Decision-making under risk of gain in young children and mangabey monkeys

Children's risk preferences vary across sexes, social contexts, and cultures

People exhibit more risk-prone behaviors when together with peers than when in private. The interplay of social context effects and other variables that alter human risk preferences (i.e., age, sex, or culture) remains poorly understood. Here, we explored risk preferences among Namibian Hai||om and Ovambo children (N = 144; AgeRange = 6-10 years). Participants chose between risky and safe options in private or during peer presence. In a third condition, children collaborated with peers before their risk preferences were assessed in those peers' presence. Children from both societies were risk-averse, but Hai||om children showed greater risk aversion than their Ovambo counterparts. Across cultures and ages, boys were less averse to risks than girls. This effect was most pronounced during peer presence, whereas collaboration did not additionally affect risk preferences. These results suggest a dynamic interplay of individual, social, and cultural factors shaping children's risk preferences.

A critical review of risk-sensitive foraging

Foraging is risk sensitive if choices depend on the variability of returns from the options as well as their mean return. Risk-sensitive foraging is important in behavioural ecology, psychology and neurophysiology. It has been explained both in terms of mechanisms and in terms of evolutionary advantage. We provide a critical review, evaluating both mechanistic and evolutionary accounts. Some derivations of risk sensitivity from mechanistic models based on psychophysics are not convincing because they depend on an inappropriate use of Jensen's inequality. Attempts have been made to link risk sensitivity to the ecology of a species, but again these are not convincing. The field of risk-sensitive foraging has provided a focus for theoretical and empirical work and has yielded important insights, but we lack a simple and empirically defendable general account of it in either mechanistic or evolutionary terms. However, empirical analysis of choice sequences under theoretically motivated experimental designs and environmental settings appears a promising avenue for mapping the scope and relative merits of existing theories. Simply put, the devil is in the sequence.

Rationality and cognitive bias in captive gorillas' and orang-utans' economic decision-making

Human economic decision-making sometimes appears to be irrational. Partly, this is due to cognitive biases that can lead to suboptimal economic choices and context-dependent risk-preferences. A pertinent question is whether such biases are part of our evolutionary heritage or whether they are culturally acquired. To address this, we tested gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and orang-utans (Pongo abelii) with two risk-assessment experiments that differed in how risk was presented. For both experiments, we found that subjects increased their preferences for the risky options as their expected gains increased, showing basic understanding of reward contingencies and rational decision-making. However, we also found consistent differences in risk proneness between the two experiments, as subjects were risk-neutral in one experiment and risk-prone in the other. We concluded that gorillas and orang-utans are economically rational but that their decisions can interact with pre-existing cognitive biases which modulates their risk-preference in context-dependent ways, explaining the variability of their risk-preference in previous literature.

Risk-Based Decision Making: A Systematic Scoping Review of Animal Models and a Pilot Study on the Effects of Sleep Deprivation in Rats

Animals, including humans, frequently make decisions involving risk or uncertainty. Different strategies in these decisions can be advantageous depending the circumstances. Short sleep duration seems to be associated with more risky decisions in humans. Animal models for risk-based decision making can increase mechanistic understanding, but very little data is available concerning the effects of sleep. We combined primary- and meta-research to explore the relationship between sleep and risk-based decision making in animals. Our first objective was to create an overview of the available animal models for risky decision making. We performed a systematic scoping review. Our searches in Pubmed and Psychinfo retrieved 712 references, of which 235 were included. Animal models for risk-based decision making have been described for rodents, non-human primates, birds, pigs and honey-bees. We discuss task designs and model validity. Our second objective was to apply this knowledge and perform a pilot study on the effect of sleep deprivation. We trained and tested male Wistar rats on a probability discounting task; a “safe” lever always resulted in 1 reward, a “risky” lever resulted in 4 or no rewards. Rats adapted their preferences to variations in reward probabilities (p < 0.001), but 12 h of sleep deprivation during the light phase did not clearly alter risk preference (p = 0.21).

Variation in primate decision-making under uncertainty and the roots of human economic behaviour

Uncertainty is a ubiquitous component of human economic behaviour, yet people can vary in their preferences for risk across populations, individuals and different points in time. As uncertainty also characterizes many aspects of animal decision-making, comparative research can help evaluate different potential mechanisms that generate this variation, including the role of biological differences or maturational change versus cultural learning, as well as identify human-unique components of economic decision-making. Here, we examine decision-making under risk across non-human primates, our closest relatives. We first review theoretical approaches and current methods for understanding decision-making in animals. We then assess the current evidence for variation in animal preferences between species and populations, between individuals based on personality, sex and age, and finally, between different contexts and individual states. We then use these primate data to evaluate the processes that can shape human decision-making strategies and identify the primate foundations of human economic behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Red-capped mangabeys (Cercocebus torquatus) adapt their interspecific gestural communication to the recipient's behaviour

Sensitivity to recipient’s attention and responsiveness are critical markers of intentional communication. Although previous research showed that ape gestures can be intentional, few studies have yet addressed this question concerning monkeys. Here, we characterise the effect of a recipient’s presence, attentional state and responsiveness on the interspecific gestural communication of captive red-capped mangabeys (Cercocebus torquatus). Previous reports showed that they produced learnt begging gestures towards a human recipient preferentially when the latter was facing them. We used here a novel setup that allows subjects to move around an experimenter and to use different modalities (visual and acoustic) to communicate. We found that when the recipient was not facing them, mangabeys moved to a position in the visual field of their recipient rather than using attention-getters. Interestingly, unlike apes, they did not elaborate their communication visually or acoustically when the experimenter did not respond favourably to their begging. However, our results may suggest that begging gestures were goal-directed, since mangabeys inhibited them when the experimenter was not available to answer immediately (i.e. give a reward). Overall, red-capped mangabeys’ interspecific visual communication presented intentionality features, but their use of begging gestures was less flexible than that of great apes in similar situations.

Rhesus macaques use probabilities to predict future events

Humans can use an intuitive sense of statistics to make predictions about uncertain future events, a cognitive skill that underpins logical and mathematical reasoning. Recent research shows that some of these abilities for statistical inferences can emerge in preverbal infants and non-human primates such as apes and capuchins. An important question is therefore whether animals share the full complement of intuitive reasoning abilities demonstrated by humans, as well as what evolutionary contexts promote the emergence of such skills. Here, we examined whether free-ranging rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) can use probability information to infer the most likely outcome of a random lottery, in the first test of whether primates can make such inferences in the absence of direct prior experience. We developed a novel expectancy-violation looking time task, adapted from prior studies of infants, in order to assess the monkeys' expectations. In Study 1, we confirmed that monkeys (n = 20) looked similarly at different sampled items if they had no prior knowledge about the population they were drawn from. In Study 2, monkeys (n = 80) saw a dynamic 'lottery' machine containing a mix of two types of fruit outcomes, and then saw either the more common fruit (expected trial) or the relatively rare fruit (unexpected trial) fall from the machine. We found that monkeys looked longer when they witnessed the unexpected outcome. In Study 3, we confirmed that this effect depended on the causal relationship between the sample and the population, not visual mismatch: monkeys (n = 80) looked equally at both outcomes if the experimenter pulled the sampled item from her pocket. These results reveal that rhesus monkeys spontaneously use information about probability to reason about likely outcomes, and show how comparative studies of nonhumans can disentangle the evolutionary history of logical reasoning capacities.