Bridging the explanatory gaps: What can we learn from a biological agency perspective?

Epistolution: a new principle necessary to a learning-first theory of life

Biological theory assumes the organized appearance of life and the reliable recurrence of traits are due to inheritance. Natural selection acting on blind variations produces phenotypes with heritable traits, one of which may be natural learning. The aim of learning, then, is solving problems related to survival and reproduction. But what if these views confuse cause with effect? Perhaps a learning algorithm is required for any phenotype at all to arise. If so, evolution proceeds learning-first, with individuals pursuing another telos entirely. I argue that this aim may be epistemological, the drive to understand the world through an umwelt. By "understand" I mean neither association nor prediction but Karl Popper's concept of explanation through conjecture and refutation. I propose that if only genetic materials are truly heritable, not traits, then testing a successful physical theory of life will depend on building abiotic machines which can perform natural learning without the presence of any inherited materials or conditions. I name this process "epistolution," combining "epistemology" and "evolution," to distinguish it from other concepts. Epistolution is an integral consequence of any learning-first view of life, such as the Cellular Basis of Consciousness theory. This type of theory suggests that in all cells during the history of life full-blown agency, involving beliefs, intentions, and desires, generated all the phenotypes that have then been winnowed by natural selection. Unlike in other versions, I posit that the aim of agential living systems is the explanation of reality rather than inductive prediction or survival/reproduction.

Evolutionary changes in the capacity for organismic autonomy

Studies of macroevolution have revealed various trends in evolution - which have been documented and discussed. There is, however, no consensus on this topic. Since Darwin's time one presumption has persisted: that throughout evolution organisms increase their independence from and stability towards environmental influences. Although this principle has often been stated in the literature, it played no role in mainstream theory. In a closer examination, we studied this particular feature and described that many of the major transitions in animal evolution have been characterized by changes in the capacity for physiological regulation. Organisms gained in robustness, self-regulation, homeostasis and stabilized self-referential, intrinsic functions within their respective systems. This is associated with expanded environmental flexibility, such as new opportunities for movement and behaviour. Together, these aspects can be described as changes in the capacity for autonomy. There seems to be a large-scale trajectory in evolution during which some organisms gained in autonomy and flexibility. At the same time, adaptations to the environment emerged that were a prerequisite for survival. Apparently, evolution produced differential combinations of autonomy traits and adaptations. These processes are described as modifications in relative autonomy because numerous interconnections with the environment and dependencies upon it were retained. Also, it is not a linear trend, but rather an outcome of all the diverse processes which have been involved during evolutionary changes. Since the principle of regulation is a core element of physiology, the concept of autonomy is suitable to build a bridge from physiology to evolutionary research.

Agency, Goal-Directed Behavior, and Part-Whole Relationships in Biological Systems

In this essay we aim to present some considerations regarding a minimal but concrete notion of agency and goal-directed behavior that are useful for characterizing biological systems at different scales. These considerations are a particular perspective, bringing together concepts from dynamical systems, combinatorial problem-solving, and connectionist learning with an emphasis on the relationship between parts and wholes. This perspective affords some ways to think about agents that are concrete and quantifiable, and relevant to some important biological issues. Instead of advocating for a strict definition of minimally agential characteristics, we focus on how (even for a modest notion of agency) the agency of a system can be more than the sum of the agency of its parts. We quantify this in terms of the problem-solving competency of a system with respect to resolution of the frustrations between its parts. This requires goal-directed behavior in the sense of delayed gratification, i.e., taking dynamical trajectories that forego short-term gains (or sustain short-term stress or frustration) in favor of long-term gains. In order for this competency to belong to the system (rather than to its parts or given by its construction or design), it can involve distributed systemic knowledge that is acquired through experience, i.e., changes in the organization of the relationships among its parts (without presupposing a system-level reward function for such changes). This conception of agency helps us think about the ways in which cells, organisms, and perhaps other biological scales, can be agential (i.e., more agential than their parts) in a quantifiable sense, without denying that the behavior of the whole depends on the behaviors of the parts in their current organization.

Bioelectric networks: the cognitive glue enabling evolutionary scaling from physiology to mind

Each of us made the remarkable journey from mere matter to mind: starting life as a quiescent oocyte ("just chemistry and physics"), and slowly, gradually, becoming an adult human with complex metacognitive processes, hopes, and dreams. In addition, even though we feel ourselves to be a unified, single Self, distinct from the emergent dynamics of termite mounds and other swarms, the reality is that all intelligence is collective intelligence: each of us consists of a huge number of cells working together to generate a coherent cognitive being with goals, preferences, and memories that belong to the whole and not to its parts. Basal cognition is the quest to understand how Mind scales-how large numbers of competent subunits can work together to become intelligences that expand the scale of their possible goals. Crucially, the remarkable trick of turning homeostatic, cell-level physiological competencies into large-scale behavioral intelligences is not limited to the electrical dynamics of the brain. Evolution was using bioelectric signaling long before neurons and muscles appeared, to solve the problem of creating and repairing complex bodies. In this Perspective, I review the deep symmetry between the intelligence of developmental morphogenesis and that of classical behavior. I describe the highly conserved mechanisms that enable the collective intelligence of cells to implement regulative embryogenesis, regeneration, and cancer suppression. I sketch the story of an evolutionary pivot that repurposed the algorithms and cellular machinery that enable navigation of morphospace into the behavioral navigation of the 3D world which we so readily recognize as intelligence. Understanding the bioelectric dynamics that underlie construction of complex bodies and brains provides an essential path to understanding the natural evolution, and bioengineered design, of diverse intelligences within and beyond the phylogenetic history of Earth.

Agency in Reproduction

While niche construction theory and developmental approaches to evolution have brought to the front the active role of organisms as ecological and developmental agents, respectively, the role of agents in reproduction has been widely neglected by organismal perspectives of evolution. This paper addresses this problem by proposing an agential view of reproduction and shows that such a perspective has implications for the explanation of the origin of modes of reproduction, the evolvability of reproductive modes, and the coevolution between reproduction and social behavior. After introducing the two prevalent views of agency in evolutionary biology, namely those of organismal agency and selective agency, I contrast these two perspectives as applied to the evolution of animal reproduction. Taking eutherian pregnancy as a case study, I wonder whether organismal approaches to agency forged in the frame of niche construction and developmental plasticity theories can account for the goal-directed activities involved in reproductive processes. I conclude that the agential role of organisms in reproduction is irreducible to developmental and ecological agency, and that reproductive goals need to be included into our definitions of organismal agency. I then explore the evolutionary consequences of endorsing an agential approach to reproduction, showing how such an approach might illuminate our understanding of the evolutionary origination and developmental evolvability of reproductive modes. Finally, I analyze recent studies on the coevolution between viviparity and social behavior in vertebrates to suggest that an agential notion of reproduction can provide unforeseen links between developmental and ecological agency.

Agential autonomy and biological individuality

What is a biological individual? How are biological individuals individuated? How can we tell how many individuals there are in a given assemblage of biological entities? The individuation and differentiation of biological individuals are central to the scientific understanding of living beings. I propose a novel criterion of biological individuality according to which biological individuals are autonomous agents. First, I articulate an ecological-dynamical account of natural agency according to which, agency is the gross dynamical capacity of a goal-directed system to bias its repertoire to respond to its conditions as affordances. Then, I argue that agents or agential dynamical systems can be agentially dependent on, or agentially autonomous from, other agents and that this agential dependence/autonomy can be symmetrical or asymmetrical, strong or weak. Biological individuals, I propose, are all and only those agential dynamical systems that are strongly agentially autonomous. So, to determine how many individuals there are in a given multiagent aggregate, such as multicellular organism, a colony, symbiosis, or a swarm, we first have to identify how many agential dynamical systems there are, and then what their relations of agential dependence/autonomy are. I argue that this criterion is adequate to the extent that it vindicates the paradigmatic cases, and explains why the paradigmatic cases are paradigmatic, and why the problematic cases are problematic. Finally, I argue for the importance of distinguishing between agential and causal dependence and show the relevance of agential autonomy for understanding the explanatory structure of evolutionary developmental biology.

Developing the genotype-to-phenotype relationship in evolutionary theory: A primer of developmental features

For decades, there have been repeated calls for more integration across evolutionary and developmental biology. However, critiques in the literature and recent funding initiatives suggest this integration remains incomplete. We suggest one way forward is to consider how we elaborate the most basic concept of development, the relationship between genotype and phenotype, in traditional models of evolutionary processes. For some questions, when more complex features of development are accounted for, predictions of evolutionary processes shift. We present a primer on concepts of development to clarify confusion in the literature and fuel new questions and approaches. The basic features of development involve expanding a base model of genotype-to-phenotype to include the genome, space, and time. A layer of complexity is added by incorporating developmental systems, including signal-response systems and networks of interactions. The developmental emergence of function, which captures developmental feedbacks and phenotypic performance, offers further model elaborations that explicitly link fitness with developmental systems. Finally, developmental features such as plasticity and developmental niche construction conceptualize the link between a developing phenotype and the external environment, allowing for a fuller inclusion of ecology in evolutionary models. Incorporating aspects of developmental complexity into evolutionary models also accommodates a more pluralistic focus on the causal importance of developmental systems, individual organisms, or agents in generating evolutionary patterns. Thus, by laying out existing concepts of development, and considering how they are used across different fields, we can gain clarity in existing debates around the extended evolutionary synthesis and pursue new directions in evolutionary developmental biology. Finally, we consider how nesting developmental features in traditional models of evolution can highlight areas of evolutionary biology that need more theoretical attention.

Toward a universal measure of robustness across model organs and systems

The development of an individual must be capable of resisting the harmful effects of internal and external perturbations. This capacity, called robustness, can make the difference between normal variation and disease. Some systems and organs are more resilient in their capacity to correct the effects of internal disturbances such as mutations. Similarly, organs and organisms differ in their capacity to be resilient against external disturbances, such as changes in temperature. Furthermore, all developmental systems must be somewhat flexible to permit evolutionary change, and understanding robustness requires a comparative framework. Over the last decades, most research on developmental robustness has been focusing on specific model systems and organs. Hence, we lack tools that would allow cross-species and cross-organ comparisons. Here, we emphasize the need for a uniform framework to experimentally test and quantify robustness across study systems and suggest that the analysis of fluctuating asymmetry might be a powerful proxy to do so. Such a comparative framework will ultimately help to resolve why and how organs of the same and different species differ in their sensitivity to internal (e.g., mutations) and external (e.g., temperature) perturbations and at what level of biological organization buffering capacities exist and therefore create robustness of the developmental system.

Promises and limits of an agency perspective in evolutionary developmental biology

An agent-based perspective in the study of complex systems is well established in diverse disciplines, yet is only beginning to be applied to evolutionary developmental biology. In this essay, we begin by defining agency and associated terminology formally. We then explore the assumptions and predictions of an agency perspective, apply these to select processes and key concept areas relevant to practitioners of evolutionary developmental biology, and consider the potential epistemic roles that an agency perspective might play in evo devo. Throughout, we discuss evidence supportive of agential dynamics in biological systems relevant to evo devo and explore where agency thinking may enrich the explanatory reach of research efforts in evolutionary developmental biology.

The agential perspective: Countermapping the modern synthesis

We compare and contrast two theoretical perspectives on adaptive evolution-the orthodox Modern Synthesis perspective, and the nascent Agential Perspective. To do so, we develop the idea from Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther of a 'countermap', as a means for comparing the respective ontologies of different scientific perspectives. We conclude that the modern Synthesis perspective achieves an impressively comprehensive view of a universal set of dynamical properties of populations, but at the considerable cost of radically distorting the nature of the biological processes that contribute to evolution. For its part, the Agential Perspective offers the prospect of representing the biological processes of evolution with much greater fidelity, but at the expense of generality. Trade-offs of this sort are endemic to science, and inevitable. Recognizing them helps us to avoid the pitfalls of 'illicit reification', i.e. the mistake of interpreting a feature of a scientific perspective as a feature of the non-perspectival world. We argue that much of the traditional Modern Synthesis representation of the biology of evolution commits this illicit reification.

A data-driven framework to model the organism-environment system

Organisms modify their development and function in response to the environment. At the same time, the environment is modified by the activities of the organism. Despite the ubiquity of such dynamical interactions in nature, it remains challenging to develop models that accurately represent them, and that can be fitted using data. These features are desirable when modeling phenomena such as phenotypic plasticity, to generate quantitative predictions of how the system will respond to environmental signals of different magnitude or at different times, for example, during ontogeny. Here, we explain a modeling framework that represents the organism and environment as a single coupled dynamical system in terms of inputs and outputs. Inputs are external signals, and outputs are measurements of the system in time. The framework uses time-series data of inputs and outputs to fit a nonlinear black-box model that allows to predict how the system will respond to novel input signals. The framework has three key properties: it captures the dynamical nature of the organism-environment system, it can be fitted with data, and it can be applied without detailed knowledge of the system. We study phenotypic plasticity using in silico experiments and demonstrate that the framework predicts the response to novel environmental signals. The framework allows us to model plasticity as a dynamical property that changes in time during ontogeny, reflecting the well-known fact that organisms are more or less plastic at different developmental stages.

The brain is not mental! coupling neuronal and immune cellular processing in human organisms

Significant efforts have been made in the past decades to understand how mental and cognitive processes are underpinned by neural mechanisms in the brain. This paper argues that a promising way forward in understanding the nature of human cognition is to zoom out from the prevailing picture focusing on its neural basis. It considers instead how neurons work in tandem with other type of cells (e.g., immune) to subserve biological self-organization and adaptive behavior of the human organism as a whole. We focus specifically on the immune cellular processing as key actor in complementing neuronal processing in achieving successful self-organization and adaptation of the human body in an ever-changing environment. We overview theoretical work and empirical evidence on "basal cognition" challenging the idea that only the neuronal cells in the brain have the exclusive ability to "learn" or "cognize." The focus on cellular rather than neural, brain processing underscores the idea that flexible responses to fluctuations in the environment require a carefully crafted orchestration of multiple cellular and bodily systems at multiple organizational levels of the biological organism. Hence cognition can be seen as a multiscale web of dynamic information processing distributed across a vast array of complex cellular (e.g., neuronal, immune, and others) and network systems, operating across the entire body, and not just in the brain. Ultimately, this paper builds up toward the radical claim that cognition should not be confined to one system alone, namely, the neural system in the brain, no matter how sophisticated the latter notoriously is.

Darwin's agential materials: evolutionary implications of multiscale competency in developmental biology

A critical aspect of evolution is the layer of developmental physiology that operates between the genotype and the anatomical phenotype. While much work has addressed the evolution of developmental mechanisms and the evolvability of specific genetic architectures with emergent complexity, one aspect has not been sufficiently explored: the implications of morphogenetic problem-solving competencies for the evolutionary process itself. The cells that evolution works with are not passive components: rather, they have numerous capabilities for behavior because they derive from ancestral unicellular organisms with rich repertoires. In multicellular organisms, these capabilities must be tamed, and can be exploited, by the evolutionary process. Specifically, biological structures have a multiscale competency architecture where cells, tissues, and organs exhibit regulative plasticity-the ability to adjust to perturbations such as external injury or internal modifications and still accomplish specific adaptive tasks across metabolic, transcriptional, physiological, and anatomical problem spaces. Here, I review examples illustrating how physiological circuits guiding cellular collective behavior impart computational properties to the agential material that serves as substrate for the evolutionary process. I then explore the ways in which the collective intelligence of cells during morphogenesis affect evolution, providing a new perspective on the evolutionary search process. This key feature of the physiological software of life helps explain the remarkable speed and robustness of biological evolution, and sheds new light on the relationship between genomes and functional anatomical phenotypes.

Teleonomy: Revisiting a Proposed Conceptual Replacement for Teleology

The concept of teleonomy has been attracting renewed attention recently. This is based on the idea that teleonomy provides a useful conceptual replacement for teleology, and even that it constitutes an indispensable resource for thinking biologically about purposes. However, both these claims are open to question. We review the history of teleological thinking from Greek antiquity to the modern period to illuminate the tensions and ambiguities that emerged when forms of teleological reasoning interacted with major developments in biological thought. This sets the stage for an examination of Pittendrigh's (Adaptation, natural selection, and behavior. In: Roe A, Simpson GG (eds) Behavior and evolution. Yale University Press, New Haven, pp 390-416, 1958) introduction of "teleonomy" and its early uptake in the work of prominent biologists. We then explore why teleonomy subsequently foundered and consider whether the term may yet have significance for discussions of goal-directedness in evolutionary biology and philosophy of science. This involves clarifying the relationship between teleonomy and teleological explanation, as well as asking how the concept of teleonomy impinges on research at the frontiers of evolutionary theory.

Endless forms most beautiful 2.0: teleonomy and the bioengineering of chimaeric and synthetic organisms

The rich variety of biological forms and behaviours results from one evolutionary history on Earth, via frozen accidents and selection in specific environments. This ubiquitous baggage in natural, familiar model species obscures the plasticity and swarm intelligence of cellular collectives. Significant gaps exist in our understanding of the origin of anatomical novelty, of the relationship between genome and form, and of strategies for control of large-scale structure and function in regenerative medicine and bioengineering. Analysis of living forms that have never existed before is necessary to reveal deep design principles of life as it can be. We briefly review existing examples of chimaeras, cyborgs, hybrots and other beings along the spectrum containing evolved and designed systems. To drive experimental progress in multicellular synthetic morphology, we propose teleonomic (goal-seeking, problem-solving) behaviour in diverse problem spaces as a powerful invariant across possible beings regardless of composition or origin. Cybernetic perspectives on chimaeric morphogenesis erase artificial distinctions established by past limitations of technology and imagination. We suggest that a multi-scale competency architecture facilitates evolution of robust problem-solving, living machines. Creation and analysis of novel living forms will be an essential testbed for the emerging field of diverse intelligence, with numerous implications across regenerative medicine, robotics and ethics.

When the end modifies its means: the origins of novelty and the evolution of innovation

The origin of novel complex traits constitutes a central yet largely unresolved challenge in evolutionary biology. Intriguingly, many of the most promising breakthroughs in understanding the genesis of evolutionary novelty in recent years have occurred not in evolutionary biology itself, but through the comparative study of development and, more recently, the interface of developmental biology and ecology. Here, I discuss how these insights are changing our understanding of what matters in the origin of novel, complex traits in ontogeny and evolution. Specifically, my essay has two major objectives. First, I discuss how the nature of developmental systems biases the production of phenotypic variation in the face of novel or stressful environments toward functional, integrated and, possibly, adaptive variants. This, in turn, allows the production of novel phenotypes to precede (rather than follow) changes in genotype and allows developmental processes that are the product of past evolution to shape evolutionary change that has yet to occur. Second, I explore how this nature of developmental systems has itself evolved over time, increasing the repertoire of ontogenies to pursue a wider range of objectives across an expanding range of conditions, thereby creating an increasingly extensive affordance landscape in development and developmental evolution. Developmental systems and their evolution can thus be viewed as dynamic processes that modify their own means across ontogeny and phylogeny. The study of these dynamics necessitates more than the strict reductionist approach that currently dominates the fields of developmental and evolutionary developmental biology.

Competency in Navigating Arbitrary Spaces as an Invariant for Analyzing Cognition in Diverse Embodiments

One of the most salient features of life is its capacity to handle novelty and namely to thrive and adapt to new circumstances and changes in both the environment and internal components. An understanding of this capacity is central to several fields: the evolution of form and function, the design of effective strategies for biomedicine, and the creation of novel life forms via chimeric and bioengineering technologies. Here, we review instructive examples of living organisms solving diverse problems and propose competent navigation in arbitrary spaces as an invariant for thinking about the scaling of cognition during evolution. We argue that our innate capacity to recognize agency and intelligence in unfamiliar guises lags far behind our ability to detect it in familiar behavioral contexts. The multi-scale competency of life is essential to adaptive function, potentiating evolution and providing strategies for top-down control (not micromanagement) to address complex disease and injury. We propose an observer-focused viewpoint that is agnostic about scale and implementation, illustrating how evolution pivoted similar strategies to explore and exploit metabolic, transcriptional, morphological, and finally 3D motion spaces. By generalizing the concept of behavior, we gain novel perspectives on evolution, strategies for system-level biomedical interventions, and the construction of bioengineered intelligences. This framework is a first step toward relating to intelligence in highly unfamiliar embodiments, which will be essential for progress in artificial intelligence and regenerative medicine and for thriving in a world increasingly populated by synthetic, bio-robotic, and hybrid beings.

Spatially and Temporally Distributed Complexity-A Refreshed Framework for the Study of GRN Evolution

Irrespective of the heuristic value of interpretations of developmental processes in terms of gene regulatory networks (GRNs), larger-angle views often suffer from: (i) an inadequate understanding of the relationship between genotype and phenotype; (ii) a predominantly zoocentric vision; and (iii) overconfidence in a putatively hierarchical organization of animal body plans. Here, we constructively criticize these assumptions. First, developmental biology is pervaded by adultocentrism, but development is not necessarily egg to adult. Second, during development, many unicells undergo transcriptomic profile transitions that are comparable to those recorded in pluricellular organisms; thus, their study should not be neglected from the GRN perspective. Third, the putatively hierarchical nature of the animal body is mirrored in the GRN logic, but in relating genotype to phenotype, independent assessments of the dynamics of the regulatory machinery and the animal’s architecture are required, better served by a combinatorial than by a hierarchical approach. The trade-offs between spatial and temporal aspects of regulation, as well as their evolutionary consequences, are also discussed. Multicellularity may derive from a unicell’s sequential phenotypes turned into different but coexisting, spatially arranged cell types. In turn, polyphenism may have been a crucial mechanism involved in the origin of complex life cycles.