Group identity as a source of threat and means of compensation: Establishing personal control through group identification and ideology

Vicarious ostracism reduces observers' sense of agency

Previous findings revealed that social ostracism reduces people's implicit sense of agency. Based on theoretical claims that observed behavior of others may be cognitively represented similarly to one's own behavior, we conducted two experiments to test whether people's own sense of agency can also be impaired by observed social exclusion of others. In Experiment 1, participants recalled episodes referring to vicarious ostracism or inclusion before completing a temporal interval estimation task to assess intentional binding effects (an established implicit measure of the sense of agency). In Experiment 2, participants immersed into a newly designed virtual Cyberball game, in which they witnessed a vicarious ostracism or inclusion scenario, before completing a Libet-style temporal estimation task and an agency questionnaire (an explicit measure of the sense of agency). The findings show, for the first time, that vicarious ostracism reduces both implicit and explicit measures of agency in observers.

Agency Through the We: Group-Based Control Theory

How do people maintain a sense of control when they realize the noncontingencies in their personal life and their strong interdependence with other people? Why do individuals continue to act on overwhelming collective problems, such as climate change, that are clearly beyond their personal control? Group-based control theory proposes that it is social identification with agentic groups and engagement in collective action that serve to maintain and restore people’s sense of control, especially when their personal control is threatened. As a consequence, group-based control may enable people to act adaptively and stay healthy even when personal control seems futile. These claims are supported by evidence showing increased in-group identification and group-based action intentions following reminders of low personal control. Furthermore, these responses of identifying with agentic in-groups increase people’s perceived control and well-being. This article succinctly presents group-based control theory and relevant empirical findings. It also elaborates on how group-based control relates to other social-identity motives and how it may explain social phenomena.

Psychologising meritocracy: A historical account of its many guises

Measured by psychologists, conceived in critical terms, popularised as satire, and exploited by politicians, meritocracy is a dilemmatic concept that has changed its meanings throughout history. Social psychologists have conceptualised and operationalised meritocracy both as an ideology that justifies inequality and as a justice principle based on equity. These two conceptualisations express opposing ideas about the merit of meritocracy and are both freighted ideologically. We document how this dilemma of meritocracy’s merit developed from meritocracy’s inception as a critical concept among UK sociologists in the 1950s to its operationalisation by U.S. and Canadian social psychologists at the end of the 20th century. We highlight the ways in which meritocracy was originally utilised, in part, to critique the measurement of merit via IQ tests, but ironically became a construct that, through its psychologisation, also required measurement. Through the operationalisation of meritocracy, social psychologists obscured the possibility of critiquing meritocracy and missed the opportunity to offer alternatives to a system that has been legitimised by their own work. A social psychology of meritocracy should take into consideration the ideological debate around its meaning and value and the implications of its measurement and study.

Does Perceived Lack of Control Lead to Conspiracy Theory Beliefs? Findings from an online MTurk sample

It is widely believed that conspiracy theory beliefs are the product of perceived lack of control. However, to date there is mixed evidence, at best, to support this claim. We consider the reasons why conspiracy theory beliefs do not appear to be based in any straightforward way on control beliefs, interrogating existing findings and presenting new data that call the relationship into question. Across six studies conducted online using MTurk samples, we observed no effect of control manipulations on conspiracy theory beliefs, while replicating previously reported correlational evidence of their association. The results suggest that conspiracy beliefs are not suitable for compensating for threats to control. We discuss possible reasons for the discrepancy between experimental and correlational effects and examine the limitations of the studies.