. In addition to validity of the explanations, we manipulated whether scientists or people explained an animate or inanimate phenomenon using mechanistic (e.g., force, cause) or intentional explanatory terms (e.g., believes, wants). Results indicate that intentional explanations were generally considered to be less valid than mechanistic explanations and that 'scientists' were relatively more reliable sources of information of inanimate phenomena whereas 'people' were relatively more reliable sources of information of animate phenomena. Moreover, after controlling for participants' performance, we found that they expressed greater overconfidence for valid intentional and invalid mechanistic explanations suggesting that the effect of belief-bias is greater in these conditions.

Subjective awareness of ultrasound expertise development: individual experience as a determinant of overconfidence

Medical decision-making requires years of experience in order to develop an adequate level of competence to successfully engage in safe practice. While diagnostic and technical skills are essential, an awareness of the extent and limits of our own knowledge and skills is critical. The present study examines clinicians' subjective awareness in a diagnostic cardiac ultrasound task. Clinicians answered diagnostic and treatment related questions for a range of pathologies. Following these questions, clinicians indicated their level of confidence in their response. A comparison of response accuracy and confidence revealed that clinicians were generally overconfident in their responses. Critically, we observed that a clinician's overconfidence was negatively correlated with prior experience: clinicians that had more prior experience expressed less overconfidence in their performance such that some clinicians were in fact underconfident. We discuss the implications for training in medical education and decision-making.

The Illusion of Knowing in Metacognitive Monitoring: Effects of the Type of Information and of Personal, Cognitive, Metacognitive, and Individual Psychological Characteristics

The aim of the paper is to analyse the illusion of knowing in metacognitive monitoring of the learning activity of university students (n = 262). The analysis focuses on the effects of the different types of information proposed and of personal, cognitive, metacognitive, and individual psychological characteristics of the participants. The research has shown that the illusion of knowing can occur in all types of metacognitive judgments, but is more evident in prospective judgments and depends on the type of information, its length and style, task type, etc. There are empirically established correlations between the selected personal, cognitive, and metacognitive characteristics. Gender and age differences in the manifestation of the illusion of knowing are not observed, although it is found that women tend towards overconfidence. The results also showed that the illusion of knowing is more typical for younger students, especially for those with lower levels of academic achievements.

Signatures of a Statistical Computation in the Human Sense of Confidence

Human confidence judgments are thought to originate from metacognitive processes that provide a subjective assessment about one's beliefs. Alternatively, confidence is framed in mathematics as an objective statistical quantity: the probability that a chosen hypothesis is correct. Despite similar terminology, it remains unclear whether the subjective feeling of confidence is related to the objective, statistical computation of confidence. To address this, we collected confidence reports from humans performing perceptual and knowledge-based psychometric decision tasks. We observed two counterintuitive patterns relating confidence to choice and evidence: apparent overconfidence in choices based on uninformative evidence, and decreasing confidence with increasing evidence strength for erroneous choices. We show that these patterns lawfully arise from statistical confidence, and therefore occur even for perfectly calibrated confidence measures. Furthermore, statistical confidence quantitatively accounted for human confidence in our tasks without necessitating heuristic operations. Accordingly, we suggest that the human feeling of confidence originates from a mental computation of statistical confidence.

Age-related similarities and differences in monitoring spatial cognition

Spatial cognitive performance is impaired in later adulthood but it is unclear whether the metacognitive processes involved in monitoring spatial cognitive performance are also compromised. Inaccurate monitoring could affect whether people choose to engage in tasks that require spatial thinking and also the strategies they use in spatial domains such as navigation. The current experiment examined potential age differences in monitoring spatial cognitive performance in a variety of spatial domains including visual-spatial working memory, spatial orientation, spatial visualization, navigation, and place learning. Younger and older adults completed a 2D mental rotation test, 3D mental rotation test, paper folding test, spatial memory span test, two virtual navigation tasks, and a cognitive mapping test. Participants also made metacognitive judgments of performance (confidence judgments, judgments of learning, or navigation time estimates) on each trial for all spatial tasks. Preference for allocentric or egocentric navigation strategies was also measured. Overall, performance was poorer and confidence in performance was lower for older adults than younger adults. In most spatial domains, the absolute and relative accuracy of metacognitive judgments was equivalent for both age groups. However, age differences in monitoring accuracy (specifically relative accuracy) emerged in spatial tasks involving navigation. Confidence in navigating for a target location also mediated age differences in allocentric navigation strategy use. These findings suggest that with the possible exception of navigation monitoring, spatial cognition may be spared from age-related decline even though spatial cognition itself is impaired in older age.

Selective attention and subjective confidence calibration

In the present experiments, failures of selective visual attention were invoked using the B. A. Eriksen and C. W. Eriksen (1974) flanker task. On each trial, a three-letter stimulus array was flashed briefly, followed by a mask. The identity of the two flanking letters was response congruent, neutral, or incongruent with the identity of the middle target letter. On half of the trials, confidence ratings were obtained after each response. In the first three experiments, participants were highly overconfident in the accuracy of their responding to incongruent flanker stimulus arrays. In a final experiment, presenting a prestimulus target location cue greatly reduced both selective attention failure and overconfidence. The findings demonstrate that participants are often unaware of such selective attention failures and provide support for the notion that, in these cases, decisional processing is driven largely by the identities of the incongruent flankers. In addition, responding was invariably slower and sometimes more accurate when confidence was required than when it was not required, demonstrating that the need to provide posttrial confidence reports can affect decisional processing. Moreover, there was some evidence that the presence of neutral contextual flanking information can slow responding, suggesting that such nondiagnostic information can, indeed, contribute to decisional processing.

Probability assessment with response times and confidence in perception and knowledge

In both a perceptual and a general knowledge comparison task, participants categorized the time they took to decide, selecting one of six categories ordered from "Slow" to Fast". Subsequently, they rated confidence on a six-category scale ranging from "50%" to "100%". Participants were able to accurately scale their response times thus enabling the treatment of the response time (RT) categories as potential confidence categories. Probability assessment analyses of RTs revealed indices of over/underconfidence, calibration, and resolution, each subject to the "hard-easy" effect, comparable to those obtained with the actual confidence ratings. However, in both the perceptual and knowledge domains, resolution (i.e., the ability to use the confidence categories to distinguish correct from incorrect decisions) was significantly better with confidence ratings than with RT categorization. Generally, comparable results were obtained with scaling of the objective RTs, although subjective categorization of RTs provided probability assessment indices superior to those obtained from objective RTs. Taken together, the findings do not support the view that confidence arises from a scaling of decision time.